[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 87 (Thursday, June 10, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4851-S4857]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mrs. HAGAN (for herself, Mr. Casey, and Ms. Landrieu):
3479. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
acting through the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, to establish and implement a birth defects prevention, risk
reduction, and public awareness program; to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Mrs. HAGAN. Mr. President, today I am proud to introduce the Birth
Defects Prevention, Risk Reduction, and Awareness Act. This bill would
ensure that women of childbearing age and health care professionals
have access to clinical and evidence based information about the risks
and benefits of drug, chemical, and nutritional exposures during
pregnancy and while a woman is breastfeeding.
Women who are pregnant or breastfeeding and taking medication for
chronic diseases such as asthma, hypertension, and epilepsy often have
questions about the risks and benefits. Most pregnant women, as we
witnessed last year, really want to know what the science indicates on
whether they should get vaccinated against H1N1 or the seasonal flu.
Oftentimes, women will seek answers to these important questions from
an established pregnancy and breastfeeding information service. In
fact, each year over 70,000 women and health care providers contact
these information services across the country. These information
services provide valuable information that empowers women. In fact, one
study indicated that 78 percent of women who were considering
terminating otherwise wanted pregnancies due to fears about exposing
their fetus to a medication changed their mind after receiving
appropriate counseling from a teratology information service.
It is not just women who use these services; health care providers,
including physicians and pharmacists, also utilize these pregnancy and
breastfeeding information services. A 2009 study found that over 90
percent of physicians who use these services indicated that the service
provides high quality information that has a significant impact on
clinical care.
In North Carolina, we have the North Carolina Pregnancy Exposure
Riskline, run out of Mission Health System in Asheville. The North
Carolina Pregnancy Exposure Riskline fields calls from a variety of
constituents, including health care providers, pregnant
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women, preconception women, potential adoptive parents, and others.
Each year, trained genetic counselors answer questions from over 300
callers, who want information on the impact of maternal exposures
during pregnancy and while breastfeeding.
The North Carolina Pregnancy Exposure Riskline provides detailed,
factual information to callers on the current available data, and makes
referrals to pregnancy registries that are continuing to gather
information so that researchers and health care providers can have the
best information for future women. If needed and requested, counselors
will refer women to pregnancy resources such as substances treatment
facilities or the NC Family Health Resource line, which has led North
Carolina in information campaigns on the benefits of folic acid and
``Back to Sleep.''
The North Carolina Pregnancy Exposure Riskline also supports the
North Carolina Teratology Information Specialists program to provide
outreach and education about fetal alcohol syndrome.
Although this is an invaluable service for many women, physicians,
and other health care providers, pregnancy and breastfeeding
information services across the country have been forced to close due
to insufficient funding.
The bill I am introducing today would require the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, through the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, to implement a birth defects prevention and public
awareness grant program. Specifically, CDC would initiate a national
media campaign to increase awareness among health care providers and at
risk populations about pregnancy and breast feeding information
services. Experienced organizations would be eligible to apply for
grants: to provide information; and to conduct surveillance and
research of pregnancy exposures that may cause birth defects,
prematurity or other adverse pregnancy outcomes, and maternal exposures
that may cause harm to a breast-fed infant.
I am so pleased that the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the March of Dimes, the
Organization of Teratology Information Specialists, and the American
Academy of Asthma & Immunology are in support of this worthwhile bill.
I urge my other colleagues to join me in supporting this important
bill to provide valuable information about maternal exposures during
pregnancy and while breastfeeding.
______
By Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Carper):
S. 3480. A bill to amend the Homeland Seeurity Act of 2002 And other
laws to enhance the security and resiliency of the cyber and
communications infrastructure of the United States; to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the
Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, which I believe
would help secure the Nation's cyber networks against attack.
The Internet may have started out as a communications oddity some 40
years ago but it is now a necessity of modern life and, sadly, one that
is under constant attack. Today, Senators Collins, Carper, and I are
introducing legislation which we believe would help secure the most
critical cyber networks and therefore all Americans.
For all of its ``user-friendly'' allure, the Internet can also be a
dangerous place with electronic pipelines that run directly into
everything from our personal bank accounts to key infrastructure to
government and industrial secrets. Our economic security, national
security and public safety are now all at risk from new kinds of
enemies--cyber-warriors, cyber-spies, cyberterrorists and cyber-
criminals. That risk may be as serious to our homeland security as
anything we face today.
Computer networks at the Departments of Defense are being probed
hundreds of thousands of times a day, and networks at the Departments
of State, Homeland Security and Commerce, as well as NASA and the
National Defense University, have all suffered ``major intrusions by
unknown foreign entities,'' according to reports.
Key networks that control vital infrastructure, like the electric
grid, have been probed, possibly giving our enemies information that
could be used to plunge us into darkness at the press of a button from
across an ocean. Banks have had millions and millions of dollars stolen
from accounts by cyber-bandits who have never been anywhere near the
banks themselves.
In a report by McAfee--a computer security company, about 54 percent
of the executives of critical infrastructure companies surveyed said
their companies had been the victims of denial of service attacks or
network infiltration by organized crime groups, terrorists, and other
nation-states. The downtime to recover from these attacks can cost $6
million to $8 million a day.
Our present efforts at securing these vital but sprawling government
and private sector networks have been disjointed, understaffed and
underfinanced. We have not operated with the sense of urgency that is
necessary to protect Americans' cyberspace, which the President has
correctly described as a ``strategic national asset.''
Our bill would bring these disjointed efforts together so that the
federal government and the private sector can coordinate their
activities and work off the same playbook.
While President Obama's creation of a cyber-security coordinator
inside the White House was a step in the right direction, we need to
make that position permanent, transparent and accountable to Congress
and the American people.
So, our proposal would create a Senate-confirmed White House cyber-
security coordinator whose job would be to lead all federal cyber-
security efforts; develop a national strategy--that incorporates all
elements of cyberspace policy, including military, law enforcement,
intelligence, and diplomatic; give policy advice to the President; and
resolve interagency disputes.
The Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy would oversee all
related federal cyberspace activities to ensure efficiency and
coordination and would report regularly to Congress to ensure
transparency and oversight.
Our legislation also would create a National Center for Cybersecurity
an Communications, NCCC, within the Department of Homeland Security,
DHS, to elevate and strengthen the Department's cyber security
capabilities and authorities. The NCCC would be run by a Senate-
confirmed Director who would have the authority and resources to work
with the rest of the Federal Government to protect public and private
sector cyber networks.
DHS has shown that vulnerabilities in key private sector networks--
like utilities and communications systems--could bring our economy to
its knees if attacked or commandeered by a foreign power or cyber-
terrorists. But other than pointing out a vulnerability, DHS has lacked
the power to do anything about it. Our legislation would give DHS the
authority to ensure that our nation's most critical infrastructure is
protected from cyber attack.
Defense of our cyber networks will only be successful if industry and
government work together, so this legislation sets up a collaborative
process where the best ideas of the private sector and the government
can be used to meet a baseline set of security requirements that DHS
would oversee.
Specifically, the NCCC would work with the private sector to
establish risk-based security requirements that strengthen the cyber
security for the nation's most critical infrastructure, such as vital
components of the electric grid, telecommunications networks, and
financial sector that, if disrupted, would result in a national or
regional catastrophe. Owners and operators of critical infrastructure
covered under the act could choose which security measures to implement
to meet these risk-based performance requirements. The act would
provide some liability protections to owners/operators who demonstrate
compliance with the new risk-based security requirements.
Covered critical infrastructure must also report significant breaches
to the NCCC to ensure the federal government has a complete picture of
the security of these networks. In return, the NCCC would share
information, including threat analysis, with owners and operators
regarding risks to their networks. The NCCC would also produce and
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share useful warning, analysis, and threat information with other
Federal agencies, State and local governments, and international
partners.
To increase security across the private sector more broadly, the NCCC
would collaborate with the private sector to develop best practices for
cyber security. By promoting best practices and providing voluntary
technical assistance as resources permit, the NCCC would help improve
cyber security across the Nation. Information the private sector shares
with the NCCC would be protected from public disclosure, and private
sector owners and operators may obtain security clearances to access
information necessary to protect the IT networks the American people
depend upon.
Thanks to great work by Senator Carper, our legislation would update
the Federal Information Security Management Act--or FISMA--to require
continuous monitoring and protection of our federal networks and do
away with the paper-based reporting system that currently exists. The
act also would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to establish
0 complete situational awareness for Federal networks and develop tools
to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and networks.
In the event of an attack--or threat of an attack--that could have
catastrophic consequences to our economy, national security or public
safety, our bill would give the President the authority to impose
emergency measures on a select group of the most critical
infrastructure to preserve their cyber networks and assets and protect
our country and the American people. These emergency measures would
automatically expire within 30 days unless the President ordered an
extension.
These measures would be developed in consultation with the private
sector and would apply if the President has credible evidence a cyber
vulnerability is being exploited or is about to be exploited. If
possible, the President must notify Congress in advance about the
threat and the emergency measures that would be taken to mitigate it.
Any emergency measures imposed must be the least disruptive necessary
to respond to the threat. The bill does not authorize any new
surveillance authorities, or permit the government to ``take over''
private networks.
Of course, DHS would need a lot of talented people to accomplish
these missions, and our bill gives it the flexibility to recruit, hire,
and retain the experts it would need to be successful. Our bill would
require the Office of Personal Management to reform the way cyber
security personnel are recruited, hired, and trained and would provide
DHS with temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the quick
establishment of the NCCC.
Finally, our legislation would require the Federal Government to
develop and implement a strategy to ensure that almost $80 billion of
the information technology products and services it purchases each year
are secure and do not provide our adversaries with a backdoor into our
networks.
More specifically, the act would require development of a
comprehensive supply chain risk management strategy to address risks
and threats to the information technology products and services the
federal government relies upon. This strategy would allow agencies to
make informed decisions when purchasing IT products and services. This
provision would be implemented through the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, requiring contracting officers to consider the security
risks inherent in agency IT procurements. The value of this approach is
that once security features are developed to protect federal networks,
private sector customers may be able to purchase that same level of
security in the products they buy.
The need for this legislation is both obvious and urgent.
A report by the bipartisan Center for Strategic and International
Studies, CSIS, concluded that ``we face a long-term challenge in
cyberspace from foreign intelligence agencies and militaries, criminals
and others, and losing this struggle would wreak serious damage on the
economic health and national security of the United States.''
Given these stakes, Senators Collins, Carper, and I are confident our
colleagues will join with us and pass the ``Protecting Cyberspace as a
National Asset Act'' in the 110th Congress.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to join Senators Lieberman and
Carper in introducing the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act
of 2010. This vital legislation would fortify the government's efforts
to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack. It would build a
public/private partnership to promote national cyber security
priorities. It would strengthen the government's ability to set,
monitor compliance with, and enforce standards and policies for
securing Federal civilian systems and the sensitive information they
contain.
The marriage of increasingly robust computer technology to expanding
and nearly instantaneous global telecommunications networks is a truly
seismic event in human history. This information revolution touches
everything, from personal relationships and entertainment to commerce,
scientific research, and the most sensitive national security
information. Cyberspace is a place of great, even unparalleled, power.
But, to tweak the familiar saying, with great power comes great
vulnerability. Cyberspace is under increasing assault on all fronts:
cyber vandalism, cyber crime, cyber sabotage, and cyber espionage.
Across the world at this moment, computer networks are being hacked,
probed, and infiltrated relentlessly. The purpose of these cyber
exploits ranges from simple mischief and massive theft to societal
mayhem and geopolitical advantage.
In February, Dennis Blair, the former Director of National
Intelligence, gave this chilling assessment before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence:
``Malicious cyber activity is occurring on an unprecedented scale
with extraordinary sophistication. While both the threats and
technologies associated with cyberspace are dynamic, the existing
balance in network technology favors malicious actors, and is likely to
continue to do so for the foreseeable future.''
Consider these sobering facts:
Cyber crime costs our national economy nearly $8 billion annually.
Hackers can operate in relative safety and anonymity from a laptop or
desktop anywhere in the world. The expanding capabilities of wireless
hand-held devices strengthen this cloak of cyber invisibility.
As our national and global economies become ever more intertwined,
cyber terrorists have greater potential to attack high-value targets.
From anywhere in the world, they could disrupt telecommunications
systems, shut down electric power grids, or freeze financial markets.
With sufficient know-how and a few keystrokes, they could cause
billions of dollars in damage and put thousands of lives in jeopardy.
As the hackers' techniques advance, the number of hacking attempts is
exploding. Just this March, the Senate's Sergeant at Arms reported that
the computer systems of Congress and Executive Branch agencies now are
under cyber attack an average of 1.8 billion times per month.
Recent examples of cyber attacks are myriad and disturbing:
Press reports a year ago stated that China and Russia had penetrated
the computer systems of America's electrical grid. The hackers
allegedly left behind malicious hidden software that could be activated
later to disrupt the grid during a war or other national crisis.
At about the same time, we learned that, beginning in 2007 and
continuing well into 2008, hackers repeatedly broke into the computer
systems of the Pentagon's $300-billion Joint Strike Fighter project.
They stole crucial information about the Defense Department's costliest
weapons program ever.
In 2007, the country of Estonia was attacked in cyberspace. A 3-week
onslaught of botnets overwhelmed the computer systems of the nation's
parliament, government ministries, banks, telecommunications networks,
and news organizations. This attack on Estonia is a wake-up call that
has yet to be sufficiently heeded.
The private sector is also under attack. In January, Google announced
that attacks originating in China had targeted its systems as well as
the networks of more than 30 other companies. The attacks on Google
sought to access the email accounts of Chinese
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human rights activists. For the other companies, lucrative information,
such as critical corporate data and software source codes, were
targeted.
Last year, cyber thieves secretly implanted circuitry into keypads
sold to British supermarkets, which were then used to steal account
information and PIN numbers. This same tactic was used against a large
supermarket chain in Maine, compromising more than 4 million credit
cards.
Nor are small businesses immune. Last summer, a small Maine
construction firm found that cyber crooks had stolen nearly $600,000
through an elaborate scheme involving dozens of coconspirators
throughout the United States.
These attacks, and the hundreds like them that are occurring at any
given time whether on our government or private sector systems, have
ushered us into a new age of cyber crime and, indeed, cyber warfare.
They underscore the high priority we must give to the security of our
information technology systems.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed the
vulnerability of our nation to catastrophic attacks. Since that
terrible day, we have done much to protect potential targets such as
ports, chemical facilities, transportation systems, water supplies,
government buildings, and other vital assets. We cannot afford to wait
for a ``cyber 9/11'' before our government finally realizes the
importance of protecting our digital resources, limiting our
vulnerabilities, and mitigating the consequences of penetrations of our
networks.
Chairman Lieberman and I have held a number of hearings on cyber
security in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee. Senator Carper has been similarly active, particularly on
exploring modifications to the Federal Information Security Management
Act that are designed to enhance protections of Federal networks and
information.
From our examinations of this issue, we know that there are threats
to and vulnerabilities in our cyber networks. We also know that the
tactics used to exploit these vulnerabilities are constantly evolving
and growing increasingly dangerous. Now, it is time to take action. A
strong and sustained Federal effort to promote cyber security is a key
component of effective deterrence.
For too long, our approach to cyber security has been disjointed and
uncoordinated. This cannot continue. The United States requires a
comprehensive cyber security strategy backed by aggressive
implementation of effective security measures. There must be strong
coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the
military, and the private owners and operators of critical
infrastructure.
This bill would establish the essential point of coordination. The
Office of Cyberspace Policy in the Executive Office of the President
would be run by a Senate-confirmed Director who would advise the
President on all cyber security matters. The Director would lead and
harmonize Federal efforts to secure cyberspace and would develop a
national strategy that incorporates all elements of cyber security
policy, including military, law enforcement, intelligence, and
diplomacy. The Director would oversee all Federal activities related to
the national strategy to ensure efficiency and coordination. The
Director would report regularly to Congress to ensure transparency and
oversight.
To be clear, the White House official would not be another
unaccountable czar. The Cyber Director would be a Senate-confirmed
position and thus would testify before Congress. The important
responsibilities given to the Director of the Office of Cyberspace
Policy related to cybersecurity are similar to the responsibilities of
the current Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
The Cyber Director would advise the President and coordinate efforts
across the Executive Branch to protect and improve our cybersecurity
posture and communications networks. By working with a strong
operational and tactical partner at the Department of Homeland
Security, the Director would help improve the security of Federal and
private sector networks.
This strong DHS partner would be the National Center for
Cybersecurity and Communications, or Cyber Center. It would be located
within the Department of Homeland Security to elevate and strengthen
the Department's cyber security capabilities and authorities. This
Center also would be led by a Senate-confirmed Director.
The Cyber Center, anchored at DHS, with a strong and empowered
leader, will close the coordination gaps that currently exist in our
disjointed federal cyber security efforts. For day-to-day operations,
the Center would use the resources of DHS, and the Center Director
would report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. On
interagency matters related to the security of federal networks, the
Director would regularly advise the President--a relationship similar
to the Director of the NCTC on counterterrorism matters or the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military issues. These dual
relationships would give the Center Director sufficient rank and
stature to interact effectively with the heads of other departments and
agencies, and with the private sector.
Congress has dealt with complex challenges involving the need for
interagency coordination in the past with a similar construct. We have
established strong leaders with supporting organizational structures to
coordinate and implement action across agencies, while recognizing and
respecting disparate agency missions.
The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center within the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a prime example of a
successful reorganization that fused the missions of multiple agencies.
The Director of NCTC is responsible for the strategic planning of joint
counterterrorism operations, and in this role reports to the President.
When implementing the information analysis, integration, and sharing
mission of the Center, the Director reports to the Director of National
Intelligence. These dual roles provide access to the President on
strategic, interagency matters, yet provide NCTC with the structural
support and resources of the office of the DNI to complete the day-to-
day work of the NCTC. The DHS Cyber Center would replicate this
successful model for cyber security.
As we have seen repeatedly, from the financial crisis to the
environmental catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, what happens in the
private sector does not always affect just the private sector. The
ramifications for government and for the taxpayers often are enormous.
This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve
cyber security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the
Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat
information with the private sector, other Federal agencies,
international partners, and state and local governments. By developing
and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical
assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber
security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center
would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the
private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private
sector would be protected.
With respect to the owners and operators of our most critical systems
and assets, the bill would mandate compliance with certain risk-based
performance requirements to close security gaps. These requirements
would apply to vital components of the electric grid,
telecommunications networks, financial systems, or other critical
infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional
catastrophe if disrupted.
This approach would be similar to the current model that DHS employs
with the chemical industry. Rather than setting specific standards, DHS
would employ a risk-based approach to evaluating cyber vulnerabilities,
and the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure would
develop a plan for protecting those vulnerabilities and mitigating the
consequences of an attack.
These owners and operators would be able to choose which security
measures to implement to meet applicable risk-based performance
requirements. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance
authorities or permit the government to ``take over'' private networks.
This model would allow for continued
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innovation and dynamism that are fundamental to the success of the IT
sector.
The bill would provide limited liability protections to the owners
and operators of covered critical infrastructure that comply with the
new risk-based performance requirements. Covered critical
infrastructure also would be required to report certain significant
breaches affecting vital system functions to the center. These reports
would help ensure that the Federal Government has comprehensive
awareness of the security risks facing these critical networks.
If a cyber attack is imminent or occurring, the bill would provide a
responsible framework, developed in coordination with the private
sector, for the President to authorize emergency measures to protect
the Nation's most critical infrastructure. The President would be
required to notify Congress in advance of the declaration of a national
cyber emergency, or as soon thereafter as possible. This notice would
include the nature of the threat, the reason existing protective
measures are insufficient to respond to the threat, and the emergency
actions necessary to mitigate the threat. The emergency measures would
be limited in duration and scope.
Any emergency actions directed by the President during the 30-day
period covered by the declaration must be the least disruptive means
feasible to respond to the threat. Liability protections would apply to
owners and operators required to implement these measures, and if other
mitigation options were available, owners and operators could propose
those alternative measures to the Director and, once approved,
implement those in lieu of the mandatory emergency measures.
The center also would share information, including threat analysis,
with owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding risks
affecting the security of their sectors. The center would work with
sector-specific agencies and other Federal agencies with existing
regulatory authority to avoid duplication of requirements, to use
existing expertise, and to ensure government resources are employed in
the most efficient and effective manner.
With regard to Federal networks, the Federal Information Security
Management Act--known as FISMA--gives the Office of Management and
Budget broad authority to oversee agency information security measures.
In practice, however, FISMA is frequently criticized as a ``paperwork
exercise'' that offers little real security and leads to a disjointed
cyber security regime in which each Federal agency haphazardly
implements its own security measures.
The bill we introduce today would transform FISMA from paper-based to
real-time responses. It would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to
establish complete situational awareness for Federal networks and
develop tools to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and
networks.
The legislation also would take advantage of the Federal Government's
massive purchasing power to help bring heightened cyber security
standards to the marketplace. Specifically, the Director of the Center
would be charged with developing a supply chain risk management
strategy applicable to Federal procurements. This strategy would
emphasize the security of information systems from development to
acquisition and throughout their operational life cycle.
While the Director should not be responsible for micromanaging
individual procurements or directing investments, we have seen far too
often that security is not a primary concern when agencies procure
their IT systems. Recommending security investments to OMB and
providing strategic guidance on security enhancements early in the
development and acquisition process will help ``bake in'' security.
Cyber security can no longer be an afterthought in our government
agencies.
These improvements in Federal acquisition policy should have
beneficial ripple effects in the larger commercial market. As a large
customer, the Federal Government can contract with companies to
innovate and improve the security of their IT services and products.
With the Government's vast purchasing power, these innovations can
establish new security baselines for services and products offered to
the private sector and the general public.
Finally, the legislation would direct the Office of Personnel
Management to reform the way cyber security personnel are recruited,
hired, and trained to ensure that the Federal Government and the
private sector have the talent necessary to lead this national effort
and protect its own networks. The bill would also provide DHS with
temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the establishment
of the center.
Some have suggested that this effort can be led from the White House
alone--why create a new center at DHS and two Senate-confirmed Director
positions? One of the great lessons of 9/11 is that true security
demands aggressive oversight, expert evaluation, and thorough testing
of systems. There must be constant, real-time monitoring of security
and analysis of threats. This task requires much more than a cyber
czar. It requires strong civilian counterparts to the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. These Directors, at
the White House and at DHS, would serve as those counterparts.
The National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies possess
enormous skills and resources, but privacy and civil liberties demands
preclude these agencies from shouldering a leadership role in the
security of our civilian information technology systems. The
intelligence community must play a critical part in providing threat
information, but it cannot lead the cyber security effort.
We are all acutely aware that there are those who seek to do harm to
this country and to our people. If hackers can nearly bring Estonia to
its knees through cyber attacks, infiltrate our military's most
closely-guarded project, and, in the case of Google, hack the computers
owned and operated by some of the world's most successful computer
experts, we must assume even more spectacular and potentially
devastating attacks lie ahead.
We must be ready. It is vitally important that we build a strong
public-private partnership to protect cyberspace. It is a vital engine
of our economy, our government, our country and our future. I urge my
colleagues to support this crucial legislation.
______
By Mr. CARDIN:
S. 3481. A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to
clarify Federal responsibility for stormwater pollution; to the
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, in recent weeks the issue of polluted
stormwater runoff from federal properties has again gained significant
attention. I continue to have grave concerns about the failure of the
Federal Government to pay localities for reasonable costs associated
with the control and abatement of pollution that is originating on its
properties. At stake is a fundamental issue of equity: polluters should
be financially responsible for the pollution that they cause. That
includes the Federal Government.
Today I am introducing legislation that makes it clear. Uncle Sam
must pay his bills just like every other American.
Annually hundreds of thousands of pounds of pollutants wash off the
hardened surfaces in urban areas and into local rivers and streams,
threatening the health of our citizens and causing significant
environmental degradation. A one-acre parking lot produces about 16
times the volume of runoff that comes from a one-acre meadow. These
pollutants include heavy metals, nitrogen and phosphorous, oil and
grease, pesticides, bacteria, including deadly
e. coli, sediment, toxic chemicals, and debris. Indeed, stormwater
runoff is the largest source sector for many imperiled bodies of water
across the country. According to the Environmental Protection Agency,
stormwater pollution affects all types of water bodies including in
order of severity; ocean shoreline, estuaries such as the Chesapeake
Bay, Great Lakes shorelines, lakes and rivers. Degraded aquatic
habitats are found everywhere that stormwater enters local waterways.
On October 5, 2009, President Obama issued a Federal Executive order
on sustainability which set goals for Federal agencies and focused on
making improvements in their environmental, energy and economic
performance.
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Among other requirements, the order specifically requires the
implementation of the stormwater provisions of the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007, section 438.
I am the author of that provision, which requires the Federal
Government to maintain the predevelopment hydrology ``to the maximum
extent practicable'' of all new building sites or major renovations.
This requirement echoed the provision in the President's Chesapeake Bay
Protection and Restoration Executive Order issued on May 12, 2009. In
the final Strategy for Protecting and Restoring the Chesapeake Bay
Watershed, issued on the one-year anniversary of the Executive Order,
each Federal agency is being called upon to implement ``the stormwater
requirements for new development and redevelopment in Section 438 of
the Energy Independence and Security Act. . .'' (pp. 33-34). These
parallel Federal stormwater management requirements are explicit
recognition of the importance of controlling and managing stormwater
pollution from Federal properties.
As EPA requires more communities to address stormwater pollution
through Clean Water Act required Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System
permits, these communities are responding with a variety of fee-based
management systems that will allow them to mitigate, manage and prevent
this type of pollution.
The EPA requires National Pollution Discharge Elimination Permits for
large communities. The President has issued two Executive Orders that
directly note the need to address this type of pollution ``to the
maximum extent practicable.'' Clearly, these actions demonstrate that
the administration recognizes the importance of dealing adequately with
stormwater pollution.
I believe that this administration recognizes its responsibility to
manage the stormwater pollution that comes off Federal properties. But
that responsibility needs to translate into payments to the local
governments that are forced to deal with this pollution. That
commitment needs to be more than an Executive order. Adopting the
legislation that I am introducing today will remove all ambiguity about
the responsibility of the Federal Government to pay these normal and
customary stormwater fees.
This is a matter of basic equity. I call upon all of my colleagues to
join me in supporting this simple legislative remedy.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill he
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 3481
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR STORMWATER POLLUTION.
Section 313 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33
U.S.C. 1323) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Federal Responsibility for Stormwater Pollution.--
Reasonable service charges described in subsection (a)
include reasonable fees or assessments made for the purpose
of stormwater management in the same manner and to the same
extent as any nongovernmental entity.
``(d) No Treatment as Tax or Levy.--A fee or assessment
described in this section--
``(1) shall not be considered to be a tax or other levy
subject to an assertion of sovereign immunity; and
``(2) may be paid using appropriated funds.''.
______
By Mr. REID:
S. 3482. A bill to provide for the development of solar pilot project
areas on public land in Lincoln County, Nevada; to the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the American Solar
Energy Pilot Leasing Act of 2010. Solar energy development is a
critical factor in creating jobs and making the United States energy
independent. This legislation will provide a pilot program for the
Department of the Interior to develop a solar leasing program in
Nevada.
The Secretary of the Interior, though the Bureau of Land Management,
BLM, is currently developing a west wide solar energy program based on
existing laws and regulations. The BLM, however, does not currently
have the legal authority to lease public lands for solar development.
This bill will establish, in Lincoln County, the first Federal solar
leasing program in the U.S., which will serve as a pilot project for
the Department of the Interior in order to guide development of solar
leasing throughout the west in the years to come.
The American Solar Energy Pilot Leasing Act designates two solar
development zones in Lincoln County for commercial solar energy
development. The 10,945 acre Dry Lake zone and the 2,845 acre Delamar
Valley zone are within high solar potential areas identified by the BLM
and were selected by Lincoln County based on extensive public input.
Since the solar zones border the Southwest Intertie Project, SWIP,
transmission corridor, these projects will create the opportunity for
southern Nevada and California to tap directly into Lincoln County's
abundant renewable power resources.
Our bill directs the agency to consult with the County and local
stakeholders before offering both parcels for lease not more than 60
days after the bill becomes law. In order to ensure efficient and wise
development throughout the west, the BLM is also directed to establish
diligent development requirements to ensure leased areas are
efficiently developed and to promulgate regulations to guide
development of the burgeoning solar leasing program.
The act directs the BLM to set a royalty rate at a level that will
encourage efficient production of solar energy and ensure a fair return
to the public for the necessary development of the public lands. As
part of this program, the BLM is given the flexibility to charge a
lower royalty, or even no royalty, for up to five years after energy
generation begins as an incentive to promote the maximum generation of
solar energy.
Royalties and fees from these solar leasing pilot projects will be
disbursed into four accounts. Thirty-five percent will be deposited
into the Renewable Energy Mitigation Fish and Wildlife Fund--
established by this act to protect and restore wildlife and their
habitat and to implement the Land and Water Conservation Fund in
Nevada. The State of Nevada and Lincoln County will each receive 25
percent of the collected royalties and fees. The last 15 percent will
be directed to the BLM to fund renewable energy permit processing over
the next 10 years. At the end of that 10-year period, this 15 percent
will be directed to the Renewable Energy Mitigation Fish and Wildlife
Fund, in addition to the 35 percent initially set aside for this
account.
As you know, I have been a longtime champion for the development of
clean, renewable energy resources. Nevada has unparalleled potential
for solar energy development and is poised to lead our Nation in clean
energy development and innovation. This is a significant step toward
moving our country away from dirty fossil fuels and creating a new job
market in the west. The model established by this legislation will also
reinvest a responsible portion of the royalties and fees from solar
energy development into the states and rural communities whose land is
being used to power our Nation.
I would like to thank Lincoln County and a great number of sportsmen,
ranchers, and conservationists who have helped us shape this
legislation. I am pleased to bring this bill to the committee and I
look forward to working with Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member
Murkowski and the other distinguished members to move this bill through
the legislative process.
Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent that the text of the bill
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 3482
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``American Solar Energy Pilot
Leasing Act of 2010''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) County.--The term ``County'' means Lincoln County,
Nevada.
(2) Federal land.--The term ``Federal land'' means any of
the Federal land in the State under the administrative
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management that is
identified as a ``solar development zone'' on the maps.
[[Page S4857]]
(3) Fund.--The term ``Fund'' means the Renewable Energy
Mitigation and Fish and Wildlife Fund established by section
3(d)(5)(A).
(4) Map.--The term ``map'' means each of--
(A) the map entitled ``Dry Lake Valley Solar Development
Zone'' and dated May 25, 2010; and
(B) the map entitled ``Delamar Valley Solar Development
Zone'' and dated May 25, 2010.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau of
Land Management.
(6) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of Nevada.
SEC. 3. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLAR PILOT PROJECT AREAS ON PUBLIC
LAND IN LINCOLN COUNTY, NEVADA.
(a) Designation.--In accordance with sections 201 and 202
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1711, 1712) and subject to valid existing rights, the
Secretary shall designate the Federal land as a solar pilot
project area.
(b) Applicable Law.--The designation of the solar pilot
project area under subsection (a) shall be subject to the
requirements of--
(1) this Act;
(2) the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
(3) any other applicable law (including regulations).
(c) Solar Lease Sales.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct lease sales
and issue leases for commercial solar energy development on
the Federal land, in accordance with this subsection.
(2) Deadline for lease sales.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, after
consulting with affected governments and other stakeholders,
shall conduct lease sales for the Federal land.
(3) Easements, special-use permits, and rights-of-way.--
Except for the temporary placement and operation of testing
or data collection devices, as the Secretary determines to be
appropriate, and the rights-of-way granted under section
301(b)(1) of the Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and
Development Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-424; 118 Stat. 2413)
and BLM Case File N-78803, no new easements, special-use
permits, or rights-of-way shall be allowed on the Federal
land during the period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act and ending on the date of the issuance of a lease
for the Federal land.
(4) Diligent development requirements.--In issuing a lease
under this subsection, the Secretary shall include work
requirements and mandatory milestones--
(A) to ensure that diligent development is carried out
under the lease; and
(B) to reduce speculative behavior.
(5) Land management.--The Secretary shall--
(A) establish the duration of leases issued under this
subsection;
(B) include provisions in the lease requiring the holder of
a lease granted under this subsection--
(i) to furnish a reclamation bond or other form of security
determined to be appropriate by the Secretary;
(ii) on completion of the activities authorized by the
lease--
(I) to restore the Federal land that is subject to the
lease to the condition in which the Federal land existed
before the lease was granted; or
(II) to conduct mitigation activities if restoration of the
land to the condition described in subclause (I) is
impracticable; and
(iii) to comply with such other requirements as the
Secretary considers necessary to protect the interests of the
public and the United States; and
(C)(i) establish best management practices to ensure the
sound, efficient, and environmentally responsible development
of solar resources on the Federal land in a manner that would
avoid, minimize, and mitigate actual and anticipated impacts
to habitat and ecosystem function resulting from the
development; and
(ii) include provisions in the lease requiring renewable
energy operators to comply with the practices established
under clause (i).
(d) Royalties.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish royalties,
fees, rentals, bonuses, and any other payments the Secretary
determines to be appropriate to ensure a fair return to the
United States for any lease issued under this section.
(2) Rate.--Any lease issued under this section shall
require the payment of a royalty established by the Secretary
by regulation in an amount that is equal to a percentage of
the gross proceeds from the sale of electricity at a rate
that--
(A) encourages production of solar energy;
(B) ensures a fair return to the public comparable to the
return that would be obtained on State and private land; and
(C) encourages the maximum energy generation practicable
using the least amount of land and other natural resources,
including water.
(3) Royalty relief.--To promote the maximum generation of
renewable energy, the Secretary may provide that no royalty
or a reduced royalty is required under a lease for a period
not to exceed 5 years beginning on the date on which
generation is initially commenced on the Federal land subject
to the lease.
(4) Disposition of proceeds.--
(A) In general.--Of the amounts collected as royalties,
fees, rentals, bonuses, or other payments under a lease
issued under this section--
(i) 25 percent shall be paid by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the State within the boundaries of which the
income is derived;
(ii) 25 percent shall be paid by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the 1 or more counties within the boundaries of
which the income is derived;
(iii) 15 percent shall--
(I) for the period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act and ending on the date specified in subclause (II),
be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to help
facilitate the processing of renewable energy permits by the
Bureau of Land Management in the State, subject to
subparagraph (B)(i)(I); and
(II) beginning on the date that is 10 years after the date
of enactment of this Act, be deposited in the Fund; and
(iv) 35 percent shall be deposited in the Fund.
(B) Limitations.--
(i) Renewable energy permits.--For purposes of subclause
(I) of subparagraph (A)(iii)--
(I) not more than $10,000,000 shall be deposited in the
Treasury at any 1 time under that subclause; and
(II) the following shall be deposited in the Fund:
(aa) Any amounts collected under that subclause that are
not obligated by the date specified in subparagraph
(A)(iii)(II).
(bb) Any amounts that exceed the $10,000,000 deposit limit
under subclause (I).
(ii) Fund.--Any amounts deposited in the Fund under clause
(i)(II) or subparagraph (A)(iii)(II) shall be in addition to
amounts deposited in the Fund under subparagraph (A)(iv).
(5) Renewable energy mitigation and fish and wildlife
fund.--
(A) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury of
the United States a fund, to be known as the ``Renewable
Energy Mitigation and Fish and Wildlife Fund'', to be
administered by the Secretary, for use in the State.
(B) Use of funds.--Amounts in the Fund shall be available
to the Secretary, who may make the amounts available to the
State or other interested parties for the purposes of--
(i) mitigating impacts of renewable energy on public land,
with priority given to land affected by the solar development
zones designated under this Act, including--
(I) protecting wildlife corridors and other sensitive land;
and
(II) fish and wildlife habitat restoration; and
(ii) carrying out activities authorized under the Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460l-4 et
seq.) in the State.
(C) Availability of amounts.--Amounts in the Fund shall be
available for expenditure, in accordance with this paragraph,
without further appropriation, and without fiscal year
limitation.
(D) Investment of fund.--
(i) In general.--Any amounts deposited in the Fund shall
earn interest in an amount determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury on the basis of the current average market yield on
outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of
comparable maturities.
(ii) Use.--Any interest earned under clause (i) may be
expended in accordance with this paragraph.
(e) Priority Development.--
(1) In general.--Within the County, the Secretary shall
give highest priority consideration to implementation of the
solar lease sales provided for under this Act.
(2) Evaluation.--The Secretary shall evaluate other solar
development proposals in the County not provided for under
this Act in consultation with the State, County, and other
interested stakeholders.
____________________