[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 98 (Monday, June 28, 2010)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1217]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2194, COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, 
               ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                            HON. GWEN MOORE

                              of wisconsin

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 24, 2010

  Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the 
conference report accompanying H.R. 2194 but not without some 
reservations which I want to talk about.
  As you all know, when this bill first came before the House, I voted 
against it. I was concerned that provisions in the bill: (1) limited or 
did not provide the President the ability to waive sanctions to advance 
important national security goals through diplomacy, (2) impacted 
disproportionately the general population of Iran who had just 
courageously stood up to the regime after last year's fraudulent 
elections, (3) and imposed unilateral measures when almost everyone 
agrees that if you are to use sanctions, multilateral ones have the 
best chance of achieving their purpose.
  At that time, I said that it was my hope that as this legislation 
moved forward in the legislative process, further changes would be made 
to strengthen this bill in a way that would truly enhance, and not 
hobble, strong diplomatic efforts to diplomatically engage Iran as well 
as to enact multilateral sanctions.
  Today, we have before us a conference report that is better than the 
bill that came before the House in December. This conference report 
makes a number of changes to provide flexibility to ensure that the 
President can continue to engage in international diplomacy, adding 
elements that were missing from the version that passed the House. It 
would also include targeted sanctions--including the denial of U.S. 
visas and asset freezes--that isolate those in the Iranian government 
or who acted on behalf of that government, based on credible evidence, 
to order or direct the serious human rights abuses that occurred 
against Iranian protesters after the June 2009 elections. Such a 
provision achieves our policy goals without also broadly impacting and 
punishing the Iranian protestors who were the victims (and continue to 
be the targets) of that brutality.
  I would also state and local governments to divest their investments 
in companies doing business with Iran, if that is a course they choose 
to pursue. This authority is similar to that granted by Congress only a 
few years ago allowing a similar divestments regarding investments in 
Sudan.
  These changes are certainly improvements to the bill that passed the 
House over my opposition in December. As I have said before, the 
President's flexibility to conduct foreign relations and diplomatic 
efforts to achieve a strong international consensus against Iran is not 
a loophole that needs to be closed but a vital tool that needs to be 
supported. Diplomacy without flexibility is not diplomacy.
  Additionally, even as I vote to support improvements that I think 
will be useful to the Administration as it pursues an engagement 
strategy with Iran working in close partnership with our allies in the 
international community, I want to make clear that I am not interested 
in causing more suffering to the Iranian people. I am not foolish 
enough to think that we can impose ``crippling U.S. sanctions'' that 
``go far beyond recently-enacted UN sanctions,'' according to the 
authors of this legislation, without causing suffering to the Iranian 
people. While the conference report before us states that the people of 
the U.S. ``have feelings of friendship for the people of Iran,'' 
unfortunately even with the most expansive waiver authority, they will 
still bear the brunt--rather than the reckless Iranian regime--of these 
policies.
  If we must do sanctions, they ought to be clearly targeted at the 
Government of Iran and individuals within that government rather than 
the Iranian society as a whole, in order to avoid creating hardship and 
inflicting harm on the Iranian people. That would send an even more 
unmistakable message to the people of Iran about our intentions. While 
not perfect, there appears to have been good faith efforts made in the 
conference on this bill to do that.
  I also hope very much that no one in the international community 
takes passage of this legislation today as a sign that diplomacy is off 
the table or that our only other option going forward to address very 
serious concerns with Iran's nuclear activities is a military strike.
  I join many who have expressed concerns that although sanctions when 
appropriately targeted can be an important tool for pressuring Iran, 
they are not a full policy and certainly not an end in themselves. We 
need to invest in these diplomatic efforts vigorously now and continue 
to work with our international allies and others interested in peace 
and stability in the region. The aim of those efforts aren't new 
sanctions, they are to achieve a verifiable end to Iran nuclear 
enrichment activities, get it to comply with its NPT and IAEA 
obligations, and prevent a volatile region from becoming even more 
combustible.
  The State Department's Under Secretary for Political Affairs, William 
Burns, made this point in testimony this week before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee when he stated, ``Let me emphasize that sanctions 
are not an end in themselves. Our foremost objective--one that is 
shared by our international partners and our allies in the region--is a 
durable diplomatic solution to the world's concerns about the Iranian 
nuclear program and the broader issues at stake with Iran.''
  Treasury Secretary Geithner stated last week, ``to be truly effective 
in ending Iran's proliferation activities and Iran's support for 
terrorism, we need to have in place a concerted, international 
approach. This is not something the United States can do alone. We need 
other countries to move with us.''
  Sanctions--even the most effective ones--cannot and should not 
substitute nor supplant strong diplomacy. Sanctions should not signify 
an end to diplomacy or alternatively be seen as the last step before a 
military strike, which almost everyone agrees does not serve U.S. 
interests or that of the international community.
  Eight months ago, there was high degree of skepticism that the U.S. 
could push through a new U.N sanction regime particularly given known 
reluctance, if not outright opposition, from Russia and China to such a 
move. Yet two weeks ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1929 committing the international community to implement 
``the most comprehensive sanctions'' that the Iranian Government has 
ever faced according to the Obama Administration.
  Diplomacy and engagement laid the ground work for such an effort but 
that doesn't mean it must stop now. United Nation's Security Council 
Resolution 1929 also emphasized ``the importance of political and 
diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that 
Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes,'' an 
emphasis that is regrettably missing from the bill before us today.
  That resolution also affirmatively supported and I would say 
encouraged--at the same time it was authorizing stronger sanctions--
continued willingness on the part of the P+5 nations (China, France, 
Germany, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.) to ``enhance diplomatic efforts 
to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue 
with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions * * * with a view 
to seeking a comprehensive, longterm and proper solution of this 
issue'' and made very clear that the parties were ready to resume 
formal negotiations.
  Lastly, it has been pointed out that this bill before us today is 
overwhelming silent on this point except brief mentions when it talks 
about using diplomacy for new sanctions. This is a key oversight in the 
bill before us and one I hope neither our own Administration nor our 
key international allies read as an indication that it is okay to trim 
back their efforts at diplomatic outreach and engagement with Iran.

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