[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 156 (Thursday, December 2, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8359-S8362]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, a number of my colleagues and I are 
coming to the floor today to discuss a critical national security issue 
that Senator Kerry has already referenced in his remarks on the Senate 
floor. It is an issue that requires strong bipartisan action by the 
Senate; that is, the ratification of the New START treaty.
  As we enter into the last weeks of the 111th Congress, there is no 
doubt we have some significant work remaining on a number of important 
priorities. But we have come to the Senate floor today to say that 
national security and the threat posed by nuclear weapons also requires 
our urgent consideration this year.
  After more than 20 Senate hearings, more than 31 witnesses, 900 
questions and answers, and nearly 8 months of thorough consideration--
including additional time during the August recess for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to consider the treaty--it is now time to 
vote on New START.
  The treaty is squarely in the national security interests of the 
United States. It reduces the number of nuclear weapons aimed at 
American cities and allows for the return of critical onsite 
inspections lost when the previous START treaty expired. Ratifying the 
treaty would reestablish American leadership on nuclear security and 
give the United States increased leverage to curb nuclear proliferation 
around the globe.
  This treaty in no way interferes with our ability to have a safe, 
secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal. In fact, in response to Senate 
concerns, the Obama administration has committed unprecedented amounts 
of money to ensure this modernization piece. Just yesterday, the three 
directors of America's nuclear labs wrote in a letter that they were 
``very pleased'' with the administration's commitment and believe this 
commitment provides ``adequate support to sustain the safety, security, 
reliability and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent.''
  Another concern that has been raised is the effect the New START 
treaty may have on some of our closest NATO allies. As chair of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe, I am intensely focused 
on meeting our NATO security commitments and defending and protecting 
our allies in NATO and beyond. I agree we need to remain vigilant in 
support of our allies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe 
that border Russia and have strong, legitimate security concerns. But a 
failure to ratify this treaty could result in deteriorating U.S.-
Russian bilateral relations and adversely affect the security of our 
partners in Europe.
  I was pleased to see, just last week, at the NATO summit in Lisbon 
that all 28 NATO allies expressed their unanimous support for Senate 
ratification of the New START treaty. New START is in America's 
interests, and as our allies in Europe have stated clearly, New START 
is also in their interests.
  Finally, a failure to ratify this treaty could have serious negative 
effects on our ability to meet the nuclear challenge posed by Iran. The 
failure to ratify the START treaty would undercut America's ability to 
marshal international support and exert increasing pressure on Iran. As 
we heard Senator Kerry reference earlier this morning, just today in 
the Washington Post five former Secretaries of State of the past five 
Republican administrations made a compelling case linking this treaty 
and the threats posed by Iran and North Korea.
  The consensus is clear. New START is in our national security 
interests, and we should not wait any longer to ratify this treaty. Our 
military and our intelligence communities do not want us to wait. Our 
allies abroad and countless foreign policy experts, Republican and 
Democrat, across the political spectrum do not want the Senate to wait. 
The American people do not want us to wait.
  We should follow in the footsteps of the Senate's strong bipartisan 
arms control history and ratify the New START treaty this year.
  Madam President, I yield the floor to my colleague from Pennsylvania, 
Senator Casey.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. Madam President, I commend my colleague from New 
Hampshire, Senator Shaheen.
  I am proud to join my colleagues this morning in support of the New 
START accord. Next Sunday will mark 1 year since American inspectors 
were on the ground in Russia. We need to vote on the resolution of 
ratification for this important treaty because it will indeed make 
America safer. Without ratification of this treaty, we are less safe 
and less secure. We have to maintain what we have always maintained in 
this country as it relates to our arsenal: a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear arsenal. This treaty is consistent with that goal.
  The agreement provides for predictability, transparency, and 
stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship.

[[Page S8360]]

Former National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Linton 
Brooks put it best when he said:

       Transparency leads to predictability; predictability leads 
     to stability.

  It is that stability that we seek. The opportunity to examine Russian 
nuclear forces helps to limit the surprises, mistrust, or 
miscalculation that could result from a lack of information. By 
building trust with regard to our respective nuclear arsenals, progress 
on other important issues such as the war in Afghanistan and our policy 
as it relates to Iran becomes more likely.
  Some have asked whether we have lost any valuable elements of the 
original START treaty's inspection regime. In June of this year, I 
chaired a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee that addressed 
this very issue. We examined the implementation of the treaty with 
respect to both inspection and verification and how the treaty would be 
executed in Russia and the United States.
  Critics point out that under the original START treaty, the United 
States was permitted 25 data update, reentry vehicles, and facility 
inspections a year, while under New START the United States can inspect 
18 facilities annually not 25. However, in a previous hearing on the 
New START treaty, Admiral Mullen noted that when START entered into 
force there were 55 Russian facilities subject to inspection, but now 
there are only 35 Russian facilities subject to inspection.
  I would also assert that the inspection regime has also changed to 
reflect the current security environment, an enhanced relationship with 
the Russian Federation, and more than a decade of experience in 
conducting START inspections. The inspection regime is simpler and 
cheaper than what was conducted under the first START treaty. We 
conduct fewer inspections under this treaty because there are fewer 
sites to inspect. Yet, proportionally, the number of inspections 
concluded under this treaty has increased not decreased. During that 
same hearing, Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy said:

       Inspections will help the United States verify that Russia 
     is reporting the status of its strategic forces accurately 
     and complying with the provisions of the New START Treaty. 
     Inspections will not be shots in the dark. Using information 
     provided by requiring data exchanges, notifications, past 
     inspections, and national technical means, we can choose to 
     inspect those facilities of greatest interest to us. Then, 
     through short-notice on-site inspections, our inspectors can 
     verify that what the Russians are reporting accurately 
     reflects reality.

  So said the Under Secretary of Defense, Mr. Miller.
  After more than 20 hearings by the Senate Committees on Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence, and comprehensive 
deliberation, it is time to vote on New START. We have examined all 
sides of the issue. We heard from Republican experts and Democratic 
experts alike. We have heard from former Secretaries of State and 
experts in international relations. The U.S. military leadership 
uniformly supports this treaty. More than 900 questions were submitted 
from the Senate to the administration on New START, and the 
administration answered every single question.

  I wish to close on a historical note. On October 1, 1992, the first 
START treaty was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 93 to 6. As the 
debate on the treaty wrapped in this room, the Senate majority leader 
at the time, George Mitchell, commended President Bush for his role in 
negotiating the agreement. He read a letter from Acting Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger which encouraged ratification.
  This expression of bipartisanship at that time was made remarkable by 
the fact that the Senators assembled would soon return home to campaign 
in the 1992 election. That election was 1 month away and Democrats and 
Republicans came together and supported ratification.
  We all remember the contentious nature of that election, similar to 
the period we are living through now. Yet even within that environment, 
both parties came together to do the right thing for national security. 
We have to do this again. It is critically important that this treaty 
be ratified.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, it is my privilege to rise to join with 
my colleagues from New Hampshire and Pennsylvania and Colorado in 
support of the New START treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty.
  I bring a bit of a personal perspective, a bit of affection for this 
issue, for this reason: When I was in graduate school, I was studying 
to take on issues of world economic development, issues of 
international poverty. I had worked in Latin America. I had worked in 
India. I traveled through Central America. I spent some time in west 
Africa. I thought global poverty was a very important issue that could 
be worth investing my career in.
  But as I came out of graduate school, I had an opportunity to switch 
tracks and work on nuclear issues as a Presidential fellow for Caspar 
Weinberger in the Reagan administration. This was a complete change of 
direction and one I didn't anticipate. But I went through that door and 
worked on strategic issues because the greatest threat to our planet 
was the successful management of nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear 
weapons, an enormous threat that needed to be smartly managed. I felt 
that engaging in that discussion, being part of that effort, was a very 
valuable matter in which to put my energy.
  So I spent 2 years at the Pentagon working on strategic nuclear 
issues and then worked for Congress, the Congressional Budget Office, 
as a strategic nuclear policy analyst during the 1980s. It gave me a 
bit of a closeup view and a view particularly of the Reagan 
administration, working with Mikhail Gorbachev--Reagan and Gorbachev--
working on these issues. One related issue--though not a strategic 
issue, it certainly had strategic implications--was the theater nuclear 
arms negotiations that resulted in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty. Back then it was called the zero option. It created 
intrusive inspection regimes to ensure that both nations were complying 
with the treaty. That, of course, was the hallmark of Reagan's 
philosophy that we ``trust but verify.''
  More than the specifics of that treaty, I wish to note that it passed 
93 to 5. That treaty, similar to most strategic arms treaties, passed 
with wide bipartisan support. When it comes to the safety of our 
Nation, when it comes to minimizing the threat of nuclear devastation, 
we have set aside red and blue, we have set aside Republican and 
Democrat, and we have done what is right for our Nation.
  Certainly, the threat involving nuclear weapons is as serious today 
as it was in 1987 when President Reagan signed the INF treaty or when 
it was ratified in 1998.
  Now the Senate must decide whether to ratify the New START treaty. 
New START limits both the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed 
strategic warheads, a significant reduction from the 2002 Moscow 
Treaty. It limits both parties to 700 deployed strategic delivery 
vehicles. These reductions continue to reduce both nations' oversized 
nuclear arsenals, a dangerous legacy of the Cold War, while allowing 
the U.S. military to preserve a flexible strategic deterrent.
  The new treaty improves our strategic relationship with Russia. The 
new treaty reinforces the U.S. global leadership in nonproliferation.
  Verification is a key element in New START, consistent with President 
Reagan's philosophy of ``trust but verify.'' With the expiration of 
START a year ago, U.S. officials have been without their ability to 
conduct onsite inspections in Russia for the first time in a decade and 
a half, and that increases the nuclear threat.
  The new treaty allows both parties to verify compliance through data 
exchanges, through onsite inspections, and through reconnaissance 
satellites. Both countries must maintain a database listing the types 
of locations of all accountable warheads and delivery vehicles. Each 
delivery vehicle is assigned a unique identifier, which is used to 
track it from the moment of production through its various deployments 
and to its dismantlement. U.S. inspectors can verify using short 
notice, onsite inspections.
  This treaty is critical in safeguarding nuclear material and 
preventing proliferation of weapons and it is critical for our 
relationship with Russia and our authority on nuclear issues.

[[Page S8361]]

  Let me quote one expert:

       The principal result of nonratification would be to throw 
     the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of 
     chaos.

  That quote comes from GEN Brent Scowcroft, who was the first 
President Bush's National Security Adviser, or let's listen to this 
expert:

       A rejection of [this treaty] would indicate that a new 
     period of American policy had started that might rely largely 
     on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear weapons, and would 
     therefore create an element of uncertainty in the 
     calculations of adversaries and allies. And therefore, I 
     think it would have an unsettling impact on the international 
     environment.

  That is Dr. Henry Kissinger.
  Today there is an article in the Washington Post: ``Why New START 
Deserves GOP Support.'' This is written by Dr. Kissinger, George 
Shultz, James Baker, III, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Colin Powell. These 
are Secretaries of State for the last five Republican Presidents 
joining together in a detailed analysis of the New START and why the 
Senate should ratify this treaty.
  There are some who may say it is not an issue of the substance but, 
rather, we just need more time to consider the provisions. Consider 
this: The treaty was signed on April 8 of this year. The treaty went 
through extensive and thorough hearings and briefings on the Foreign 
Relations Committee. The committee favorably reported it out with 
bipartisan support on September 16. In the 34 weeks since the treaty 
was signed and the 10 weeks since it was reported from the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, every Member of our body has had an opportunity to 
read the testimony, to explore the content, to consult with the 
experts, to consult with the administration, and to reach a conclusion. 
In fact, we have had more opportunity to review this treaty than the 
100th Congress did for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
under Ronald Reagan.
  Finally, I think it is useful to hear President Reagan's thoughts on 
nuclear weapons. In 1985, he said this:

       There is only one way safely and legitimately to reduce the 
     cost of national security, and that is to reduce the need for 
     it. And this we are trying to do in negotiations with the 
     Soviet Union. We are not just discussing limits on a further 
     increase of nuclear weapons. We seek, instead, to reduce 
     their number. We seek total elimination one day of nuclear 
     weapons from the face of the Earth.

  Well, this treaty does not eliminate nuclear weapons, but it does 
reduce them and it does, in the eyes of expert after expert after 
expert--Democratic experts and Republican experts--make our Nation more 
secure. So there can be no better reason to ratify it as soon as 
possible.
  I thank the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BENNET. Madam President, I rise to support timely ratification of 
the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, often called New START. New 
START accomplishes critical goals for our national security. It reduces 
Russia's deployed nuclear warhead stockpile by 30 percent. It reduces 
the number of deployed and nondeployed launchers to 800. It limits the 
number of deployed missiles and bombers to 700--fewer than half the 
number of the original START treaty.
  It also establishes a stronger system of onsite inspections, allowing 
us to physically count individual warheads. This is the safest way to 
ensure that we have an accurate understanding of Russia's nuclear 
weapons force. Nevertheless, the Senate has failed to take action on 
what should be noncontroversial--a treaty with bipartisan support that 
will make our country safer. Today, I wish to talk about the 
consequences if we fail to ratify New START.
  Right now, with no treaty in place, our country has virtually no 
ability to monitor Russia's nuclear weapons. The previous START treaty 
expired on December 5, 2009, almost a year ago today. Since that time, 
our inspectors have been shut out of Russia's facilities. We have been 
making national security decisions in the dark.
  By contrast, the comprehensive verification system proposed under New 
START allows our military to make better, safer decisions about our 
national security. Without these verification measures in place, we 
will lose track of Russia's nuclear arsenal. We will spend more money 
to obtain less reliable information. Delaying ratification makes no 
sense for our national security or for this Nation's wallet. Failure to 
ratify New START does not just undermined our short-term national 
security interests, it weakens our long-term relationship with Russia 
and countries all around the world. In a post-9/11 world, strong 
relationships and shared intelligence have never been more critical as 
we defend against emerging threats.
  We rely on Russia's support to help us contain one of the biggest 
threats to our national security and to the world's security: Iran's 
progress toward a nuclear weapon. In fact, earlier this year, the 
United States brokered an agreement with Russia and China that imposes 
new U.N. sanctions against Iran to limit its weapons production. Our 
failure to move forward on New START would make these efforts more 
difficult.
  The goal of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons requires a 
solid United States-Russia relationship, and that relationship begins 
with New START.
  We have had ample time to study the treaty: 20 formal hearings, 
countless briefings, 900 questions submitted for the record. All 
Senators have had time to express opinions and register concerns. The 
experts, both Republicans and Democrats, tell us it is time to ratify 
the treaty. In fact, LTG Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser for 
Presidents Ford and George H. W. Bush, has said:

       The principal result of nonratification would be to throw 
     the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of 
     chaos.

  He is not alone in this considered view.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the majority has 
expired.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to extend our 
time until 10:20 and to then allow for 5 minutes for the Republicans at 
the other side of their time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BENNET. Madam President, I will wrap up in the next couple of 
minutes.
  He is not alone in this considered view. Listen to the bipartisan 
wisdom calling on the Senate to ratify this treaty: former Secretaries 
of State George Shultz, James Baker, Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, 
Madeleine Albright, and Warren Christopher; former Defense Secretaries 
James Schlesinger, William Cohen, William Perry, Frank Carlucci, and 
Harold Brown; former National Security Advisers Brent Scowcroft, 
Stephen Hadley, and Sandy Berger. Patriots all, committed public 
servants who take it as an article of faith that partisanship ends at 
our water's edge, as do most Coloradans and most Americans. When it 
comes to New START, I believe the Senate will as well.
  President Reagan began negotiating the first START treaty with the 
Soviet Union in 1982--right in the middle of the Cold War. Even today, 
all these years later, we remember Reagan's brilliant phrase ``trust 
but verify.'' Many believed the Cold War would never end. So much has 
changed since the fall of the Soviet Union: the rise of global 
terrorism, the growing threat of Iran, the integration of our global 
economy, and the realization that when one economy falls, all are in 
danger.
  As you know, I have just finished a long and tough campaign, and I 
can tell you that Coloradans are patriots before they are partisans. 
They are parents before they are Republicans and Democrats. And they 
are neighbors before they are foes. We need to respond, and the Senate 
should ratify New START now.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maryland is 
recognized.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I join my colleagues who have taken the 
floor this morning to urge a timely ratification of the START treaty. 
We have now been 1 year without a comprehensive verification regime to 
understand Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Since the end of the Cold 
War, we have had a verification system in place because we need to know 
what Russia is doing. We are at risk by not

[[Page S8362]]

having a comprehensive verification regime in place. The ratification 
of New START will allow us to have that verification system in place, 
and it is in our national security interest.
  We have had plenty of opportunity to understand exactly what is 
involved in the New START Treaty. For 7 months, the Senate has been 
considering the ratification. We have had over 20 hearings. I am 
honored to serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have had 
numerous hearings and opportunities, both in closed sessions and open 
sessions, to understand exactly why this ratification is in the 
security interest of the United States.
  I point out that this is New START. We already had a Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty with Russia that expired at the end of last year. That 
treaty was ratified by a prior vote of 93 to 6. So we have great 
interest. We know what is involved, and we have had strong, bipartisan 
support for the ratification of START. The United States needs 
transparency to know what Russia is doing and to provide confidence and 
stability. We need that confidence and stability to contribute to a 
safer world.
  The ratification of New START allows the United States to continue to 
be in the leadership internationally, not only to deal with arms 
reduction but also with nonproliferation issues. That is particularly 
important today as we get international support to prevent Iran from 
becoming a nuclear weapon state. Russia has helped us in that regard. 
The ratification of this treaty is a continued movement toward 
isolating Iran's nuclear ambitions.
  As other colleagues have pointed out, military leadership and 
bipartisan political leadership has supported this ratification.
  I urge my colleagues to ratify New START. It is in our national 
security interest.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Louisiana is 
recognized.

                          ____________________