[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 84 (Monday, June 7, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4613-S4614]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                SOMALIA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, once again, I wish to express my 
concern about the situation in Somalia. To put it frankly, the 
situation is appalling. Since the start of fighting in 2007, at least 
21,000 people have been killed and more than 1.5 million have been 
displaced. Thousands of refugees continue to pour into overcrowded 
camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and elsewhere. For those who remain in 
Somalia, the United Nations refugee and food agencies are unable to 
reach many of them because of the insecurity and threats to 
humanitarian staff. The terrorist group al Shebaab and other armed 
groups continue to wage war against the Transitional Federal 
Government, the TFG, in Mogadishu as well as against one another in an 
effort to expand their territorial control. Al Shebaab has resorted to 
using suicide bombings, most recently in an attack inside a mosque in 
Mogadishu, which killed dozens of civilians. Meanwhile, al Shebaab is 
employing increasingly brutal tactics to maintain its control over 
certain areas--carrying out executions, chopping off hands and legs, 
and forcibly conscripting youth.
  Mr. President, we should be appalled at this situation, but we should 
also be concerned because of the direct ramifications for our national 
security. Al Shebaab's leadership has links to al-Qaida, and it has 
indicated, through public statements, that it intends to provide 
support to al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen. Even more disconcerting, it 
has recruited a number of Americans to travel to the region and fight 
with it. In October 2008, a Somali-American blew himself up in Somalia 
as part of a coordinated attack by al Shebaab, reportedly becoming the 
first known suicide bomber with U.S. citizenship. The Justice 
Department has since brought terrorist charges against over a dozen 
people for recruiting and raising funds for Americans to fight with al 
Shebaab. Last September, the Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center, Michael Leiter, testified that ``the potential for al-Qaida 
operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to the United 
States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of significant 
concern.'' Earlier this year, the New York Times reported that an 
American from Alabama, Omar Hammami, has become a key figure in al 
Shebaab. Just this past weekend, two other Americans, neither with 
family ties in Somalia, were arrested in New Jersey for allegedly 
planning to fight in Somalia with al Shebaab. This is very troublesome 
news and brings home the implications of Somalia's ongoing crisis.
  The Obama administration has been right to refocus attention on 
Somalia--and to consider regional dynamics at the same time. I am also 
pleased that the administration has been clear in its support for the 
Djibouti peace process. I am, however, concerned that this process--as 
currently constituted--is not sufficient to unite Somalis and mitigate 
the ongoing crisis. As the situation there turns more dreadful, I worry 
that the process is becoming increasingly detached from events on the 
ground. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that while the administration 
continues to provide assistance--both materiel and diplomatic--to the 
TFG, we still do not have an overarching strategy for Somalia that ties 
our programs and policies together. As a result, we appear to be 
grasping at straws to ``do something'' while our national security 
increasingly hangs in the balance.
  Under the previous administration, our approach toward Somalia lacked 
coherence and was shortsighted. This discord gave rise to conflicting 
agendas that undermined each other and our credibility. Without clear 
policy guidance, the current administration's efforts--however well 
intentioned--may fall into the same trap. There is great risk that by 
focusing too narrowly on tactical decisions we will continue to operate 
without a larger strategy.
  Now, I understand in the early months of the administration there was 
an interagency effort to review our policy toward Somalia and the Horn 
of Africa. However, it is also my understanding that no overarching 
policy was established. Now is the time to renew such an effort, and as 
part of this initiative, we need some way to measure whether we are 
making progress. The administration has rightly pressed the TFG to 
broaden its appeal and strength, but we have seen no major improvement 
on that front. With the exception of its agreement with Ahlu Sunna wal 
Jama, the TFG has done little to expand its reach and undercut its 
opposition. The TFG has not become more inclusive, and it has not 
projected an attractive political vision to counter that of armed 
opposition groups. As a result, it is not becoming more legitimate in 
the eyes of Somalis.
  Going forward, we need clear guidance on what we expect to achieve 
with our support for the TFG, the Djibouti Process, and our efforts to 
weaken al Shebaab and provide humanitarian assistance. Without such a 
coordinated and measurable approach, we run the risk of continuing to 
fund the same initiatives with little progress made. Such an assessment 
is important not only so that American taxpayers know their money is 
being well spent, but also so we know our safety and security are being 
enhanced.
  There are some thoughtful observers who believe that the best option 
for the United States might be to just disengage altogether and let 
this crisis play out. The stakes are too high to do that. However, 
these observers are right that a continuation of the status quo will 
only further entrench the crisis. The current efforts by the United 
States and the international community are insufficient to change the 
fundamental dynamics of the situation. We need to go back to the 
drawing board and develop a strategy with measurable goals and a clear 
plan of how we will reach them.
  We also need to consider whether appointing a Special Envoy for the 
Horn of Africa, to help create and drive policy, is once again 
appropriate. For years I have called for the creation of such a 
position--at a very senior level--but to no avail. I do believe that 
now is the time for this position to be considered particularly because 
of the direct national security implications, but also because the 
crisis in Somalia requires a regional approach. We need a senior 
official to regularly connect the dots between a number of countries in 
the region including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Yemen in order to 
develop an effective strategy. In addition, having a senior envoy 
focused on addressing this crisis can help show the people of Somalia 
that we are finally serious about helping their efforts to achieve a 
future free of terror and conflict.
  In thinking about how we fit counterterrorism concerns into a broader 
strategy, we must be practical. Mr. President, tactical operations 
against individuals and networks may be justified in some cases, 
especially if the targets have clear ties to al-Qaida and pose a direct 
threat to the United States. But we need to think hard about the 
strategic implications and potential risks of these operations because 
at the same time we need to reach out to, work with, and support all 
Somalis who seek a more stable and secure country. The perception that 
the United States is only interested in tactical counterterrorism 
operations in Somalia has generated suspicion among Somalis and fueled 
anti-Americanism. Not taking that into account when planning or 
authorizing any tactical operations is counter-productive.
  Equally as important to our counterterrorism goals is the need to 
continue

[[Page S4614]]

pressing for an inclusive and functional system of governance that can 
enforce the rule of law and provide security. In addition to supporting 
the TFG, we should look for creative ways to work with other 
governments and nongovernmental actors to encourage political consensus 
and reconciliation among different groups in Somalia. We need to look 
at the grassroots and local level and see how they can be bolstered and 
expanded. Helping Somalis to come together around a shared political 
vision and to translate that vision into a political system that makes 
a tangible difference in people's lives is the surest way to address 
our national security concerns over the long term.
  Achieving stability and restoring the rule of law in Somalia will not 
be easy or quick--nearly two decades of dysfunction have made sure of 
that--but we must have a strategy in place if we are to proceed. We 
cannot respond in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner to the conditions 
that breed and empower terrorist organizations and we cannot address 
them on the cheap. Our national security, the fate of Somalia's people, 
and the region's stability demand nothing less.

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