[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 153 (Monday, November 29, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8209-S8211]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TELEVISING THE SUPREME COURT
Mr. SPECTER. One other point briefly--I see a colleague awaiting an
opportunity to speak--and that is my hope we will address, before the
end of the year, the issue of televising the proceedings of the Supreme
Court of the United States. This is an issue I have worked on, on the
Judiciary Committee, for a couple decades now. It has been reported a
number of times out of committee. It is currently on the Senate agenda.
The Supreme Court of the United States decides all of the cutting
edge questions. There ought to be transparency. When the case of Bush
v. Gore was argued, then-Senator Biden and I wrote to the Chief Justice
urging that the proceedings be televised. We got a response back in the
negative, but on that day there was a simultaneous audio released. I
noticed 2 weeks ago that on C-SPAN there was a Supreme Court argument
which was a couple weeks old with an audio, and they had a picture of
the Justice who was speaking and a picture of the lawyer arguing the
case--sort of like movies before talking; sort of like silent movies.
There was an audio.
It is high time the public's business be open. Newspaper reporters
can walk into the Supreme Court, make notes, upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Visitors are limited to some 3 minutes. The
chambers can only hold about 250 people. It is time the Court was
televised. I hope the Senate will act. I have discussed the issue with
the leadership in the House and there are positive responses on the
issue.
[[Page S8210]]
Exhibit 1
From: Sen. Jon Kyl, Sen. Bob Corker
To: Republican Members
Date: November 24, 2010
Re: Progress in Defining Nuclear Modernization Requirements
We appreciate your willingness to consider New START in the
context of modernization of our nuclear complex and the
weapons it supports.
In advance of having an opportunity to discuss the issue
more fully next week in Washington, we want to summarize the
status of our discussions with the administration.
Summary
Throughout the Obama administration's pursuit of a New
START treaty, we have been clear, as has Secretary Gates,
that we could not support reductions in U.S. nuclear forces
unless there is adequate attention to modernizing those
forces and the infrastructure that supports them. The
Administration's recent update of the 1251 plan, originally
submitted in May in accordance with Section 1251 of the
FY2010 NDAA, is an acknowledgment that more resources we
needed to accomplish the objectives set forth in the Nuclear
Posture Review for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. This memo discusses our concerns with the original
1251 plan, changes made and our assessment of those changes
and remaining issues.
Background--the Decline of the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile and
Infrastructure
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear weapons
infrastructure (including laboratories, production facilities
and supporting capabilities) has been allowed to deteriorate.
The weapons have remained safe, secant and reliable, but they
and their caretakers have been in a state of limbo--only when
critical problems have arisen has action been taken. The
production facilities are Cold War relics, safety and
security costs have grown exponentially, and critical skills
have been jeopardized through layoffs, hiring freezes, and
the retirement of skilled scientists and technicians who
earlier were able to fully exercise the full set of nuclear
weapons-related skills. In FY2010, the Ohama administration
invested only $6.4 billion in the National Nuclear Security
Administration Weapons Activities funding line, a 20 percent
loss in purchasing power from FY2005 alone. It is no longer
possible to continue deferring maintenance of either the
facilities or the weapons. As a result, the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review set forth a broad range of modernization and
sustainment requirements that would be impossible without
additional budget support.
A detailed explanation of these concepts is located in the
appendix to this memo; but to help understand the current
situation, imagine an automotive expert working in a garage
built in 1942. The roof leaks and his tools are becoming
outdated. Moreover, he has responsibility for a fleet of
eight racing Ferraris, which have been sitting in storage for
about 30 years. The last time any engine was turned on was
1992, but this ``steward'' is responsible for assuring that,
at any given moment, each of the eight finely-tuned cars will
respond to the key turn. To do this, he is allowed to assess
components of the cars for aging--leaks, cracks, rust, etc.
(though he isn't able to look at the components often enough
and in sufficient detail because of his maintenance budget).
Even on a shoe-string budget, he is beginning to see signs
of age throughout the fleet, and realizes that each and every
car will require a complete overhaul (a ``life extension''
program). To be successful, he needs a new garage, updated
tools, and skilled assistants (because truthfully, the expert
will be retiring long before the overhauls are complete,
assuming his pension fund is still solvent). He will have to
replace some of the parts (especially the electronics--some
of his fleet of Ferraris still have vacuum tubes), because
they just aren't available anymore; but some parts will have
to be reused, or manufactured to be as close to the original
as possible. Some of the original parts contained materials
that are now illegal for safety or environmental reasons. To
add to the problem, the owner is asking for air bags, anti-
lock brakes and anti-theft technology. Each overhaul will
take about a decade, from planning through execution and
without a new garage, he will be unable to finish the
overhauls on time. And at the end of the day, the mechanic is
fairly certain that he will not be allowed to turn the
ignition to check his work.
This is the state of our nuclear deterrent today, except,
we're dealing not with cars, but with the most sophisticated
and dangerous weapons ever devised by man.
Section 1251 Plan and FY2011 Budget--A Response to the Nuclear Posture
Review
The initial section 1251 report showed a ten-year budget
plan for Weapons Activities totaling $80 billion. But most of
that $80 billion is not directed at modernization activities
called for in the NPR--it is mostly consumed in ``keeping the
lights on'' at the laboratories and plants, including safety,
security, facility upkeep (which is difficult on very old
facilities that would have been replaced long ago in the
private sector), and routine warhead maintenance.
Only about $10 billion of that ten year number was for new
weapons activity, about half of it coming from DOD and half
from ``savings'' assumed from low inflation projections. We
doubt such savings can be realized and the DOD funding is not
enough to cover everything that needs to be done. It provides
for a small increase to stockpile surveillance for warhead
evaluation, funding for the W76 life extension program and
the B61 and W78 life extension studies, and partial funding
for badly-needed design, engineering and a modest investment
for construction of new plutonium and uranium processing
facilities--the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
(CMRR) nuclear facility and the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF). These new facilities will replace Manhattan Project-
era buildings that are a substantial maintenance burden and
are becoming increasingly challenging to maintain in a safe
and operable condition.
Recognizing that more money was needed up front, the
administration's FY2011 budget request of $7.0 billion for
Weapons Activities improved the FY2010 budget by $624
million. The $624 million was included as a budget
``anomaly'' in the two month C.R. we passed before the
October recess, but will have to be maintained in the
longer-term C.R. or Omnibus we will pass in December.
The initial 1251 plan left a lot of questions about how all
the work articulated in the NPR would be funded. Numerous
experts expressed concerns about obvious shortfalls in
funding and about restrictions placed on designers that will
constrain their ability to work through stockpile issues. The
funding levels for CMRR and UPF were of significant concern,
as was the funding for Life Extension Programs--especially to
incorporate improved safety, security and reliability in
these warheads. And of great concern to the directors of the
national weapons laboratories, much of the promised budget
increase for modernization was not pledged until FY 16, by
which point the Administration's commitment (if it is still
in office) may have waned. As a result, we requested an
update to the 1251 plan that would answer the questions we
raised and that would show a stronger commitment to
modernization.
Undated 1251 Plan
Atter reviewing our questions, and with further review of
the requirements imposed by the NPR, the Administration
agreed that updated budgets were required. Thus, on November
17, 2010, an updated 1251 report was provided to the Senate,
including an early FY12 budget projection with White House
approval. The 1251 update, and the briefing provided as part
of the update, satisfied many, but not all, of the initial
questions we had earlier expressed.
The 1251 plan update increases the FY2012 budget request by
an additional $600 million, increases the FY2012 five-year
plan by $4.1 billion, and adds to the total FY11 ten-year
plan between $5.4 and $62 billion. We are told that the new
increases will not be taken from the DOD budget line. This
update brings the ten-year plan (from FY11) to between $85.4
and $86.2 billion. Again, approximately $70 billion of the
original pledge of $80 billion was needed just to maintain
current operations of the nuclear weapons complex, without
covering the expense of the needed modernization of the
stockpile or infrastructure. This update also includes
revised cost estimates for CMRR and UPF; those estimates now
range from $3.7 to $5.8 billion for CMRR and $4.2 to $6.5
billion for UPF.
The new $4.1 billion for the five years of the FY2012 FYNSP
is divided as follows:
$340 million for design and engineering and modest
construction activity for CMRR and UPF (see below for more
detail);
$1.7 billion (approximately) for other facility
construction and maintenance requirements, including the High
Explosive Pressing Facility at Pantex and test facilities at
Sandia National Laboratories;
$1.0 billion (approximately) for stockpile work, with added
funding for life extension programs, stockpile surveillance
and other design and research activities, though some of this
funding ($255 million for the W76) is only needed because one
life extension program will take longer due to the capacity
bottleneck in the complex;
$1.1 billion for contractor pension obligations spread
through Weapons Activities accounts (which, while needed,
does not support modernization).
Remaining Concerns
Despite this new increase, there remain a few substantial
concerns about the adequacy of the proposed budget. For one,
the Administration is attempting to address the enormous
increases in the cost estimates for CMRR and UPF by delaying
the full operation of those facilities by one to two years.
This would stretch the final completion of CMRR to 2023 and
UPF to 2024, although the Administration states that some
operational capability would be established (as required) in
2020. If extended, hundreds of millions of dollars would be
needed annually to maintain Manhattan Project-era facilities
at LANL & Y-12. Additional funding could be applied to
accelerate the construction of these facilities to ensure on
schedule completion and prevent wasted investments in
maintaining an securing facilities that are being replaed
anyway.
Furthermore, the Administration is ignoring the benefits of
ensuring funding commitments for these facilities early in
the budget process. Responsible advance funding mechanisms
exist, such as a FY12 request for three-year rolling funding
(recommended by some NNSA budget specialists), or
alternatively, an Administration commitment to seek advanced
funding in FY13 following the completion of the 90 percent
design cost estimate. Further Administration effort to
advance funding is the best path to successful completion of
these facilities.
[[Page S8211]]
Given the need to live with our currently aging stockpile
until an adequate production capability is established (after
2020), accurate assessment of the state of the current
stockpile is paramount. The 1251 plan update shows a doubling
of surveillance funding from FY09 to FY11--which is
commendable--but is our understanding that the NNSA is
reviewing an updated surveillance plan that could lead to
greater budget requirements. NNSA should affirm that this
review has been completed and the budget request will reflect
updated requirements.
Finally, the 1251 update made clear that NNSA will not
restore a production capability adequate to maintain our
current stockpile levels (declassified as 5,113 weapons
total), and instead allow up to 1,500 warheads to be retired
or held with no maintenance unless funding increases are
sought and obtained. Failing to maintain hedge weapons will
increase the risk that the U.S. cannot respond to a problem
in our aging stockpile. The Administration should not engage
in further cuts to our deployed or non-deployed stockpile
without first determining if such cuts are in our national
security interest and then obtaining corresponding reductions
in other nations' nuclear weapons stockpiles, such as
Russia's large stockpile of weapons not limited by New START
(e.g., its tactical nuclear weapons).
Modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems
The 1251 update deals not only with our nuclear weapons,
but the delivery systems that are part of our TRIAD. The
update indicates somewhat clearer intent by the
Administration to pursue a follow-on heavy bomber (though not
specifically nuclear) and air-launched cruise missile (ALCM),
though development costs beyond FY 2015 are yet to be
determined. While the update notes that estimated costs for a
follow-on bomber for FY 2011 through FY 2015 are $1.7
billion, there are still no costs or funding commitments
beyond FY 2015. It is the same for the ALCM: $800 million
programmed over the FYDP, but no cost estimates are included
beyond FY 2015. We should have a better idea of these
estimated costs over the full ten years of the 1251 plan, and
know whether the Administration intends to make this new
heavy bomber and ALCM nuclear capable.
Decision-making for an ICBM follow-on is unlikely before FY
2015, at the completion of an ongoing analysis of
alternatives. The update notes: ``While a decision on an ICBM
follow-on is not needed for several years, preparatory
analysis is needed and is in fact now underway. This work
will consider a range of deployment options, with the
objective of defining a cost-effective approach for an ICBM
follow-on that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear
weapons while promoting stable deterrence.'' (emphasis added)
We think it important to understand what the Administration
intends when it suggests that a decision regarding a follow-
on ICBM must be guided, in part, by whether it ``supports
continued reductions'' in U.S. nuclear weapons--especially
since we seriously doubt it's in our interests to pursue
reductions beyond the New START treaty. One logical inference
from this criterion is that a follow-on ICBM is no longer
needed because the U.S. is moving to drastically lower
numbers of nuclear weapons. We continue to press for a letter
from the DOD confirming its commitment to follow-on nuclear-
capable delivery systems.
Conclusion
Until these issues are resolved, it will be difficult to
adequately assess the updated 1251 plan, despite the welcome
increases in proposed spending. And as has always been clear,
assurances from the appropriate authorizers and appropriators
must be obtained to ensure that the enacted budget refledcts
the President's request.
appendix
Briefly, some of the stockpile programs most affected by
the lack of Administration support for modernization include:
Replacing Manhattan Project-era Facilities: Since the
closure of the Rocky Flat Plant in 1989, the U.S. has had
only a limited capability to produce the core component of
our stockpile weapons: the plutonium pit. To establish a pit
production capability, a 60-year-old research laboratory must
be replaced by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility at Los Alamos. Likewise,
producing uranium components at the 70-year-old facility at
Y-12 in Oak Ridge is an increasing risk that requires
construction of a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF).
Completion of these new facilities will be essential in
meeting life extension program requirements starting in 2020.
Production Capacity: As Secretary Gates stated,
``Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear
power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has
the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.'' The United
States requires a nuclear weapon production capability with
sufficient capacity to satisfy the life extension requirement
of our aging weapons, as well as to provide a ``hedge''
against future technical or political problems. Currently, we
are limited to producing a handful of plutonium pits a year
for one weapon, but are unprepared to produce most of the
remaining pieces of that weapon. Modernization of the NNSA
laboratories and plants is required to correct this issue,
with the stated goal of establishing a ``capability-based''
production capacity. Without this capacity, there can be no
stockpile reductions. In fact, General Chilton argues the
stockpile might have to be increased: ``I would say because
of the lack of a production capacity there's a fear that you
might need to increase your deployed numbers because of the
changing and uncertain strategic environment in the future.''
Life Extension Programs: Under current policy, the
laboratories and plants are constrained to extending the life
of existing warheads to keep them in the stockpile for much
longer than originally expected. Thus, as the weapons age and
concerns are observed, the laboratories and plants determine
how best to repair the weapons. Aging components are
replaced, remanufactured or inspected for reuse in the
stockpile. In performing life extension for the W87 and the
ongoing W76, our experts have discovered that it is very
difficult to reconstitute processes and capabilities that
have been allowed to atrophy. Currently, the W76 warhead is
in LEP production, the B61 LEP study is underway and the NPR
called for an FY2011 start to a W78/W88 LEP study that
will research if the two warheads can be life-extended
simultaneously.
Surveillance: The average age of our current nuclear
weapons is approaching 30 years. To ensure that each warhead
remains reliable, each year approximately 11 warheads per
type should be returned from the military for dismantlement
and evaluation. Components are inspected and tested to ensure
reliable operation. This program aids in the annual
assessment of the stockpile performed by the laboratories and
is the lead mechanism for identifying potential stockpile
issues. Due to inadequate funding, surveillance requirements
have not been met for many years, raising concerns about
confidence in the stockpile.
Deferring Maintenance, Creating Chokepoints: In addition to
the CMRR and UPF construction projects to replace aging
facilities, a significant number of buildings in our
laboratories and plants have been accumulating a backlog of
maintenance. This deferred maintenance creates a substantial
number of facilities that could (and occasionally do) become
a choke point in the progress of a life extension program.
Maintenance can only be deferred for so long, until,
eventually, something breaks; and when it does break, it is
usually much more expensive to replace than routine
maintenance would have cost. Reducing deferred maintenance is
a demonstration that we are moving from a nuclear weapons
complex in decline, to a revitalized and robust capability.
Critical Skills: Perhaps the most significant attribute of
a strong deterrent is the scientific and technical capability
that is present in our laboratories and military complex.
Maintaining those skills, especially as most nuclear-test
experienced weapon designers are past retirement age, is a
growing challenge within the NNSA laboratories and plants.
Hedging: Without a robust production capability, the U.S.
maintains a large non-deployed stockpile as a technical hedge
against stockpile concerns and a political hedge that allows
rapid upload should another nation become increasingly
adversarial. With the technical hedge, if one weapon type
were discovered to have an urgent issue requiring
replacement, alternate components in the force structure
theoretically could be used to compensate for that loss of
capability. For example, W78 warheads on Minuteman III might
be replaced by W87 warheads maintained in storage, and vice-
versa.
Delivery Systems: Nuclear weapon delivery systems require
replacement within the next thirty years. These systems
include:
The B-52H bomber, first deployed in 1961 and scheduled to
be sustained through 2035;
The B-2 penetrating bomber, deployed in 1993 is currently
being updated for long-term sustainment;
The Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), deployed in 1981
and scheduled to be sustained through 2030;
The Minuteman III ICBM, deployed in 1970, undergoing life
extension and scheduled for replacement by 2030;
And the ballistic missile submarines and missiles. Ohio-
class SSBNs were first deployed in 1981 and commence
retirement in 2027. The Trident II Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missile (SLBM), deployed in 1990, will be sustained
through at least 2042, following a life extension.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nebraska.
____________________