[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 104 (Wednesday, July 14, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5842-S5843]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN TRIP

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about a trip Senator Jack 
Reed and I recently took to Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, we 
met with the Prime Minister, the Governor of the critical northern 
province that includes the Swat Valley, the Pakistani general who is 
commander of their Army's 11th Corps. In Afghanistan, we met in Kabul 
with General Petraeus, with Ambassador Eikenberry, with President 
Karzai, with many of his ministers.
  Then, in Afghanistan, we traveled to Kandahar Province, where we met 
with General Carter, who is the commander of the ISAF forces, the 
Kandahar Governor and the city mayor of Kandahar. Then we met with the 
commander of the Afghan Army's 205th Corps, Major General Zazai.
  One of the key things we saw, and something which is critically 
important to the success of this mission in Afghanistan, is that the 
Afghan Army be strengthened, take responsibility, primarily, for the 
security of the country, and lead operations which are joint operations 
between the Afghan Army and the coalition forces, including American 
forces.
  That will be dramatized, that movement towards the shift of 
responsibility to the Afghans, where it belongs. A dramatic moment is 
going to take place later in July or early in August when, in a major 
operation in the area around Kandahar city, right in the heart of 
Taliban country, there is going to be a large number of forces that are 
Afghan forces, a large number of American forces, and from other 
countries, and it will be the Afghans who will be in the lead in that 
operation.
  This is the Taliban's worst nightmare: facing an Afghan-led force 
that is going to clear them from control of the area. The Afghan people 
detest the Taliban, and they respect their own army. And our major goal 
and mission should be to build up that army, strengthen it sizewise and 
with equipment and training so it can take major security 
responsibility for that country. This is the path to success in 
Afghanistan.
  Again, because of this planned operation, which is now announced, and 
because of a number of other steps which have been taken--a very 
significant number of positive steps in the last 6 months--I have some 
confidence we are on the way to a successful outcome in Afghanistan.
  Afghanistan has made progress in a number of ways since my visit 
there in January.
  The progress I refer to is toward the key goal of preventing 
Afghanistan from being dominated by a Taliban organization that would 
once again provide a haven for the international terrorist movement, 
al-Qaida.
  To achieve that goal, Afghanistan must be able to take principal 
responsibility for its own security. We and other outsiders cannot 
secure Afghanistan, but we can help the Afghan security forces do so.
  The building blocks to achieve that goal are present. The Afghan 
National Army, ANA, is respected by the people and the Taliban is 
despised and feared because of the terror they spread and threaten.
  A capable, strong, large Afghan Army is the Taliban's worst nightmare 
because it means that the Taliban's propaganda that foreigners seek to 
dominate Afghanistan rings hollow. This is particularly true when 
Afghan troops are in the lead in joint operations with the troops of 
ISAF.
  That is why I believed we should have focused on training and 
equipping the ANA, why we should have sent in trainers and mentors 
instead of sending in more combat troops. That is why when President 
Obama decided to send in 30,000 more U.S. troops, I strongly supported 
the decision to begin to reduce those troops in July of 2011. That date 
is the action-driving mechanism to demonstrate to the Afghans the 
urgency of acting to get their army up to the size and capability where 
they can succeed in the mission so vital to them and to us--securing 
their country against the Taliban.
  A number of steps have been taken in the last 6 months toward 
achieving that goal.
  First, recruitment for the ANA is up, partly because, according to 
General Caldwell, who leads the ISAF training mission, the announcement 
of the July 2011 date last December incentivized the Afghan leaders to 
act to stimulate recruitment.
  Second, the Afghan army has grown very quickly, exceeding the goals. 
Last December the army had 100,000 men; by May the number was 125,000; 
and Minister of Defense Wardak said he expects to announce that the end 
of September 2010 goal of 134,000 will be met by the time of the Kabul 
conference in late July.
  Third, the ratio of ISAF forces to Afghan forces is improving in 
terms of Afghans becoming numerically dominant. When I was with our 
marines in Helmand Province in January, there were two or three marines 
for each Afghan soldier. In Kandahar Province, where Senator Reed and I 
visited last week, the ratio is about one to one and by September it 
will be predominantly Afghan.
  Fourth, the partnering in the field between the ANA and ISAF is real. 
Every Afghan unit from battalion down to company level is now planning 
and operating together with ISAF units. This has the twin benefits of 
training Afghan troops and having the Afghan people see that it is 
their respected army that they want to provide the security which is 
doing that, rather than foreign troops which have less understanding of 
their culture and will someday leave.
  Fifth, and central to the success of the mission of Afghans being 
principal providers of security, is the fact that Afghan troops are 
more and more in the lead in joint operations. A highly significant 
event will take place at the end of July and early August. A major 
joint ANA-ISAF operation will move into the Taliban heartland of the 
Arghandab Valley, just west of Kandahar city. Approximately 10,000 
troops--the Afghan 205th Corps with 5,160 soldiers and ISAF with 4,430 
soldiers--will clear the area of insurgents.

  The planning is complete and the orders signed. It is a major, 
incredibly important effort and, of great significance, the Afghans 
will be in the lead.
  The significance of this will not be lost on the Afghan people, nor 
on the Taliban.
  Kandahar Province is where the Taliban movement was born. Months of 
effort have been extended to ``shape'' the upcoming effort. The city of 
Kandahar and its environs are being secured at the cost of many lives--
both Afghan and coalition forces--so as to

[[Page S5843]]

prevent additional insurgents from reinforcing the Arghandab region.
  This will not be just a clearing operation.
  It will be a clear and hold operation, with Afghan National Police, 
ANP, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police, ANCOP, doing the 
holding with the Afghan National Army and coalition military police.
  As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, said:

       To have American Marines standing on a corner in a key 
     village isn't nearly as effective as having an Afghan 
     policeman or Afghan soldier.

  The key to success of a counterinsurgency effort, which is aimed at 
protecting the people, is winning the support of those people. A 
significant sign of progress in this respect is that the tips needed 
about the whereabouts of the Taliban, so essential to defeating them, 
are coming into the coalition in vastly increasing numbers. An ISAF 
Strategic Assessment report indicates that there has been increased 
reporting by local Afghans on the locations of IEDs and weapons caches, 
resulting in a higher ratio of finds/turn-ins to explosions.
  Sixth, the equipping of the Afghan Army is beginning to happen. We 
authorized the transfer of equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan for the 
ANA instead of bringing all that equipment back to the United States. 
We learned that 800 of 1,600 up-armored humvees have arrived in 
Afghanistan and the rest will soon arrive.
  There are other reasons for optimism. We met with the Governor of 
Kandahar Province and the mayor of the city of Kandahar. Their 
outspoken opposition to the Taliban and the warlords who have been in 
power and who recently assassinated the District Governor of Arghandab 
remains strong and resolute.
  Those are some of the signs of progress, but it has come at great 
cost. We have lost almost 1,200 of our brave troops in Afghanistan, and 
many times that number wounded. The cost to our treasure has been high. 
The months ahead will see more casualties, almost all inflicted by 
IEDs. The strain on our extraordinary troops and their families and on 
the U.S. civilians in Afghanistan is great. Despite the stress, their 
morale is high, and regardless of whether one agrees with the mission 
in Afghanistan, those men and women deserve a tribute from all 
Americans. We stand in awe of them.
  There are also significant threats to the Afghan mission.
  The first threat emanates from Pakistan. While Pakistan has taken 
steps relatively recently to take on some terrorist groups, and has 
done so at a real cost to the Pakistan Army, they have not taken on a 
number of groups that use Pakistan as a safe haven, crossing the border 
into Afghanistan to attack Afghan and ISAF forces, or supplying and 
supporting those attacks and then returning to the Pakistan safe haven.
  Two of those groups are the Haqqani network in the North Waziristan 
area of the federally administered tribal area, FATA, across the border 
from eastern Afghanistan, and the home of the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, 
just across the border from Kandahar.
  The State Department maintains a list of foreign terrorist groups. 
The State Department has said it is currently considering adding the 
Pakistani Taliban to that list. In my view, the Haqqani network has 
also long belonged on that list. We would not tolerate such groups 
attacking us from a neighboring country. Pakistan's failure to attack 
them, knowing full well, as they do, the location of their headquarters 
in Miranshah and Quetta, is also intolerable.
  A second threat to the success of our Afghan mission is the failure 
of the Afghan Government to provide noncorrupt, effective government to 
their people. This has been the subject of much concern. President 
Karzai's administration and international action on the civilian 
government side are beginning to stir into long overdue action.
  The number of U.S. Government civilians in Afghanistan has tripled 
since 2009, with a greater percentage in the field outside Kabul.
  A third threat to the success of the Afghan mission is the 
undiminished power of warlords and power brokers and the so-called 
private security contractors, paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars, who are 
engaged in bribes and perverse, blatant racketeering and rip-offs.
  General Rodriguez, commander, International Security Assistance Force 
Joint Command and deputy commander, United States Forces--Afghanistan, 
is determined to protect our convoys from the warlords and their thugs 
who extort fees for safe passage and often collaborate with the Taliban 
to create the very threat of insecurity they presumably are hired to 
guard against.
  The Afghan people hate and live in fear of the power brokers and 
warlords.
  They corrupt the local police and are one reason why there is little 
public confidence in the local police.
  Training of more and better local police and the expansion of the 
Afghan Civil Order Police, ANCOP, are hopeful signs. But the 
combination of warlords and power brokers operating in effective league 
with private security contractors, the Taliban, and an often corrupted 
local police, remain a significant threat to the Afghan mission's 
success.
  The role of Afghan private security contractors, who often have 
devastating connections to our enemies and who rip off American tax 
payers, and who are facilitated by the failures of U.S. contractors to 
adequately vet and oversee their activities, will be the subject of a 
forthcoming report of a Senate Armed Services investigation.
  Fourth, because success of the Afghan mission depends, probably more 
than anything else, on the rapid growth and capability of the one 
nationally respected institution, the ANA, the continuing failure of 
NATO allies to fill the shortfall of perhaps 2,000 trainers for 
partnering in the field with Afghan Army and police, so-called 
operational mentoring and liaison teams, OMLTs, and police operational 
mentoring and liaison teams, POMLTs, is inexcusable.
  Many of our allies, notably the Brits, Canadians, Australians, Poles, 
Danes, and Georgians have been most admirable in their efforts. But too 
many NATO allies have failed to make commitments or carry out 
commitments so important to the success of the first NATO out-of-area 
combat mission. Continuing pressure on the laggard allies shouldn't be 
needed--but it is.
  The success of the Afghan mission ultimately depends on a political 
settlement. An approach to the reintegration of those lower level 
insurgents who can be reintegrated, and the reconciliation with those 
groups that are not irreconcilable, is underway. The Afghan Government 
is leading that effort also, as, of course, it must. While our views 
and experiences in this regard are surely relevant, a brilliant British 
general leading the ISAF effort in Kandahar reminded us of what T.E. 
Lawrence said to the British over 100 years ago in a similar situation 
in a place that is not too far distant from Afghanistan:

       Do not try to do much with your own hands. Better (they) do 
     it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war and 
     you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, 
     under the very odd conditions (there), your practical work 
     will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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