[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 166 (Wednesday, December 15, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10257-S10259]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                           WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Madam President, I rise to discuss the 
Presidential review that is taking place on the war in Afghanistan.
  We are approaching another signpost in the conflict that has kept our 
military men and women in harm's way longer than any other in our 
history--109 months and counting. That is longer than the wars in 
Vietnam or Iraq. It is even longer than the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.
  The signpost I wish to speak of is one President Obama posted when he 
ordered the troop increase in Afghanistan last December.
  In his orders, he also called for a review of our war strategy to be 
conducted 1 year later. That review was to include:

       The security situation and other conditions, including 
     improvement in Afghan governance, development of Afghan 
     National Security Forces, Pakistani actions and international 
     support.

  That review is due this month.
  I commend our President for his foresight in calling for this review. 
But in recent months, I have read troubling statements from 
administration and military leaders. These statements lead me to 
believe this review is seen as nothing more than a check in the box.
  In a Washington Post article, an Under Secretary of Defense said as 
much when he stated that the review will not go into much more detail 
than what is already provided to the President during his monthly 
status updates.
  General Petraeus was also quoted in the same article as saying: ``I 
would not want to overplay the significance of this review.''
  I think this approach to this review would be another tragic mistake 
in what I fear is an ongoing series of them.
  After 9 years and $455 billion, the unfortunate reality is, we are 
still not anywhere near where we want to be or should be in 
Afghanistan. Anything less than a thorough and unflinching review is 
unacceptable. It is unacceptable to me, and it is unacceptable to the 
American people.
  A famed military author, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote a book titled 
``On War,'' which is required reading for any military professional. In 
that book, he wrote:

       The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of 
     judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to 
     establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; 
     neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 
     something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of 
     all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

  Today, our struggles in Afghanistan necessitate that we again follow 
von Clausewitz's advice. We must answer the big questions about the 
kind of war we set out to fight and the kind of war we are fighting.
  Everyone knows the big question when it comes to Afghanistan. That is 
why it is the big question: Is our prolonged involvement in Afghanistan 
worth the costs we as a nation are paying for it? Is it worth the human 
cost? Thousands of Americans have been maimed or killed in this war so 
far, and thousands more stand in harm's way as we speak. Is it worth 
the fiscal cost? Our wars in the last decade have left us with huge 
deficits. And for the last decade, wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq 
went unpaid for. Instead of rallying the Nation during a time of war, 
asking for sacrifices from everyone, Congress and two Presidents chose 
to pass this massive debt on to future generations--the first time we 
have done so in modern times.

  The real issue is not what we are spending to protect our Nation but 
whether that spending is making us safer, which leads to the question: 
Is our continued involvement in Afghanistan worth the cost to our 
larger national security priorities? Our commitment in Afghanistan is 
pulling time, energy, and funds from other equally important national 
security priorities, priorities such as energy independence, 
counterproliferation, and countering terrorist activities in Yemen, 
Somalia, and many other places around the world.
  That is why this review is so critical. We have to decide as a Nation 
if our prolonged involvement in Afghanistan is worth it, and we must 
decide on an exit strategy. We have a responsibility to answer that big 
question with a thoroughness and honesty that honors the sacrifices of 
our military men and women.
  I believe we answer that question by using this signpost--by using 
this review--to address four key issues that will ultimately mean the 
difference between our success and our failure in Afghanistan. To me, 
those four issues are: our timeline for an exit strategy, an 
accelerated transition to an Afghan-led security operation, corruption 
in the Karzai government, and safe havens in Pakistan.
  Let me take them one at a time. First, our timeline for an exit 
strategy. This review should provide an honest assessment of where we 
are in the timeline that President Obama laid out last year. In his 
speech at West Point last December, President Obama rightly dropped the 
open-ended guarantee of U.S. and NATO involvement. Here is what he 
said:

       The absence of a time frame for transition would deny us 
     any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. 
     It must be clear that Afghans will have to take 
     responsibility for their security and that America has no 
     interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

  His order last year for the military mission was clear and included a 
timeline based on a ``accelerated transition.'' In that order--quoting 
from the order--he focused on:
  Increasing the size of the ANSF and leveraging the potential for 
local security forces so we can transition responsibly for security to 
the Afghan government on a time line that will permit us to begin to 
decrease our troop presence by July 2011.
  July 2011. That is a little more than 6 months from now. The American 
people deserve to know if July 2011 is still a realistic timeframe to 
begin our exit from Afghanistan; and, if not, what has happened to 
cause a delay and how long will that delay be? What will be the 
additional costs, both human and budgetary?
  The bottom line is this: Without an aggressive timeline for reducing 
U.S. military support in the region--a timeline that the Afghans 
believe is rock solid--there is no incentive for them to defend their 
villages and cities. With the U.S. and NATO as guarantors of security, 
the people of Afghanistan could rely on our forces to provide security 
indefinitely.
  Chairman Levin, our Armed Services chairman here in the Senate, has 
given careful thought to the issue of a timeline. In a recent speech to 
the Council on Foreign Relations, he said:

       Open-ended commitments encourage drift and permit inaction. 
     Firm time lines demand attention and force action.

  Without an aggressive timeline, there is no exit strategy.
  Issue No. 2, and directly related to No. 1, the accelerated 
transition to the Afghan people. This must be an Afghan-led security 
effort. This month's report should update the American people on our 
progress or lack thereof in turning over security duties to the Afghan 
National Army, the Afghan National Security Forces, and the Afghan 
National Police.
  The famed British officer T. E. Lawrence, known to many as Lawrence 
of Arabia, once said, with regard to the Arab insurgency against the 
Ottoman Empire:

       Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the 
     Arabs do it tolerably than they do it perfectly. It is their 
     war, and you are there to help them.

  This quote is also mentioned in the Army Field Manual on 
counterinsurgency. In Afghanistan, I believe the same approach can be 
applied.
  The Afghan security forces are not doing their job perfectly, nor 
should we expect the Afghan forces to match the might of the U.S. 
military. But to echo T. E. Lawrence, they are beginning to do it 
tolerably, and I believe it is better that the Afghans continue to 
build on their new success.
  Combined, an aggressive timeline and an accelerated transition to the 
Afghans will help us achieve two equally important goals: first, the 
timely handover of security helps prove to the international community 
that the American people do not have imperial ambitions in Afghanistan. 
As President Obama said at West Point:

       We have no interest in occupying your country.

  And second, a timely handover allows the United States and its allies 
to bring our heroes home, and it allows us

[[Page S10258]]

to begin the important work of reducing our deficits, investing in our 
Nation and our people so we can remain strong and build a more 
prosperous Nation.
  This brings me to issue No. 3: Corruption in the Karzai government. 
There is no doubt our Armed Forces have the ability to conduct the 
difficult counterinsurgency work of clearing and holding. The question 
is whether the Afghan Government has the ability to build their nation 
and to be ready for a timely transition. That is why in his order to 
the military President Obama was clear when he said:

       Given the profound problems of legitimacy and effectiveness 
     with the Karzai government, we must focus on what is 
     realistic. Our plan for the way forward in dealing with the 
     Karzai government has four elements: Working with the Karzai 
     government when we can, working around him when we must; 
     enhancing sub-national governance; strengthening corruption 
     reduction efforts; and implementing a post-election compact.

  There is no doubt that corruption is rampant throughout Afghanistan 
and, in particular, within the Karzai administration. For years, 
independent daily press reports from Afghanistan, as well as official 
U.S. Government reports, confirm corruption at all levels of Afghan 
society. A recent leak of diplomatic cables reveals the severity of the 
problem.
  First, let me stress I do not condone these recent leaks. They have 
needlessly put our military and diplomatic corps at risk. But these 
documents pull back the curtain on the scale of the corruption in 
Afghanistan.
  One example in particular illustrated the tremendous difficulty we 
face in our search for an honest, reliable partner. That was the 
account in the New York Times of former Afghanistan Vice President 
Ahmed Zia Massoud. Massoud was detained after he brought $52 million in 
unexplained cash into the United Arab Emirates. He was allowed to keep 
the $52 million.
  Let me say that again: $52 million. That is a lot of money, 
especially when you consider that his government salary was a few 
hundred dollars a month.
  Not only is corruption rampant in Afghanistan--with the reports of 
Karzai's own brother involved in double dealing and unscrupulous 
actions--but basic government functions are suffering because of 
Karzai's inability to manage his own government.
  In Kandahar, our military has made this former Taliban stronghold a 
much more secure city. But despite that progress, the Washington Post 
has reported multiple vacancies in key government positions. As an 
unnamed U.S. official stated:

       We are acting as donor and government. That is not 
     sustainable.

  We cannot be expected to indefinitely shoulder the security or 
governmental burdens in Afghanistan. Having a firm timeline will put 
President Karzai on notice that he must step up his efforts to make 
this an Afghan-led effort. Our goal must be to transition 
responsibility and authority for the future of Afghanistan to the 
Afghan people, and this month's review should include a report to the 
American people on our progress and how he is making that happen.
  This brings me to the fourth and final issue: safe havens in 
Pakistan. For years, safe havens have been permitted to exist in 
Pakistan for insurgent and terrorist forces, enabling them to operate 
freely. This has been one of the worst kept secrets in the region, 
which is why President Obama stated during his West Point speech:

       We will act with the full recognition that our success in 
     Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with 
     Afghanistan. We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from 
     once again spreading through that country. But this same 
     cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. 
     That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of 
     the border.

  Since 2001, the United States has sent more than $10.4 billion to 
Pakistan to support humanitarian and security operations. Despite these 
expenditures, radical militant groups such as the Quetta Shura Taliban 
and the Haqqani Network have continued to leverage their freedom of 
movement to kill, maim and disrupt our efforts and those of our NATO 
allies.
  These insurgent activities are nearly textbook--something that the 
Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency describes in detail as having 
occurred throughout the history of insurgent warfare.

       The issue of sanctuaries thus cannot be ignored during 
     planning. Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all 
     sanctuaries.

  With such military advice in mind, I must ask: How do we expect to 
defeat an insurgency that is being supported by elements of the 
Pakistani military and intelligence service on the other side of the 
Khyber Pass?
  After 9 years, why are we tolerating these safe havens? Mullah Omar, 
the leader of the Taliban insurgents, is in exile in Pakistan. His 
followers regroup and rest in Pakistan only to cross the border and 
fight our troops once again. Insurgent fighters have increased their 
attacks by 53 percent over the last quarter. And when both ISAF and 
U.S. forces are unable to infiltrate their base of operation, how can 
we expect to maintain an adequate level of security for the future?
  President Obama's order specifically spelled out assessment criteria 
for Pakistan. The assessment was intended to include the following 
question:

       Are there indicators we have begun to shift Pakistan's 
     strategic calculus and eventually end their active and 
     passive support for extremists?

  Thus far, Pakistan's ``strategic calculus'' has been overly focused 
on India and toward turning a blind eye to radical groups in Waziristan 
and other regions near the Afghan border.
  Furthermore, the current position of the Pakistani Government has 
only led to a host of crazed conspiracy theories about the United 
States and its involvement in the region, giving fuel to the 
recruitment efforts of our enemies.
  Because of double-dealing by some in Pakistan and a Pakistani 
Government that has not fully supported our efforts, we are sending our 
men and women to fight in Afghanistan without a true partner. We are 
asking them to fight with one hand tied behind their back.
  These challenges I discussed are not a secret. Each and every one of 
them has been debated, discussed, dissected, and yet the answers remain 
elusive. We invaded Afghanistan as a justifiable military response to 
the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001. This response was 
overwhelmingly supported by Congress--including myself, the public, and 
the international community. But I believe today, after 109 months of 
fighting, after more than 1,400 American military deaths in Operation 
Enduring Freedom, almost 10,000 American military men and women 
injured, after $455 billion and counting expended, a good, hard, 
realistic assessment of our mission is needed.
  If our plan to succeed in Afghanistan is not yielding the results we 
seek, then we must also reevaluate our plan and mission. Make no 
mistake, I am proud of our brave men and women in uniform and what they 
are doing there. I am equally proud of our diplomatic workers, aid 
workers, and civilians who are working hard to improve the livelihoods 
of Afghan people.
  I had an opportunity to meet many of them earlier this year on a 
CODEL led by my colleague Senator Carper of Delaware. These are some of 
the finest men and women our Nation has to offer to the Afghan people. 
But it is not their job that is in question--it is ours, the Congress, 
the President, his administration, the military leadership. It is up to 
us to find the answers, to ensure we have a clear, achievable mission 
for our soldiers to carry out.
  Today I am not sure that is the case. I am looking forward to hearing 
the conclusions of the review the President called for 1 year ago. I 
also look forward to hearing the President reaffirm his July 2011 
deadline for an accelerated transition to the Afghans.
  We all must be prepared to ask the hard questions and demand honest 
answers, regardless of the political consequences. Our military men and 
women deserve no less.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask consent to speak for 15 minutes in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, first let me commend my colleague from 
New Mexico, Senator Thomas Udall, for a thoughtful presentation on a 
challenge we face as Americans regardless of political affiliation. It 
is

[[Page S10259]]

thoughtful in that he reflected not only on our mission and our 
responsibility but thoughtful in that he reflected on the cost, the 
cost in human lives and the cost in dollars and the challenge we face 
in Congress to make sure those dollars are well spent and no American 
life is wasted. I thank my colleague for that thoughtful presentation.

                          ____________________