[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 153 (Monday, November 29, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8214-S8219]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEW START TREATY
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are in what we all understand are very
difficult times--challenging in every respect and certainly with
respect to the national security concerns of the country. As we speak,
American soldiers are fighting a war in Afghanistan, winding down a war
in Iraq, and our Nation has young men and women in harm's way in many
parts of the world, engaged in a persistent challenge against global
terrorism. Iran's nuclear program continues to advance, and North Korea
is building a uranium enrichment facility and provoking the south on a
regular basis with its military aggression.
Every single one of these is a complex challenge without any easy
solution. But in the middle of all these challenges, the Senate has
been given an opportunity to actually reduce the dangers our country
faces. We have been given an opportunity set an example for the world.
We have been given an opportunity to make the decision that would help
to put greater pressure on Iran, on North Korea or on any other country
that might be contemplating the notion of moving toward nuclear
weapons. The Senate has been given the opportunity in the next days to
express the leadership of our country with respect to moving in the
opposite direction--away from nuclear weapons to greater controls,
greater accountability, greater security and safety for our people.
With one simple vote before we leave here in the next days, we could
approve the New START treaty and make America and the world more secure
and take an important step forward in leadership as we express to the
world our sense of responsibility with respect to the challenge of
nuclear weapons. That is the opportunity we have. The question before
every Senator is going to be whether we come here in these next days to
do the business of the American people, to do our constitutional
responsibility to advise and consent to a treaty negotiated by the
executive department of the country.
New START is, quite simply, a commonsense agreement to control the
world's most dangerous weapons and enhance stability between the two
countries that possess over 90 percent of them. Just think of the
statement it makes to those countries contemplating where Iran may be
going when the countries that possess 90 percent of these weapons begin
to dismantle these weapons and provide intrusive verification steps
between us for how we will both behave. What an important statement at
this moment in time with respect to Iranian behavior, with respect to
North Korean behavior, and what a completely opposite, irresponsible
decision it would be if the Senate just got bogged down in politics and
walked
[[Page S8215]]
away from this moment, unwilling to make that kind of decision that
offers the leadership that I think the world and certainly the American
people expect us to make.
This treaty will limit the number of nuclear weapons Russia can
deploy to 1,550 warheads. What American who contemplates the nature of
nuclear war and conflict and the potential damage of 1 weapon, 10
weapons, 20 weapons--what American does not understand the common sense
of limiting Russia to 1,550 weapons pointing at the United States of
America, some of them directly pointing at us even as I stand here and
speak today?
This treaty will give us flexibility in deploying our own arsenal so
we do not have to live by a strict restraint with respect to land or
sea or air. We have flexibility in which weapons we want to put into
which modality, and the verification provisions will significantly
deepen our understanding of Russian forces. It has been almost a full
year now since the original START treaty and its verification
procedures expired. Every day since then, insight that treaty provided
has been degrading.
New START does more than just restrain the weapons. It does more than
just provide verification. It actually strengthens the relationship
between the United States and Russia, and it enhances the global
nonproliferation regime we signed up to years and years ago during the
Cold War. It will improve our efforts to constrain Iran and, most
important, to contain the loose nuclear materials we all fear could one
day fall into the hands of terrorists and, if not result in a nuclear
explosion, result in what we call a dirty bomb explosion where nuclear
material is, in fact, scattered for want of the ability to create a
nuclear weapon itself but with grave consequences of radioactive
material doing enormous injury to large populations as a result.
Already in the 7 months since we signed the New START, Russia has shown
greater dedication to this renewed relationship. They have supported
harsher sanctions against Iran. They have suspended the sale of the S-
300 air defense system to Tehran.
The original START agreement which was the bedrock of the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, a program whereby we are
currently reducing nuclear warheads with Russia and containing the
nuclear material--one of the great contributions to nonproliferation of
modern times--that is the most successful nonproliferation effort to
date in which any country has engaged. That would be threatened if this
START agreement does not pass. It is strengthened if the START
agreement does pass.
Without the START treaty, the New START treaty--I think nobody
expresses concern greater than Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar, a
Republican Senator, has shown enormous leadership on this issue for
years and years now. He is respected all across the globe by those
people who follow these issues. He has expressed the urgency of passing
this treaty now, in this Senate, in this Congress, in this session.
In summary, the New START helps the United States to lead other
countries so we help each other to address the lingering dangers of the
old nuclear age, and it gives us a very important set of tools in order
to combat the threats of the new nuclear age. Indeed, the single most
significant question being raised at this point in time is not about
the substance of the treaty within the four corners of the treaty; it
is about language external to the treaty with respect to whether it
somehow might limit our missile defenses. All of us acknowledge that
those missile defense investments we have made to date will go a long
way toward helping us to be able to address the threat of rogue states.
Let me just say as unequivocally as I know how that there is nothing
in this treaty--there is no way this treaty--there is no way the
policies of this administration--there is no way any language that is
formal or binding between our nations or any other language, in fact,
binds the United States or restrains us from pursuing missile defense.
The answer with respect to any question on missile defense in this
treaty is, no, it unequivocally does not restrain America's ability to
develop and deploy missile defense. What is more, the evidence of that
was very clear in Lisbon just the other day where the President of the
United States, together with European countries, publicly announced the
procedure by which we are going forward to deploy a missile defense in
Europe in order to deal with the rogue threat problem.
Let me be even more clear. With respect to the question of any
limitation of missile defense, the Secretary of Defense, appointed by
President George W. Bush, says no, there is no limitation on missile
defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says no, there is no
limitation on missile defense; the commander of our nuclear forces says
no, no limitation on missile defense; the Director of the Missile
Defense Agency says no, there is no limitation on missile defense.
Again and again, senior military leaders have said unambiguously that
this treaty does not limit our missile defense plans. So, in my
judgment and the judgment of most people I know who reasonably approach
this treaty, there is no issue of missile defense with respect to this
treaty.
Now we are beginning to hear people say that maybe we do not have
time, in the context of the lameduck session, to deal with this
question of American leadership, this constitutional responsibility
that ought properly to be executed by the Senate that has done all of
the work on this treaty. There is in that statement about lack of time,
to some degree, a sort of question: Maybe there are a whole bunch of
issues out there that just have not been resolved. Let me try to deal
with that for a moment because I wish to make it very clear that the
New START treaty's inspection and evaluation and analysis process by
the Senate and appropriate committees has been extensive and
exhaustive.
I wish to make clear what the record says about the time we have to
consider this treaty. The Senate has been working on this treaty for
the past year and a half, ever since the negotiations first began.
Starting in June of 2009, the Foreign Relations Committee was briefed
at least five times during the talks with the Russians. Senators from
the Armed Services Committee, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Senate's National Security Working Group--all of them took part in
those briefings. That was an obligation of this Congress. This Congress
was present during the briefings with the negotiators, this Congress
was privy to those negotiations as they went along--something a future
Congress could not be because the negotiations are over. That
underscores even more why this is the Congress that is the appropriate
Congress to deal with this treaty. Roughly 60 U.S. Senators, through
those committees I named, were able to follow the negotiations in
detail, and individual Senators had additional opportunities to meet
with our negotiating team, and a delegation of Senators even traveled
to Geneva in the fall of 2009 to meet with the negotiators. I might add
that included Senator Kyl, who has been one of the leading Senators on
the other side involved in our discussions on this treaty. In other
words, by the time the New START treaty was formally submitted to the
Senate in May, the 111th Congress was already steeped in this, deeply
steeped in this. No other Senate can now replicate the input we had
into these negotiations.
Over the next 6 months after the Senate treaty was submitted, the
Senate became even more immersed in the treaty's details through
hearings, briefings, documents, and hundreds upon hundreds of questions
that were submitted to the administration. Something like 900 questions
were submitted to the administration, and all of them have been
answered in full.
This Senate has done its homework on the New START treaty, and it is
this Senate that has an obligation to complete the advice and consent
on that treaty.
The fact is, there are also very important security reasons for us
not to wait. Next Sunday, December 5, it will have been 1 year since
the original START treaty expired--a whole year without on-the-ground
inspections in Russia. Some people say it doesn't really make a
difference whether it be a month or 2 months or whatever. I have to
tell you something: When it comes to nuclear arsenals, every day
matters. Without this treaty, we know
[[Page S8216]]
too little about the only arsenal in the world that has the potential
to destroy the United States.
As James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, said--and he
does not come to us with an opinion that is clouded by politics; he
doesn't come to us as a Democrat or a Republican; he comes to us as a
professional whose task it is to defend the security of our country and
who has a lifetime career wearing the uniform of our Nation, defending
our country--he says of ratifying New START, ``I think the earlier, the
sooner, the better.''
One of our most solemn responsibilities is this responsibility of
advice and consent. We have been through a tough political year. The
American people, we all understand--Senators keep coming to the floor
and referring to the anger. It is real. It is there. We know the
American people are angry. But they are angry because the business of
the country does not seem to get done. They are angry because they see
a partisan food fight, a political food fight taking place instead of
the serious business of our Nation.
I believe other countries are watching us to see whether we can
fulfill our constitutional responsibilities. Just how well does this
democracy we sell all over the world actually work? If we can't make it
work here at home and we can't deliver now, what kind of a message does
it send about the power of the United States to leverage its values and
its interests in the challenging world we face today?
Every Senator has an obligation to ask that question of themselves
over the course of these next days: Are we a credible partner? Can
other nations rely on us? What happens when the President of the United
States negotiates a treaty, and he comes back here and the rest of the
world sees that treaty bogged down, not in the substance of the treaty
but in the politics of the day?
With this vote we can demonstrate our resolve and our leadership, and
we can demonstrate something about the quality of our democracy. I
think the schedule of the Foreign Relations Committee shows good-faith
efforts which we have applied to live up to the Senate's
responsibility.
After the treaty was signed in April, Senator Lugar and I worked
together to set up a bipartisan review of the treaty. Never once did
Senator Lugar or I approach this in a partisan way. I am grateful to
Senator Lugar for his exceptional leadership and his willingness to
stand up to some of the currents of the day and act on the interests of
the country as he sees them.
Our primary consideration in the scheduling of witnesses before our
committee was not whether they would support or oppose the treaty, we
looked for expertise and we looked for experience. On April 29, the
committee heard from Bill Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and Jim
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and
Director of Central Intelligence.
These men recently led the congressionally mandated Strategic Posture
Commission. They both said we should approve the New START treaty. Dr.
Schlesinger said it is--this is the quote of Dr. Schlesinger, who
served a Republican President--``obligatory''--that is his word--
``obligatory for the United States to ratify New START.''
Dr. Perry told us this treaty advances American security objectives,
particularly with respect to nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. On May 18, the committee held a hearing with Secretary
Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Admiral Mullen told us
the New START treaty ``has the full support of your uniformed
military.''
Secretary Gates made clear the treaty will not constrain U.S. missile
defense efforts. He said:
From the very beginning of this process more than 40 years
ago the Russians have hated missile defense. They do not want
to devote the resources to it and so they try and stop us
from doing it through political means. This treaty does not
accomplish that for them.
That is what Secretary Gates said. The next day, former Secretary of
State Jim Baker, who helped negotiate START I and helped negotiate
START II, said that the New START ``appears to take our country in a
direction that can enhance our national security while at the same time
reducing the number of nuclear warheads on the planet.''
A week later, on May 25, Henry Kissinger recommended ratification of
the treaty. He also cautioned us that rejection of the treaty would, in
his words, have an ``unsettling impact'' on the international
environment.
We also heard from two former National Security Advisers; Stephen
Hadley, who served under George W. Bush, who told us the treaty is ``a
modest but nonetheless useful contribution to the security of the
United States and to international security''; and Brent Scowcroft, who
served under George H.W. Bush, said he supports the treaty and he told
us the New START does not restrict our missile defense plans. He said
the Russian unilateral statement was simply an issue of ``domestic
politics for the Russians.''
So we heard from some of the most eminent statesmen this country has
produced, Republicans and Democrats, with decades and decades of public
service. They said we should approve this treaty. In all, six former
Secretaries of State, five former Secretaries of Defense, the Chair and
Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and numerous other distinguished
Americans have said it is important we approve New START.
On July 14, seven former heads of the U.S. Strategic Command and
Strategic Air Command sent the committee a letter urging approval of
the treaty. Indeed, some of the strongest support for this treaty has
come from the military, which unanimously supports the treaty. On June
16, I chaired a hearing on the U.S. nuclear posture, modernization of
the nuclear weapons complex, and our missile defense plans.
GEN Kevin Chilton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, which is
responsible for overseeing our nuclear deterrence, explained why the
military supports the New START. He said:
If we don't get the treaty, A, the Russians are not
constrained in their development of force structure, and, B,
we have no insight into what they are doing. So it is the
worst of both possible worlds.
Again, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command says not ratifying
this treaty is the worst of both possible worlds. And LTG Patrick
O'Reilly, who heads the Missile Defense Agency, told us the New START
does not limit our missile defense plans.
I have briefed the Russians, personally in Moscow, on every
aspect of our missile defense development. I believe they
understand what that is. And that these plans for development
are not limited by this Treaty.
In other words, the Russians know what we intend to do and they
signed the treaty, nonetheless.
On July 14, the committee had a closed hearing on monitoring and
verification of treaty compliance with senior officials from the
intelligence community. Obviously, that was a highly classified
briefing. But every Senator is welcome to go down to the Office of
Senate Security and read the transcript of that hearing, which I
suspect will stay there and not appear in WikiLeaks.
If my colleagues want a public statement on verification, I would
once again cite what James Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence, said last week about ratifying the New START treaty:
I think the earlier, the sooner, the better. You know the
thing is, from an intelligence perspective only--
This is General Clapper's perspective--
are we better off with it or without it? We're better off
with it.
The committee also heard testimony from the directors of the Nation's
three nuclear laboratories. As we all know, much of the debate on the
treaty has focused on the resources that are needed to sustain our
nuclear deterrent and modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure, and
it was important for our committee to hear from the responsible
officials directly. They praised the Obama administration's budget
request for this fiscal year. I suspect my colleague from North Dakota,
in a few minutes, will have something to say about that additional
funding for the nuclear modernization program and the plan of action
that has been outlined.
I will simply say, again and again, the administration has bent over
backward to work in good faith openly and accountably with Senator Kyl.
I have been part of those discussions all
[[Page S8217]]
along. I think we have acted in good faith to try to meet the needs--so
much so that we put money into the continuing resolution a few months
ago, in order to show our good faith for this effort to try to produce
the modernization funding as we go forward.
In all, the Foreign Relations Committee conducted 12 open and
classified hearings, featuring more than 20 witnesses. The Armed
Services and Intelligence Committees held more than eight hearings and
classified briefings of their own. We did not stack the deck with
Democrats. In fact, most of the former officials who testified were
Republicans. Even the executive branch witnesses included several
holdovers from the last administration--Secretary Gates, Admiral
Mullen, General Chilton, Lieutenant General O'Reilly--all originally
appointed to their posts by President Bush.
Overwhelmingly, these witnesses supported timely ratification of the
New START treaty. As I have said, some of the strongest endorsements
came from America's military leaders. The combined wisdom of our
current and former military and civilian leaders, accumulated over
decades in service, not to political parties but in service to the
Nation as a whole, was clear: All of them said this treaty should be
ratified.
Over the summer, the committee also reviewed a number of important
documents, including a National Intelligence Estimate, assessing the
U.S. capability to monitor compliance with the terms of the New START,
a State Department report assessing international compliance with arms
control agreements, including Russia's compliance with the original
START, the State Department's analysis of the New START's
verifiability, a classified summary of discussions during the treaty
negotiations on the issue of missile defense.
By the end of July, the Foreign Relations Committee had compiled an
extensive record. We could have reported the treaty out of committee
then. We had the votes. I was prepared to move forward, but because
some Republican Senators knew we were prepared to move forward, they
came and asked for more time to review the treaty and to look at the
testimony and the documents we had gathered.
So, in August, in direct response to this Republican request, I made
a decision as chairman to postpone for 6 weeks, over the course of the
August recess, until after that so Members would have more time to
review the record, as the Republicans requested. Frankly, the treaty, I
have said again and again, is too important to get caught up in
partisan politics, so I thought it was very important not to allow
anybody to say we were rushing it.
We gave that additional time, even though we had the votes. We came
back afterwards and we dealt with each and every one of the concerns
that were raised in good faith. Frankly, it is important to have
reciprocal good faith in the workings of the Senate. Over the next 6
weeks, I encouraged Senators to contact Senator Lugar and me with their
comments on a draft resolution of ratification. In discussions with
Senator Lugar, Senator Corker, Senator Isakson, I made it clear we
welcomed and needed their input and, indeed, we got their input.
At the same time, the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees were
wrapping up their work on the treaty. Senators Levin and McCain each
wrote to the Foreign Relations Committee with their views on the
treaty, as did Senators Feinstein and Bond from the Intelligence
Committee.
We received the answers to several outstanding questions Senators had
posed to the administration. In all, over the past 7 months, Senators
formally submitted some 900 questions to the Obama administration, and
they have received thorough responses to every one of them.
By mid-September, our bipartisan work produced a resolution of
ratification we should all be able to support. Our review process was
not designed to cheerlead for the treaty. It was designed to probe
every aspect of the treaty and to come up with a resolution that
provided the Senate's input and protected the prerogatives of the
Senate and, indeed, of individual Senator's points of views. That is
what we have done. At 28 pages, the resolution of ratification--
including 13 conditions, 3 understandings, 10 declarations--addresses
every serious topic we have discussed over these months. If a Senator
was worried about the treaty and missile defense, then condition (5),
understanding (1), and declarations (1) and (2) addressed those issues.
If they were worried about modernization of our nuclear weapons
complex and strategic delivery vehicles, then condition (9) and
declaration (13) addressed those concerns.
If they were worried about conventional prompt global strike
capabilities, then conditions (6) and (7), understanding (3) and
declaration (3) addressed those.
Worried about tactical nuclear weapons? Well, that is in there.
Verifying Russian compliance? It is in there. Even the concern that was
raised about rail-mobile missiles was fully addressed in the resolution
of ratification.
In short, the resolution is the product of careful, bipartisan
deliberation and collaboration intended to address each of the concerns
that was raised. That does not mean the resolution is perfect. It does
not mean it could not possibly be further improved. But in the past
weeks, I have been reaching out to colleagues to get additional ideas.
I will be happy to consider any germane amendment that colleagues might
propose. But the only way to do that is by having the floor debate on
this treaty.
With the Senate now back in session, there are 33 days before the end
of the year. All of us would obviously not like to repeat what happened
last year and not be here right up until Christmas Eve. But there is
plenty of time in the next 3 weeks for debate.
Look at the record. The original START agreement was a far more
dramatic treaty than the New START because its cuts were sharper and
because the Soviet Union had just collapsed, leaving tremendous
uncertainty in its wake. Yet the full Senate needed only 5 days of
floor time before it approved that treaty, by a vote of 93 to 6, a far
more complicated and far more provocative, if you will, treaty at that
time.
The START II treaty took only 2 days on the floor in the Senate
before it was approved by a vote of 87 to 4.
So leave the precedent aside for a moment. When it comes to
protecting our national security, the American people expect us to make
time. That is exactly what we are prepared to do.
We are prepared to work around the clock. If time is the only
concern, then we have no concerns. Given the time that it took to
consider past treaties, it is clear we can do this. We are not new to
this business. We are not new to this treaty. We could get this done if
there is a will to do so. I know some Senators still worry about the
administration's plans with respect to modernization of the nuclear
weapons complex. That is not directly within the four corners of the
treaty, but I understand their concern. So let's review the work very
quickly that has been done there.
The Obama administration proposed spending $80 billion over the next
10 years. That is a 15-percent increase over the baseline budget, even
after accounting for inflation. It is much more than was spent during
the Bush administration's 8 years. Still some Senators have concerns.
On September 15, the Vice President assured our committee that the
10-year plan would be updated and a revised 2012 budget figure would be
provided this fall. In the meantime, because I believed that the
nuclear weapons program ought to be adequately funded, I worked with
other colleagues--with the leader and Senators Dorgan and Inouye--to
guarantee that an anomaly in the continuing resolution that we passed
in October provided an additional $100 million for the past 2 months.
It ensured that we would get the updated figures from the
administration. The administration has now provided those figures. It
is asking for an additional $5 billion over the next 10 years.
I remind colleagues that according to the resolution of ratification,
if any of this funding does not materialize in future years, the
President will be required to report to Congress as to how he is going
to address the shortfall. But if the Senate does not now approve the
ratification of the New START, it will become increasingly difficult
without
[[Page S8218]]
any requirement for a report, and it will become increasingly difficult
to provide that funding. That is a solid reason why we ought to get
this done now.
Ultimately, bottom line, we need to approve this treaty because it is
critical to the security of our country. It is better to have fewer
nuclear weapons aimed at the United States. It is better to have the
right to inspect Russian facilities. It is better to have Russia as an
ally in our efforts to contain Iran and North Korea and in order to
deal with the global proliferation challenge. Our military thinks it is
better to have these things. If any of my colleagues disagree, let them
make their case to the full Senate. That is the way it is supposed to
work around here. Let them make their case to the American people. If
the American people said anything in this election year, it is that
Congress needs to get down to the real business of our Nation. If the
national security of our Nation is not the real business, I don't know
what is. They have asked us to protect American interests. By ratifying
this treaty, we will do so.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.
Senator Kerry, as chairman of the committee, has done an extraordinary
job. I also mention Senator Lugar and others who have worked very hard
on the issue of the ratification of the START treaty. I was a member of
the Senate National Security Working Group, and the Administration kept
us informed all along the way during the negotiations with the
Russians. We had meetings in various locations and were briefed by the
negotiators who described to us what the negotiations were about, what
the progress was, and so on. Some of my colleagues from this Chamber
who were a part of that National Security Working Group came to the
meetings. We all had an opportunity to ask a lot of questions. It is
not as if someone just dropped on the Senate some package called the
START treaty. We have been a part of that all along and have been a
part of having discussions and descriptions of the work of this treaty
for some long while.
I wish to go through a couple of things today. First, some colleagues
have decided we should not proceed with the ratification of this new
arms reduction treaty that we have negotiated with the Russians. Some
have alleged that there are all kinds of difficulties with it. They say
it would limit our ability to produce and deploy an antiballistic
missile. That is not the case. It is not accurate. They are suggesting
that our modernization program of existing nuclear weapons or the
lifetime extension programs for existing nuclear weapons is not funded
sufficiently, and that is not the case. They indicate it would not meet
our national security requirements to go ahead with this treaty.
Let me describe what some very distinguished Americans who would know
about this have said. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike
Mullen, said: I, as well as our combatant commanders around the world,
stand solidly behind this new treaty.
That is from the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This is General Chilton, commander of the Strategic Command that is
in charge of our nuclear weapons. He says:
The United States strategic command was closely consulted
throughout the development of the nuclear posture review and
during negotiations on the new strategic arms reduction
treaty. . . .
What we negotiated is absolutely acceptable to the United
States strategic command for what we need to do to provide a
deterrent for the country.
This chart pictures former nuclear commanders who support this
treaty: Generals Davis, Welch, Chain, and Butler, Admiral Chiles,
General Habiger, Admiral Ellis. I have worked with many of these folks,
and they are very respected. All of them believe this treaty is the
right thing for this country and its security.
Dr. Henry Kissinger says:
It should be noted I come from the hawkish side of this
debate so I'm not here advocating these measures in the
abstract. I try to build them into my perception of the
national interest. I recommend ratification of this treaty.
This chart shows America's most prominent national security experts
who support this New START treaty, Republicans and Democrats, the most
significant thinkers about foreign policy in this country today. They
say they support this treaty and what it means to the country.
Some have said there is not enough funding for our modernization
program for existing nuclear weapons or for the lifetime extension
program for existing nuclear weapons, and that would be a problem. They
are wrong about that. Let me describe what Linton Brooks, the former
NNSA administrator in charge of these areas, nuclear weapons and the
modernization and the lifetime extension programs, says, someone who
served under the Bush administration in that role:
As I understand it, it is a good idea on its own merits,
but I think for those who think it is only a good idea if you
only have a strong weapons program, this budget ought to take
care of that. Coupled with the outyear projections, it takes
care of the concerns about the complex and it does very good
things about the stockpile. And it should keep the labs
healthy.
Then he said:
I would have killed for this budget.
This is from the man who headed NNSA during the Bush administration.
Let me go through the issue of spending because one of the principal
concerns has been we are not spending enough money on the existing
nuclear weapons stockpile. There are roughly 25,000 nuclear weapons in
this world. With respect to our portion of those nuclear weapons, we
modernize them. We have life extension programs to make certain they
can be certified as workable nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the fact
that we don't ever want to have to see that one works because it seems
to me the explosion of a nuclear weapon in a major city will change
everything in the future. But, nonetheless, we have a certification
program. We spend a great deal of money modernizing and keeping up to
date with lifetime extension programs, the existing stock of nuclear
weapons.
I chair the appropriations subcommittee that funds the nuclear
weapons stockpile among other things. The Appropriations Committee
considered a request from the President this year for $7 billion for
these weapons programs. In my subcommittee, which does a lot of
things--energy and water programs and nuclear weapons--almost
everything else was either flatlined or reduced. But nuclear weapons
was increased substantially. The $7 billion the President requested was
a 10-percent increase over the previous year. Some of my colleagues
have said that leaves us way short of what we need.
That $7 billion was put into the continuing resolution in November.
There wasn't much discussion of that. So while virtually all other
functions of government will continue to function at last year's
appropriations level, the nuclear NNSA, nuclear weapons function, will
be able to spend at the new funding level of $7 billion, up 10 percent
from the previous year.
Let me also describe what has happened with respect to fiscal years
2011 to 2015. The President's budget plan for those years provided $5.4
billion above the previous plan. So this President has proposed
generous appropriations to make certain that modernization and the life
extension programs of existing nuclear weapons is funded well. I
mentioned it went to $7 billion.
Now, in November, the President sent a report to Congress which
reported that he plans to request $7.6 billion for the year 2012. That
is a $600 million increase over 2011 which was a $600 million increase
over 2010. Overall, the request in this new report is a $4.1 billion
increase over the baseline during 2012 to 2016. So then we will be
spending $85 billion in the 10-year period, $85 billion on
modernization of our current nuclear stockpile and the life extension
program in our current nuclear stockpile, and even that is not enough.
We are told that is not nearly enough money.
How much is enough? If we can certify the stockpile works and the
stockpile provides a deterrent, how much is enough? This President has
robustly funded the requests that were needed. Now we are told not
nearly enough money has been appropriated.
By the way, those who are saying this are saying we need to
substantially cut Federal spending and reduce
[[Page S8219]]
the Federal budget deficit. Very interesting.
Let me relate, as I have in the past, something that happened over 9
years ago to describe the importance of this subject. On 9/11/2001,
this country was attacked. One month later, October 11, 2001, there was
a report by a CIA agent code named Dragonfire. One of our agents had a
report that said there was a nuclear weapon smuggled into New York, a
10-kiloton Russian nuclear weapon stolen and smuggled into New York by
terrorists to be detonated. That was 1 month to the day after 9/11.
That report from the CIA agent caused apoplexy among the entire
national security community. It was not public at that point. It was
not made public.
After about a month, they decided that it was perhaps not a credible
piece of intelligence. But when they did the post mortem, they
discovered that clearly someone could have stolen a Russian nuclear
weapon, perhaps a 10-kiloton weapon, and could have smuggled it into
New York City. A terrorist group could have detonated it, and a couple
hundred thousand people could have perished--one stolen nuclear weapon.
There are 25,000 of them on the planet--25,000.
The question is, Do these agreements matter? Do they make a
difference? Of course, they do. The fact is, nuclear arms agreements
have made a very big difference.
I have had in the drawer of my desk for a long period a couple of
things I would like unanimous consent to show.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. This is a piece of metal from a Soviet Backfire bomber.
We didn't shoot this bomber down. It was sawed off. They sawed the
wings off this bomber. They did it because we paid for it under the
Nunn-Lugar agreement in which we have actually reduced nuclear weapons,
both delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons.
So I have in my desk a piece of a Soviet bomber that had its wings
sheared off because of a US-Russian agreement, and that delivery system
is gone. I have a hinge that was on a silo in Ukraine for a missile
that had on it a nuclear weapon aimed at this country. Well, that
missile is now gone. I have the hinge in my hand. That missile that
held a nuclear warhead aimed at America is gone. In its place on that
field are sunflowers--sunflowers--not missiles.
I have in this desk as well some copper wire that was ground up from
a Soviet submarine that was dismantled as a result of a US-Russian arms
control agreement. These agreements work. We know they work. We have
reduced the number of delivery vehicles; yes, submarines, bombers,
missiles. We have reduced the number of nuclear weapons. This agreement
will further reduce the number of nuclear weapons.
Now, if it is not the responsibility of our country to begin
addressing the ability to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to
reduce the number of nuclear weapons on the face of this Earth, then
whose responsibility is it? It is clearly our responsibility to
shoulder that leadership. One important element of that is when we
negotiate these kinds of treaties, arms reduction treaties, that
virtually everyone--Republicans and Democrats who know anything at all
about national security and about arms reduction agreements--has said
makes sense for our country, when we do that, it seems to me we ought
not have the same old thing on the floor of the Senate, and this ought
not be a part of gridlock.
This is a negotiation between our country and Russia with respect to
reducing delivery vehicles and reducing nuclear weapons. The National
Security Working Group, of which I was a member--and a number of my
colleagues were members--met in this Capitol Building, and we were
briefed and briefed and briefed again by those who were negotiating
this treaty. This is not a surprise. There is nothing surprising here.
In my judgment, this Senate should, in this month, do what is necessary
to have the debate and ratify this treaty.
Again, let my say, this President sent to the Congress a budget
request that had ample and robust funding, with a 10-percent increase
for modernization and life extension programs for our nuclear weapons.
I know that because I chaired the committee that put in the money at
the President's request.
Then, because of those who believed you had to have the extra money
for the nuclear weapons program, that money was put in a continuing
resolution so that program goes ahead with a 10-percent increase, while
the rest of the Federal Government goes on at last year's level. I did
not object to that. But I do object when they say there is not ample
funding here--a 10-percent increase this year, a 10-percent increase
next year. Testimony by everyone who knows about these weapons
programs, the cost of them and the effectiveness of these treaties,
ought to be demonstration enough for us to do our job and to do our job
right.
We have a lot of important issues in front of us. I understand that.
But all of these issues will pale by comparison if we do not find a way
to get our arms around this question of stopping the spread of nuclear
weapons and reducing the number of nuclear weapons. If one, God
forbid--one--nuclear weapon is exploded in a city on this planet, life
on this planet will change.
So the question of whether we assume the responsibility of
leadership--whether we are willing to assume that responsibility--will
determine in large part, it seems to me, about our future and about
whether we will have a world in which we systematically and
consistently reduce the number of nuclear weapons and therefore reduce
the threat of nuclear weapons in the future.
I do hope my colleagues--and, by the way, I do not suggest they are
operating in bad faith at all. But some of my colleagues have
insisted--insisted--there is not enough funding. It is just not the
case. The demonstration is clear. It is the one area that has had
consistent, robust increases in funding, requested by this President,
and complied with by this Congress, and now even advance funding
through the continuing resolution. It seems to me it is time to take
yes for an answer on the question of funding, and let's move ahead and
debate this treaty and do what this country has a responsibility to do:
ratify this treaty, and do it soon.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
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