Personal Explanation

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on rollover Nos. 470—H. Res. 1556, 471—H. Res. 5730, and 472—H. Res. 1366, I was unable to vote today, since I was at the White House meeting with the President. Had I been present, I would have voted “no” on H. Res. 1556, “yes” on H. Res. 5730, and “yes” on H. Res. 1366.

Pakistan War Powers Resolution

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1556, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 301) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Pakistan, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Speaker proclaims the concurrent resolution read.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. Con. Res. 301
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM PAKISTAN.

Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), Congress directs the President to remove the United States Armed Forces from Pakistan—

(1) by no later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the day on which this concurrent resolution is adopted; or

(2) if the President determines that it is not safe to remove the United States Armed Forces before the end of that period, by no later than December 31, 2010, or such earlier date as the President determines that the Armed Forces can safety be removed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The concurrent resolution shall be debatable for 1 hour, with 30 minutes controlled by the Chair and ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH) and the gentleman from Florida—

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

U.S. forces are in Pakistan. Congress never voted expressly to send troops there. Congress has a constitutional responsibility under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. And I will insert Article I, Section 8, in the RECORD.

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment and counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States; To establish Post Offices and Post Roads; To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the Appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of the Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it is Congress which has the power to declare war.

Now, the War Powers Act extended the debate over Article I, Section 8 by pointing out that, if circumstances occurred where the President committed troops to imminent hostilities, that Congress has the right to create a debate and to create a vote over whether or not those troops should stay in those hostilities.

Now, are there hostilities involving U.S. troops in Pakistan? The answer is that there are.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

U.S. forces are in Pakistan. Congress never voted expressly to send troops there. Congress has a constitutional responsibility under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. And I will insert Article I, Section 8, in the RECORD.
by the authorization for the use of military force which passed Congress on September 14, 2001. I have here a copy of that resolution, which I will include in the RECORD.

H.J. RES. 64

Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treachery and violence were unleashed against the United States and its citizens;

Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad;

Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence;

Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States; and

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the “Authorization for Use of Military Force”.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) In General.—That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or participated in the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

(b) War Powers Resolution Requirements.

(1) Specific Statutory Authorization.—Consistent with section 5(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) Applicability of Other Requirements.—Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

That resolution has this language: “Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”

So let’s put to rest right away that the authorization for use of military force would cover our presence in Pakistan and obviate the need for any congressional direction. It is very clear that the President has a responsibility to notify Congress. He has a responsibility, according to section 4 of the War Powers Act, to report to Congress whenever he introduces U.S. Armed Forces abroad in certain situations.

Section 4(a)(1) triggers a time limit in the section, and it requires reporting to Congress. Why is that? Because the people’s House has a responsibility under the Constitution. We cannot abrogate or renounce that responsibility. That is why today is about assuring that Congress has a role in a critical foreign policy area where our troops have already lost lives in Pakistan.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Berman. Mr. Speaker. I rise in opposition to the resolution, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this is the second time in four months that we are debating a resolution under the War Powers Act. I welcome congressional scrutiny of the commitment of U.S. forces abroad, and I appreciate the gentleman from Ohio’s effort to focus attention on one of the most sacred duties of Congress. But once again, to take issue with the invocation of Section 5(c) of the War Powers Act as the basis for this debate. That section authorizes a privileged resolution, like the one before us today, to require the withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces when they are engaged in hostilities and Congress has not authorized the use of military force.

Whereas the Afghanistan war powers debate focused on whether there was an authorization for military force, here we do not even reach that question because, based on everything I know, U.S. forces are not engaged in hostilities in Pakistan.

The Wall Street Journal article distributed by my friend from Ohio refers to the U.S. military’s role in training and humanitarian assistance programs in Pakistan. That’s not “engaging in hostilities.” In fact, our Armed Forces participate in these types of programs in dozens of countries around the world.

The gentleman refers to the terrible tragedy of three U.S. forces killed by an IED. They were on a humanitarian aid mission. We have people on such missions, people involved in military training, uniformed officers, who have been killed in many different parts of the world. From that, one does not draw the conclusion that the U.S. is engaged in hostilities with enemy forces. In fact, since U.S. forces are not engaged in hostilities in Pakistan, there is no factual basis for invoking the War Powers Act.

Mr. Speaker, Pakistan is an important partner in the fight against extremism.

Last year Congress demonstrated America’s long-term commitment to Pakistan by passing the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. Any attempt to cut the military ties between our two countries would be counterproductive for our national security interest in the region.

No matter what your position on the situation in Pakistan, whether you think we should withdraw tomorrow, shift from a counterinsurgency strategy to a counterterrorism strategy, or send in even more troops, there is no reason to automatically conclude that we should cease our efforts to help Pakistan address the dire threats to its security.

In 1990, we stopped providing military assistance and training to Pakistan for what seemed like a good reason at the time. But as a result, a whole generation of Pakistani military officers rose through the ranks without any connection or affinity with the United States, and that contributed to some of the suspicion and mistrust that we are still struggling to overcome.

Mr. Speaker, there is no question that Pakistan needs to step up in a number of important areas. We hope to increase cooperation on various security issues, strengthen the role of Pakistan’s democratically elected government and achieve a greater parity between military and civilian assistance. The United States is aiding Pakistan because it is in our interest to ensure an economically and politically stable Pakistan does not provide sanctuary for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

The reports in recent days that elements of the Pakistani intelligence service may have been aiding our enemies is nothing new to those of us who have been following this issue and is not a reason to abandon our many friends in Pakistan who are struggling to transform their economy, their political system, and their military. The security forces of Pakistan are steadily taking on a Taliban-backed insurgency, taking direct action against those who threaten Pakistan’s security instability, including military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province.

Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that using the War Powers Act to call for the removal of U.S. combat forces, which do not exist, will only serve to inflame Pakistan’s sensibilities and do nothing to strengthen the partnership that we need to achieve our goals in the South Asia region. I urge my colleagues to oppose the resolution.

I reserve the balance of my time.
This article "To Die for a Mystique" was written by Andrew Bacevich, himself a Vietnam veteran, his son, a graduate of West Point, killed in Iraq.

"To Die for a Mystique." The dirty little secret to which few in Washington will turn up is that the United States now faces the prospect of perpetual war and conflict. That's why this debate has to take place, whether we have three Americans killed in Pakistan or we have 33 or we have 300. What's the intelligence, responsibility? That's what this is about.

I will regret to the day I go to my grave that I voted to give President Bush the authority to go into Iraq. We did not meet our responsibilities. We passed some little resolution, and I voted for it. We trusted the President to not go to war unless it was absolutely necessary, but we went to war.

Mr. Speaker, I have signed over 9,400 letters to families. This is my retribution to my God for not doing my job that I was voted for that resolution. That's why I stand on the floor today with the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from Texas to say let's meet our responsibility. Let's not keep saying to the American kids, You need to die for a mystique. Let's give them purpose.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, God, please bless our men and women in uniform.

Please support this resolution.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I believe that this dangerous resolution is less about U.S. policy toward Pakistan than it is about Afghanistan and a back-door attempt to force U.S. withdrawal from that country. Because our success in Afghanistan is directly linked to our effort in Pakistan, withdraw from the latter, and you may bring defeat in both.

In response to the September 11 attacks, Congress authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against the perpetrators of those attacks, including against those who harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States.

But al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan fit that description precisely. Our wonderful U.S. personnel in Afghanistan are there to train and support Pakistan's military and security forces to enable them to battle their own insurgents, including al Qaeda and other threats.

Much of this training is not combat related, but instead is focused on helping Pakistan undertake civil, military operations aimed at establishing stable and effective civilian authority in areas that are now off limits and serve as safe havens for extremist groups.

Far from withdrawing, we must work with Pakistan to increase our own intelligence and the information and intelligence networks in that country that use it and neighboring Afghanistan as a launching pad from which to direct attacks against us and our allies. The adoption of this resolution would undo our efforts to accomplish these goals and build trust and credibility with Pakistani leaders and the Pakistani people that will help provide for long-term stability and advance our long-term interests.

Mr. Speaker, removing our personnel from Pakistan would present al Qaeda with a gift that it desperately needs and convince it and the world that it is winning the fight, thereby inevitably enhancing its prestige, confidence, assets, and resources. If this resolution were adopted, it would make it more difficult, and perhaps impossible, for General Petraeus to effectively implement the strategy that he is pursuing in Afghanistan and that is being carried out by our brave men and women serving there.

Some will focus on the information reportedly contained in the many thousands of classified U.S. documents related to the conflict against al Qaeda and that Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is, on a reckless and irresponsible act which compromises U.S. security as justification for this resolution.

Some of those documents reflect the legacy of mistrust between the United States and Pakistan as well as between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a legacy which we are even now trying to overcome through enhanced dialogue.

I am gravely concerned that those leaked documents may have put in jeopardy our national and military missions. As National Security Adviser General James Jones has warned, the leaks could "put the lives of Americans and our partners at risk and threaten our national security."

But we would be compounding the risk and further undermining our efforts against radical Islamic militants in Pakistan and in Afghanistan if this Congress would take this knee-jerk approach to our national security and military strategy by adopting this resolution before us.

Instead, we must remain focused on our mission, on success, on prevailing against the global jihadist network. These Islamist radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan, who seek to destabilize our allies and attack our Nation and our interest, are driven and are focused on carrying out their deadly mission.

We must, in turn, demonstrate that we possess the strength of character, the commitment, the wherewithal to counter al Qaeda, the Taliban and other enemies at every turn. We must not be looking at any opportunity or excuse to seek an immediate withdrawal from the epicenter of violent extremism, as some in the Administration have been described.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentlelady, for whom I have the greatest respect, for her concerns about the resolution. But I would like to respectfully suggest to her that the danger that's presented here is that this Congress ignores the WikiLeaks documents that point out a connection between Pakistani intelligence and the Afghan Taliban where they're actually helping the Taliban against our troops. We have to pay attention to that. I didn't create this resolution in order to link it with the Afghanistan war, but the connection today is the link with the Afghanistan war because they are actually helping the Taliban. They created the link.

I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from California (Ms. WOOLSEY), who has been a strong advocate for peace in this Congress.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support wholeheartedly Mr. KUCINICH's and Mr. PAUL's resolution to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Pakistan.

The War Powers Act clearly states that the President must seek congressional approval before committing U.S. troops and before committing funds. As reports and media reports, our troops are in Pakistan without congressional authorization, and they, as well as we, ask, To what end?

Mr. Speaker, we are running up record deficits with two wars which have cost the United States in blood and treasure. Together, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the American taxpayers over $1 trillion and, worst of all, more than 5,000 men and women in uniform have given their lives. And what do we get for all of this, Mr. Speaker? Instead of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghan people, we're fueling hatred and insurgency, and now we want to export that to Pakistan. I don't think so. Let's not do it.

I urge my colleagues to demand that the administration comply with the War Powers Act and remove our troops from Pakistan.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds in response to my friend from California's point.

The War Powers Act, I repeat again, doesn't deal with the presence of military forces without an authorization from Congress. It deals with engaging in hostilities or imminent hostilities without the authorization of Congress.

We have uniform personnel in Pakistan. They are working on the military assistance programs. We are working in training Pakistani military. They are involved, as the Wall Street Journal revealed, in the delivering of humanitarian assistance in areas that are not secure enough for AID and civilian personnel to go.

The WikiLeaks documents, with all the transparency that it provided for us about what the situation is, I'm unaware of any excerpt which indicates reports of U.S. military forces engaged in hostilities in Pakistan.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to introduce into the Record a Gallup poll that revealed that 59 percent of Pakistanis...
view the U.S. as their biggest threat, and that 67 percent of Pakistanis polled were opposed to military operations in their country. Now, Mr. Speaker, if putting our troops inside the borders of Afghanistan, if we’re not putting them in a hostile environment, with those poll results, I don’t know what would be hostile.

[From Al Jazeera, Aug. 13, 2009]

PAKISTAN SEE US AS BIGGEST THREAT
(By Owen Pay)

A survey commissioned by Al Jazeera in Pakistan has revealed a widespread dis-enchantment among United States for interfering with what most people consider internal Pakistani affairs.

The polling was conducted by Gallup Pakistan, an affiliate of the Gallup International polling group, and more than 2,600 people took part.

Interviews were conducted across the political spectrum in all four of the country’s provinces, and represented men and women of every economic and ethnic background.

When asked whether they consider to be the biggest threat to the nation of Pakistan, 11 percent of the population identified the Taliban fighters, who have carried out scores of deadly bomb attacks across the country in recent years.

Another 12 percent said that they believe that the greatest threat came from neighboring India, which has fought three wars with Pakistan since partition in 1947.

But an overwhelming number, 59 percent of respondents, said the greatest threat to Pakistan right now is, in fact, the U.S., a donor of considerable amounts of military and development aid.

TACKLING THE TALIBAN

The resentment was made clearer when residents were asked about the Pakistani military’s efforts to tackle the Taliban.

Keeping with recent trends a growing number of people, now 41 percent, supported the campaign.

About 24 percent of people remained opposed, while another 22 percent of Pakistanis remained neutral on the question.

A remaining 15 percent of respondents would not back the military efforts.

Pakistan's government formally opposed US military operations on Pakistani soil.

“Maybe the intelligence channels, the military channels consider it productive, but for the general public it is controversial . . . the drone attacks are causing collateral damage,” he told the editor-in-chief of Pakistan’s The Daily Mail newspaper, said.

“Tackle the Taliban, let the US military help the Pakistani government deal with the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, are believed to have been killed in about 50 US drone attacks since August last year, according to intelligence agents, local government officials and witnesses,” Washington refuses to confirm the raids, but the US military in neighbouring Afghanistan and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are the only forces operating in the area that are known to have the technology.

The government in Islamabad formally opposes the attacks saying that they violate Pakistani sovereignty and cause civilian casualties which the US has destroyed the area and forced two million to leave their homes.

The military has declared the operation a success, however, some analysts have suggested that many Taliban fighters simply slipped away to other areas, surviving to fight another day.

When people were asked if they would support government-sanctioned dialogue with Taliban fighters if it were a viable option the numbers change significantly.

Although 41 percent said they would still support the military offensive, the number of those supporting dialogue leaps up to 43 percent.

So clearly, Pakistanis are, right now, fairly evenly split on how to deal with the Taliban threat.

DRONE ANGER

However, when asked if they support or oppose the drone attacks the same thing what Washington claims are Tribunal and al-Qaeda targets, only nine percent of respondents reacted favourably.

A massive 67 percent say they oppose US military operations on Pakistani soil.

“This is a fact that the hatred against the US is growing very quickly, mainly because of these US drone attacks,” said Naseem Makhdoom, former prime minister, who now edits the editor-in-chief of Pakistan’s The Daily Mail newspaper, said.

A senior US official told Al Jazeera he was not surprised by the poll’s findings.

The US has been accused of making efforts to not only stop the Taliban’s ability to work to do make itself better understood to the Muslim world, he said.

And it would take not only educational and economic work to win over the Pakistani people but also a concerted effort to help the Pakistani government deal with “extremist elements” that are trying to disrupt security, he added.

Nearly 500 people, mostly suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, are believed to have been killed in about 50 US drone attacks since August last year, according to intelligence agents, local government officials and witnesses.

Washington refuses to confirm the raids, but the US military in neighbouring Afghanistan and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are the only forces operating in the area that are known to have the technology.

The government in Islamabad formally opposes the attacks saying that they violate Pakistani sovereignty and cause civilian casualties which the US has destroyed the area and forced two million to leave their homes.

By far, the largest percentage would opt to have the drone attacks continue. Among those supporting dialogue five per cent.

Pakistan, they don’t want us there. But from there, opinions vary greatly. Maybe the intelligence channels, the military channels consider it productive, but for the general public it is controversial . . . the drone attacks are causing collateral damage.”
But what about in Pakistan? There is a lot of conniving going on there because I am sure their leaders are quite satisfied with us going in there because we bribe them. The Congress just recently passed a bill that promises them $7.5 billion, not that they stay in power, and it’s also how they can help the Taliban who’s fighting us.

The whole thing is such a mess, but the people, if you ask the people of Pakistan, they’re not going to support this. And the argument is that we have to support this because our generals want us to, because this is our mission. Well, what is our mission? Our mission ought to be to defend this country, preserve liberty, and show people what a free society looks like. We shouldn’t be trying to tell other people how to live with bombs and threats. We give them two options: We tell them do it our way, and if they do, we give them a lot of money. If they don’t do it our way, we start bombing them. But we don’t achieve anything. That’s my contention. We just go on and on.

My big beef is with the overall policy. I know we’re talking about the technicalities and we’re talking about Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we don’t have these technical problems until we deal with the subject of what kind of a foreign policy we endorse. Are we supposed to be the policemen of the world? Are we supposed to be in nation building? Are we supposed to be helping people? Are we supposed to support the infrastructure of others, building all around the world and neglect all of ours? It’s coming to an end because this country is bankrupt, and we’re going to have to change our policy whether we like it or not.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am so pleased to yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. MCKEON), the ranking member on the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. MCKEON. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this resolution and I am pleased to join my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs and the Armed Services Committees who are opposed to this ill-timed and ill-conceived measure. I am disappointed that the House Democratic leadership would allow this resolution to come to the floor for a vote at this time.

In April 2009, the President released his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and began to make the case to the American people that security and stability in the region are vital to the U.S. national security interests. I support this strategy.

In Pakistan, instability and violence have reached new highs with the insurgency moving eastward toward the capital of Islamabad and bombings and suicide attacks on the rise. This fight not only affects the people of Pakistan but our security, too. Moreover, Pakistan is an essential partner to the United States, both in the near and the long term, and we must remain committed to building trust between our two nations.

It remains in our national interest to defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies and to ensure they will have no safe havens from which to attack the American people. In Pakistan, the government and people are increasingly seeing the insurgency operating from the tribal border areas as the most existential threat to their country.

Despite Pakistan’s increased military operations, the scale, nature, and frequency of violence in Pakistan makes it a nation more appropriately comparable to a combat zone, such as that found in Afghanistan, and it should be treated as such rather than as a central European country seeking foreign military financing.

That is why our military partnership with Pakistan is essential. There are approximately 230 U.S. military personnel in Pakistan—all assigned to the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan. This small contingent is in Pakistan at the invitation of the Government of Pakistan to support security assistance programs and training to deepen our cooperative relationship with Pakistan.

Let me be clear. This is not a combat mission but a train and equip role for the U.S. train in Pakistan. These trainers were selected based on the requirements established by the Government of Pakistan. These programs are key to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations—training which Pakistan needs to defeat al Qaeda and Taliban forces operating within their borders.

Representative KUCINICH’s resolution, if enacted into law, would mandate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Pakistan by the end of 2010. Why would the Commander in Chief and his commanders without giving the military a chance to implement the strategy?

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to send a clear message to our military men and women: This Congress believes in you. We support you, and we honor your dedication.

I urge my colleagues to vote “no.”

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank my colleague for his support for the troops because we both support the troops. The question is that some of us believe that the best way to support the troops is to bring them home.

I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. ELLISON).

Mr. ELLISON. Let me thank the gentleman for his support for the troops.

Mr. Speaker, let there never be any other war, military conflict, or armed hostilities involving U.S. military personnel that are not openly debated, expressly authorized and consented to, and scrupulously overseen by this Congress.

We are the Congress. It is our job to do our constitutional duty. It is not second-guessing. It is oversight. It is engaging in the process of governance. There is nowhere in the Constitution that says that the President just gets to go fight wars without the oversight of the Congress. It is not unpatriciatic. It is not a pejorative. It is our constitutional duty, if you are going to commit troops, to know why, when and how, and there are provisions in the Constitution and in the War Powers Act to make sure that Congress has the ability to exercise its constitutional responsibility. We can’t shirk these duties constitutionally, not under the War Powers Act or anything else.

The Speaker pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. ELLISON. We are in Pakistan. We are there with troops on the ground, apparently, and we are there in unmanned aerial vehicles. We have to exercise our responsibility. We cannot escape what history has assigned to us. We can’t turn a blind eye when we know troops are there and engaged. It is not responsible.

The Pakistani public opinion is at an all-time low with regard to the United States. Why? We hardly know because we haven’t dealt with this engagement in a forthright manner.

Vote “yes.”

Mr. BERMAN. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to just, if I might, Mr. Speaker, respond to my friend from California who is in my neighboring district, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. He made a reference to House leadership. He couldn’t understand why it was setting this for debate.

Secondly, while I disagree with my friend from Ohio about whether the requisite requirements of the War Powers Act are met—because my conclusion is we are not engaged in hostilities as that term is used in the War Powers Act—I do want to say I don’t understand, when seeking oversight, when making sure that taxpayers’ funds are well spent, that our troops are protected and are being well served, and that our interests are being pursued by a particular operation, why the debate on that on the House floor is evidence of not supporting the troops.

To the contrary, had we had more debate on the House floor over the past 10 years, perhaps $30 billion in military assistance to Iraq, which was lost, and can’t be accounted for, might not have happened.

I know one thing. Perhaps we wouldn’t have given the military leader of Pakistan free rein to cut deals with political appointments agreements, in various parts of Pakistan during the period prior to his removal from office. Perhaps we would
have a greater sense—and here we do have a greater sense—of knowledge of where our defense aid is going and what our military assistance is being used for than ever before, in large part, thanks to the oversight responsibilities of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. These are usual processes. They are much better than simply providing the money and then turning away until it is all over. I commend the gentleman for using what I think is the wrong vehicle but the appropriate subject of having an open discussion about the wisdom of what we are doing. I think that serves our forces. I think it serves our country.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to inquire as to how much time each side has remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. YARMUTH). The gentleman from Ohio has 17 minutes remaining. The gentleman from California has 7 minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from Florida has 7 minutes remaining.

Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to talk a little bit more about our policy because, as I said before, I think it is the policy that gets us into these predicaments and that, if you deal with this as a strictly technical/tactical problem that we have to face in how to rectify our problems, I don’t think it will occur. I think we have to deal in the overall policy.

In many ways, we follow a schizophrenic type of foreign policy because, one time, they are our best friends, then later on they become our worst enemies. This was true with Saddam Hussein. In the 1980s, he was our friend. We took care of him. We encouraged him and supported his war. Then of course that changed. Even right before 9/11, we were still receiving money from us, and now they receive money from us indirectly. The Taliban gets money from the Pakistanis, or at least information as has been reported, but they literally get some of our money in the process because, in order for us to move equipment through Afghanistan, they literally end up getting a lot of American dollars from doing this.

So here we are going into Pakistan. One of the arguments to go into Pakistan is that we have to go after the Taliban—that they are over there, that they are organizing and that they want to kill the American soldiers in Afghanistan. This means that now they are our archenemies. Yet the Taliban, especially in the 1980s, and we didn’t call the Taliban the Mujahideen. It was a precursor, but they were our best friends along with Osama bin Laden. We were allies with them because we supported the principle that if the Soviets were to be occupying Afghanistan.

Now the tables have turned. Now we are the occupiers. Now the very people who used to help us are shooting and killing us. It has been revealed just recently with this release of information that they actually have some Stinger missiles, and as of the last month or so, three of our helicopters have been shot down.

So where does this all end?

One thing about the reports in the newspaper, I think if they changed the definition or the use of one term, I think it would change everybody’s attitude, if people came around to believing that the Taliban are people who aren’t dedicated toward coming over here to kill us, like some of the al Qaeda are, but the Taliban are only interested in getting rid of the occupiers of their country.

So we call them militant. So we go in, and we raid and shoot and kill and bomb, and then we say, aha, we killed 37 militants today.

What if we reported this always like we did in the eighties?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield the gentleman another minute.

Mr. PAUL. What if it was always reported that freedom fighters were killed, as it was when they were our friends and our allies? The whole thing would change.

But, no, we call them militants and we call them insurgents. But they were formerly our allies and our so-called friends.

So this is just a reflection on the ridiculousness of our analyst policy of intervention and how so often our allies and our friends turn against us, and how our money, taxpayers’ money, so often is used against us. I think this is a perfect example.

We would like to stop it. That’s why we brought this legislation up. We don’t want to see this war spread, and we want the American people to know about it, and we want this Congress to know about it, because foreign policy isn’t even written in the Constitution.

The responsibility of how we run our foreign affairs is with the U.S. Congress; and when we go to war, it should be a congressional function, not an executive function; and some day we may get there, but right now, today, we have to do our very best to let people know the shortcomings of the policy we’re following in Pakistan.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON), the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I’d like to remind my colleagues who are so hell bent to get the training troops that we have, 230 U.S. troops, helping with the training in Pakistan. I’d like to remind them that on 9/11 we were attacked by al Qaeda terrorists, whose head was Osama bin Laden. And Osama bin Laden has been going back and forth across the Afghan/Pakistani border. And there has been training going on with terrorists there, and in Yemen, to try to foment more terrorism and to try to get them to move toward more attacks on the United States of America.

This is a war that we’re fighting to protect America, as well as make sure the entire region over there is stable. There’s a number of problems. If the Taliban and al Qaeda are successful in taking over that country, can you imagine what the rest of the world would have to deal with with them having the nuclear capability that they would have? That’s one of the things we have to talk about.

And without the training, I’d like to point this out, without the training of our troops that are in Pakistan as trainers, the 230 of them, the money that American dollars from doing this. But, no, we call them militants and can train them and teach them about what this equipment can and will do.

Now, let me just make a couple of points. First of all, if we cut military ties to Pakistan, it’s crazy. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan just goes all over the place. Nobody can really tell you when you cross the border and go back and forth. So you’re going to have some mistakes made in going after the Taliban or al Qaeda terrorists in that region.

And for us to cut aid and assistance to Pakistan at a time when we’re trying to win the war and stop terrorism in Afghanistan would be, in my opinion, insane using $2 billion to continue the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda would not be used as effectively and as efficiently because those people have to be trained to use the technology that we’re giving them. And you have to have somebody that can train them and teach them about what this equipment can and will do.

And without the training, I’d like to point this out, without the training of our troops that are in Pakistan as trainers, the 230 of them, the money that American dollars from doing this.

So here we are going into Pakistan. One of the arguments to go into Pakistan is that we have to go after the Taliban—that they are over there, that they are organizing and that they want to kill the American soldiers in Afghanistan. This means that now they are our archenemies. Yet the Taliban, especially in the 1980s, and we didn’t call the Taliban the Mujahideen. It was a precursor, but they were our best friends along with Osama bin Laden. We were allies with them because we supported the principle that if the Soviets were to be occupying Afghanistan.

Now the tables have turned. Now we are the occupiers. Now the very people
the enemy have sanctuary. If we didn’t learn anything from Vietnam, we should have learned that.

This is an entire breeding ground for terrorism, that border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, part of Pakistan and part of Afghanistan. And because we’ve been putting so much heat on the Talibain and al Qaeda, they have been moving their training grounds outside of Afghanistan into Yemen and into Pakistan, and that’s why we must not allow them to have sanctuary.

And another thing I would like to talk about that has not been mentioned is the rules of engagement. When I was coming in today, I heard on the radio an Afghanistan American soldier who had just gotten back from Afghanistan. And he said, the rules of engagement are crazy. He said, he’ll go into a combat situation and he’ll have an enemy target, and they’ll say, you can’t fire on that target unless you get approval from your commanding officer. And he says many times the soldiers who are put in that position will get killed before they get the approval to fire on their targets.

We need to change those rules of engagement so we can go after the enemy, where they are and get the job done. Why should we handcuff our troops when they’re in a combat situation? It makes absolutely no sense. That’s a recipe for disaster.

So if I were talking to the President or General Petraeus I would say, let the troops do their job. Don’t give sanctuary to the enemy, help the Pakistanis fight them, train the Pakistanis over there, and give our troops the ability, when they hit a target, to be able to go after that target, to knock that target out, and not wait for orders that might endanger their very lives. That’s a good way to get all of our troops killed.

We are in a war, not only in that area that’s going to decide what’s going to go on in the entire Middle East with Iran and Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we’re in a war that may very well come back to the United States and hurt us a great deal.

We cannot let the terrorists have the ability, with impunity, to be trained and be ready to attack the United States again or any of our allies. And that’s why we, and our allies, must work together to make sure we stop the terrorists from having the ability to feel safe in their training practices in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, Yemen or wherever they are.

This is a war. And it’s a war for the survival of many parts of the world and I believe, including the United States. And so we must do whatever is necessary to win that war.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

I want to say to my friend from Indiana, who is my friend and with whom I have served in this Congress for 14 years and whose dedication to our Nation should never be questioned, I want to say to my friend from Indiana that this House Concurrent Resolution does not cut aid to Pakistan. It does not cut assistance to Pakistan.

I will place in the RECORD an account of the direct U.S. Aid and military re-imbursements to Pakistan from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2011.

DIRECT OVERT U.S. AID AND MILITARY REIMBURSEMENTS TO PAKISTAN, FY2002–FY2011
(rounded to the nearest millions of dollars)

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Sources: U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development
Abbreviations:
CSF: Coalition Support Funds (Pentagon budget)
DA: Development Assistance
CSH: Child Survival and Health (Global Health and Child Survival, or GHCS, from 2010)
ESF: Economic Support Funds
FMF: Foreign Military Financing
HRDF: Human Rights and Democracy Funds
IDF: International Disaster Assistance (Pakistan earthquake and internally displaced persons relief)
IMET: International Military Education and Training
INLGS: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security)
MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance
NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (the majority allocated for Pakistan is for anti-terrorism assistance)
PSCFC (Pakistan Counterterrorism Fund/Counterterrorism Capability Fund) (transferred to State Department oversight in FY2010)
Notes:
* P.L. 480 Title I (loans), P.L. 480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.
** P.L. 480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.
+ P.L. 480 (counterterrorism assistance, aid to Pakistan, and lobbying against Pakistan’s nuclear program). PSCFC (Pakistan Counterterrorism Fund/Counterterrorism Capability Fund) (transferred to State Department oversight in FY2010)
* P.L. 480 Title I (loans), P.L. 480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.
** P.L. 480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.
+ P.L. 480 Title I (loans), P.L. 480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.
** P.L. 480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.

In this, it points out the following: that coalition support funds, Pakistan during this period has received $8.11 billion; that with respect to foreign military financing, it has received $2.1 billion; and with respect to economic support funds, it has received $4.7 billion.
Now some Members may feel that we should have troops in Pakistan, and this is the first time we’ve had this debate because since we do have troops there, we can at least have the debate, which is an appropriate role for Congress.

But my friend from Indiana has raised several important questions. He has talked about Osama bin Laden. The Pakistan ISI, their intelligence, is extraordinary. They’re so extraordinary that they can play a double game with the United States. They can ask us to help them go after the Taliban in Pakistan, which we do, while at the same time they aid the Taliban in Afghanistan against our own troops. Now someone who is that slick, who can basically con the United States, you can imagine what’s going on in their mind with respect to helping the United States locate Osama bin Laden if in fact he is still alive.

The other thing is, we have to be concerned that whenever we send our troops, that United States occupation fuels insurgencies. This is why we’ve had the casualties in Iraq. This is why we’ve had the casualties in Afghanistan. It is why if we continue to expand our military in Pakistan, why there will be more U.S. casualties there.

The final thing that I want to answer my friend—and I will yield him time in a minute—he mentioned Vietnam. Prior to the beginning of the Vietnam War, in 1964, U.S. military advisers had been around South Vietnam for almost a decade. As the government of South Vietnam grew weaker, the number of military advisors grew in numbers.

The final thing that I want to answer my friend—and I will yield him time in a minute—he mentioned Vietnam. Prior to the beginning of the Vietnam War, in 1964, U.S. military advisers had been around South Vietnam for almost a decade. As the government of South Vietnam grew weaker, the number of military advisors grew in numbers.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself an additional minute.

The U.S. poured billions of dollars of military aid into South Vietnam to prop up the increasingly weak government and prevent the ostensible expansion of communism in the world.

Now does this scenario sound familiar? Well, it should, because it’s exactly what is happening in Pakistan and why I am glad that the gentleman from New York (Mr. McMahon) will control the time of the gentleman from California.

There was no objection.

Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. At this point, I yield 3 minutes to the gentle lady from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the distinguished manager and I really applaud Congressman Kucinich for allowing us to today discuss a crucial aspect of America’s foreign policy.

Frankly, I believe it is time for us to come home from Afghanistan, having just returned just over 2 weeks ago, in the early part of July, we were able to see the enormity of corruption and the lack of standing up by the Afghan Government. But I saw the resilience of the United States military and the willingness of the people in Afghanistan to be able to desire a better quality of life. I think that we are now poised to build the Afghan national security forces and to remove our forces from the dangers of the Taliban neighbors who live in Afghanistan, who are not leaving, who have a difference of opinion.

In the instance of Pakistan, I think it is key that we recognize that there are some troubling circumstances. And yes, we do have some questions as relates to the people of Pakistan understanding the great humanitarian work that the American people have done; the work they’ve done with USAID, the work they’ve done in helping to build schools, and it is the responsibility of the Pakistan Government to be able to strengthen the decision of the United States is all about.

I do not want boots on the ground dealing with hostility. We have boots on the ground all around the world, but they’re not engaged in hostility. They’re providing, if you will, a level of peacekeeping and friendship and cooperation.

Now we need to rid ourselves of the involvement of the ISI in undermining American soldiers in Afghanistan. They cannot be playing around with the Taliban while we are investing treasure. But at the same time Pakistani army or military forces is investing their treasure and we are trying to provide them with the training that is necessary.

I believe that what Congressman Kucinich has done here is important, and he is absolutely right to be able to have this discussion and to recognize the situation and to work together on the humanitarian side to be able to inform the Pakistani people and the Pakistan Parliament and government officials to not run away from the humanitarian work that the United States is doing. We have just passed a multi-billion-dollar bill that is going to work on building and helping to rebuild Pakistan from the education and social and health care.

So the training that is being done by our military should be done in a peaceful mode. That should be announced by the officials of the Pakistan Government, and they should not run away from the good things that we are doing there.

And my concern to be able to acknowledge or affirm that we have troops there under the War Powers Act would suggest that we are there in a hostile manner.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentle lady has expired.

Mr. McMahon. I yield the gentle lady 1 additional minute.

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. We are perceived with hostility because there has not been a standing up by our friends in Pakistan in that we are working collaboratively in a diplomatic manner to enhance the quality of life and to provide for the security, if you will, of the Pakistan people, working with or with their military in the forefront.

So I would argue that we have much work to do in Afghanistan, our troops need to come home, and the technical assistance that is being given to the neighbor Pakistan must be defined as the right and not defined as a hostile manner.

I’m looking forward to us clarifying the relationship and ensuring that the Pakistan intelligence is not undermining this diplomatic, civilian-focused effort of our military using training techniques and to be able to cooperate by allowing the Pakistani military to interact with our military for procedures and process. It is clear that we have a very contentious situation in the region; Pakistan, India, Bangladesh.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentle lady has again expired.

Mr. McMahon. I yield the gentle lady an additional 30 seconds.

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. We have a contentious relationship there, but I have great hope as the cochair of the Pakistan Caucus that, working with Pakistani Americans, building on the core of humanitarianism that we have passed with the Pakistan American Foundation that has been developed, that we can overcome the image and the perception the Pakistan
people have that we’re not there to work with them to fight the Taliban, to fight against al Qaeda, to fight against Osama bin Laden, and to put them forward trained and equipped to be able to work on behalf of the Pakistani people.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire how much time the respective debaters have here.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 8½ minutes, the gentleman from New York has 2½ minutes, and the gentlewoman from Florida has 1 minute.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 5 minutes.

In response to the gentlelady’s comments about training troops, the U.S. has been training troops in Iraq and Afghanistan for over 7 years now with arguable little or no sign of success; yet we are applying the same failed counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan and now perhaps Pakistan.

A seemingly endless stream of money, an estimated $1 trillion, has been poured into the destruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. Millions of dollars in taxpayer money spent to prop up a corrupt and unpopular central government and to train local security forces. Yet attacks on the U.S. and allied troops continue to rise. Documents released by WikiLeaks report that Pakistan intelligence service, the ISI, supports Taliban attacks on U.S. forces. This despite an average of $1 billion a year in aid from the U.S.

Now, this raises a broader question. Mr. Speaker, which is really about forces. This despite an average of $1 billion a year in aid from the U.S.

In response to the gentlelady’s comments about training troops, the U.S. has been training troops in Iraq and Afghanistan for over 7 years now with arguable little or no sign of success; yet we are applying the same failed counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan and now perhaps Pakistan.

Not to mention that the Afghan government is hopelessly corrupt; that countless innocent civilians have been killed by mistake; that the Afghan government is hopelessly corrupt; that Pakistan intelligence has collaborated with the Taliban in plotting attacks in Afghanistan.

On Tuesday, in its first reaction to the leak, Afghanistan’s National Security Council said the United States had failed to attack the patrons and supporters of the Taliban hiding in Pakistan throughout the nine-year conflict.

The National Security Council did not name Pakistan, but said use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy was a dangerous gamble and had to be stopped.

At a news conference later on Tuesday, council head Rangzen Daftar Spanta was more specific, quoting the billions of dollars in cash aid and military assistance Washington has given to Pakistan over the years.

"It is really not justifiable for the Afghan people that how come you give to one country $1 billion or more as help for reconstruction or strengthen its security or defensive forces, but from other side the very forces train terrorism," he said.

He warned that this would not succeed unless there was a review of Afghan policy by Washington that focuses on Taliban sanctuaries and bases in Pakistan and their supporters.

Those supporting militants should be punished rather than be treated as an ally, said Spanta, who served for years as foreign minister in President Hamid Karzai’s government until last year.

The White House has condemned the WikiLeaks disclosures, saying it could threaten national security. Pakistan said leaking unprocessed reports from the battlefield was irresponsible.

The documents, numbering tens of thousands, also said that coalition troops had killed hundreds of Afghan civilians in unreported incidents and often sought to cover up the mistakes that have shaken up confidence in the war effort among many in Afghanistan.

On Monday, the Afghan government said it had spoken in private and in public meetings with its Western allies about the need to stop civilian deaths.

"In the past nine years (since Talibans fall) thousands of citizens of Afghanistan and from our other countries have become victimised," it said.

It’s been said early on in this debate that the WikiLeaks documents, 92,000 documents, I don’t know who has had the time to read them all, but according to what’s been said publicly, that it represents nothing new. Here’s the key findings of these WikiLeaks documents that were reported in the New York Times in the last day: a point that our troops have been put in mortal danger because of poor logistics; that countless innocent civilians have been killed by mistake; that the Afghan government is hopelessly corrupt; that Pakistan intelligence has collaborated with the Taliban in plotting attacks in Afghanistan.

A seemingly endless stream of money, an estimated $1 trillion, has been poured into the destruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. Millions of dollars in taxpayer money spent to prop up a corrupt and unpopular central government and to train local security forces. Yet attacks on the U.S. and allied troops continue to rise. Documents released by WikiLeaks report that Pakistan intelligence service, the ISI, supports Taliban attacks on U.S. forces. This despite an average of $1 billion a year in aid from the U.S.

Now, if this has been going on for years and it’s nothing new, you have to ask the question then why in the world weren’t we having that debate over the last 6 years? If this is nothing new, why didn’t the American people know all along? Why did it take a document dump by WikiLeaks to suddenly wake up the Congress to say, Hey, wait a minute, the war isn’t going the way you thought it was?

I mean it’s not only a question of if we knew then what we know now, it’s a question that do we remember what we knew then? And why isn’t it affecting our policy right now? Why aren’t we getting out of Afghanistan? Why are we pretending there is a withdrawal from Iraq if we leave 50,000 troops there? And why the U.S. would be in this environment expanding our footprint in Pakistan?

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McMAHON. I continue to reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to ask how much time remains on each side, because I am going to reserve the right to close.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 3½ minutes. The gentleman from New York has 2½ minutes. The gentlewoman from Florida has 1 minute.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield myself the balance of my time.

We all know that the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is one of the most complex and critically important in the world. While significant challenges remain, the U.S. and Pakistan have deepened mutual cooperation against insurgent and terrorist groups. Counterterrorism cooperation has led to significant losses to al Qaeda’s relationship and leadership within Pakistan, with more than half of al Qaeda’s senior leaders being killed or captured.

The Pakistan military has undertaken offensives in Swat and South Waziristan, putting sustained pressure on violent militant groups. The U.S. and Pakistan have also commenced a strategic dialogue, which has expanded cooperation on a wide range of critical issues.

Even with these positive trends, the U.S. must continue to press the Pakistani Government, particularly its
military and intelligence services, to continue their strategic shift against extremists and stay on the offensive.

Mr. Speaker, the U.S. needs to maintain steadfastness in purpose in Pakistan, and I therefore urge the defeat of this dangerous resolution not only our forces in Pakistan.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material into the RECORD on House Concurrent Resolution 301.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. KUCINICH. I continue to reserve.

Mr. MCMAHON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I wish to thank the gentleman from Ohio for his passion and concern for our men and women in uniform, and certainly for the foreign policy of this Nation, even though I join in disagreement of his position with him. I wish to thank the gentleman from Florida, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

I think it’s quite clear to anyone that America’s relationship with Pakistan is one that is fraught with uncertainty, complexity, and opacity. It’s been clear since 1979, when the American embassy was stormed in Islamabad, and we realized that there are many different layers to this onion which is the society of Pakistan.

That being said, however, we know from the many Pakistani Americans who live in our districts, who have come to this country that these are people, both here in this country and in Pakistan, who want to have in the majority a strong relationship with America. And that’s why it’s so important, Mr. Speaker, that we have these boots on the ground, as we said, these few hundred military personnel, who are making contact not only our forces in Pakistan, but also our civil funds that go to this country are used in the right way.

We are not engaged in hostilities in Pakistan, and therefore this resolution is misguided. It is dangerous. It sends the wrong message. For those reasons, Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues in this House to oppose it.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the request of the gentleman from New York and also the gentleman from California for this. And I want to thank Mr. PAUL, who has been a very powerful voice in this country to talk about the limitations of power.

People have been asking why this resolution has arisen now? Because I strongly believe that we should nip in the bud an expansion of U.S. ground presence in Pakistan.
which I don’t need remind anyone is the nation from which the September 11th attacks were launched. There were many others arguing the same thing. Finally, with President Obama we got serious policy review and a real strategy. It has been just 18 months since the President’s speech at West Point which aptly reminded the nation that a very real threat still exists. Moreover, the additional 30,000 troops called for in that speech will not be fully deployed until September. It would be a mistake to abandon the President’s plan now before we allow time for the plan to work. To do so could jeopardize the lives of our American troops.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I support my colleagues raising the issue of Congressional oversight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the debate here today. I share their deep reservations about our engagement in the region, though I disagree with their invocation of the War Powers Act in this case. In fact, the targeted cooperation and training that U.S. Special Forces are said to be conducting in the mountainous border area of Pakistan will likely do more to help us in the long run than doubling down with a troop surge in Afghanistan.

Though I cannot support this resolution, I support the spirit of oversight and accountability behind it. Because I believe our strategy in Afghanistan is fundamentally flawed and cannot succeed without a credible partner in the Afghan government, I hope we can have a serious and vigorous debate about this—the real issue—in the coming months.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unyea number is 372, the nay number is 180. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 38, nays 372, answered “present” 4, not voting 18, as follows:

(Roll No. 473)

[YEARS—98]

**Baldwin**

Baltimore (MD) - 58

Bancroft

Baker

Byrne

Berkley

Berman

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