[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 150 (Wednesday, November 17, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7965-S7968]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 EXECUTIVE REPORT OF COMMITTEE--TREATY

  The following executive report of committee was submitted during the 
recess of the Senate on October 1, 2010 under the authority of an order 
of the Senate of September 29, 2010:

       By Mr. KERRY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

    [Treaty Doc. 111-5  Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further 
     Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms with 10 
  conditions, 3 understandings, and 13 declarations (Ex. Rept. 111-6)]

       The text of the committee-recommended resolution of advice 
     and consent to ratification is as follows:
       Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein), That the Senate advises and consents to the 
     ratification of the Treaty between the United States of 
     America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
     Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
     signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including 
     Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on 
     Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric 
     Information to the Protocol, all such documents being 
     integral parts of and collectively referred to in this 
     resolution as the ``New START Treaty'' (Treaty Document 111-
     5), subject to the conditions of subsection (a), the 
     understandings of subsection (b), and the declarations of 
     subsection (c).
       (a) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
     following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) General Compliance.--If the President determines that 
     the Russian Federation is acting or has acted in a manner 
     that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the New 
     START Treaty, or is in violation of the New START Treaty, so 
     as to threaten the national security interests of the United 
     States, then the President shall--
       (A) consult with the Senate regarding the implications of 
     such actions for the viability of the New START Treaty and 
     for the national security interests of the United States;
       (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting with the Russian 
     Federation at the highest diplomatic level with the objective 
     of bringing the Russian Federation into full compliance with 
     its obligations under the New START Treaty; and
       (C) submit a report to the Senate promptly thereafter, 
     detailing--
       (i) whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in 
     the national security interests of the United States; and
       (ii) how the United States will redress the impact of 
     Russian actions on the national security interests of the 
     United States.
       (2) Presidential certifications and reports on national 
     technical means.--(A) Prior to the entry into force of the 
     New START Treaty, and annually thereafter, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that United States National 
     Technical Means, in conjunction with the verification 
     activities provided for in the New START Treaty, are 
     sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian 
     compliance with the provisions of the New START Treaty and 
     timely warning of any Russian preparation to break out of the 
     limits in Article II of the New START Treaty. Following 
     submission of the first such certification, each subsequent 
     certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate 
     indicating how United States National Technical Means, 
     including collection, processing, and analytic resources, 
     will be utilized to ensure effective monitoring. The first 
     such report shall include a long-term plan for the 
     maintenance of New START Treaty monitoring. Each subsequent 
     report shall include an update of the long-term plan. Each 
     such report may be submitted in either classified or 
     unclassified form.
       (B) It is the sense of the Senate that monitoring Russian 
     Federation compliance with the New START Treaty is a high 
     priority and that the inability to do so would constitute a 
     threat to United States national security interests.
       (3) Reductions.--(A) The New START Treaty shall not enter 
     into force until instruments of ratification have been 
     exchanged in accordance with Article XIV of the New START 
     Treaty.
       (B) If, prior to the entry into force of the New START 
     Treaty, the President plans to implement reductions of United 
     States strategic nuclear forces below those currently planned 
     and consistent with the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive 
     Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (commonly 
     referred to as ``the Moscow Treaty''), then the President 
     shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such 
     reductions on the national security of the United States; and
       (ii) take no such reductions until the President submits to 
     the Senate the President's determination that such reductions 
     are in the national security interest of the United States.
       (4) Timely warning of breakout.--If the President 
     determines, after consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence, that the Russian Federation intends to break 
     out of the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty, the 
     President shall immediately inform the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Armed Services of the Senate, with a view to 
     determining whether circumstances exist that jeopardize the 
     supreme interests of the United States, such that withdrawal 
     from the New START Treaty may be warranted pursuant to 
     paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.
       (5) United states missile defense test telemetry.--Prior to 
     entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that the New START Treaty does not 
     require, at any point during which it will be in force, the 
     United States to provide to the Russian Federation telemetric 
     information under Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part 
     Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric 
     Information to the Protocol for the launch of--
       (A) any missile defense interceptor, as defined in 
     paragraph 44 of Part One of the Protocol to the New START 
     Treaty;
       (B) any satellite launches, missile defense sensor targets, 
     and missile defense intercept targets, the launch of which 
     uses the first stage of an existing type of United States 
     ICBM or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New 
     START Treaty; or
       (C) any missile described in clause (a) of paragraph 7 of 
     Article III of the New START Treaty.
       (6) Conventional Prompt global strike.--(A) The Senate 
     calls on the executive branch to clarify its planning and 
     intent in developing future conventionally armed, strategic-
     range weapon systems. To this end, prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall provide a 
     report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate containing the following:
       (i) A list of all conventionally armed, strategic-range 
     weapon systems that are currently under development.
       (ii) An analysis of the expected capabilities of each 
     system listed under clause (i).
       (iii) A statement with respect to each system listed under 
     clause (i) as to whether any of the limits in Article II of 
     the New START Treaty apply to such system.
       (iv) An assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of 
     each system.
       (v) A discussion of alternative deployment options and 
     scenarios for each system.
       (vi) A summary of the measures that could help to 
     distinguish each system listed under clause (i) from nuclear 
     systems and reduce the risks of misinterpretation and of a 
     resulting claim that such systems might alter strategic 
     stability.
       (B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be supplemented 
     by a classified annex.
       (C) If, at any time after the New START Treaty enters into 
     force, the President determines that deployment of 
     conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs is required at levels 
     that cannot be accommodated within the limits in Article II 
     of the New START Treaty while sustaining a robust United 
     States nuclear triad, then the President shall immediately 
     consult with the Senate regarding the reasons for such 
     determination.

[[Page S7966]]

       (7) United states telemetric information.--In implementing 
     Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part Seven of the 
     Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the 
     Protocol, prior to agreeing to provide to the Russian 
     Federation any amount of telemetric information on a United 
     States test launch of a conventionally armed prompt global 
     strike system, the President shall certify to the Committees 
     on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate that--
       (A) the provision of United States telemetric information--
       (i) consists of data that demonstrate that such system is 
     not subject to the limits in Article II of the New START 
     Treaty; or
       (ii) would be provided in exchange for significant 
     telemetric information regarding a weapon system not listed 
     in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New START Treaty, or a 
     system not deployed by the Russian Federation prior to 
     December 5, 2009;
       (B) it is in the national security interest of the United 
     States to provide such telemetric information; and
       (C) provision of such telemetric information will not 
     undermine the effectiveness of such system.
       (8) Bilateral consultative commission.--Not later than 15 
     days before any meeting of the Bilateral Consultative 
     Commission to consider a proposal for additional measures to 
     improve the viability or effectiveness of the New START 
     Treaty or to resolve a question related to the applicability 
     of provisions of the New START Treaty to a new kind 
     of strategic offensive arm, the President shall consult 
     with the Chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate with regard 
     to whether the proposal, if adopted, would constitute an 
     amendment to the New START Treaty requiring the advice and 
     consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 
     2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
       (9) United states commitments ensuring the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.--
       (A) The United States is committed to ensuring the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces. It is the 
     sense of the Senate that--
       (i) the United States is committed to proceeding with a 
     robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and 
     modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and 
     capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and 
     performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at the New 
     START Treaty levels and meet requirements for hedging against 
     possible international developments or technical problems, in 
     conformance with United States policies and to underpin 
     deterrence;
       (ii) to that end, the United States is committed to 
     maintaining United States nuclear weapons laboratories and 
     preserving the core nuclear weapons competencies therein; and
       (iii) the United States is committed to providing the 
     resources needed to achieve these objectives, at a minimum at 
     the levels set forth in the President's 10-year plan provided 
     to the Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
     111-84).
       (B) If appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the 
     resource requirements set forth in the President's 10-year 
     plan, or if at any time more resources are required than 
     estimated in the President's 10-year plan, the President 
     shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment or 
     the identification of the requirement for such additional 
     resources, as appropriate, a report detailing--
       (i) how the President proposes to remedy the resource 
     shortfall;
       (ii) if additional resources are required, the proposed 
     level of funding required and an identification of the 
     stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, 
     operation, activity, construction, or project for which 
     additional funds are required;
       (iii) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of United States nuclear forces; 
     and
       (iv) whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought 
     about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national 
     interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New 
     START Treaty.
       (10) Annual report.--As full and faithful implementation is 
     key to realizing the benefits of the New START Treaty, the 
     President shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than 
     January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012, 
     which will provide--
       (A) details on each Party's reductions in strategic 
     offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered 
     into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, 
     during the previous year;
       (B) a certification that the Russian Federation is in 
     compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a 
     detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian 
     Federation;
       (C) a certification that any conversion and elimination 
     procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START 
     Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in 
     ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the 
     New START Treaty, or--
       (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or 
     elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia 
     within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission 
     remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in 
     paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; 
     and
       (ii) a comprehensive explanation of steps the United States 
     has taken with respect to each such case;
       (D) an assessment of the operation of the New START 
     Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including--
       (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise 
     impeded the collection of telemetric information; and
       (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric 
     information; and
       (E) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists 
     that endangers the national security interests of the United 
     States.
       (b) Understandings.--The advice and consent of the Senate 
     to the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
     following understandings, which shall be included in the 
     instrument of ratification:
       (1) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the United 
     States that--
       (A) the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on 
     the deployment of missile defenses other than the 
     requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START 
     Treaty, which states, ``Each Party shall not convert and 
     shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement 
     of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further 
     shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile 
     defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs 
     therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers 
     that were converted prior to signature of this treaty for 
     placement of missile defense interceptors therein.'';
       (B) any additional New START Treaty limitations on the 
     deployment of missile defenses beyond those contained in 
     paragraph 3 of Article V, including any limitations agreed 
     under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, 
     would require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may 
     enter into force for the United States only with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article 
     II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 
     States; and
       (C) the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement by the Russian 
     Federation on missile defense does not impose a legal 
     obligation on the United States.
       (2) Rail-mobile icbms.--It is the understanding of the 
     United States that--
       (A) any rail-mobile-launched ballistic missile with a range 
     in excess of 5,500 kilometers would be an ICBM, as the term 
     is defined in paragraph 37 of Part One of the Protocol (in 
     the English-language numbering), for the purposes of the New 
     START Treaty, specifically including the limits in Article II 
     of the New START Treaty;
       (B) an erector-launcher mechanism for launching an ICBM and 
     the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted would be an 
     ICBM launcher, as the term is defined in paragraph 28 of Part 
     One of the Protocol (in the English-language numbering), for 
     the purposes of the New START Treaty, specifically including 
     the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty;
       (C) if either Party should produce a rail-mobile ICBM 
     system, the Bilateral Consultative Commission would address 
     the application of other parts of the New START Treaty to 
     that system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and XI of 
     the New START Treaty and relevant portions of the Protocol 
     and the Annexes to the Protocol; and
       (D) an agreement reached pursuant to subparagraph (C) is 
     subject to the requirements of Article XV of the New START 
     Treaty and, specifically, if an agreement pursuant to 
     subparagraph (C) creates substantive rights or obligations 
     that differ significantly from those in the New START Treaty 
     regarding a ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' as defined in Part 
     One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty, such agreement 
     will be considered an amendment to the New START Treaty 
     pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article XV of the New START Treaty 
     and will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification.
       (3) Strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon systems.--It is the 
     understanding of the United States that--
       (A) future, strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems that 
     do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New START Treaty 
     will not be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' subject 
     to the New START Treaty;
       (B) nothing in the New START Treaty restricts United States 
     research, development, testing, and evaluation of strategic-
     range, non-nuclear weapons, including any weapon that is 
     capable of boosted aerodynamic flight;
       (C) nothing in the New START Treaty prohibits deployments 
     of strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems; and
       (D) the addition to the New START Treaty of--
       (i) any limitations on United States research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-nuclear 
     weapon systems, including any weapon that is capable of 
     boosted aerodynamic flight; or
       (ii) any prohibition on the deployment of such systems, 
     including any such limitations or prohibitions agreed under 
     the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
     would require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may 
     enter into force for the United States only with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, 
     section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
       (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     the ratification of the New

[[Page S7967]]

     START Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which 
     express the intent of the Senate:
       (1) Missile defense.--(A) It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (i) pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
     (Public Law 106-38), it is the policy of the United States 
     ``to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an 
     effective National Missile Defense system capable of 
     defending the territory of the United States against limited 
     ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, 
     or deliberate)'';
       (ii) defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for 
     new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should 
     deterrence fail; and
       (iii) further limitations on the missile defense 
     capabilities of the United States are not in the national 
     security interest of the United States.
       (B) The New START Treaty and the April 7, 2010, unilateral 
     statement of the Russian Federation on missile defense do not 
     limit in any way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting, 
     activities that the United States Government currently plans 
     or that might be required over the duration of the New START 
     Treaty to protect the United States pursuant to the National 
     Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to protect United States 
     Armed Forces and United States allies from limited ballistic 
     missile attack, including further planned enhancements to the 
     Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and all phases of the 
     Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe.
       (C) Given its concern about missile defense issues, the 
     Senate expects the executive branch to offer regular 
     briefings, not less than twice each year, to the Committees 
     on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on all 
     missile defense issues related to the New START Treaty and on 
     the progress of United States-Russia dialogue and cooperation 
     regarding missile defense.
       (2) Defending the united states and allies against 
     strategic attack.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (A) a paramount obligation of the United States Government 
     is to provide for the defense of the American people, 
     deployed members of the United States Armed Forces, and 
     United States allies against nuclear attacks to the best of 
     its ability;
       (B) policies based on ``mutual assured destruction'' or 
     intentional vulnerability can be contrary to the safety and 
     security of both countries, and the United States and the 
     Russian Federation share a common interest in moving 
     cooperatively as soon as possible away from a strategic 
     relationship based on mutual assured destruction;
       (C) in a world where biological, chemical, and nuclear 
     weapons and the means to deliver them are proliferating, 
     strategic stability can be enhanced by strategic defensive 
     measures;
       (D) accordingly, the United States is and will remain free 
     to reduce the vulnerability to attack by constructing a 
     layered missile defense system capable of countering missiles 
     of all ranges;
       (E) the United States will welcome steps by the Russian 
     Federation also to adopt a fundamentally defensive strategic 
     posture that no longer views robust strategic defensive 
     capabilities as undermining the overall strategic balance, 
     and stands ready to cooperate with the Russian Federation on 
     strategic defensive capabilities, as long as such cooperation 
     is aimed at fostering and in no way constrains the defensive 
     capabilities of both sides; and
       (F) the United States is committed to improving United 
     States strategic defensive capabilities both quantitatively 
     and qualitatively during the period that the New START Treaty 
     is in effect, and such improvements are consistent with the 
     treaty.
       (3) Conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems.--
     Consistent with statements made by the United States that 
     such systems are not intended to affect strategic stability 
     with respect to the Russian Federation, the Senate finds that 
     conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems not co-
     located with nuclear-armed systems do not affect strategic 
     stability between the United States and the Russian 
     Federation.
       (4) Nunn-lugar cooperative threat reduction.--It is the 
     sense of the Senate that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction (CTR) Program has made an invaluable contribution 
     to the security and elimination of weapons of mass 
     destruction, including nuclear weapons and materials in 
     Russia and elsewhere, and that the President should continue 
     the global CTR Program and CTR assistance to Russia, 
     including for the purpose of facilitating implementation of 
     the New START Treaty.
       (5) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the New START 
     Treaty, the President should regulate reductions in United 
     States strategic offensive arms so that the number of 
     accountable strategic offensive arms under the New START 
     Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds 
     the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms 
     possessed by the United States to such an extent that a 
     strategic imbalance endangers the national security interests 
     of the United States.
       (6) Compliance.--(A) The New START Treaty will remain in 
     the interests of the United States only to the extent that 
     the Russian Federation is in strict compliance with its 
     obligations under the New START Treaty.
       (B) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate 
     expects the executive branch to offer regular briefings, not 
     less than four times each year, to the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on compliance 
     issues related to the New START Treaty. Such briefings shall 
     include a description of all United States efforts in United 
     States-Russian diplomatic channels and bilateral fora to 
     resolve any compliance issues and shall include, but would 
     not necessarily be limited to, a description of--
       (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Consultative 
     Commission, in advance of such meetings; and
       (ii) any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral 
     Consultative Commission, within thirty days of such meetings.
       (7) Expansion of strategic arsenals in countries other than 
     russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that if, during the 
     time the New START Treaty remains in force, the President 
     determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic 
     arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty so 
     as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, 
     then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the 
     Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START Treaty 
     remains in the national interest of the United States.
       (8) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition 
     (1) of the resolution of advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols (commonly referred to as the 
     ``INF Treaty''), approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, and 
     condition (8) of the resolution of advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties 
     to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
     November 19, 1990 (commonly referred to as the ``CFE Flank 
     Document''), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997.
       (9) Treaty modification or reinterpretation.--The Senate 
     declares that any agreement or understanding which in any 
     material way modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States 
     or Russian obligations under the New START Treaty, including 
     the time frame for implementation of the New START Treaty, 
     should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent 
     to ratification.
       (10) Consultations.--Given the continuing interest of the 
     Senate in the New START Treaty and in strategic offensive 
     reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with 
     national security requirements and alliance obligations of 
     the United States, the Senate expects the President to 
     consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to 
     paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.
       (11) Tactical nuclear weapons.--(A) The Senate calls upon 
     the President to pursue, following consultation with allies, 
     an agreement with the Russian Federation that would address 
     the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles 
     of the Russian Federation and of the United States and would 
     secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable 
     manner.
       (B) Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced 
     in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical 
     nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the 
     security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to 
     engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of--
       (i) establishing cooperative measures to give each Party to 
     the New START Treaty improved confidence regarding the 
     accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons 
     maintained by the other Party; and
       (ii) providing United States or other international 
     assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate 
     accounting and security of its tactical nuclear weapons.
       (12) Further strategic arms reductions.--(A) Recognizing 
     the obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow on July 1, 1968, ``to pursue negotiations in good 
     faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
     nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear 
     disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete 
     disarmament under strict and effective international 
     control,'' and in anticipation of the ratification and entry 
     into force of the New START Treaty, the Senate calls upon the 
     other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early 
     consideration to corresponding reductions of their own 
     nuclear arsenals.
       (B) The Senate declares that further arms reduction 
     agreements obligating the United States to reduce or limit 
     the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in any 
     militarily significant manner may be made only pursuant to 
     the treaty-making power of the President as set forth in 
     Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
     United States.
       (13) Modernization and replacement of united states 
     strategic delivery vehicles.--In accordance with paragraph 1 
     of Article V of the New START Treaty, which states that, 
     ``Subject to the provisions of this treaty, modernization and 
     replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried

[[Page S7968]]

     out,'' it is the sense of the Senate that United States 
     deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of 
     strategic delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States 
     is committed to accomplishing the modernization and 
     replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and 
     to ensuring the continued flexibility of United States 
     conventional and nuclear delivery systems.

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