[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 124 (Wednesday, September 15, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7098-S7102]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise to speak in morning business 
about the military construction issue I spoke about in July. I raised 
concerns then about the Pentagon's overseas military construction 
program, particularly in Germany, Korea, and Guam, because, as the 
ranking member of the Military Construction Subcommittee, I am seeing 
that we are changing a strategy. Yet we have not had the strategy 
explained to us. This is the beginning of a huge taxpayer-funded influx 
of rebuilding overseas in a way that I think is perhaps duplicative and 
even against the interests that have been shown in our previous 
strategy. I think it is time to take a pause.
  I rise to speak because the GAO has just released a study this week 
that says we should take a pause. The Military Construction 
Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Johnson--and I respect and appreciate 
his leadership in this so much--asked the GAO to do a study because we 
were seeing the Army coming in and asking for what is going to be a 
commitment for $1 to $2 billion to change their headquarters from 
Heidelberg to Wiesbaden and to add more BCTs than were originally 
intended to stay in Germany. We looked at this and said: Wait a minute. 
We are getting ready to duplicate a lot of effort that we have made in 
bases in America and at a great taxpayer expense. Yet we are not seeing 
the backup and the strategy proposed to support this kind of taxpayer 
expense.
  Let me start back in the beginning. Prior to the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, the Army planned to return the four brigade combat 
teams stationed in Europe to the United States in fiscal years 2012 and 
2013. It would save millions annually in overseas stationing costs. 
This was in response to the Overseas Basing Commission--that was passed 
by Congress--to adopt a force projection strategy. The Pentagon is 
reversing the recent efforts to transform the military and restation 
tens of thousands of military personnel back on U.S. soil. That is what 
the Overseas Basing Commission recommended, passed by Congress, 
supported by Congress, and now we seem to see a change in that strategy 
but without a projection of what the strategy would be.
  What the Overseas Basing Commission found, and the Pentagon 
originally agreed with, is that training and deployment of forces was 
determined to be superior in the U.S. bases and certainly more cost 
efficient. We learned that there were constraints on transferring the 
members of our military into Iraq because we could not use the airspace 
of certain European countries, and we could not go on the train through 
certain European countries. It was costly to get our troops from 
Germany into Iraq, more costly than it should have been.
  In addition, there are training constraints. The Overseas Basing 
Commission saw this. Many of us who have looked at bases overseas see 
that there are training constraints. There are constraints for live 
artillery training. There are constraints for use of the airspace. In 
looking at this, it was determined we should bring them home from 
Germany to train in America to accommodate our families in America and 
to deploy from America, where we would control the capability to deploy 
quickly and cost efficiently.
  On that basis, we have invested $14 billion in U.S. bases to 
accommodate the military and the families who were projected to come to 
American bases and have the training capabilities they need. Now we are 
seeing requests for military construction, and it triggered our 
committee to say: Wait a minute. We are supposed to be pulling out of 
Germany, but now we are seeing the Army get ready to put $1 billion to 
$4 billion into military construction, to change their headquarters 
from Heidelberg to Wiesbaden, and duplicate what we have already done 
in the United States for construction projects in Europe, Korea, and 
Guam, without demonstrating the cost efficiencies or projected future 
costs.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has used 5 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Hearing no 
objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Senator from Maryland.
  Now we are seeing an expensive and duplicative strategy--well, there 
is not a strategy but request for spending. I am asking for a strategy.
  The Government Accountability Office did issue a report this week 
that says the Army's justification for keeping the forces in Europe was 
based on a flawed analysis, and it would cost taxpayers up to $2 
billion, from 2012 to 2021, to pay for it. Let me reference a couple 
things from the report. The GAO found the decision to retain brigades 
in Europe to require the Army to seek roughly $176 million annually to 
support the Bamberg and Swineford communities, again in fiscal year 
2013. Those are the communities that would have had Army facilities.
  The Army now estimates that not returning two of the four BCTs, 
brigade combat teams, in Europe to the United States could potentially 
cost between $1 billion and $2 billion between fiscal years 2012 and 
2021. It will cost an average of 360 million American dollars per year 
to retain those units in Europe that were scheduled to be moved to 
America.
  Closing the Heidelberg facility and moving the headquarters to 
Wiesbaden--the Army estimated that move from Heidelberg to go to 
Wiesbaden would save hundreds of millions of dollars in 2013. But the 
GAO found the Army now admits they will need $150 million annually to 
support the continuing operation in Heidelberg because of delays.
  The GAO goes on to say that the Army has not documented the savings, 
nor why the move is necessary at that cost. The GAO concludes that with 
over $1.3 billion invested since 2004 and another $1.4 billion in 
infrastructure investments planned for the Wiesbaden consolidation and 
the recapitalization of medical facilities and the potential to 
increase costs, it would cost up to $2 billion over the next 10 years 
if all four BCTs were kept in the Europe. The financial stakes are 
high.
  The GAO is recommending in its report that the Secretary of Defense 
take advantage of a pause before final decisions are made on the Army's 
European force structure, conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
alternatives, and have a process that is credible in determining what 
the costs are and whether those units should be kept in Europe or, as 
originally planned and as invested in our military bases in America, 
what it is going to cost.
  The GAO has concluded that we need a comprehensive analysis.
  It conducted important cost-benefit analyses at the urging of the 
Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee, chaired by 
Senator Johnson. The GAO report findings are instructive. I hope the 
Pentagon will pause and take a fresh look at this military construction 
program to determine, does it serve our Nation not to move those troops 
back? We prepared the bases for them. The families, the medical units, 
are in the United States now. So, please, I am asking the Pentagon to 
determine if it does serve our best military strategy and our taxpayers 
to keep those troops in Europe rather than moving them back.
  I want to thank Senator Johnson for including a provision in the 
military construction/VA appropriations bill that would restrict the 
level of spending in overseas construction. Our bill would restrict the 
use of MILCON funds for Germany until the Department of Defense 
completes the following: an evaluation of the NATO strategy concept 
review, the U.S. assessment of its defense posture in Europe, a front-
end assessment of DOD's global posture from fiscal year 2012 to 2016 in 
the program budget review cycle.
  I have shared my concerns with the Secretary of Defense. I have asked 
him, as our committee has asked him, to provide to the Congressional 
defense committees a comprehensive Army basing strategy for Europe 
based on these assessments and a projected timeline and a cost estimate 
of what this will be.
  In Korea, it is the same. We need a cost estimate for the decision 
that the Pentagon has apparently made to put more troops and families 
into Korea without any accommodation for the new facilities that will 
be needed for the accompanied families' military transfer into Korea.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.

[[Page S7099]]

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank you for allowing me to have the extra 5 
minutes. I thank the Senator from Maryland. This is a serious issue. 
The Department of Defense says they are trying to cut back on military 
spending, and this is a place that would be very important, because if 
we are going to have accompanied service people, more in Korea now, we 
have got to accommodate those families. There will be a longer duration 
of mission, and we have got to accommodate them.
  There is going to be a cost, and we have not even seen the cost 
estimates for that yet. We should take a pause on this German MILCON 
until we know if that is the right thing for our global strategy. I 
thank the Senator from Maryland for accommodating me on the time. There 
will be further discussion, I assure you.
  I ask unanimous consent that the summary from the GAO report be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   U.S. Government


                                        Accountability Office,

                               Washington, DC, September 13, 2010.
     Subject: Defense planning: DOD needs to review the costs and 
         benefits of basing alternatives for Army forces in 
         Europe.

     Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
     Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate.
     Hon. Tim Johnson,
     Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans 
         Affairs, and Related Agencies, Committee on 
         Appropriations, U.S. Senate.


                                Summary

       Keeping more Army forces in Europe than originally planned 
     would result in significant additional costs; however, it is 
     unclear the extent to which DOD plans to weigh these costs 
     against the benefits of having additional forces overseas, 
     especially in light of an evolving European strategic concept 
     and U.S. posture plans. In the near term, delays in decisions 
     associated with two initiatives will impact the Army's costs 
     in Europe. First, prior to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
     Review, the Army had planned to return two of four brigade 
     combat teams stationed in Europe to the United States in 
     fiscal years 2012 and 2013, which would have saved millions 
     annually in overseas stationing costs by allowing the closure 
     of installations located at Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany. 
     However, these plans are on hold pending an announcement of 
     the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's strategic concept 
     planned to be announced in November 2010, as well as ongoing 
     U.S. assessments of the global defense posture, which have a 
     less clear time frame for completion. The decision to retain 
     these brigades in Europe will require the Army to seek 
     funding of roughly $176 million annually to support the 
     Bamberg and Schweinfurt communities beginning in fiscal year 
     2013, according to Army estimates. Second, U.S. Army Europe 
     estimated that closing Heidelberg and moving its headquarters 
     to Wiesbaden would save hundreds of millions of dollars 
     annually beginning in 2013. However, because of uncertainty 
     for the funding of construction in Wiesbaden, Heidelberg will 
     remain open longer than originally planned and the previously 
     estimated savings will be delayed by 2 years or more. As a 
     result, the Army estimates it will need approximately $150 
     million annually to support continued operations. Both our 
     review and an analysis performed by the Army found gaps in 
     the support used to justify the decision to close Heidelberg 
     and consolidate forces in Wiesbaden. Our work revealed that 
     the original analyses were poorly documented, limited in 
     scope, and based on questionable assumptions. Department of 
     the Army officials also found the U.S. Army Europe's original 
     analysis inadequate and performed another more detailed 
     analysis in mid-2009 that affirmed the decision to 
     consolidate but lowered the estimated savings. In the longer 
     term, if DOD decides not to return two of the four Brigade 
     Combat Teams in Europe to the United States the incremental 
     cost could be significant. The Army estimates that, depending 
     upon the assumptions used, it will potentially cost between 
     $1 billion and $2 billion more from fiscal years 2012-2021 to 
     keep the two brigades in Europe than it would cost to return 
     them to the United States. DOD is reconsidering retaining the 
     brigades in Europe in part because senior military officials 
     in Europe have said that four brigade combat teams in Europe 
     are needed to meet operational and mission requirements. 
     According to DOD officials, the evaluation of U.S. forces in 
     Europe will be primarily focused on whether four combat 
     brigades will be retained in Europe. DOD and Army guidance 
     call for the department to consider alternatives as part of 
     the economic analyses conducted when contemplating 
     construction or real property acquisition, which are 
     decisions that often arise in the basing decision process, 
     but we found that prior analyses have been limited in scope, 
     or based on assumptions that were questionable. Without a 
     comprehensive analysis, the Army may lack sufficient 
     information to determine the most cost effective approach to 
     maintaining a continued military presence in Europe that will 
     align with the evolving North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     strategic concept and U.S. defense posture.
       Once DOD determines its force structure and basing plans 
     for a region, it then needs to determine the types and 
     quantities of facilities necessary to provide operational and 
     quality of life support to its soldiers and families; 
     however, we were unable to validate whether completed or 
     planned facilities in Europe would meet Army facility 
     planning criteria because U.S. Army Europe planners use 
     inconsistent processes to generate facility requirements. The 
     Army in Europe does not consistently use the official Army 
     facility planning tools that are designed to calculate, using 
     population data and facility space criteria, the facilities 
     required to accommodate forces and ensure that quality-of-
     life and other facility standards are met. Army officials 
     stated that its facility planning systems do not always 
     include current force structure and installation population 
     data because overseas basing decisions are sensitive and not 
     reflected in the systems before public announcements are 
     made. The Army's systems showed populations at some 
     installations even after anticipated closure dates, making 
     the requirements generated by the systems inaccurate. Army 
     planners in Europe use unofficial, locally developed systems 
     to determine requirements, and we found that planners at 
     different installations were not using consistent methods to 
     calculate requirements for barracks and other facilities. The 
     Army planners in Europe told us that they are developing 
     their own criteria for determining the requirements that 
     varies among the installations. Because these alternative 
     methods are not linked with the Army's official system and 
     its resident facility criteria and vary among the 
     installations, we were unable to determine if completed and 
     planned facilities will meet the Army's quality-of-life and 
     other facility planning criteria. Our inability to validate 
     infrastructure requirements reflects systemic issues that 
     have been brought to the Army's attention, but have not yet 
     been resolved. For example, in a June 2010 report addressing 
     domestic facility requirements, we reported that the Army's 
     Real Property Planning and Analysis System did not always 
     produce reliable results for some types of facilities because 
     the systems have often relied on data that were not complete, 
     current, or accurate. Until the Army has a process to 
     calculate facility requirements based on current and accurate 
     information, the department cannot be assured that planned 
     Army facilities in Europe will meet quality-of-life and other 
     facility standards.
       We are recommending that DOD require the Army to conduct a 
     comprehensive analysis of alternatives for stationing forces 
     in Europe that, at a minimum, should be done as expeditiously 
     as possible upon the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization's strategic concept announcement and consider 
     the costs and benefits of a range of force structure and 
     basing alternatives. Additionally, we are recommending that 
     the Army develop a consistent process to determine specific 
     facility requirements associated with the various basing 
     options. In written comments on a draft of this 
     correspondence, DOD stated that it concurred with our 
     recommendations and have already initiated a strategy-based 
     assessment of U.S. defense posture to be completed by the end 
     of calendar year 2010 and that the Army intends to develop a 
     central, on line classified site containing Army Stationing 
     and Installation Plan population data that will reflect out-
     year stationing decisions that are classified due to host-
     nation sensitivity.


                               Background

       Since 2004, as part of DOD's Integrated Global Presence and 
     Basing Strategy, the Army has drawn down its forces in Europe 
     and consolidated remaining forces and infrastructure at fewer 
     locations. As a result, according to Army officials these 
     efforts have resulted in significant recurring savings. As 
     shown in figure 1, the Army's plan called for reducing the 
     number of permanent, or enduring, major installations in 
     Europe to six located in Germany at Wiesbaden, Baumholder, 
     Kaiserslautern, Grafenwoehr, Stuttgart, and Ansbach, and one 
     located in Italy at Vicenza. Figure 1 also shows 
     installations located in Germany at Schweinfurt and Bamberg 
     that the Army originally planned to close; however, the 
     status of these installations is now uncertain because of the 
     February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review tentative decision 
     to retain forces in Europe pending a global force posture 
     review.
       From fiscal years 2004 to 2009, the Army spent 
     approximately $1.3 billion dollars to support its 
     infrastructure transformation and consolidation plans in 
     Europe, The majority of this investment was used to undertake 
     two main efforts: (1) the consolidation of operational forces 
     close to Europe's training facilities at Grafenwoehr, Germany 
     and (2) the consolidation of the U.S. Army Europe's Airborne 
     Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. In and around 
     Grafenwoehr, the Army spent about $473 million on facilities. 
     These included new or renovated operational complexes, 
     maintenance and operations centers, and barracks to support 
     Army brigade combat teams and other units. Other work at 
     Grafenwoehr included upgrading a medical and dental facility 
     and constructing a new post exchange and commissary, dining 
     facility, physical fitness center, as well as numerous other 
     facilities to

[[Page S7100]]

     support unit operations, the soldiers, and their families. 
     Looking forward, the Army is planning military construction 
     to build barracks facilities at Grafenwoehr to meet the 
     current barracks standard, though this was not part of the 
     original transformation and consolidation plan. At Vicenza, 
     Italy, the Army has spent about $424 million on facilities to 
     accommodate an expected increase in the forces stationed in 
     Italy. The Army's construction and renovation projects 
     include headquarters and maintenance buildings, barracks, 
     child development centers, and schools at various locations 
     around Vicenza. The remainder of the Army's investment, 
     including Payment-in-Kind and Sustainment, Restoration, and 
     Modernization funds, were used to support transformation and 
     consolidation-related projects throughout Germany, including 
     at Ansbach, Heidelberg, and Kaiserslautern, among others.
       In addition to the Army's projects at Grafenwoehr and 
     Vicenza, the Army and TRICARE Management Activity have plans 
     for two major infrastructure projects to support forces in 
     Europe at a cost of almost $1.4 billion. These include 
     construction of an Army headquarters facility at Wiesbaden, 
     Germany and construction of a replacement regional medical 
     center adjacent to Ramstein Air Base near Kaiserslautern, 
     Germany. Moving and consolidating several Army headquarters 
     from Heidelberg and other locations to Wiesbaden is the last 
     step in the U.S. Army Europe's transformation and 
     consolidation plan that began in 2004. According to U.S. Army 
     Europe officials, consolidating the headquarters would 
     optimize command and control, intelligence, and signal 
     capabilities; provide a more responsive organizational 
     structure; offer better force protection options than at the 
     current location in Heidelberg; and provide access to a 
     nearby Army airfield. The Wiesbaden location would include a 
     theater-level command and control center, a consolidated 
     intelligence center, and a network warfare center at a cost 
     of approximately $240 million. The first increment of $59.5 
     million was appropriated for fiscal year 2009 to build the 
     command and control center and the U.S. Army Corps of 
     Engineers began design work for the facility in the first 
     quarter of the fiscal year 2010. DOD's second project is to 
     replace the regional medical center located in Landstuhl and 
     the Medical Clinic at Ramstein Air Base in Germany with a new 
     consolidated medical center adjacent to Ramstein Air Base 
     near Kaiserlautern, Germany at a cost projected at $1.2 
     billion. According to DOD, this project is being driven by 
     the effort to recapitalize medical facilities worldwide, and 
     was not part of the effort to transform and consolidate Army 
     forces in Europe. The medical center is a major hospital that 
     provides primary care for more than 40,000 military personnel 
     and 245,000 beneficiaries in the European Command. The 
     facility also provides medical support for casualties that 
     are air-evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan: wounded 
     personnel are flown into Ramstein Air Base and then taken by 
     bus to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, approximately 20 
     minutes away. According to TRICARE Management Activity 
     officials, a 2002-2003 Army Medical Department study 
     recommended that DOD renovate and add to the existing 
     hospital in Landstuhl. However, in 2009, the Senate 
     Appropriations Committee directed DOD to complete a site 
     assessment for this approach and the Office of the Deputy 
     Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) 
     conducted a new analysis that included consideration of 
     alternative sites. One of the reasons officials decided upon 
     the new construction adjacent to Ramstein Air Base was 
     because it allows for easier access to the airfield where 
     wounded personnel arrive from combat zones.
       Many defense organizations are involved in force structure 
     and basing decisions. According to Army, Joint Staff and DOD 
     guidance, unit commanders, U.S. Army Europe, and European 
     Command are responsible for providing analytical support and 
     coordinating proposed basing actions. For example, for 
     stationing actions and unit moves, commanders of units 
     stationed in Europe will review the mission, operational 
     facilities, base support, available resources, potentially 
     including available funds, and political and environmental 
     effects of the proposed basing action. For force structure 
     changes, Army Headquarters or U.S. Army Europe obtains input 
     and comments from affected commands, including European 
     Command, the functional combatant commands and the component 
     commands. Army Headquarters transmits the resulting proposal 
     to the Joint Staff and requests approval by the Secretary of 
     Defense. European Command conducts an assessment of the 
     implications of potential force structure changes, to inform 
     the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense of the 
     relative values or benefits and costs or risks. The 
     assessment includes political-military, operational risk, 
     force structure, infrastructure, and resource implications of 
     the proposed change, and it should address alternatives 
     considered, where applicable.


  Future Plans for Army Forces in Europe Are Uncertain, but Costs Are 
            Likely to Be Higher Than Earlier Army Estimates

       Keeping the four brigades in Europe will require the Army 
     to seek funds to keep installations open in the near term 
     (fiscal years 2013 and 2014) and future decisions about force 
     structure could result in $1 billion to $2 billion in 
     incremental costs in the long term if four combat brigades, 
     rather than two, are retained. The Army's force structure in 
     Europe is subject to the results of several pending reviews 
     including a comprehensive review of U.S. defense posture 
     worldwide. To date, however, DOD has not announced the 
     details of the scope and timing for the completion of this 
     comprehensive review.
     Retaining forces in Europe will require the Army to spend 
         additional funds, lowering anticipated near-term savings
       Delays and changes in decisions will require the Army to 
     seek hundreds of millions of dollars more annually than 
     planned to support facilities in Europe that they originally 
     intended to close. As part of its plans to return two brigade 
     combat teams stationed in Europe to the United States in 
     fiscal years 2012 and 2013, U.S. Army Europe intended to 
     close installations located at Bamberg and Schweinfurt, 
     Germany. However, the decision to retain these brigades in 
     Europe delays or eliminates these savings and, according to 
     Installation Management Command-Europe, will require the Army 
     to seek funding of roughly $176 million annually beginning in 
     fiscal year 2013 to support base operations at these two 
     communities.
       In addition, U.S. Army Europe planned hundreds of millions 
     in savings by closing Heidelberg and consolidating in 
     Wiesbaden by 2013 and did not program funding to operate this 
     installation beyond 2012. However, because of uncertainty for 
     the funding of construction in Wiesbaden, Heidelberg will 
     remain open longer than originally planned and the previously 
     estimated savings will be delayed by 2 years or more. As a 
     result, the Army estimates it will need approximately $150 
     million annually to support continued operations.
       Both our review and the subsequent analyses performed by 
     the Army found gaps in the support used to justify the 
     decision to close Heidelberg and consolidate forces in 
     Wiesbaden. The original analyses were poorly documented, 
     limited in scope, and based on questionable assumptions. Army 
     and DOD guidance describing economic analyses to support 
     military construction projects or decisions about the 
     acquisition of real property indicate that reasonable 
     alternatives should be considered when contemplating 
     projects. For example, DOD Instruction 7041.3 indicates that 
     the analyses should address alternatives that consider the 
     availability of existing facilities and estimated costs and 
     benefits, among other factors. Similarly, Army Pamphlet 415-3 
     identifies the consideration and evaluation of alternatives 
     as sound economic principles underlying the economic analyses 
     to be performed in support of military construction projects. 
     When we asked to see the original analyses for the 2005 
     decision, U.S. Army Europe officials provided us with an 
     information paper that had been prepared in response to our 
     request but did not produce documentation to support the 
     original decision. Little detail was available about the 
     alternatives that had been considered, or how quantitative 
     criteria (like cost savings) and qualitative criteria (like 
     force protection and access to airfields) were weighed in the 
     decision. Army officials told us that alternatives to 
     Wiesbaden had been considered in discussions, and that these 
     were rejected in favor of Wiesbaden. In addition, although 
     they noted that estimated cost savings was one of the key 
     reasons for the decision, they also told us that the decision 
     was primarily based on judgment. Furthermore, according to 
     DOD officials, the analysis was not rigorous or documented. 
     Department of the Army officials also deemed the analysis 
     inadequate to defend the operational and business needs for 
     the consolidation and as a result called for additional 
     cost analysis to be conducted by officials from the 
     Assistant Chief of Staff-Installation Management. A 
     subsequent, more robust cost analysis completed in 2009 
     reduced the estimated annual cost savings to less than 
     half of the original estimate, but affirmed the decision 
     to consolidate in Wiesbaden. DOD has updated its plans and 
     has announced that its current plan is to close the 
     facilities in and around Heidelberg by 2015, but has not 
     yet obtained all the funding to build the new headquarters 
     complex in Wiesbaden.
     Keeping more forces in Europe than originally planned could 
         cost up to $2 billion in the long term
       DOD has not yet made a final decision on the number of 
     brigades that will remain in Europe for the long term; 
     however, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
     Programs (G8) estimates that the long-term incremental costs 
     for keeping the two brigades in Europe will be between $1 
     billion and $2 billion for fiscal year 2012 through 2021. The 
     projected costs will vary depending on whether forces are 
     sent from the United States to Europe for training to 
     maintain a constant presence in Europe. Figure 2 compares the 
     Army's annual estimated cost for fiscal years 2012 through 
     2021 for keeping the two additional brigades in Europe versus 
     returning them to the United States, assuming no rotational 
     costs. As shown, in years 2012 and 2013 the need to construct 
     facilities in the United States to house the returning 
     brigades would cost more than retaining the brigades in 
     Europe at existing installations. However, Army analyses show 
     that for fiscal year 2014 through 2021 it will cost on 
     average $360 million more per year to retain the brigades in 
     Europe.
       Several factors make keeping the two additional brigades in 
     Europe more expensive than returning them to the United 
     States. These include the cost to provide schools and 
     commissaries overseas, increased personnel

[[Page S7101]]

     costs due to overseas allowances, and additional funds for 
     needed infrastructure projects to continue operations at 
     Bamberg and Schweinfurt. For example, the Army estimates that 
     for fiscal years 2016 to 2021 it will need approximately $370 
     million to improve facilities at Bamberg and Schweinfurt to 
     meet quality of life standards because improvements had not 
     been planned for either of these locations as they had 
     previously been scheduled to be returned to the German 
     government.
       Even with the potential significant long-term costs, senior 
     military officials in Europe have argued that the larger 
     force structure is necessary. In March 2010, the Commander of 
     European Command stated in written testimony that without 
     four brigade combat teams and certain headquarters 
     capabilities European Command assumes risks in its capability 
     to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and 
     contingency missions and that deterrence and reassurance are 
     at increased risk. He also stated that the loss of certain 
     headquarters combined with significant force requirements in 
     support of Overseas Contingency Operations outside the 
     European Command region makes retaining four brigade combat 
     teams critical to the United States Army Europe's and 
     European Command's mission.
     DOD's plans for reviewing U.S. global defense posture are 
         unclear, but alternatives under consideration are limited
       The Army's force structure in Europe is subject to the 
     results of a pending review of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization's Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S. 
     assessment of the U.S. European defense posture network. The 
     new North Atlantic Treaty Organization strategic concept is 
     scheduled to be unveiled at a November 2010 meeting in 
     Lisbon, Portugal. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 
     announced plans for a comprehensive review of U.S. defense 
     posture worldwide and the Secretary of Defense issued a 
     memorandum in May 2010 identifying global posture as a 
     critical issue to be scrutinized in preparation for the 
     fiscal year 2012 budget process. To date, DOD has yet to 
     announce the details of the scope and timing for the 
     completion of its comprehensive review of global posture.
       DOD and Army guidance should prompt the department to 
     consider alternatives when contemplating basing decisions. In 
     our past work, we have found weaknesses in the department's 
     process for adjusting defense global posture and linking it 
     with current strategy. And, even though DOD has stated that 
     it plans to conduct a comprehensive review of global posture, 
     DOD and Army officials told us their review of Army forces in 
     Europe will focus on whether four combat brigades will be 
     retained in Europe. Additionally, until the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization new strategic concept is unveiled, it is 
     not known if DOD and the Army are making basing decisions 
     that will support the new strategy.


    Inconsistent Processes to Develop Facility Requirements Hampers 
                      Validation of Facility Needs

       Once DOD determines its force structure and basing plans 
     for a specific region, it then needs to determine the types 
     and quantities of facilities necessary to provide operational 
     and quality of life support to its soldiers and families; 
     however, we were unable to validate whether completed and 
     planned facilities in Europe meet Army facility planning 
     criteria because U.S. Army Europe planners use inconsistent 
     processes to generate facility requirements. The Army in 
     Europe does not consistently use official Army facility 
     planning tools to calculate its requirements. The Army's 
     official tools for determining facility requirements do not 
     use the most current and accurate information for European 
     locations, such as installation population data and, in some 
     cases, planners have used alternative or workaround methods 
     to develop facility requirements.
       Army guidance directs garrison planning staff to use an 
     Army-wide system, known as the Real Property Planning and 
     Analysis System, to conduct facility requirements analyses 
     which determine requirements for the number, type, and size 
     of facilities needed to accommodate forces stationed at each 
     installation. The planning and analysis system uses 
     installation population data from the Army Stationing and 
     Installation Plan and Army standardized facility criteria 
     needed to support the population and meet mission 
     requirements and quality-of-life standards. For example, the 
     system uses installation population data to determine the 
     required number and size of headquarters and administrative 
     buildings, maintenance facilities, barracks, medical and 
     dental clinics, commissaries, and other support facilities 
     needed at each installation.
       According to Army officials, the force structure and 
     installation population data used by the Real Property 
     Planning and Analysis System are not current and thus not 
     accurate. Army officials stated that its facility planning 
     systems do not always include current force structure and 
     installation population data because overseas basing 
     decisions are sensitive and not reflected in the systems 
     before public announcements are made. For example, we found 
     in the case of Vicenza that the facility requirements in the 
     planning and analysis system did not track with anticipated 
     increases in the installation population. Specifically, the 
     Army's force structure is expected to almost double in 
     Vicenza, Italy for fiscal years 2010 to 2014, yet the 
     planning and analysis system was not edited to reflect a 
     corresponding increase in facility requirements.
       Because the stationing data do not always reflect current 
     or planned force structure decisions, U.S. Army Europe 
     planners often use alternative methods to determine facility 
     requirements. However, such methods use spreadsheets that are 
     not linked to the planning and analysis system or the 
     criteria database. And, because the alternative requirements 
     determination methods are not linked with the official 
     planning system and its resident facility criteria and 
     standards, it is unknown if planned facilities will meet Army 
     quality-of-life and other facility standards contained in 
     that system. We found that planners were not using 
     consistent methods to calculate facility requirements. To 
     illustrate, key U.S. Army Europe officials told us that 
     because accompaniment rates for troops in Europe are 
     different than in the United States, Army installation 
     planners in Europe were not using the Army's facility 
     planning criterion for determining barracks and family 
     housing requirements; instead, they are using their own 
     subjective estimates that vary among the installations. 
     Planners explained that it was a challenge to develop 
     these rates because the documents available to them that 
     provided details on installation population were not 
     always up to date and did not accurately reflect future 
     Army force structure decisions. This lack of consistency 
     in the methods used by planners in Europe and not knowing 
     to what extent the planners are using current information 
     to determine facility requirements precluded us from 
     validating whether completed or planned facilities in 
     Europe would satisfy its infrastructure needs.
       Our inability to validate infrastructure requirements 
     reflects systemic issues that have been brought to the Army's 
     attention, but have not yet been resolved. A 2006 Army Audit 
     Agency report on military construction requirements in Europe 
     noted that Army systems for planning construction projects 
     often contained conflicting or inaccurate information and 
     planners sometimes generated incorrect requirements when they 
     used the systems. Although the Army Audit Agency found that 
     planned military construction projects were adequate to 
     support U.S. Army Europe's installation plans, it also 
     identified concerns with the accuracy of the information used 
     to determine facility requirements in Europe. The report 
     noted that project planners often did not maintain adequate 
     documentation supporting how they determined requirements 
     and, as a result, often had to recreate the information to 
     support their analysis. In addition, in a June 2010 report 
     that examined facility requirements for Army installations in 
     the United States, we found that the Army's Real Property 
     Planning and Analysis System did not always produce reliable 
     results for some types of facilities because the system has 
     often relied on data that are not complete, current, or 
     accurate. For instance, we found that the facility design 
     criteria had not been updated to reflect current standard 
     designs for 47 of the 58 facility types in the system. As a 
     result of our findings, to improve the accuracy and 
     completeness of the Army's Real Property Planning and 
     Analysis System as a tool for generating facility 
     requirements, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
     direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement 
     guidance that requires the Army Criteria Tracking System 
     which feeds standardized facility criteria into the Army's 
     Real Property Planning and Analysis System to be updated to 
     reflect changes to facility designs as they are made. DOD 
     concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Army 
     has already taken action to enhance the accuracy of its 
     planning systems to better respond to changing requirements.


                              Conclusions

       With over $1.3 billion invested since 2004, another $1.4 
     billion in infrastructure investments planned for the 
     Wiesbaden consolidation and the recapitalization of medical 
     facilities, and the potential to increase costs by up to $2 
     billion over the next 10 years if all four Army brigades are 
     kept in Europe, the financial stakes are high for DOD as it 
     considers its future posture. Existing guidance should prompt 
     the department to consider analyses of alternatives when 
     contemplating basing options; however, previous Army analyses 
     have not been well documented, and the plans being pursued 
     are based on a previous strategy developed in 2004 and may 
     not be aligned with a new strategic concept that has yet to 
     be determined. In addition, the Army's approach to managing 
     its facilities thus far has resulted in uncertainty 
     concerning whether completed and planned facilities will meet 
     infrastructure needs. Until facility requirements reflect 
     quality-of-life and other standardized facilities criteria, 
     there is inadequate assurance that the Army's facilities in 
     Europe will fully meet the needs of soldiers and their 
     families. Without a comprehensive review the Army may lack 
     sufficient information to determine the most cost effective 
     approach to maintaining a continued presence in Europe.


                  Recommendations for Executive Action

       To take advantage of the pause before final decisions on 
     the Army's European force structure are made and determine 
     the best course of action for its European posture, we 
     recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
     of the Army to take the following two actions:
       1, Conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives for 
     stationing forces in Europe. At

[[Page S7102]]

     a minimum, the review should be done as expeditiously as 
     possible upon the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization's strategic concept announcement and consider 
     the costs and benefits of a range of force structure and 
     basing alternatives.
       2. Develop a consistent process to determine specific 
     facility requirements associated with the various options.
       We are sending copies of this report to other congressional 
     committees and interested parties. We are also sending copies 
     to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. In addition, this 
     report will be available at no charge on our Web site at 
     http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions 
     about this report, please contact me. Contact points for our 
     Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
     found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
     contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II.

                                               John Pendleton,

                                                         Director,
                              Defense Capabilities and Management.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maryland.

                          ____________________