[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 163 (Friday, December 10, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8730-S8732]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, this month, the Obama administration will
submit its review of the war in Afghanistan. I expect--and I think a
number of Members of Congress expect--that this review will provide
answers to the key questions before us, questions the American people
deserve answers to. I believe these questions fall into three broad
categories: first of all, Afghan governance; second, development and
humanitarian efforts; and, finally, establishing a sustainable security
environment in Afghanistan.
Since the announcement of a new strategy in December of 2009 and the
deployment of 30,000 additional troops, I have sought to carefully
monitor U.S. progress toward its goals. As part of this effort, I have
paid special attention to combating the top killer of U.S. troops,
which, of course, is improvised explosive devices. I chaired a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on this topic on November 18 and
will continue to press our government and our leaders and governments
in the region to do more to restrict the availability of components
that make up these terrible weapons, especially, of course, ammonium
nitrate, which flows into Afghanistan every day of the week to make
IEDs that kill our troops.
I am pleased significant progress has been made by the Department of
State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Defense to coordinate an all-of-government approach to this problem. I
wish to applaud the recent efforts of the Afghan security forces that
seized one metric ton of ammonium nitrate on Monday in Zabul Province.
All the key players appear to be on the same page on this issue, but
there still has not been a significant decrease of these deadly weapons
in Afghanistan. I trust that the December review by the administration
will address the flow of ammonium nitrate, and I look forward to
continuing to work closely with the administration on this issue.
At a strategic level, too many questions remain as we head into the
December review. I would like to list some of those right now.
First of all, on the issue of governance, I have two questions I hope
the December review will address. First, do we have a political
strategy--a political strategy--in place to ensure that the Afghan
Government is prepared to enact reforms that concretely show the
population it represents their key interests and concerns? I believe
our efforts to pressure the Afghan Government have been at best uneven
in this area, due, in large part, to a reluctance to pressure the
Afghan leadership.
Any security gains in Afghanistan can be easily squandered without
serious progress on governance. The United States, ISAF, and Afghan
security forces are sacrificing too much as the Afghan Government fails
to enact reforms in the best interests of the Afghan people. It will be
difficult to succeed in Afghanistan without a strategy to help build
the institutions of governance, including the judiciary, political
parties, and, of course, electoral institutions.
As difficult as these interactions may be, the international
community must be more willing to confront the Afghan Government on
issues of political representation, corruption, and the rule of law. We
should stand ready to help build and develop these democratic
institutions.
The 2009 Presidential election and the 2010 parliamentary elections
were rife with problems that seriously undermined the confidence of the
international community in Afghanistan's ability to conduct elections
free of fraud and manipulation. If the electoral process remains deeply
flawed, the Afghan people's support for the democratic process itself
may well erode.
While the government has said it wants to develop a ``strategy for
long-term electoral reform that addresses in particular the
sustainability of the electoral process,'' few steps have been taken in
this direction. The election law is in need of serious reform. The
executive branch has nearly exclusive power over the Independent
Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission. The single
nontransferable vote system impedes the development of political
parties, an essential long-term way to organize and represent the
interests of the Afghan people.
Corruption continues to be a serious issue that affects citizens
across Afghanistan, especially in the southern part of the country. A
recent public opinion survey conducted by the Washington Post, ABC
News, the BBC, and ARD television in Germany showed that 55 percent of
respondents in Kandahar say they have been asked for bribes from the
police--55 percent--well above the national figure of 21 percent.
Moreover, most Kandahar residents say their situation would only get
worse if they exercised due process and filed a complaint about a
public official.
U.S. efforts to improve governance at times compete with our security
concerns. There is an inherent tension between the United States and
ISAF forces in efforts to engage, to combat extremist elements at the
local level and cooperation with warlords who rule over certain areas.
While there is an imperative to collect intelligence and conduct
operations that may require cooperation with local power brokers, I am
concerned the long-term cost of such interaction is very high. Are we
empowering another generation of local power brokers who have little
regard for representing the interests of the local population? That is
a question that needs to be asked over and over, and we need answers to
that question.
It is a simple fact, disaffection among Afghan citizens with the
central government and local power brokers provides recruiting
opportunities for the Taliban. This is a serious concern because it
gets to the heart of our engagement in Afghanistan: Cooperation
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with local warlords can provide short-term security gains, but what is
the long-term impact? I hope the administration's December review will
address this issue.
Question No. 2: What is the state of the reconciliation process with
the Taliban? I have expressed serious concerns about the impact of
negotiations with the Taliban on women and other vulnerable groups in
Afghanistan. My concern grew--and I know others' concern as well--our
concern grew in reading the poll numbers from Afghanistan recently.
There was a 13-percent jump from last year among respondents who say
women's rights are suffering.
The December review should address the current state of play with
respect to these negotiations. The recent Afghan poll showed that
nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should
pursue negotiations with the Taliban, with almost two-thirds willing to
accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office.
Ultimately, there must be a political solution to end the war in
Afghanistan. I am not suggesting we are close at this time to that
result, but we need to know the degree to which the administration and
the Karzai government are coordinated and headed down the same path.
International engagement on any negotiation process will be essential
to long-term success. Pakistan has a role to play and is a necessary
element to any long-lasting peace agreement.
The next area, security. U.S. operations in southern Afghanistan
appear to be having a positive impact on Afghan public opinion. Sixty-
seven percent of the people in the Province of Helmand describe their
security as good, a 14-percent jump from December 2009. Nearly two-
thirds of Helmand residents state that Afghanistan is on the right
track.
This is an indication that positive momentum has been built in
Afghanistan's most sensitive region. But such gains can be short-lived,
and in order to facilitate a sustainable security, we must take a long-
term approach to ensure that the Afghan Government can provide for its
own security.
The training of the Afghan National Security Forces is a key
threshold question. We cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become a
haven for al-Qaida or other extremist groups to launch attacks against
the United States. ISAF forces have denied al-Qaida this haven since
2001. However, we cannot provide this security in perpetuity. The
Afghans have to assume more responsibility for their own security, and
we must do all we can to prepare the Afghan National Security Forces
for that day.
So where do we stand at this point? I would have to say the view is
decidedly mixed. For years, the international community exercised what
can be characterized as gross neglect in building Afghan security
forces, and only recently have we begun to take on this task.
First, some positive news on this issue. We do not hear enough about
this.
Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Caldwell, the NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan, the so-called NTM-A, has been a source of
real progress. The Afghan National Army and Police are exceeding--
exceeding--their recruitment goals. As of August of this year, the
Afghan National Army's total strength had grown to 138,164, exceeding
the goal for October 2010 by more than 8,000 troops. As of August, the
Afghan National Police had an end strength of 119,639, exceeding the
2010 goal of 109,000. These recruitment numbers are an important sign
of progress, but serious concerns remain related to the quality of the
force, the retention rate, and the low rate of literacy.
The Afghan National Army has significant shortages in officer and
noncommissioned officer leadership. Effective junior leaders are
essential to a professional force since they control immediate on-the-
ground situations.
The Ministry of Defense and the training mission in Afghanistan are
working to overcome a shortfall of more than 4,500 Afghan National Army
officers. There are more Officer Candidate School units, twice as many
seats in the Integration Mujahedeen Course, and larger classes at the
National Military Academy.
As for noncommissioned officers, the Afghan National Army faces a
shortage of more than 10,500. Similar expansions in training capacity
and direct entry programs are underway to address this deficiency.
According to a recent Pentagon report, the gap will not be closed until
the end of 2012.
The Pentagon also reports we face a shortfall of more than 900
international trainers in Afghanistan. I hope our allies in ISAF can
help to address this very important training need. Many European
countries have a proud history of developing elite paramilitary forces.
This valued expertise is needed right now in Afghanistan.
While expanding capacity is critical to growing the force, I hope the
December review by the administration will address not just the efforts
to grow more leaders but also describe how these leaders are laying the
foundation for professionalizing the Afghan national security forces.
Retention and attrition rates. For years, the Afghan national
security force's attrition rate has been an issue. Facilitating rapid
growth while increasing quality requires that retention rates remain
high.
In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approved
the goal of developing a force of 305,600 personnel by October 2011.
Recruiting efforts compared with increased retention have allowed the
force to grow ahead of schedule so far. Moving forward, projections
remain uncertain. The Defense Department reports the police have met
attrition and retention goals. However, the Afghan National Army still
has issues with attrition that may impact its ability to maintain its
impressive growth in numbers. This month's review by the administration
should clarify projections and detail efforts to boost retention.
Literacy is a big problem. The literacy rates are very low in the
Afghan Security Force and this must be addressed. Consider this story
from Lieutenant General Caldwell. He visited a base in northern
Afghanistan where 90 percent of the troops claimed they had been unpaid
for months. To limit corruption, the government has been paying the
troops by electronic funds transfer instead of cash. The troops had no
idea, however, since they could not read their bank statements.
Think about weapons security. How can a soldier be sure he has been
assigned a weapon if he cannot read the serial number? Illiteracy is
widespread in the force: Only 11 percent of enlisted personnel can
read, write, or do simple math. This creates significant challenges in
professionalizing the security force. In response, a huge literacy
program has grown around the fielding of the Afghan security forces. So
we have much to do on that.
I will move to the last part of our concerns, and that is on
development. A qualified Afghan soldier is much cheaper to train and
equip on the field than an American, so the overall cost to U.S.
taxpayers would certainly diminish as the U.S. forces draw down. But by
investing in this large force, there are long-term implications. Do we
expect to pay for the Afghan security forces 10 years from now, 20
years from now? At what point will the Afghan Government be able to
collect its own revenue to fund its security as well as other
priorities?
That is, again, why responsible Afghan governance is essential. While
the international community will shoulder much of the humanitarian and
security burden in the short term, the Afghan Government needs to take
steps to increase its domestic revenue collection, as well as put into
place a sound legislative framework to encourage investment. They need
to develop a minerals framework law, and they also need to put in place
changes to bring about a stronger infrastructure.
Let me close with a reflection upon our troops. We have the
obligation here in the Senate to ask and have answers to very critical
questions, whether they relate to development or governance or
security, and especially on the question of security. We also have an
obligation to remember and keep in mind the human toll.
SSG SEAN FLANNERY
In the State of Pennsylvania, as in a lot of States, we have lost a
lot of soldiers. To date, we have lost 60 servicemembers since the
beginning of the war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, we got to the number of
about 196--just below 200. Let me share one story as I conclude. Two
weeks ago, Pennsylvania
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lost Army SSG Sean Flannery who died a hero in Afghanistan. He is from
the town of Wyomissing, PA, in Bucks County. He was an infantry squad
leader who was killed after delivering first aid to a wounded Afghan
soldier. Sean and his team carried the man to an evacuation helicopter.
They stepped on an improvised explosive device which killed Sean and
another soldier. Staff Sergeant Flannery was 29 years old. After he
graduated from Wyomissing High School in 1999 and Shippensburg
University, he was determined to serve his country. He was on his
fourth tour of duty after having served two tours in Iraq and a prior
tour in Afghanistan. He earned a Bronze Star because of his heroism and
then another commendation last week. One of his high school classmates
paid tribute to his friend at a service earlier this week. He said:
His fellow soldiers talked about how much they respected
him and what a great leader he was and how they had true love
for him, and not a word of it surprised us. He was the type
of guy everybody wants their son to be--loyal, humble, and
generous. I was honored to have him as a friend.
That is what Matt Rader, a classmate of Sean Flannery's, said about
Sean.
All of us are honored to represent these young men and women who
fight for us and some who die for this cause. Today we pray for those
families. We pray for Sean and his family. But in the larger sense I
guess we pray for ourselves as well. We pray that we are worthy and can
prove ourselves worthy of their valor.
One of the ways Members of the Congress can prove ourselves worthy of
that valor is to ask and demand answers to these very difficult
questions, no matter who the administration is and no matter what
party, because we have to get this policy right. We have an obligation
to get it right, for Sean Flannery and for those who have loved and
lost, and for our country.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the
conclusion of my remarks, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island,
Senator Reed, be given time on the floor for his remarks.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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