[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 124 (Wednesday, September 15, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7098-S7102]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise to speak in morning business
about the military construction issue I spoke about in July. I raised
concerns then about the Pentagon's overseas military construction
program, particularly in Germany, Korea, and Guam, because, as the
ranking member of the Military Construction Subcommittee, I am seeing
that we are changing a strategy. Yet we have not had the strategy
explained to us. This is the beginning of a huge taxpayer-funded influx
of rebuilding overseas in a way that I think is perhaps duplicative and
even against the interests that have been shown in our previous
strategy. I think it is time to take a pause.
I rise to speak because the GAO has just released a study this week
that says we should take a pause. The Military Construction
Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Johnson--and I respect and appreciate
his leadership in this so much--asked the GAO to do a study because we
were seeing the Army coming in and asking for what is going to be a
commitment for $1 to $2 billion to change their headquarters from
Heidelberg to Wiesbaden and to add more BCTs than were originally
intended to stay in Germany. We looked at this and said: Wait a minute.
We are getting ready to duplicate a lot of effort that we have made in
bases in America and at a great taxpayer expense. Yet we are not seeing
the backup and the strategy proposed to support this kind of taxpayer
expense.
Let me start back in the beginning. Prior to the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Army planned to return the four brigade combat
teams stationed in Europe to the United States in fiscal years 2012 and
2013. It would save millions annually in overseas stationing costs.
This was in response to the Overseas Basing Commission--that was passed
by Congress--to adopt a force projection strategy. The Pentagon is
reversing the recent efforts to transform the military and restation
tens of thousands of military personnel back on U.S. soil. That is what
the Overseas Basing Commission recommended, passed by Congress,
supported by Congress, and now we seem to see a change in that strategy
but without a projection of what the strategy would be.
What the Overseas Basing Commission found, and the Pentagon
originally agreed with, is that training and deployment of forces was
determined to be superior in the U.S. bases and certainly more cost
efficient. We learned that there were constraints on transferring the
members of our military into Iraq because we could not use the airspace
of certain European countries, and we could not go on the train through
certain European countries. It was costly to get our troops from
Germany into Iraq, more costly than it should have been.
In addition, there are training constraints. The Overseas Basing
Commission saw this. Many of us who have looked at bases overseas see
that there are training constraints. There are constraints for live
artillery training. There are constraints for use of the airspace. In
looking at this, it was determined we should bring them home from
Germany to train in America to accommodate our families in America and
to deploy from America, where we would control the capability to deploy
quickly and cost efficiently.
On that basis, we have invested $14 billion in U.S. bases to
accommodate the military and the families who were projected to come to
American bases and have the training capabilities they need. Now we are
seeing requests for military construction, and it triggered our
committee to say: Wait a minute. We are supposed to be pulling out of
Germany, but now we are seeing the Army get ready to put $1 billion to
$4 billion into military construction, to change their headquarters
from Heidelberg to Wiesbaden, and duplicate what we have already done
in the United States for construction projects in Europe, Korea, and
Guam, without demonstrating the cost efficiencies or projected future
costs.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has used 5 minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Hearing no
objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Senator from Maryland.
Now we are seeing an expensive and duplicative strategy--well, there
is not a strategy but request for spending. I am asking for a strategy.
The Government Accountability Office did issue a report this week
that says the Army's justification for keeping the forces in Europe was
based on a flawed analysis, and it would cost taxpayers up to $2
billion, from 2012 to 2021, to pay for it. Let me reference a couple
things from the report. The GAO found the decision to retain brigades
in Europe to require the Army to seek roughly $176 million annually to
support the Bamberg and Swineford communities, again in fiscal year
2013. Those are the communities that would have had Army facilities.
The Army now estimates that not returning two of the four BCTs,
brigade combat teams, in Europe to the United States could potentially
cost between $1 billion and $2 billion between fiscal years 2012 and
2021. It will cost an average of 360 million American dollars per year
to retain those units in Europe that were scheduled to be moved to
America.
Closing the Heidelberg facility and moving the headquarters to
Wiesbaden--the Army estimated that move from Heidelberg to go to
Wiesbaden would save hundreds of millions of dollars in 2013. But the
GAO found the Army now admits they will need $150 million annually to
support the continuing operation in Heidelberg because of delays.
The GAO goes on to say that the Army has not documented the savings,
nor why the move is necessary at that cost. The GAO concludes that with
over $1.3 billion invested since 2004 and another $1.4 billion in
infrastructure investments planned for the Wiesbaden consolidation and
the recapitalization of medical facilities and the potential to
increase costs, it would cost up to $2 billion over the next 10 years
if all four BCTs were kept in the Europe. The financial stakes are
high.
The GAO is recommending in its report that the Secretary of Defense
take advantage of a pause before final decisions are made on the Army's
European force structure, conduct a comprehensive analysis of
alternatives, and have a process that is credible in determining what
the costs are and whether those units should be kept in Europe or, as
originally planned and as invested in our military bases in America,
what it is going to cost.
The GAO has concluded that we need a comprehensive analysis.
It conducted important cost-benefit analyses at the urging of the
Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee, chaired by
Senator Johnson. The GAO report findings are instructive. I hope the
Pentagon will pause and take a fresh look at this military construction
program to determine, does it serve our Nation not to move those troops
back? We prepared the bases for them. The families, the medical units,
are in the United States now. So, please, I am asking the Pentagon to
determine if it does serve our best military strategy and our taxpayers
to keep those troops in Europe rather than moving them back.
I want to thank Senator Johnson for including a provision in the
military construction/VA appropriations bill that would restrict the
level of spending in overseas construction. Our bill would restrict the
use of MILCON funds for Germany until the Department of Defense
completes the following: an evaluation of the NATO strategy concept
review, the U.S. assessment of its defense posture in Europe, a front-
end assessment of DOD's global posture from fiscal year 2012 to 2016 in
the program budget review cycle.
I have shared my concerns with the Secretary of Defense. I have asked
him, as our committee has asked him, to provide to the Congressional
defense committees a comprehensive Army basing strategy for Europe
based on these assessments and a projected timeline and a cost estimate
of what this will be.
In Korea, it is the same. We need a cost estimate for the decision
that the Pentagon has apparently made to put more troops and families
into Korea without any accommodation for the new facilities that will
be needed for the accompanied families' military transfer into Korea.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.
[[Page S7099]]
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank you for allowing me to have the extra 5
minutes. I thank the Senator from Maryland. This is a serious issue.
The Department of Defense says they are trying to cut back on military
spending, and this is a place that would be very important, because if
we are going to have accompanied service people, more in Korea now, we
have got to accommodate those families. There will be a longer duration
of mission, and we have got to accommodate them.
There is going to be a cost, and we have not even seen the cost
estimates for that yet. We should take a pause on this German MILCON
until we know if that is the right thing for our global strategy. I
thank the Senator from Maryland for accommodating me on the time. There
will be further discussion, I assure you.
I ask unanimous consent that the summary from the GAO report be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Government
Accountability Office,
Washington, DC, September 13, 2010.
Subject: Defense planning: DOD needs to review the costs and
benefits of basing alternatives for Army forces in
Europe.
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate.
Hon. Tim Johnson,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans
Affairs, and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate.
Summary
Keeping more Army forces in Europe than originally planned
would result in significant additional costs; however, it is
unclear the extent to which DOD plans to weigh these costs
against the benefits of having additional forces overseas,
especially in light of an evolving European strategic concept
and U.S. posture plans. In the near term, delays in decisions
associated with two initiatives will impact the Army's costs
in Europe. First, prior to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review, the Army had planned to return two of four brigade
combat teams stationed in Europe to the United States in
fiscal years 2012 and 2013, which would have saved millions
annually in overseas stationing costs by allowing the closure
of installations located at Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany.
However, these plans are on hold pending an announcement of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's strategic concept
planned to be announced in November 2010, as well as ongoing
U.S. assessments of the global defense posture, which have a
less clear time frame for completion. The decision to retain
these brigades in Europe will require the Army to seek
funding of roughly $176 million annually to support the
Bamberg and Schweinfurt communities beginning in fiscal year
2013, according to Army estimates. Second, U.S. Army Europe
estimated that closing Heidelberg and moving its headquarters
to Wiesbaden would save hundreds of millions of dollars
annually beginning in 2013. However, because of uncertainty
for the funding of construction in Wiesbaden, Heidelberg will
remain open longer than originally planned and the previously
estimated savings will be delayed by 2 years or more. As a
result, the Army estimates it will need approximately $150
million annually to support continued operations. Both our
review and an analysis performed by the Army found gaps in
the support used to justify the decision to close Heidelberg
and consolidate forces in Wiesbaden. Our work revealed that
the original analyses were poorly documented, limited in
scope, and based on questionable assumptions. Department of
the Army officials also found the U.S. Army Europe's original
analysis inadequate and performed another more detailed
analysis in mid-2009 that affirmed the decision to
consolidate but lowered the estimated savings. In the longer
term, if DOD decides not to return two of the four Brigade
Combat Teams in Europe to the United States the incremental
cost could be significant. The Army estimates that, depending
upon the assumptions used, it will potentially cost between
$1 billion and $2 billion more from fiscal years 2012-2021 to
keep the two brigades in Europe than it would cost to return
them to the United States. DOD is reconsidering retaining the
brigades in Europe in part because senior military officials
in Europe have said that four brigade combat teams in Europe
are needed to meet operational and mission requirements.
According to DOD officials, the evaluation of U.S. forces in
Europe will be primarily focused on whether four combat
brigades will be retained in Europe. DOD and Army guidance
call for the department to consider alternatives as part of
the economic analyses conducted when contemplating
construction or real property acquisition, which are
decisions that often arise in the basing decision process,
but we found that prior analyses have been limited in scope,
or based on assumptions that were questionable. Without a
comprehensive analysis, the Army may lack sufficient
information to determine the most cost effective approach to
maintaining a continued military presence in Europe that will
align with the evolving North Atlantic Treaty Organization
strategic concept and U.S. defense posture.
Once DOD determines its force structure and basing plans
for a region, it then needs to determine the types and
quantities of facilities necessary to provide operational and
quality of life support to its soldiers and families;
however, we were unable to validate whether completed or
planned facilities in Europe would meet Army facility
planning criteria because U.S. Army Europe planners use
inconsistent processes to generate facility requirements. The
Army in Europe does not consistently use the official Army
facility planning tools that are designed to calculate, using
population data and facility space criteria, the facilities
required to accommodate forces and ensure that quality-of-
life and other facility standards are met. Army officials
stated that its facility planning systems do not always
include current force structure and installation population
data because overseas basing decisions are sensitive and not
reflected in the systems before public announcements are
made. The Army's systems showed populations at some
installations even after anticipated closure dates, making
the requirements generated by the systems inaccurate. Army
planners in Europe use unofficial, locally developed systems
to determine requirements, and we found that planners at
different installations were not using consistent methods to
calculate requirements for barracks and other facilities. The
Army planners in Europe told us that they are developing
their own criteria for determining the requirements that
varies among the installations. Because these alternative
methods are not linked with the Army's official system and
its resident facility criteria and vary among the
installations, we were unable to determine if completed and
planned facilities will meet the Army's quality-of-life and
other facility planning criteria. Our inability to validate
infrastructure requirements reflects systemic issues that
have been brought to the Army's attention, but have not yet
been resolved. For example, in a June 2010 report addressing
domestic facility requirements, we reported that the Army's
Real Property Planning and Analysis System did not always
produce reliable results for some types of facilities because
the systems have often relied on data that were not complete,
current, or accurate. Until the Army has a process to
calculate facility requirements based on current and accurate
information, the department cannot be assured that planned
Army facilities in Europe will meet quality-of-life and other
facility standards.
We are recommending that DOD require the Army to conduct a
comprehensive analysis of alternatives for stationing forces
in Europe that, at a minimum, should be done as expeditiously
as possible upon the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's strategic concept announcement and consider
the costs and benefits of a range of force structure and
basing alternatives. Additionally, we are recommending that
the Army develop a consistent process to determine specific
facility requirements associated with the various basing
options. In written comments on a draft of this
correspondence, DOD stated that it concurred with our
recommendations and have already initiated a strategy-based
assessment of U.S. defense posture to be completed by the end
of calendar year 2010 and that the Army intends to develop a
central, on line classified site containing Army Stationing
and Installation Plan population data that will reflect out-
year stationing decisions that are classified due to host-
nation sensitivity.
Background
Since 2004, as part of DOD's Integrated Global Presence and
Basing Strategy, the Army has drawn down its forces in Europe
and consolidated remaining forces and infrastructure at fewer
locations. As a result, according to Army officials these
efforts have resulted in significant recurring savings. As
shown in figure 1, the Army's plan called for reducing the
number of permanent, or enduring, major installations in
Europe to six located in Germany at Wiesbaden, Baumholder,
Kaiserslautern, Grafenwoehr, Stuttgart, and Ansbach, and one
located in Italy at Vicenza. Figure 1 also shows
installations located in Germany at Schweinfurt and Bamberg
that the Army originally planned to close; however, the
status of these installations is now uncertain because of the
February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review tentative decision
to retain forces in Europe pending a global force posture
review.
From fiscal years 2004 to 2009, the Army spent
approximately $1.3 billion dollars to support its
infrastructure transformation and consolidation plans in
Europe, The majority of this investment was used to undertake
two main efforts: (1) the consolidation of operational forces
close to Europe's training facilities at Grafenwoehr, Germany
and (2) the consolidation of the U.S. Army Europe's Airborne
Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. In and around
Grafenwoehr, the Army spent about $473 million on facilities.
These included new or renovated operational complexes,
maintenance and operations centers, and barracks to support
Army brigade combat teams and other units. Other work at
Grafenwoehr included upgrading a medical and dental facility
and constructing a new post exchange and commissary, dining
facility, physical fitness center, as well as numerous other
facilities to
[[Page S7100]]
support unit operations, the soldiers, and their families.
Looking forward, the Army is planning military construction
to build barracks facilities at Grafenwoehr to meet the
current barracks standard, though this was not part of the
original transformation and consolidation plan. At Vicenza,
Italy, the Army has spent about $424 million on facilities to
accommodate an expected increase in the forces stationed in
Italy. The Army's construction and renovation projects
include headquarters and maintenance buildings, barracks,
child development centers, and schools at various locations
around Vicenza. The remainder of the Army's investment,
including Payment-in-Kind and Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization funds, were used to support transformation and
consolidation-related projects throughout Germany, including
at Ansbach, Heidelberg, and Kaiserslautern, among others.
In addition to the Army's projects at Grafenwoehr and
Vicenza, the Army and TRICARE Management Activity have plans
for two major infrastructure projects to support forces in
Europe at a cost of almost $1.4 billion. These include
construction of an Army headquarters facility at Wiesbaden,
Germany and construction of a replacement regional medical
center adjacent to Ramstein Air Base near Kaiserslautern,
Germany. Moving and consolidating several Army headquarters
from Heidelberg and other locations to Wiesbaden is the last
step in the U.S. Army Europe's transformation and
consolidation plan that began in 2004. According to U.S. Army
Europe officials, consolidating the headquarters would
optimize command and control, intelligence, and signal
capabilities; provide a more responsive organizational
structure; offer better force protection options than at the
current location in Heidelberg; and provide access to a
nearby Army airfield. The Wiesbaden location would include a
theater-level command and control center, a consolidated
intelligence center, and a network warfare center at a cost
of approximately $240 million. The first increment of $59.5
million was appropriated for fiscal year 2009 to build the
command and control center and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers began design work for the facility in the first
quarter of the fiscal year 2010. DOD's second project is to
replace the regional medical center located in Landstuhl and
the Medical Clinic at Ramstein Air Base in Germany with a new
consolidated medical center adjacent to Ramstein Air Base
near Kaiserlautern, Germany at a cost projected at $1.2
billion. According to DOD, this project is being driven by
the effort to recapitalize medical facilities worldwide, and
was not part of the effort to transform and consolidate Army
forces in Europe. The medical center is a major hospital that
provides primary care for more than 40,000 military personnel
and 245,000 beneficiaries in the European Command. The
facility also provides medical support for casualties that
are air-evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan: wounded
personnel are flown into Ramstein Air Base and then taken by
bus to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, approximately 20
minutes away. According to TRICARE Management Activity
officials, a 2002-2003 Army Medical Department study
recommended that DOD renovate and add to the existing
hospital in Landstuhl. However, in 2009, the Senate
Appropriations Committee directed DOD to complete a site
assessment for this approach and the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)
conducted a new analysis that included consideration of
alternative sites. One of the reasons officials decided upon
the new construction adjacent to Ramstein Air Base was
because it allows for easier access to the airfield where
wounded personnel arrive from combat zones.
Many defense organizations are involved in force structure
and basing decisions. According to Army, Joint Staff and DOD
guidance, unit commanders, U.S. Army Europe, and European
Command are responsible for providing analytical support and
coordinating proposed basing actions. For example, for
stationing actions and unit moves, commanders of units
stationed in Europe will review the mission, operational
facilities, base support, available resources, potentially
including available funds, and political and environmental
effects of the proposed basing action. For force structure
changes, Army Headquarters or U.S. Army Europe obtains input
and comments from affected commands, including European
Command, the functional combatant commands and the component
commands. Army Headquarters transmits the resulting proposal
to the Joint Staff and requests approval by the Secretary of
Defense. European Command conducts an assessment of the
implications of potential force structure changes, to inform
the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense of the
relative values or benefits and costs or risks. The
assessment includes political-military, operational risk,
force structure, infrastructure, and resource implications of
the proposed change, and it should address alternatives
considered, where applicable.
Future Plans for Army Forces in Europe Are Uncertain, but Costs Are
Likely to Be Higher Than Earlier Army Estimates
Keeping the four brigades in Europe will require the Army
to seek funds to keep installations open in the near term
(fiscal years 2013 and 2014) and future decisions about force
structure could result in $1 billion to $2 billion in
incremental costs in the long term if four combat brigades,
rather than two, are retained. The Army's force structure in
Europe is subject to the results of several pending reviews
including a comprehensive review of U.S. defense posture
worldwide. To date, however, DOD has not announced the
details of the scope and timing for the completion of this
comprehensive review.
Retaining forces in Europe will require the Army to spend
additional funds, lowering anticipated near-term savings
Delays and changes in decisions will require the Army to
seek hundreds of millions of dollars more annually than
planned to support facilities in Europe that they originally
intended to close. As part of its plans to return two brigade
combat teams stationed in Europe to the United States in
fiscal years 2012 and 2013, U.S. Army Europe intended to
close installations located at Bamberg and Schweinfurt,
Germany. However, the decision to retain these brigades in
Europe delays or eliminates these savings and, according to
Installation Management Command-Europe, will require the Army
to seek funding of roughly $176 million annually beginning in
fiscal year 2013 to support base operations at these two
communities.
In addition, U.S. Army Europe planned hundreds of millions
in savings by closing Heidelberg and consolidating in
Wiesbaden by 2013 and did not program funding to operate this
installation beyond 2012. However, because of uncertainty for
the funding of construction in Wiesbaden, Heidelberg will
remain open longer than originally planned and the previously
estimated savings will be delayed by 2 years or more. As a
result, the Army estimates it will need approximately $150
million annually to support continued operations.
Both our review and the subsequent analyses performed by
the Army found gaps in the support used to justify the
decision to close Heidelberg and consolidate forces in
Wiesbaden. The original analyses were poorly documented,
limited in scope, and based on questionable assumptions. Army
and DOD guidance describing economic analyses to support
military construction projects or decisions about the
acquisition of real property indicate that reasonable
alternatives should be considered when contemplating
projects. For example, DOD Instruction 7041.3 indicates that
the analyses should address alternatives that consider the
availability of existing facilities and estimated costs and
benefits, among other factors. Similarly, Army Pamphlet 415-3
identifies the consideration and evaluation of alternatives
as sound economic principles underlying the economic analyses
to be performed in support of military construction projects.
When we asked to see the original analyses for the 2005
decision, U.S. Army Europe officials provided us with an
information paper that had been prepared in response to our
request but did not produce documentation to support the
original decision. Little detail was available about the
alternatives that had been considered, or how quantitative
criteria (like cost savings) and qualitative criteria (like
force protection and access to airfields) were weighed in the
decision. Army officials told us that alternatives to
Wiesbaden had been considered in discussions, and that these
were rejected in favor of Wiesbaden. In addition, although
they noted that estimated cost savings was one of the key
reasons for the decision, they also told us that the decision
was primarily based on judgment. Furthermore, according to
DOD officials, the analysis was not rigorous or documented.
Department of the Army officials also deemed the analysis
inadequate to defend the operational and business needs for
the consolidation and as a result called for additional
cost analysis to be conducted by officials from the
Assistant Chief of Staff-Installation Management. A
subsequent, more robust cost analysis completed in 2009
reduced the estimated annual cost savings to less than
half of the original estimate, but affirmed the decision
to consolidate in Wiesbaden. DOD has updated its plans and
has announced that its current plan is to close the
facilities in and around Heidelberg by 2015, but has not
yet obtained all the funding to build the new headquarters
complex in Wiesbaden.
Keeping more forces in Europe than originally planned could
cost up to $2 billion in the long term
DOD has not yet made a final decision on the number of
brigades that will remain in Europe for the long term;
however, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Programs (G8) estimates that the long-term incremental costs
for keeping the two brigades in Europe will be between $1
billion and $2 billion for fiscal year 2012 through 2021. The
projected costs will vary depending on whether forces are
sent from the United States to Europe for training to
maintain a constant presence in Europe. Figure 2 compares the
Army's annual estimated cost for fiscal years 2012 through
2021 for keeping the two additional brigades in Europe versus
returning them to the United States, assuming no rotational
costs. As shown, in years 2012 and 2013 the need to construct
facilities in the United States to house the returning
brigades would cost more than retaining the brigades in
Europe at existing installations. However, Army analyses show
that for fiscal year 2014 through 2021 it will cost on
average $360 million more per year to retain the brigades in
Europe.
Several factors make keeping the two additional brigades in
Europe more expensive than returning them to the United
States. These include the cost to provide schools and
commissaries overseas, increased personnel
[[Page S7101]]
costs due to overseas allowances, and additional funds for
needed infrastructure projects to continue operations at
Bamberg and Schweinfurt. For example, the Army estimates that
for fiscal years 2016 to 2021 it will need approximately $370
million to improve facilities at Bamberg and Schweinfurt to
meet quality of life standards because improvements had not
been planned for either of these locations as they had
previously been scheduled to be returned to the German
government.
Even with the potential significant long-term costs, senior
military officials in Europe have argued that the larger
force structure is necessary. In March 2010, the Commander of
European Command stated in written testimony that without
four brigade combat teams and certain headquarters
capabilities European Command assumes risks in its capability
to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and
contingency missions and that deterrence and reassurance are
at increased risk. He also stated that the loss of certain
headquarters combined with significant force requirements in
support of Overseas Contingency Operations outside the
European Command region makes retaining four brigade combat
teams critical to the United States Army Europe's and
European Command's mission.
DOD's plans for reviewing U.S. global defense posture are
unclear, but alternatives under consideration are limited
The Army's force structure in Europe is subject to the
results of a pending review of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S.
assessment of the U.S. European defense posture network. The
new North Atlantic Treaty Organization strategic concept is
scheduled to be unveiled at a November 2010 meeting in
Lisbon, Portugal. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
announced plans for a comprehensive review of U.S. defense
posture worldwide and the Secretary of Defense issued a
memorandum in May 2010 identifying global posture as a
critical issue to be scrutinized in preparation for the
fiscal year 2012 budget process. To date, DOD has yet to
announce the details of the scope and timing for the
completion of its comprehensive review of global posture.
DOD and Army guidance should prompt the department to
consider alternatives when contemplating basing decisions. In
our past work, we have found weaknesses in the department's
process for adjusting defense global posture and linking it
with current strategy. And, even though DOD has stated that
it plans to conduct a comprehensive review of global posture,
DOD and Army officials told us their review of Army forces in
Europe will focus on whether four combat brigades will be
retained in Europe. Additionally, until the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization new strategic concept is unveiled, it is
not known if DOD and the Army are making basing decisions
that will support the new strategy.
Inconsistent Processes to Develop Facility Requirements Hampers
Validation of Facility Needs
Once DOD determines its force structure and basing plans
for a specific region, it then needs to determine the types
and quantities of facilities necessary to provide operational
and quality of life support to its soldiers and families;
however, we were unable to validate whether completed and
planned facilities in Europe meet Army facility planning
criteria because U.S. Army Europe planners use inconsistent
processes to generate facility requirements. The Army in
Europe does not consistently use official Army facility
planning tools to calculate its requirements. The Army's
official tools for determining facility requirements do not
use the most current and accurate information for European
locations, such as installation population data and, in some
cases, planners have used alternative or workaround methods
to develop facility requirements.
Army guidance directs garrison planning staff to use an
Army-wide system, known as the Real Property Planning and
Analysis System, to conduct facility requirements analyses
which determine requirements for the number, type, and size
of facilities needed to accommodate forces stationed at each
installation. The planning and analysis system uses
installation population data from the Army Stationing and
Installation Plan and Army standardized facility criteria
needed to support the population and meet mission
requirements and quality-of-life standards. For example, the
system uses installation population data to determine the
required number and size of headquarters and administrative
buildings, maintenance facilities, barracks, medical and
dental clinics, commissaries, and other support facilities
needed at each installation.
According to Army officials, the force structure and
installation population data used by the Real Property
Planning and Analysis System are not current and thus not
accurate. Army officials stated that its facility planning
systems do not always include current force structure and
installation population data because overseas basing
decisions are sensitive and not reflected in the systems
before public announcements are made. For example, we found
in the case of Vicenza that the facility requirements in the
planning and analysis system did not track with anticipated
increases in the installation population. Specifically, the
Army's force structure is expected to almost double in
Vicenza, Italy for fiscal years 2010 to 2014, yet the
planning and analysis system was not edited to reflect a
corresponding increase in facility requirements.
Because the stationing data do not always reflect current
or planned force structure decisions, U.S. Army Europe
planners often use alternative methods to determine facility
requirements. However, such methods use spreadsheets that are
not linked to the planning and analysis system or the
criteria database. And, because the alternative requirements
determination methods are not linked with the official
planning system and its resident facility criteria and
standards, it is unknown if planned facilities will meet Army
quality-of-life and other facility standards contained in
that system. We found that planners were not using
consistent methods to calculate facility requirements. To
illustrate, key U.S. Army Europe officials told us that
because accompaniment rates for troops in Europe are
different than in the United States, Army installation
planners in Europe were not using the Army's facility
planning criterion for determining barracks and family
housing requirements; instead, they are using their own
subjective estimates that vary among the installations.
Planners explained that it was a challenge to develop
these rates because the documents available to them that
provided details on installation population were not
always up to date and did not accurately reflect future
Army force structure decisions. This lack of consistency
in the methods used by planners in Europe and not knowing
to what extent the planners are using current information
to determine facility requirements precluded us from
validating whether completed or planned facilities in
Europe would satisfy its infrastructure needs.
Our inability to validate infrastructure requirements
reflects systemic issues that have been brought to the Army's
attention, but have not yet been resolved. A 2006 Army Audit
Agency report on military construction requirements in Europe
noted that Army systems for planning construction projects
often contained conflicting or inaccurate information and
planners sometimes generated incorrect requirements when they
used the systems. Although the Army Audit Agency found that
planned military construction projects were adequate to
support U.S. Army Europe's installation plans, it also
identified concerns with the accuracy of the information used
to determine facility requirements in Europe. The report
noted that project planners often did not maintain adequate
documentation supporting how they determined requirements
and, as a result, often had to recreate the information to
support their analysis. In addition, in a June 2010 report
that examined facility requirements for Army installations in
the United States, we found that the Army's Real Property
Planning and Analysis System did not always produce reliable
results for some types of facilities because the system has
often relied on data that are not complete, current, or
accurate. For instance, we found that the facility design
criteria had not been updated to reflect current standard
designs for 47 of the 58 facility types in the system. As a
result of our findings, to improve the accuracy and
completeness of the Army's Real Property Planning and
Analysis System as a tool for generating facility
requirements, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement
guidance that requires the Army Criteria Tracking System
which feeds standardized facility criteria into the Army's
Real Property Planning and Analysis System to be updated to
reflect changes to facility designs as they are made. DOD
concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Army
has already taken action to enhance the accuracy of its
planning systems to better respond to changing requirements.
Conclusions
With over $1.3 billion invested since 2004, another $1.4
billion in infrastructure investments planned for the
Wiesbaden consolidation and the recapitalization of medical
facilities, and the potential to increase costs by up to $2
billion over the next 10 years if all four Army brigades are
kept in Europe, the financial stakes are high for DOD as it
considers its future posture. Existing guidance should prompt
the department to consider analyses of alternatives when
contemplating basing options; however, previous Army analyses
have not been well documented, and the plans being pursued
are based on a previous strategy developed in 2004 and may
not be aligned with a new strategic concept that has yet to
be determined. In addition, the Army's approach to managing
its facilities thus far has resulted in uncertainty
concerning whether completed and planned facilities will meet
infrastructure needs. Until facility requirements reflect
quality-of-life and other standardized facilities criteria,
there is inadequate assurance that the Army's facilities in
Europe will fully meet the needs of soldiers and their
families. Without a comprehensive review the Army may lack
sufficient information to determine the most cost effective
approach to maintaining a continued presence in Europe.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To take advantage of the pause before final decisions on
the Army's European force structure are made and determine
the best course of action for its European posture, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to take the following two actions:
1, Conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives for
stationing forces in Europe. At
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a minimum, the review should be done as expeditiously as
possible upon the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's strategic concept announcement and consider
the costs and benefits of a range of force structure and
basing alternatives.
2. Develop a consistent process to determine specific
facility requirements associated with the various options.
We are sending copies of this report to other congressional
committees and interested parties. We are also sending copies
to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on our Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions
about this report, please contact me. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key
contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II.
John Pendleton,
Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maryland.
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