[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 151 (Thursday, November 18, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8052-S8053]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong opposition 
to the administration's New START Treaty. I do so after great 
deliberation and after initial disposition to support the treaty 
because of the generic importance of these types of treaties for our 
Nation. But with what I have learned from classified intelligence 
information, I cannot in good conscience support this treaty. I have 
written a classified letter summarizing my views that is available to 
all members in Senate security; I urge them to read it, even as I try 
now with a few unclassified comments to explain my position.
  When the administration announced this new treaty, we were told that 
its goal was to reduce strategic nuclear forces in a manner that would 
make America safer and enhance nuclear stability. That goal may be 
admirable, but unfortunately, the deal the administration has struck 
with Moscow falls well short. Consequently, I believe the 
administration's New START Treaty has been oversold and overhyped.
  The first thing we must all understand about this treaty is that it 
forces the United States to reduce unilaterally our forces, such as 
missiles, bombers, and warheads, in order to meet treaty limits. On the 
other hand, the Russians will actually be allowed to increase their 
deployed forces because they currently fall below the treaty's limits. 
This raises a crucial question: exactly what does the United States 
gain from this treaty in exchange for a one-sided reduction in our 
deployed forces?
  Defenders of this treaty have argued, first, that the treaty places 
no limits on America's plans for missile defense systems, and second, 
that our own military will have the flexibility to deploy our strategic 
forces, such as bombers, submarines, and missiles, in ways that best 
meet our security interests.
  Unfortunately, these explanations simply do not stand up to scrutiny. 
The United States does not need a treaty with Russia, or any other 
country, to be free to pursue the missile defense system we need to 
keep America safe. The United States does not need a treaty to give us 
the flexibility to deploy our strategic forces as we wish.
  Interestingly, the administration's justifications completely dismiss 
the unilateral statement Russia has made to this treaty that claims the 
right to withdraw if we expand our missile defenses. This Russian 
statement is pure and simple manipulation.
  At some point down the road, our Nation will need to expand its 
missile defenses. Because of this unilateral statement, however, the 
reaction from some in the administration or in Congress will be to 
reject any expansion lest we upset the Russians and cause them to pull 
out of this new Treaty. The Russians surely are counting on this 
reaction. Yet in all the rhetoric in support of this treaty, I have not 
heard any reasonable explanation for why we would give Russia this 
lever to use against our legitimate and necessary right to defend 
ourselves against ballistic missile attack.
  For several months, we have listened to the administration's claims 
that New START will make America more secure by strengthening nuclear 
stability. In the ``Show Me'' State, where I come from, and I suspect 
throughout the rest of the country, claims like this need to be backed 
up by facts. But if we cannot verify that the Russians are complying 
with each of the treaty's three central limits, then we have no way of 
knowing whether we are more secure or not.
  The Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this issue 
closely over the past several months. As the vice chairman of this 
committee, I have reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to 
monitor this treaty and heard from our intelligence professionals. 
There is no doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably 
verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.
  As an initial hurdle, the ten annual warhead inspections allowed 
under the treaty permit us to sample only 2 to 3 percent of the total 
Russian force. Further, under New START, unlike its predecessor, any 
given missile can have any number of warheads loaded on it. So even if 
the Russians fully cooperated in every inspection, these inspections 
cannot provide conclusive evidence of whether the Russians are 
complying with the warhead limit.
  Let's take an example: say that the United States found a missile 
that was loaded with more warheads than the Russians declared. While 
this would be a faulty and suspicious declaration by Russia, we could 
not necessarily infer from it that they had violated the 1,550 warhead 
limit--especially because the Russians could always make some excuse 
for a faulty declaration.
  Compounding this verification gap is the current structure of the 
treaty's warhead limits which would allow Russia to prepare legally to 
add very large numbers of warheads to its forces in excess of the 
treaty's limit. For example, the Russians could deploy a missile with 
only one warhead, but legally flight-test it with six warheads to gain 
confidence in the increased capability--a practice they could not 
employ under the original START. The Russians could then store the five 
extra warheads for each such missile nearby, ready to mate them to the 
missile on a moment's notice. All of this would be legal.
  Further, unlike START, this new treaty places no limit on the number 
of nondeployed missiles, so the Russians legally could store spare 
missiles to be mated with the spare warheads. This potential for Russia 
to ``break-out'' of the treaty in a short period of time--perhaps 
without adequate warning to the United States--may undermine the very 
nuclear stability this administration claims this treaty provides.
  Arguably, it also means that, despite the opportunities to cheat, it 
may be even easier for Russia to circumvent legally the limits of this 
treaty. That does not sound to me like a great bargain for the United 
States.
  Because the details on verification and breakout of this treaty are 
classified, I have prepared a full classified assessment that is 
available to any Senator for review. The key points, however, are not 
classified and I believe the Senate and the American public need to 
understand them fully.
  Common sense suggests that the worse a treaty partner's arms control 
compliance record with existing and past treaties, the stronger 
verification must be for any new treaties. So, exactly what is Russia's 
record? According to the official State Department reports on arms 
control compliance, published by this administration and the previous 
administration, the Russians have previously violated, or are still 
violating, important provisions of most of the key arms control 
treaties to which they have been a party, including the original START, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and

[[Page S8053]]

Open Skies. I recommend that my colleagues review the classified 
versions of these reports before any further Senate action is taken on 
this treaty.
  Despite Russia's poor compliance record, the administration has 
decided that we will rely primarily on good Russian cooperation to 
verify New START's key 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. This brings to 
mind the famous adage: fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame 
on me.
  One of the persistent Russian arms control violations of the original 
START was its illegal obstruction of U.S. on-site inspections of 
warheads on certain types of missiles. The only reason these Russian 
violations did not prevent us from verifying START's warhead limits was 
because START limited the capability to deploy warheads through a 
``counting rule'' that could be verified primarily with our own 
intelligence satellites. Unfortunately, New START has discarded this 
critical counting rule, designed to work hand-in-glove with our 
satellites, in favor of reliance on no more than ten sample inspections 
a year--again, just 2 to 3 percent of Russia's force.
  The warhead limit in New START is calculated from the actual number 
of warheads loaded on a missile, and unlike START, this new treaty 
permits any missile to have any number of warheads loaded on it. But no 
satellite can tell us how many warheads are loaded on missiles. 
Therefore, if this treaty is ratified, we will have to rely primarily 
on on-site inspections to verify actual warhead loadings the very same 
kind of inspections that the Russians violated in START. If the 
Russians continue their poor compliance record and obstruct our warhead 
inspections under New START, the consequences will be much more serious 
and will substantially degrade verification.
  The administration is surely aware of these verification and breakout 
problems as there is no shortage of verification gimmicks in this 
treaty. But not even all of them together permit us to verify reliably 
the treaty's warhead limit. So how have treaty enthusiasts responded to 
these problems?
  First, they discard the military significance of possible Russian 
cheating. Our own State Department's verification assessment states 
that:

     any Russian cheating under the Treaty would have little if 
     any effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. 
     strategic forces. In particular, the survivability and 
     response capabilities of [U.S.] strategic submarines and 
     heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale 
     cheating.

  This is not exactly a ringing endorsement. I think it is pretty clear 
that a large-scale breakout would have a seismic impact from a 
geopolitical perspective. It would escalate tensions between the 
superpowers and lead to extreme strategic instability. Even more 
fundamentally, the State Department statement raises a pivotal 
question: If no level of Russian cheating under New START is deemed 
militarily significant, then what is the value of this treaty in the 
first place?
  Second, treaty proponents attempt to draw a parallel to the 
``Moscow'' arms control treaty, signed by President Bush and approved 
95-0 by the Senate. They argue that this treaty has the same kind of 
warhead verification difficulties as New START, therefore critics of 
New START are applying a double-standard. This argument fails on two 
counts: the first being that the Moscow arms control treaty was placed 
on top of the verification measures already in effect for START; and 
second, that the United States had decided unilaterally to move to the 
limits imposed in the Moscow treaty, whether or not Russia reduced to 
them. This is simply not the case for New START. Clearly, the two 
treaties are not comparable from a verification standpoint.
  The administration also argues that our ability to monitor Russian 
forces will be greater with the new treaty than without it. As a 
general proposition, this is true. In actuality, however, the extent of 
the treaty's monitoring benefits could be insignificant or only modest 
in some important respects. This disparity between generalization and 
reality is explained more in my classified paper.
  The bottom line is this: if the chief benefit of this treaty is that 
we will know more about what Russia is doing with its nuclear forces, 
then the same benefit could have been achieved with a much more modest 
confidence-building protocol, one which would not require unilateral 
U.S. force reductions, give Russia a vote on our missile defenses, or 
present impossible verification problems.
  The administration claims that New START is indispensible to reap the 
``Reset'' benefits with Russia. If a fatally flawed arms control 
agreement is the price of admission to the Reset game, our Nation is 
better off if we this one out.
  Similarly, any suggestion by treaty advocates that rejecting the 
treaty weakens the ``good'' Russian leader, Medvedev, and strengthens 
the ``bad'' Russian leader, Putin, should be met with healthy 
skepticism. Now is not the time to fall for a ``good cop--bad cop'' act 
from Moscow.
  In many cases, concerns about particular treaties can be solved 
during the ratification process. I respect my colleagues who are 
attempting to do so with this treaty. Unfortunately, New START suffers 
from fundamental flaws that no amount of tinkering around the edges can 
fix. I believe the better course for our nation, and for global 
stability, is to put this treaty aside and replace it with a better 
one.
  The United States needs, and we in the Senate should demand, a treaty 
that can be reliably verified by our own intelligence assets without 
relying on Russia's good graces, not one that requires unilateral 
reductions or gives Russia a vote on our strategic defenses. I urge my 
colleagues to reject anything less and to take a strong stand for 
America's defense and America's future.

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