[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 133 (Wednesday, September 29, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7736-S7737]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEFENSE MODERNIZATION
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I read an article from the October 2010
edition of the Defense Technology International this morning that
discussed military and other technology advances. Entitled ``Big Guns:
China muscles up artillery punch,'' this article details China's
efforts in the development of artillery and rocket systems and the
associated doctrine they have created. Specifically, it addresses
Chinese efforts in research and development in areas such as computer-
based fire control, digital communication, and command capabilities,
use of sophisticated radars and jammers, and the development of ramjet
powered and stealth coated artillery shells, to name a few key areas.
Though not necessarily new items of research and development for the
United States, China's efforts in these areas tells me one thing: China
is pursuing modernization and development initiatives that, based on
our recent history of research and development specific to artillery
and rockets, may be superior if they are not at least equal to our
efforts
Now let me shift same gears to another potential peer country: Russia
and its fifth-generation fighter development. In the same context as
China's efforts in artillery and rocket capability, Russia is pursuing
the deployment of a fifth-generation fighter, known as the PAK FA
advanced tactical frontline fighter. Russia has publicly stated that
this aircraft is the peer to the F-22. This aircraft, together with
upgraded fourth-generation fighters, will define Russian Air Force
potential for the next several decades and will challenge our aviation
efforts without question. And don't think that China isn't developing
their own fifth-generation aircraft; they are. It is called the JA-12
it is also going to go head to head with our F-22.
The point to this is not a comparison of capabilities or numbers but
a public reinforcement of an assessment I have maintained for a long
time. We, the United States of America, are not taking our future
national security seriously, because we are failing to focus on
maintaining the edge that we have had for the last several decades.
So where is the United States in terms of future military hardware
necessary to maintain that edge? Did you know that the oldest combat
vehicle in the Army inventory is the M109A6 Paladin howitzer and we are
on the sixth version of this vehicle which is built around a
refurbished chassis circa 1963? The Army's answer to artillery
modernization has been the Crusader, which was supposed to replace the
Paladin, the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon as part of FCS, the Non-Line-of-
Sight Launch System, another FCS related system, and now the Paladin
Integrated Management, or PIM program, which is a modification of the
Paladin to a Bradley chassis. All but the PIM program have been
cancelled in the last 8 years or so, and the PIM program has been
delayed in production.
Current Army fleets of armored personnel carriers, tanks, wheeled
vehicles, and helicopters were developed and procured 30 to 60 years
ago. DOD and the President's answer to that: cancel FCS, with no viable
replacement options, and continue to ``upgrade'' current fleets of
Bradleys an Abrams tanks until the next-generation ground combat
vehicle can be figured out.
Our strategic bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s and B-2s vary in age from
10 to 30 years. The SECDEF has publicly stated in the press and in
Congress that 2020 will be the first time we see a new bomber, which
means that current airframes will have to remain in service until at
least 2040.
One of our two fifth-generation aircraft, the F-22, the peer to the
Russian's PAK FA and Chinese JA-12, has had the production line
cancelled with only 187 aircraft built out of a requested 750, pulling
us in a ``high risk'' state for air dominance. The other fifth-
generation aircraft, the F-35, will not be ready until at least 2015,
has suffered significant cost and timing problems, and will be 250
aircraft less than the requested 1,240.
Our Ohio class Trident submarines, the ones that deliver ballistic
missiles from the sea, are an average of 20 years old. Replacement
builds don't start till 2019 and won't be finished until 2028. As well,
the administration remains opaque about plans for replacement of the
30-year-old air-launched cruise missile which is a critical component
of our nuclear and long-range conventional strike capability. This is
the same for our Minuteman ICBM, which is decades old as well.
I am convinced well beyond any reasonable doubt that we are heading
down a slippery slope due to a shortsighted and dangerous strategy from
our current administration. The litany of programs cancelled, modified,
or mismanaged over the last two budget periods is minf-boggling--FCS,
F-22, F-35, NLOS-C and LS, PIM, missile defense, nuclear stockpile,
surface and submarine ships, strategic bombers--the list is
overwhelming.
I, for one, will not let this happen. I will continue to voice my
concerns over this issue. I will continue to fight for a flat
expenditure of at least 4 percent of GDP spent on defense to ensure
that this country continues to have the best military in the world. I
will continue to press the administration to do more for the future of
our national security.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article
``Big Guns'' to which I referred.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Defense Technology International, Oct. 2010]
Big Guns--China Muscles Up Artillary Punch
(By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.)
The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military
Balance 2010 report places China third in the number of
artillery systems it fields, after Russia and North Korea.
But China doubtless exceeds both in resource commitment and
breadth of artillery investments. Credited with an estimated
17,700-plus towed, self-propelled and rocket systems, the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) has at least 56 artillery
systems in use, development or available for export. The U.S.
Army and Marine Corps, by contrast, have 8,187-plus artillery
pieces of roughly 10 types.
[[Page S7737]]
China has had a mixed record of using artillery for
military and political-military goals. Its successes as when
it routed Indian forces in 1962 with the high-altitude use of
artillery and mortars, have been offset by incidents
provoking third-party responses or leading to regional
standoffs. Examples include the shelling of islands
controlled by Taiwan in 1955-58, resulting in U.S.
intervention and a stalemate over the Taiwan Strait. In July,
a unit based in the Nanjing military region fired missiles
from 300-mm. PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) into the
Yellow Sea to show China's anger at U.S. naval exercises with
South Korea. The exercises, a result of China-backed North
Korea's sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonon in March,
went ahead anyway.
China evolution as an artillery power stems from Soviet and
Russian influences dating to the Korean War Soviet artillery
and training improved PLA artillery operations during the war
and led to the formation of the first formal artillery
command. Soviet aid continued through the 1950s, and by the
time of the Sin-Soviet split of the 1960s, China was
producing copies or modified versions of Soviet pieces.
The PLA makes extensive use of Soviet-origin 152-, 130- and
122-mm. calibers, though Western calibers such as the 155-
and 105-mm. are seeing greater use. China purchased the
Russian 9A52 Smerch 300-mm. MRL in the 1990s, and the PLA
produced a near facsimile in the A-100/PHL-03 MRL. The 155-
mm. PLZ-05 self-propelled artillery system that emerged in
2005 bears an uncanny resemblance to the Russian 2519 MSTA.
In the 1990s, PLA artillery was affected by reforms in
strategy (its closest concept to doctrine) and organization.
Toward the end of the decade, the PLA was immersed in
strategy goals of ``informatization'' and ``mechanization.''
The former included the broad application of improving
information technologies, which for artillery included new
computer-based fire controls and ever-improving digital
communication and command linkages. PLA artillery units
increasingly include flrefinding counter-battery radar such
as the 50-km.-range (31-mi.) SLC-2 and Type 704, and use
sophisticated electronic warfare systems such as the Russian
SPR-2 radio fuse jammer, a possible Chinese facsimile and
possibly a recently revealed artillery radar jammer.
Artillery recon vehicles and recon troops feature advanced
optronic and digital communication capabilities. In addition,
PLA artillery units have sophisticated meteorological
capabilities and use muzzle velocity radar to improve
accuracy.
Mechanization put renewed emphasis on developing tracked
and wheeled self-propelled tubed artillery, with rocket
artillery largely truck-mounted. This trend was emphasized in
late 2004 when Chinese Communist Party and PLA leader Hu
Jintao enunciated the PLAs new ``historic missions,'' a
euphemism for invasions, which call on the PLA to defend
state interests abroad. It is likely that new medium-weight
artillery systems based on airmobile armored personnel
carriers will follow for these strategic missions.
Organic PLA artillery units have decreased in size,
following the pattern of general large-scale troop
reductions. When combined with ``informatization'' advances,
this will permit many infantry and armored divisions to be
reformed into mechanized brigades. However, in a counter-
trend that emphasizes their continued importance, the PLA
maintains five independent artillery divisions and 20
independent brigades. Of these, two divisions and six
brigades are stationed in the Shenyang and Beijing military
regions, for potential Korean contingencies. Three divisions
and eight brigades are in the Nanjing Guangzhou and Jinan
military regions, for Taiwan contingencies.
Among artillery systems, mortars include a 60-mm. hand-held
system used by infantry and special forces. The new Type 93
60-mm. fixed mortar weighs 22.4 kg. (49.2 lb.) and fires 20
rounds/min. to 5.5 km. There are also fixed W91 and W87 81-
mm. mortars that fire to 8 km. and 5.6 km., respectively. The
PLA has largely copied Russia's Vasilyek 81-mm. automatic
mortar, called the W99 or SM-4, which comes in a towed
version or mounted in a Hummer-like vehicle. It fires four
rounds in 2 sec. out to 6.2 km. The W86 120-mm. towed mortar
weighs 206 kg. and fires 20 rounds/min. to 4.7 km.
In 2001, the PLA revealed the PLL-05 mobile mortar based on
the Russian 120-mm. 2S23 NONA-SVK that it purchased in the
1990s, but mounted on a WZ-551 6 X 6 armored personnel
carrier (APC). It fires a rocket-assisted round 13.5 km. In
2007, the PLA revealed a laser-guided 120-mm. mortar round,
though it is not clear if it is in service.
Towed and self-propelled tubed systems dominate artillery
units. The largest number of towed guns are likely the 122-
mm. versions. These include the Type-96, based on the Russian
D-30, with a 360-deg. traversing base, and the simpler Type-
83. Their rocket-assisted rounds have a 27-km. range. The
Type-59 130-mm. towed gun fires a rocket-assisted round 44
km. Of heavy towed artillery, the 152-mm. Type-66, a copy of
the Russian D-20, is most numerous and fires rocket-assisted
rounds 28 km. In 1999, the PLA revealed the 155-mm. PLL01/WA
021 towed artillery system, based on the Austrian Noricum GH
N-45, which fires a rocket-assisted round 50 km. The PLL01
and the Type-66 fire 155- and 152-mm. versions of the Russian
Krasnopol laser-guided shell.
Self-propelled tubed artillery includes the PLL02, which
places the Type-86 100-mm. gun on a WZ-551 APC. In 2009, the
PLA revealed the new Type-07 122-mm. tracked artillery
system, which features hull and electronic improvements over
the previous Type-89 Tracked 122-mm. system. In 2009,
photographs appeared on the Internet of the SH-3, a truck-
mounted 122-mm. artillery system with digital control systems
in a hatch over the cab.
Heavy self-propelled systems include the 155-mm. PLZ-05,
which has a version of the PLL01 gun, and appeared in 2005.
It is replacing the 152-mm. Type-83, which entered service in
1983. The PLZ-05 also fires the Krasnopol laser-guided
projectile and a rocket-assisted round 50 km., and is capable
of flat-trajectory antitank fire. Unconfirmed reports state
the PLZ-05 has an automatic gun-loading system and weighs 35
tons.
PLA investments in rocket artillery are impressive. A five-
wheel all-terrain vehicle has been modified to carry a 107-
mm. MRL for experimental mechanized special forces units. The
tracked Type-89 and more recent Type-90 truck-mounted 122-mm.
MRL feature self-contained 40-round rocket reloaders. In
addition, the Smerch-derived 12-round PHL-03, which
reportedly fires a 150-km.-range missile, is entering
increasing numbers of artillery units. The latest AR1A export
variant features a modular U.S. MLR system-style 5-round
rocket carrier, which speeds reloading. In 2009, Norinco
revealed an as yet unidentified truck carrier for this 5-
round rocket box, similar to Lockheed Martin's High-Mobility
Artillery Rocket System.
The PLA is also investing in larger MRL systems. The 400-
mm. WS-2D reportedly has a range of 400 km., and one payload
features three ``killer unmanned aerial vehicles,'' according
to a Chinese report. An earlier 200-km.-range version, the
WS-3, uses navigation satellite guidance to achieve a
remarkable 50-meter (164-ft.) circular error probable. The WS
family complements the 150-km.-range P-12 and 250-km. B-611M
maneuverable navsat-guided short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs), which could supplement or replace the PLA's two
brigades of 300-600-km. DF-11A SRBMs.
New artillery systems are entering amphibious and airborne
units for possible missions abroad. PLA marine and army
amphibious units are receiving the Type-07B tracked 122-mm.
amphibious artillery system, which places the gun from the
Type-07 on a larger hull. Airborne units are equipped with a
version of the Type-96 122-mm. gun, but a new tracked
airmobile APC may feature a mortar or gun system. The ZBD-09
122-mm. gun system could eventually feature in airmobile army
units. Future artillery systems may feature electromagnetic
launch, an area of extensive research. The PLA is also
interested in ramjet-powered and stealth-coated artillery
shells.
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