[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 117 (Wednesday, August 4, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6741-S6749]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF ELENA KAGAN TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT--Continued
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the nomination of
Solicitor General Elena Kagan to the U.S. Supreme Court. Just over a
year ago, the Senate considered the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor
to the Supreme Court and today we continue the debate on Solicitor
General Kagan's. Then, as now, I think it is fully appropriate for us
to discuss the judicial philosophy of the nominees being put forward
because of the increasing intrusion of the Supreme Court into very
contentious issues within the society. If that is the case, then I
think judicial philosophy needs to be discussed, and I think that is
one that we need to consider in this nominee in Solicitor General
Kagan.
The debate and discussion of Solicitor General Kagan's nomination
followed a different path from the Sotomayor nomination, but it has led
me to the same result: I have too many questions about the nominee's
judicial philosophy to permit me to support the nomination to a
lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
As I said last year, a nominee's judicial philosophy is a key concern
at the heart of the Supreme Court confirmation process. For me, the
question is whether a nominee to the Court supports an activist
judicial philosophy that would invite the judiciary into all sorts of
areas of American life where it has not intruded before, or whether
they hold a more deferential view of the Constitution that would limit
the role of the courts. It is really that view, of what is the
appropriate role of the courts under the Constitution that I think is
key, given the more activist role the Court has taken in this society
in recent years.
As I noted during the Sotomayor debate, in my view, democracy is
wounded when Justices on the high Court, who are unelected, invent
constitutional rights and alter the balance of governmental powers in
ways that find no support in the text, structure, or history of the
Constitution. Unfortunately, in recent years the courts have assumed a
more aggressive political role.
In last year's confirmation debate, we talked a lot about whether a
nominee's life story and experiences should be a significant factor in
assessing that nominee. Whatever the merits of that debate, Judge
Sotomayor was nominated as a Federal judge with a judicial background
that offered some clues as to her judicial philosophy. With this
nominee, we have comparatively little of written record to evaluate.
Solicitor General Kagan has no previous experience on the bench. If
confirmed, she would be the first Supreme Court Justice without prior
experience on the bench in almost 40 years. In order to hire anyone for
any job, an employer looks at an applicant's past employment history.
That is true for private sector jobs and public sector jobs. It is true
for the staffs we maintain in the Senate and it is certainly true for
Supreme Court nominees. I think most Americans would agree that prior
judicial experience would be a good thing for a nominee to the Supreme
Court to have. It is not a prerequisite for confirmation. Certainly, we
have had Justices in the past who did not have any prior judicial
experience. But I would suggest that since Solicitor General Kagan
lacks prior experience on the bench, we have an obligation to look even
more closely at the professional experience she does have.
There is no question she has an outstanding resume. Few people in
America can say that they have her academic credentials, including an
Ivy League law degree, as well as experience teaching at the University
of Chicago and as the dean of Harvard Law School. And she has terrific
political credentials, including working on the Dukakis for President
campaign and as a policy adviser in the Clinton administration.
Unfortunately, very little of her resume pertains to formal legal
practice, let alone time on the bench.
So Solicitor General Kagan's experience is not necessarily the
experience we would prefer, but it is the experience that we have to go
on. And as I look through this professional experience, I see plenty of
reasons to be concerned about the philosophy that she would bring to
the bench.
In particular, I want to highlight her experience as a policy
adviser. From the Presidential campaign trail in 1988 to the Senate
Judiciary Committee to the Clinton White House, she has spent a great
deal of time working on tough, highly contentious issues. In each of
those cases, I think it is clear that she favors the kind of judicial
activism that has concerned me throughout my time in the Senate. Her
views, and the policies she has supported, endorse a role for the
courts that I find very troubling. And let me be clear, whether or not
I agree with her views on any particular issue, I am most concerned
about the way those views will shape her still-emerging judicial
philosophy.
For example, let's take a look at the life issue. As an adviser in
the Clinton White House, Ms. Kagan led efforts to preserve partial-
birth abortion. Obviously, I disagree with that position, as do most
Americans, but that is the role that advisers often play inside the
White House. Unfortunately in this case, however, the evidence shows
Ms.
[[Page S6742]]
Kagan manipulated arguments about the need for a partial-birth abortion
ban and whether such a ban is constitutional. When a draft scientific
statement from a medical association threatened to undermine the policy
she supported, Ms. Kagan seems to have rewritten that statement in a
way that did not reflect the considered medical judgment of the
association but was more in line with the policy she supported. Her
explanation that she was merely helping the association state its own
views more accurately does not bear scrutiny. This should be a red flag
for Senators considering confirmation of someone to the Supreme Court.
Without a judicial track record to evaluate, I am concerned about how
she would apply her personally held views on similar matters if she is
confirmed.
To turn to another example, as many of my colleagues have pointed
out, the scandal over military recruitment at Harvard also shows
evidence of politically held views coloring the nominee's legal
judgment. Ms. Kagan opposed military recruiting on campus as part of a
protest against the military's don't ask, don't tell policy, even
during a time of war, denying the military access to Harvard's on-
campus recruiting program while the university was receiving Federal
money. It was apparent at the time that she was openly defying the
intent of the Solomon Amendment, but she felt comfortable defying the
law in the ``hope'' that the Defense Department would simply fail to
enforce it. Her argument that law schools could take such steps despite
the plain intent of the Solomon Amendment was, again, primarily a
political argument with very little, if any, legal standing. The
Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with her.
Based on other statements she has made about issues ranging from
military tribunals for detainees in the war on terrorism to political
speech under the first amendment, there are numerous reasons to be
concerned about how Solicitor General Kagan might apply the law as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
It is worth asking whether the solicitor general has ever argued that
the law should be applied contrary to her political views. Perhaps I
would not have to ask that question if we could assess extensive legal
writings or a history of judicial rulings. But since this nominee lacks
such experience, I am left to question how Ms. Kagan would let her
political views shape her judicial philosophy. The weight of the
available evidence clearly suggests political motivations for her legal
views.
I have long believed that the judicial branch helps itself through
refraining from action on political questions. This concept was perhaps
best expressed by Justice Felix Frankfurter, a steadfast Democrat
appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt.
Justice Frankfurter said this:
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed
to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment
is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within
narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded
on independence. History teaches that the independence of the
judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the
passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in
choosing between competing political, economic and social
pressures. Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests
which compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs
to the Congress.
I would add, not to the court.
When the courts improperly assume the power to decide issues more
political than legal in nature, the People naturally focus less on the
law and more on the lawyers who are chosen to administer it. Some are
keen to impose their policy agendas through the judicial process.
Others want judges who will stick to interpreting the law, rather than
making it. It is beyond dispute that the Constitution and its Framers
intended for judges to satisfy the latter criteria.
I know that many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have
underscored Ms. Kagan's strong intellect and outstanding academic
background as evidence that she would rule fairly if confirmed to the
Court. Perhaps they are right. But we ought not be operating in the
realm of ``perhaps'' when it comes to a Supreme Court appointment.
Advise and consent is a serious matter and we have to do better than
``maybe.'' As I read about Ms. Kagan's experience and background and
look for clues to her judicial philosophy, I believe it is far more
likely than not that she will rely on a set of political views to guide
her decisions rather than a strict construction of the Constitution.
After many weeks of public debate, hearings and discussion, I cannot
escape the conclusion that this nomination would only perpetuate
judicial activism on the Nation's highest Court. I opposed the
confirmation of Judge Sotomayor on that basis, and I will oppose Ms.
Kagan's confirmation on those grounds also. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I also rise to discuss President Obama's
nomination of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, to serve on the U.S.
Supreme Court. I agree very strongly with the remarks made by my
colleague who has just indicated there is a strong concern about the
continuation of a pattern of increasing judicial activism in our
country, which we definitely do not need to perpetuate on the highest
Court of our land.
I appreciate the work that has been done by my colleagues on the
Senate Judiciary Committee to examine this nomination and to hold
thorough hearings. There is no doubt that Ms. Kagan's educational
resume is impressive, with a degree from Princeton and from Harvard Law
School. It is unfortunate that the Senate confirmation process has
reached the point, though, where nominees are no longer comfortable
candidly discussing their judicial philosophy and views on key issues,
especially when the nominee herself decries this development prior to
being nominated.
To date, I have received more than 1,500 letters and e-mails and
phone calls from my Idaho constituents, overwhelmingly in opposition to
Elena Kagan's nomination. Many of the concerns raised in the
correspondence I have received mirror concerns I also have about her
nomination. It was my hope, through the committee hearings and
questionnaires and in my own personal meeting with Ms. Kagan, that my
concerns and those of my constituents could be resolved. As Ms. Kagan
stated in her committee testimony, because she has not had prior
experience as a judge, my Senate colleagues and I must assess her
nomination based on her other career experiences. Therefore, we must
evaluate a career that has been focused largely in her role as a policy
advocate and political adviser and whether she would carry this
political advocacy with her to the Court. I would like to discuss, in
that context, some of my areas of concern--first of all, the broad area
of judicial activism.
I am concerned about Ms. Kagan's background in political advocacy and
activism and how her previous statements suggest her willingness to
bring that activism to the bench. Rather than pursuing a path of
judicial restraint, carrying out a limited role in interpreting the
Constitution, Ms. Kagan's writings and testimony suggest that she sees
the Supreme Court as a body that must lead the Nation and have the
freedom to change the law in response to ``new conditions and new
circumstances.''
As dean of the Harvard Law School, Ms. Kagan used her position to
lead the school in a direction not based on the law but based on her
own personal policy preferences when she denied military recruiters
equal access to the students at Harvard Law School, complying with the
law only when forced to do so by the Court.
It seems that Ms. Kagan has an extremely broad view of the powers of
all branches of the Federal Government and does not seem to respect the
traditional limits the Constitution places on each of those branches.
If the Constitution requires that a certain outcome can only be
achieved through the actions of the legislative branch and if the
legislative branch fails to take those actions, it does not mean the
executive or judicial branch can then have the opportunity to
independently take those actions or achieve those policy objectives. I
am not convinced Ms. Kagan respects that constitutional separation of
power.
She has gone so far as to cite Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak as
her ``judicial hero,'' even though Judge Barak is widely regarded as
one of the most activist judges in the world.
The Framers of the Constitution wisely, clearly, and intentionally
set
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limits on the powers of the Federal Government. The Framers also set
forth a method with an appropriately high threshold for expanding or
curtailing those powers. That method for expanding or curtailing the
powers of the government is the constitutional amendment process.
Judges must respect the limits placed on the government by our
Constitution and must not try to circumvent the constitutional
amendment process by seeking other opportunities to expand the powers
of the Federal Government to meet their own personal policy
preferences. I am not convinced Ms. Kagan respects that limit in our
Constitution and the responsibility to have limited judicial activism
and interpret our Constitution as it was intended.
I also have a very specific concern on a specific issue. In fact,
this is the same concern I had when we were presented with the
President's nomination of the last nominee, Sonia Sotomayor, to our
Court; that is, the second amendment right to bear arms--a specific
provision in the U.S. Constitution which has been a very controversial
and debated provision in recent years in the United States.
On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, in
the District of Columbia v. Heller, that the second amendment to the
Constitution guaranteed an individual's right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense purposes. This landmark ruling finally established that
the right to bear arms in the second amendment is an individual right
but left open the question of whether this right in the second
amendment applies to the States rather than just to Federal enclaves
such as the District of Columbia.
For those of us who believe in the right to law-abiding citizens to
protect themselves, the Court's ruling in Heller marked a new
beginning, especially for those who believe the second amendment to our
Constitution gives Americans an individual right to bear arms. For too
long, many law-abiding Americans were told by their elected
representatives and by some courts that the Constitution did not
necessarily guarantee an individual's right to own a firearm, denying
citizens the right to protect themselves, their property, and their
families.
Soon thereafter, though, a case entitled McDonald v. Chicago made its
way through the court system, in which a Federal district court and a
circuit court of appeals ruled that the very severe restrictions on
second amendment rights in two Illinois municipalities were
constitutional because Heller only applied to the rights of those
living in Federal enclaves such as Washington, DC.
On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court also overturned that decision,
affirming that the 2nd amendment, like most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, is applicable to the States via incorporation
principles derived from the 14th amendment. The Court affirmed that
individual rights established in Heller did not just apply to those
living in Federal enclaves such as Washington, DC; they ruled they also
apply to all law-abiding Americans who wish to keep and bear arms for
self-defense. It is now firmly established by these two rulings from
our highest Court that our Constitution guarantees an individual right
to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes no matter where you
live.
All of this brings us to our nominee, Ms. Kagan, and the question
before the Senate with regard to her nomination. Those of us who
believe in an individual's right to keep and bear arms have a
responsibility to ensure that hostility to the second amendment does
not find home in the hands of the Supreme Court.
With no judicial record to review, Ms. Kagan invited Senators to
glean what we can from the body of her work, her statements, her
academic life, and the policies for which she has actively advocated
during her career, including her Supreme Court clerkship and her later
career in political activism.
We took her at her invitation to see how her past reflected her views
on the issue of second amendment rights. After discussing this issue
with her personally, fully reviewing her past actions in relation to
the second amendment, and evaluating her statements before the
Judiciary Committee, I am convinced she does not believe the second
amendment reserves to all Americans a strong and broad right to bear
arms.
To cite some well-known examples, as a Supreme Court law clerk, Ms.
Kagan wrote that she was ``not sympathetic'' to a challenge to
Washington, DC's, ban on firearms. After the Supreme Court struck down
certain provisions of the Brady law in Printz v. United States, Ms.
Kagan, who was then serving on President Clinton's staff, worked to
reimpose those unconstitutional provisions by Executive order, without
the approval of Congress and contrary to the ruling of the Court. When
the McDonald case came before the Supreme Court, Ms. Kagan, who was
then the Solicitor General of the United States, did not even see it
necessary to file a brief in support of the second amendment.
When asked about her position, Ms. Kagan has stated that she accepts
the Heller and McDonald cases as settled law. But she has also made it
clear that in her opinion these two cases leave much of the detail as
to what this right entails to future court interpretation. This is very
similar to what now Justice Sotomayor said when she was before the U.S.
Senate for confirmation.
As a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge
Sotomayor ruled on a case that was very similar to and, in fact, was
later incorporated into the Chicago case, Maloney v. Cuomo. In that
ruling, then-Judge Sotomayor ruled that Heller only guaranteed an
individual right to keep and bear arms for residents of Federal
enclaves. Her explanation was that Heller answered ``a different
question'' than Maloney and relied on a precedent from 1886 to do so.
Pressed about Heller at her Senate hearings, Judge Sotomayor stated
that she accepted that Heller was now ``settled law.'' Yet when the
McDonald case came before the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor voted
against it, joining with the dissenting opinion, stating that ``in sum,
the framers did not write the Second Amendment in order to protect a
private right of self defense.''
The Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald were important
milestones for establishing the second amendment right to bear arms,
but they were long overdue. Countless law-abiding Americans were denied
their constitutional rights to keep and bear arms for way too long. It
is imperative that the next Supreme Court Justice fully understand and
accept and support these rights. I am not convinced that Ms. Kagan
does, and that causes me great concern.
Similar to now Justice Sotomayor, Ms. Kagan has stated that she
accepts Heller and McDonald as settled law. But that does not mean she
would not vote to overrule them if an opportunity presented itself. As
she herself has said, that also does not define the scope and breadth
of this right, which will fall to future Court decisions. A Supreme
Court hostile to the Heller and McDonald decisions or a Supreme Court
with a narrow view of the right to bear arms protected by the second
amendment could severely limit or restrict that right. As I have said,
I do not believe Ms. Kagan believes in the strong and broad right to
bear arms that I do or that the majority of Idahoans do.
These concerns have also been expressed by our ranking member on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Sessions, who noted:
Ms. Kagan's record regarding the Second Amendment leaves
little doubt that she will be hostile to the rights of law-
abiding citizens to own and possess firearms.
For these reasons--her activist philosophy and her position that I
expect we will see on the second amendment right to bear arms--I cannot
vote to confirm her to the highest Court of our land.
Mr. President, I take the responsibility of confirming Supreme Court
Justices very seriously, and my decision was not reached lightly.
Judges take an oath to ``administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.''
My review of Ms. Kagan's record gives me reason to question whether
she will abide by that standard. Her statements, actions, and writings
throughout her public life suggest a vision for the Court that is not
restrained by the Constitution but that has a responsibility in being
activist in
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reaching policy goals. As such, I must vote against her nomination to
sit on the highest Court in our country.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Idaho for his
comments. He is one of the most capable lawyers in the Senate. He is a
practicing lawyer, clerked on the court of appeals, and is scholarly
and careful in what he says. I believe he has raised some very
troubling points about this nomination that should be considered.
I say to Senator Crapo, I notice today that a single sitting Federal
judge in California has just wiped out proposition 8 that was passed by
a majority of the people in California. I guess there were millions
voting on that, which simply said a marriage should be defined as being
between a man and a woman.
This judge struck down proposition 8 and, obviously, at some point,
this will get to the Supreme Court of the United States, as the Senator
well knows. It will go first to the Ninth Circuit, on which the Senator
clerked, and then it will go to the Supreme Court probably. We will
have the nominee who is before us today who has already demonstrated at
Harvard that her views about don't ask, don't tell and similar social
and marriage issues involve such strong feelings on her part that she
has not been able to follow the law. I am worried about that. I think
the American people are worried about that, and I think they have a
right to be.
Let me talk a little bit about today's decision by a Federal judge in
California that was replete, in my view, with results-oriented liberal
judicial activism. I think that is what it is, as the court explained
in substituting its judgment, the judge's judgment and opinion, for the
judgment of the people of California expressed in a full statewide
referendum. Now this is a powerful thing.
Was there some clear statement in the Constitution or law that would
invalidate the people's expression of what a marriage should be in the
State of California? I submit not. This is what the judge said.
[W]hat remains of proponents' case is an inference, amply
supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition [8] was
premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not
as good as opposite-sex couples. Whether that belief is based
on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays
and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a
man and a woman is inherently better than a relationship
between two men or two women, this belief is not a proper
basis on which to legislate.
So the judge just declared that laws that are on the books in
virtually every State in America--and certainly by referendum in
California--are improper. States cannot legislate in this area. It is
not ``a proper basis'' on which to legislate.
That is what activism is. It is a judge replacing the people's views
with his views.
President Obama has made similar statements. He said that judges
should decide cases based on ``one's deepest values, one's core
concerns, one's broader perspectives on how the world works, and the
depth and breadth of one's empathy.''
This was in a floor speech in the Senate delivered from right over
there from his desk in which he opposed Chief Justice John Robert's
confirmation to the Supreme Court--one of the finest nominees ever to
be brought before this body.
This is the kind of rationale, the kind of empowerment that many
judges feel. Well, they can just use their broader perspective on how
the world works or the depth and breadth of their empathy or their
deepest values or core concerns. Whose core concerns? The judge's core
concerns. What does this have to do with law, I ask?
Indeed, I would suggest that this whole litany of matters raised by
President Obama is not law. These are invitations for judges to allow
their bias to influence how they decide cases, an encouragement for
judges to use their power of defining the words of our laws and
Constitution to promote their agenda. This is an unacceptable view. It
is contrary to the great heritage of law this country is based on and
should not be tolerated by the judiciary.
When Justice Stevens announced his retirement, whom Ms. Kagan would
replace--he served 38 years; he served until age 88--if Ms. Kagan were
to serve till that age, she would serve 38 years on the Supreme Court
without ever having to answer once to the American people. She has
never tried a case. We have no judicial history. She has never really
practiced law in any serious way. She has been a political lawyer most
of her life. She has been an advocate for a lot of leftwing views and
that is all right.
You can have a view that the military's don't ask, don't tell
policy--law passed by Congress; it is a law not a policy--you can
oppose that. That is fine. That should not disqualify you from serving
on the bench. You can be against the death penalty and serve as a good
judge if you understand that if the law requires the death penalty, you
should have to apply it. You cannot obstruct the law because you do not
agree with it. This is basic to the understanding of the American
jurisprudence system.
When Justice Stevens announced his retirement, President Obama
rephrased his empathy standard that took a lot of criticism and,
indeed, was renounced by Justice Sotomayor in her confirmation hearings
last year. He said he wanted a nominee with a ``keen understanding of
how the law affects the daily lives of the American people.''
Well, I think that is what Congress is supposed to do. We are
supposed to be monitoring how the laws affect the daily lives of the
American people. If we do not think, as a matter of policy, it is doing
it correctly, we should fix the law, change it, eliminate it, and do
whatever is appropriate. That is not the judge's responsibility. The
judge's responsibility is to enforce the law, to follow the law, or
else he is a lawmaker instead of a judge.
When the President announced Elena Kagan's nomination, he said: ``She
has often referred to . . . Justice Thurgood Marshall, for whom she
clerked, as her hero'' and ``credits him with reminding her that, as
she put it, `behind law there are stories--stories of people's lives.'
''
Well, there are stories, and a judge should certainly be very aware
of the facts in a case. Judges should not deny relevant evidence. But
in the end, the judge must find the true facts, and then apply that
truly to the law as it is whether they like it or not. Activism arises
when a judge allows their personal values, even deepest values, core
concerns, broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth
and breadth of their empathy to influence decisions. Isn't that bias?
Who knows what these judges believe--they have a lifetime appointment
and they get to impose their core concerns on us? No. This is a serious
matter.
I think the American people understand it because when you empower a
judge to do these kinds of things, you have given him control over you.
You have given him the power to redefine marriage when the people of
the State don't want to. And you have no recourse. They have a lifetime
appointment. Some people say nine judges can do that. Only five,
really. It only takes five. They meet and have tea and they go to the
great salons of Europe, and they get these ideas about how to make
America a better place, and they want to come back and get itching to
write it into some opinion somewhere.
I would say that no drafter of the Constitution or any of the
provisions in it at any point that those amendments were adopted would
ever have imagined a Federal judge in California would declare that the
people of California's decision to define marriage as it has been since
the founding of the Republic as between a man and a woman is
unconstitutional. Make no mistake. When a judge says something is
unconstitutional, this is not a little bitty matter. The American
people have no recourse, except to pass a constitutional amendment. It
takes two-thirds of both the House and the Senate and three-fourths of
the State. They make it so because they say it is so. There is nothing
in the Constitution that defines marriage. If it is defined--the most
logical argument is that when it was written, if they had wanted to
change the definition of marriage, they would have put it in there,
because every State in America at the time the Constitution was drafted
and every amendment to it defined marriage as between a man and a
woman.
That is what we get. Right now we have had battles over those kinds
of
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issues. They are the cause celebre of the day, but they become further
issues in the future. Do we think maybe in the future it comes down to
whether a judge can require the State to raise taxes? Will it require a
State to provide insurance to everyone or the Federal Government to do
so because the Constitution somewhere said that everybody should have
equal protection of the law? Does that mean everybody should have
health insurance?
We have one nominee President Obama has submitted, Mr. Liu, who says
everybody in America is entitled to constitutional welfare rights.
Presumably, if you file a lawsuit in front of him, he would order the
State to provide welfare to everybody, whether we can afford it or
whether the legislature decided that is the right thing. This is what
activism is. It is a serious matter.
I wanted to speak of a few additional points for discussion that
relate to matters that have been raised in the last day or so about
this nomination. I am trying to be correct in what I say. I want to be
correct and fair. This nominee deserves fair treatment and accuracy,
and we should try to achieve that in the Senate. If I have said
anything before or say anything now that is in error, I hope my
colleagues will call that to my attention and I will be pleased to
admit that I made an error, if I have, and correct it. Likewise, I am
beginning to wonder--I have said this before--since nobody has
corrected any significant matter I have stated, they must be agreeing
to it.
One of our Senators defended Ms. Kagan by insisting that any
arguments she made as Solicitor General were made on behalf of her
client, the United States, and should not be held against her. They
suggest that her actions as Solicitor General should, therefore, be
immune from criticism. In other words, she didn't necessarily do what
she thought ought to be done, but she had a duty to defend the law.
It misses the point about the Witt case, the important case I talked
about in which I criticized her decisions as Solicitor General. The
problem with Ms. Kagan's actions in the Witt case is she did not make
all appropriate arguments in defense of her client, the United States.
She declined to effectively represent her client, the United States. I
went into some length about that today. We are not saying that she must
agree with every argument she made as Solicitor General in terms of
policy. Solicitors General are required by their duty to defend the
laws Congress passes. They don't have to agree with the law, but they
have a duty to defend it if it is challenged as being unconstitutional
or in some other fashion improper.
What is most important about this is that in the Witt case, it dealt
with the military's don't ask, don't tell policy. People can disagree
on that, as I indicated, but it was the law passed by Congress and
signed by President Clinton. She spent 5 years in the Clinton White
House. She never complained to him about the law, to my knowledge. She
didn't protest or quit working for him. She goes to Harvard, however,
and bars the military from being able to enter the Career Services
Office and recruit students because she didn't like the law Congress
passed and her former boss signed. She punished the military officers
who were there on campus to recruit Harvard students to be JAG officers
in the military. Maybe those officers just got back from Iraq and
Afghanistan--we were in two wars at the time--yet they were treated as
second-class citizens, not allowed to enter the career services office.
Oh, they could call the little veterans group on campus and they
could ask them and they could help them. One officer wrote in a memo
that was produced by the Defense Department: We were relegated to
wandering the halls hoping somebody would stop and speak to us. They
weren't able to recruit properly on the Harvard campus. Her suggestion
that this was nothing she was doing and unimportant is not accurate. It
was a misrepresentation of the grave circumstances that occurred at
Harvard when she was dean. She led this effort. She personally led the
effort to reverse Harvard's policy and deny the military the right to
enter the Career Services Office. They said, Well, it is OK, they can
call the veterans groups. They were offended by it. They sent out an e-
mail and said we are not able to arrange for these kinds of meetings.
We are law students here who happen to be veterans. We can't do what
the career services can do to provide assistance to the military. It
was plainly against the Solomon amendment which was in effect at all
times when she reversed Harvard's policy and began to bar the military
from coming on campus.
When she came up for confirmation last year to be Solicitor General
of the United States and there were cases filed around the country
challenging the constitutionality of don't ask, don't tell, it was
clear it might fall to her duty to defend that law, and she was asked
in committee about it. She was asked: Will you defend the law? She
said: Absolutely, she would. She committed to it. Generally she would
commit to defending all laws of the United States and, specifically, in
answer to a written question, she committed to defending don't ask,
don't tell.
What I wish to say is that my colleagues were in error in their
statements about this because it wasn't that she made arguments to the
Court that she didn't believe in and that somehow we are unfairly
criticizing her for doing that. What I am saying is there were
arguments she did not make that she was duty bound to make to defend
the law and actions that she was duty bound to take.
It has been said by one of our colleagues that it is ``Lawyer 101''
that an attorney will take positions on behalf of the client even when
the lawyer disagrees with it. Well, that is exactly right. An attorney
does have an obligation to vigorously defend his or her client, but Ms.
Kagan refused to do that. Her client was the United States of America.
When the Solicitor General of the United States stands before the U.S.
Supreme Court or any lawyer--as I had the privilege to do for 15
years--in the Department of Justice stands up in a Federal court, do
you know what they say? The first thing they are asked is, Counsel, the
judge will say, is the government ready? And the lawyer says, The
United States is ready, Your Honor. The United States is ready. That is
who the lawyer's client is: the United States of America. It is not her
personal view of don't ask, don't tell. It is not President Obama's
interests or idea of what should be don't ask, don't tell; not his
views. It is the United States of America. And what is the position she
was defending? The lawfully passed statutes of this Congress signed by
her former boss, President Clinton, passing the law don't ask, don't
tell that was being challenged.
I am of the view that in failing to properly defend that case, as I
said earlier, she violated a direct, specific commitment she made to
the Congress and violated her duty even if she hadn't made that
commitment as Solicitor General to defend the laws of the United
States.
One of my colleagues made reference to Justice Souter, saying:
Justice Souter pointed out in a recent commencement address
recently [that] different aspects of the Constitution point
in different directions toward different results, and they
need to be reconciled.
Judges do have to do that.
Acknowledging these inherent tensions is not only Main
Street, it is as old as the Constitution.
Well, there is some truth to that, but Justice Souter's speech and
others in his philosophical mold are very troubling. In fact, Justice
Souter's speech intellectually followed on to Justice Brennan's 1985
Georgetown speech which is clearly the playbook for judicial activism.
In it, Justice Brennan, former Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
stated:
For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world now dead and gone, but
in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs. What the constitutional
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be
their measure to the vision of our time.
So if the Constitution's drafters decided that every American from
time immemorial, unless the Constitution was specifically amended, had
a right to keep and bear arms, Justice Brennan would say, Well, we can
look at that. We need to see what the vision for our time is. Maybe we
need to consult the Europeans as they did in this recent case, the
dissenters in a 5-to-4 vote that narrowly upheld the right to keep and
bear arms.
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Allowing judges to determine the vision of our time is a recipe for
legislating by unelected judges. What is the vision of our time is
decidedly in the eye of the beholder. It is the job of the elected
branches of government to make these calls in our constitutional
system, not the unelected judiciary. The job of the judiciary is to
interpret the law, not make the law. That is so basic. Don't we all
know that?
As Professor John Baker of LSU put it:
The choice is between two distinct modes of decision-
making.
Legislators make laws; they do not write opinions.
Legislators can legitimately make laws to govern future
conduct only. . . . Legitimate judging, on the other hand,
concerns the existing law. Interpretation of the existing
law, contrary to lawmaking, focuses on the past. Legitimate
interpretation of existing law explains the result in a well-
reasoned opinion.
I think that was nicely said. Judges are not empowered to amend laws,
to promote their vision. They are not empowered to alter the meaning of
the words of laws or the Constitution to promote their core values.
What is Ms. Kagan's view about that? She wrote a law review article
entitled ``Confirmation Messes, Old and New.'' It is kind of
interesting. She has said nominees should be far more forthcoming when
they testify. Most people think she failed to meet the standard in her
own law review article. She also quoted Stephen Carter's book, with
approval, saying:
In every exercise of interpretive judgment, there comes a
crucial moment when the [judge's] own experience and values
become the most important data.
The judge's own experience and values become the most important data?
That is not law. I don't know what that is, but it is not law.
In a 2004 interview in Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, she said:
The attitudes and views that a person brings to the bench
make a difference in how they reach those decisions.
Is that not biased? Is that not an affirmation that a judge can bring
to the bench their attitudes and views, instead of being a neutral
umpire, putting on that black robe to symbolize impartiality? I think
it is. This is a philosophy of law that is afoot in many of our law
schools. There is no doubt about it. It is out there. People advocate
it. She wrote about and advocated it. Many judges are adhering to this,
and it is wrong. They are not empowered to do these kinds of things.
In one interview in a magazine, in 2004, she said:
There should be a range of opinions on the [Supreme] Court;
it should not just be about lawyerly qualifications.
The opinions we need on the Court are that a judge should identify
the law and then follow it. That is what the view should be.
Mr. President, people are still asserting things about the Harvard
issue that I don't think are quite accurate. I do not believe she
handled the Harvard military question in any way that is defensible. I
have looked at it very carefully. I have laid it out in some detail.
And now I wish to respond to some of the statements that have been
made.
One their efforts has been to point out and to assert that Elena
Kagan treated veterans at Harvard Law School with great respect,
hosting them for private dinners in her home, publicly recognizing them
and thanking them for their service to our country. She has been
praised by several law school veterans who have said Ms. Kagan is not
antimilitary. Those things have some truth to them, and Senator Leahy
has introduced some letters.
But, for the most part, Dean Kagan's outreach to Harvard Law veterans
began after all this brouhaha and the resistance to military recruiting
occurred on campus and things got tense.
It was not such a pleasant time. The military veterans were not
comfortable. She talked about other students being uncomfortable with
the military on campus. She said that herself. So the annual veterans
dinner I referred to began in 2006, after the university president,
Larry Summers, had instructed the law school to restore equal access to
military recruiters and after the Supreme Court had rejected her
argument that the Solomon Amendment, which Congress passed to make sure
these law schools either admitted the military or ceased getting
Federal money--her argument that the Solomon amendment did not require
Harvard to give the military access to the career services office was
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court 8 to 0.
According to the military veterans who attended Harvard Law School
during this period, 2004 to 2006, the dinners were actually initiated
at the suggestion of the school--the university's dean of students,
Ellen Cosgrove, to whom the military veterans had expressed their
concerns about the hostile campus environment toward the military. In
other words, they had gone to Dean Cosgrove and complained about the
hostile environment on campus toward the military, and she started some
of these dinners. It was only later that Dean Kagan--who was speaking
at one time to a protest rally while the military recruiter was in the
next building trying to recruit students--she was out there speaking to
a protest rally about the military being on campus, saying how wrong
she thought the military was.
Most law school veterans who have praised Dean Kagan were either not
present at the law school during the height of the controversy or were
not then even in the military. Almost all of them were more recent
graduates or current students at Harvard, people who liked her outreach
efforts at that time. But that was after she was forced to let the
recruiters back on campus by the President of the school and by the
Supreme Court. None of the individuals who have written and said
positive things were members of the student veterans association that
she tried to conscript to take care of the needs of the military
recruiters. None of them wrote any such letter.
I wished to share a few of those thoughts and again challenge my
colleagues to be as accurate as they can in what they say, either for
or against this nominee. She is entitled to fair treatment, but these
matters are very serious. The American people want judges who are
committed to their oath, and their oath says they are to be impartial,
that they are to do equal justice to the poor and the rich, and that
they are to serve under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
not above it. That is the commitment they must have.
We, the Senate, should never vote to confirm any judge--liberal
activist or conservative activist--who, once they put on that robe,
will not be impartial or provide equal justice but will allow personal
biases, core beliefs, prejudices or politics to influence how they
decide cases. That is a disqualifying factor.
We must know that any nominee is committed to the ideal of impartial
justice. I don't believe this nominee has ever demonstrated that she
would be unbiased in these situations, and, indeed, the record
indicates she has consistently allowed her personal feelings to
override the law and her duties. Therefore, I will oppose the
nomination.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The DREAM Act
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about S. 729, known as the
DREAM Act. This is bipartisan immigration legislation that I have
introduced with Republican Senator Dick Lugar of Indiana.
Immigration is a controversial issue, but I hope there is one aspect
of this debate that does not divide us: Innocent children should not be
victims of our broken immigration system.
That is why I introduced the DREAM Act almost 10 years ago. The DREAM
Act would give a select group of immigrant students the chance to earn
legal status if they grew up in the United States, have good moral
character, and attend college or enlist in the military of our country.
The DREAM Act has broad, bipartisan support. The last time the Senate
considered the DREAM Act, it received 52 votes, including 11
Republicans, but
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we needed 60 votes under the Senate rules. It is clear, though, that a
bipartisan majority in the Senate supports the DREAM Act.
Since then, support for the DREAM Act has only grown, and the bill
now has 40 cosponsors. The DREAM Act also is the only immigration bill
that the Obama administration has officially and publicly endorsed.
Just this month, President Obama said:
We should stop punishing innocent young people for the
actions of their parents by denying them the chance to stay
here and earn an education and contribute their talents to
build the country where they have grown up. The DREAM Act
would do this, and that is why I supported this bill as a
State legislator, as a U.S. Senator, and I continue to
support it as President.
The DREAM Act is also supported by a broad coalition of education,
labor, business, civil rights, and religious leaders, including the
AFL-CIO, the American Jewish Committee, the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, the National PTA, and the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops.
It also has the support of the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, such as
Microsoft and Pfizer, and dozens of colleges and universities.
The DREAM Act also has broad support from the American people.
According to a recent poll by Opinion Research Corporation, 70 percent
of likely voters favored the DREAM Act, including 60 percent of the
likely Republican voters.
Here is how it works. A student would have the chance to qualify only
if he or she meets the following requirements: came to the United
States as a child; has lived here for more than 5 years; has good moral
character; has not engaged in criminal activity; does not pose any
threat to national security; passes a thorough background check; and
graduates from an American high school. If a student fulfills all of
these requirements, he or she would receive temporary legal status.
Next, they would be required to serve in the military or attend a
college for at least 2 years. After 6 years, if this requirement is
completed, the student could apply for permanent legal status. If this
requirement is not completed, that student would lose their legal
status and be subject to deportation.
Students who obtain conditional legal status under the DREAM Act
would not be eligible for Pell grants. They also would be subject to
tough criminal penalties for fraud. The DREAM Act would not allow what
is known as chain migration. In fact, DREAM Act students would have
very limited ability to sponsor family members for legal status.
Let me tell you why I first introduced the DREAM Act almost a decade
ago. I was contacted in my office by a Korean woman living in Chicago.
She told me she had several children. Her oldest daughter turned out to
be an accomplished classical pianist. Her daughter finished high school
and was accepted to the Juilliard music school in New York. It is
amazing because so few are accepted there--several hundred each year.
She was so proud of her daughter.
She said when they were completing the form for Juilliard, there was
a question about her daughter's nationality or citizenship. Her
daughter turned to her mother and said: American, right?
Her mom said: We brought you here at the age of 2, but we never filed
any papers.
The girl said: What should we do?
The mother said: Let's call Durbin.
They called my office. It is the first time I can ever recall ever
facing something quite like this. My staff said: Let's look into it and
find out what the legal situation is.
After telling the facts to the immigration agency of our government,
we were informed that the girl's choice was obvious. She had to return
to Korea, a place she had never been for 16 years, with a language she
did not speak. The rest of her family--her mother, all of her
siblings--were American citizens. She was not. Her parents failed to
file the paperwork.
She had made a choice about her career and knew that she was
ineligible for a lot of the student assistance available to those who
are legal residents of the United States.
I thought to myself: That is fundamentally unfair. I reflected on my
own story. My mother was brought to this country at the age of 2 as an
immigrant. Her mother came from Lithuania. She came in her mother's
arms and arrived in 1911 with a brother and a sister. They made it to
East St. Louis, IL, where other Lithuanians were waiting, as well as my
grandfather. My mother did not have any vote in that family decision to
get on the boat and come to America. I am glad she did because her son
now gets to serve as a Senator from the State of Illinois, where they
emigrated.
I thought of this poor little girl, 2 years of age, brought to this
country from Korea, now being told at age 18: Go back to Korea.
That is what the laws of America say, and that is why I introduced
the DREAM Act.
When I first introduced the DREAM Act, I started telling the story
about the Korean girl, and I noticed something interesting was
happening as I told the story: there would be young people waiting
after the speech asking if they could speak to me privately. Many of
them were Hispanic, some were Polish. They were from all over. They
would take me aside, look around to make sure no one was there, and
say: I was one of those kids. I was brought here illegally by my
parents who were legal at the time, and I am illegal today. But this is
the only country I have ever known, gone to school here, this is where
my friends are, this is where my future is. Help me. That is what the
DREAM Act is all about.
Over the years, these people who used to wait nervously in the
shadows have started coming out of the shadows and telling their
stories. They are student council presidents, they are valedictorians,
they are junior ROTC leaders, star athletes. They are tomorrow's
scientists, soldiers, and teachers in America. They were brought to the
United States when they were so young that they did not understand what
was going on. They grew up here. It is the only home they ever knew.
The fundamental premise of the DREAM Act is that we should not punish
the children for the parents' actions. That is not what America is
about. Instead, the DREAM Act says to these students: America will give
you a chance with strict requirements, but we will give you a chance.
Nine years after I introduced this legislation, I have noticed the
DREAM Act students are not whispering in the shadows anymore. Recently,
I met with four young people who would qualify for the DREAM Act:
Felipe Matos, Carlos Roa, Gaby Pacheco, and Carlos Rodriguez. These
four students walked from Miami, FL, to Washington, DC--1,500 miles--in
order to build support for the DREAM Act. Along the way, they were
joined by hundreds of supporters, young students and young people in
the same situation they were in but other young people who understood
the injustice that is being perpetrated on these people. They called
this trip, this long 1,500-mile hike, ``the trail of dreams.''
I also would like to update the Senate on two DREAM Act students
about whom I have spoken in the past.
This is Tam Tran. Tam was born in Germany and was brought to the
United States by her parents when she was 6 years old. Tam's parents
are refugees who fled Vietnam as boat people at the end of the Vietnam
war. They moved to Germany, and then they came to the United States to
join relatives. An immigration court ruled that Tam and her family
could not be deported to Vietnam because they would be persecuted by
the Communist government. The German Government refused to accept them.
Tam literally had nowhere else to go, so she grew up in America. She
graduated with honors from UCLA with a degree in American literature
and culture. She was studying for a Ph.D. in American civilization at
Brown University. But 2 months ago, Tam was tragically killed in an
automobile accident.
Three years ago, Tam was one of the first ``dreamers''--that is what
I call these students--to speak out when she testified before a House
Judiciary Committee. This is what she said:
I was born in Germany, my parents are Vietnamese, but I
have been American raised and educated for the past 18 years.
. . .Without the DREAM Act, I have no prospect of overcoming
my state of immigration limbo; I'll forever be a perpetual
foreigner in a country where I've always considered myself an
American.
Tam was sitting right up here in the gallery when the DREAM Act
received
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52 votes on the Senate floor. After the vote, I met with Tam and
several other DREAM Act students. Tam was hopeful, even though we lost
the vote. She knew we had 52 and realized we needed 60, but she would
not give up hope. She talked about the need to pass the DREAM Act so
she would have a chance to contribute more fully to this country--the
country she loved so much.
I wish to use this moment to offer my condolences to Tam Tran's
family and friends and assure them I will do everything I can to honor
her memory by working to pass the DREAM Act.
Let me tell you about another DREAM Act student. This is Oscar
Vasquez. Oscar was brought to Phoenix, AZ, by his parents when he was a
small child. He spent his high school years in Junior ROTC and dreamed
of enlisting in the military. But at the end of his junior year, a
recruiting officer told Oscar he was ineligible for military
service because he was undocumented.
Oscar found another outlet. He entered a robot competition sponsored
by NASA. Oscar and three other DREAM Act students worked for months in
a storage room in their high school. They were competing against
students from MIT and other top universities, but Oscar's team won
first place.
The story does not end there. Last year, Oscar graduated from Arizona
State University with a degree in mechanical engineering. Oscar was one
of only three Arizona State University students who were honored during
President Obama's commencement address at that university.
Following his graduation, Oscar did an extraordinary thing: he
voluntarily returned to Mexico, a country he had not lived in since he
was a child. He has now applied to reenter the United States. Oscar
said:
I decided to take a gamble and try to do the right thing.
But there is a problem. Unless Oscar is granted a waiver, he will not
be able to enter the United States for at least 10 years, if not
longer. In the meantime, he is going to be separated from his wife
Karla, who is here in the United States, and their 2-year-old daughter
Samantha, who are both American citizens.
This extraordinary young man--a mechanical engineer who won a
national competition, a person who can add something to America, who
has a wife and family here, who is doing the right thing by going back
to the country of his origin even though he has little connection with
it anymore--is being told: America doesn't need you. Wait for 10 years,
separated from your family.
It is not fair.
There are so many other stories of young people who would be eligible
for the DREAM Act. Every week--every single week--I receive calls, e-
mails, and letters from these dreamers. Let me tell you about two
others.
This is Benita Veliz. Benita Veliz was brought to the United States
by her parents in 1993. She was 8 years old. Benita graduated
valedictorian of her high school class at the age of 16. She received a
full scholarship to St. Mary's University. She graduated from the
honors program with a double major in biology and sociology. Benita's
honors thesis was written about the DREAM Act.
Benita sent me a letter recently, and I am going to read into the
Record what she said. Benita said:
I can't wait to be able to give back to the community that
has given me so much. I was recently asked to sing the
national anthems for both the U.S. and Mexico at Cinco de
Mayo community assembly. Without missing a beat, I quickly
belted out the Star Spangled Banner. I then realized that I
had no idea how to sing the Mexican national anthem. I am
American. My dream is American. It's time to make our dreams
a reality. It's time to pass the DREAM Act.
Let me show one other. This is Minchul Suk. Minchul was brought to
the United States from South Korea by his parents in 1991 when he was 9
years old. Minchul graduated from high school with a 4.2 GPA. He
graduated from UCLA with a degree in microbiology, immunology, and
molecular genetics. With support from the Korean American community,
Minchul was able to graduate from dental school. He has passed the
national boards and licensing exam to become a dentist, but he cannot
obtain a license because he does not have legal status.
Minchul sent me a letter recently. Here is what he wrote:
After spending the majority of my life here, with all my
friends and family here, I could not simply pack my things
and go to a country I barely remember. I am willing to accept
whatever punishment is deemed fitting for that crime; let me
just stay and pay for it . . . I am begging for a chance to
prove to everyone that I am not a waste of a human being,
that I am not a criminal set on leeching off taxpayers'
money. Please give me a chance to serve my community as a
dentist.
The DREAM Act is not just the right thing to do, it is the right
thing for America. Wouldn't America be a better place if someone such
as Minchul Suk would be able to serve his community as a dentist?
Couldn't our military use someone such as Oscar Vazquez, a mechanical
engineer who has overcome so many obstacles in his young life? Wouldn't
we all be better off if these talented young immigrants were able to
contribute more fully to the country they love?
Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of New York City, knows something about
economic development. He sent me a letter supporting the DREAM Act.
Here is what he said:
Why shouldn't our economy benefit from the skills these
young people have obtained here? It is senseless for us to
chase out the home-grown talent that has the potential to
contribute so significantly to our society. They're the ones
who are going to start companies, invest in new technologies,
pioneer medical advances.
Michael Bloomberg is right.
Our country would also benefit from thousands of highly qualified,
well-educated young people who are eager to serve the United States of
America in our armed services. I know. I have spoken with those who
work at the Pentagon. Diversity is important in our military. There are
not enough, primarily from Hispanic populations, currently
enlisting. This is a good way to change that, to make sure the next
generation of leadership in the military truly reflects the United
States of America.
Immigrants have an outstanding tradition of military service. More
than 65,000 immigrants are currently on Active Duty. The Center for
Naval Analysis has concluded that ``noncitizens have high rates of
success while serving--they are far more likely, for example, to
fulfill their enlistment obligations. . . .''
Many DREAM Act students come from a demographic group that is already
predisposed toward military service. The RAND Corporation found that
``Hispanic youth are more likely than any other groups to express a
positive attitude toward the military'' and ``Hispanics consistently
have higher retention and faster promotion speeds than their white
counterparts.''
The Army says high school graduation is ``the best single predictor''
of success in the military. However, in recent years, the Army has
accepted more applicants who are high school dropouts, have low scores
on the military aptitude test, and even some with criminal backgrounds.
In contrast, under the DREAM Act, which I have introduced, all recruits
would be well qualified as high school graduates with good moral
character and no criminal record.
Since the Bush administration, we have worked closely with the
Defense Department on the DREAM Act. Defense Department officials have
said to me publicly and privately that it is a very appealing law. It
would apply to the cream of the crop of students and be great for
military readiness.
Military experts also support the DREAM Act. LTC Margaret Stock, a
professor at West Point, wrote an article supporting the DREAM Act. She
concluded:
Passage of the DREAM Act would be highly beneficial to the
United States military. The DREAM Act promises to enlarge
dramatically the pool of highly qualified recruits for the
U.S. Armed Forces.
Mr. President, I am sorry I waited until late in the evening and held
the staff here for this, but this means a lot to me and it means a lot
to literally hundreds of thousands of young people across America. I
have introduced a lot of bills in my career. Some of them have become
law. Most of them haven't. Most of them aren't even noticed. This one
is noticed by hundreds of thousands of young people who, when they hear
the name Durbin, ask the next question: When is he going to
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pass the DREAM Act? Our lives depend on it. I feel a special, personal
obligation to these young people.
I want to take this story to my colleagues because I think they
believe that America is a just and caring country, that these young
people can bring talent and service to our great Nation and they
deserve a chance. They should not be punished for any wrongdoing by
their parents. They deserve a chance to prove themselves and to make
this a better nation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
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