[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 76 (Wednesday, May 19, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3980-S3981]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY: LEADERS WITHOUT FOLLOWERS
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my
remarks today to the National Policy Conference of The Nixon Center and
The Richard Nixon Foundation be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
A central tenet of the Obama Administration's security
policy is that, if the U.S. ``leads by example'' we can
``reassert our moral leadership'' and influence other nations
to do things. It is the way the President intends to advance
his goal of working toward a world free of nuclear weapons
and to deal with the stated twin top priorities of the
Administration: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
This morning, I want to test this thesis--to explore whether,
for example, limiting our nuclear capability will cause
others who pose problems to change their policies.
To begin the discussion, let me mention just three specific
examples of things the administration has done to ``lead by
example.''
First, the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
changed U.S. declaratory policy to limit the circumstances
under which the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to defend the
nation on the theory that if we appear to devalue nuclear
weapons, other states will similarly devalue them and choose
not to obtain them. The downside, of course, is that such
emphasis on nuclear weapons only reminds states, including
rogue regimes, of their value.
Second, the central point of the START agreement, was a
significant draw down of our nuclear stockpiles. And, the
Administration has already been talking about a next phase
that could even include reductions by countries in addition
to the U.S. and Russia.
Third, President Obama wants to commit the U.S. never again
to test nuclear weapons under the CTBT so that, hopefully,
others will follow our example.
I'll discuss these three examples in more detail in a
minute.
Obviously, if the theory is wrong, we could be risking a
lot. For example, we could be jeopardizing our own security
and the nuclear umbrella that assures 31 other countries of
their security. Ironically, as our capacity is reduced, their
propensity to build their own deterrent is increased--the
opposite of what we intend.
We could be sacrificing our freedom to deploy the full
range of missile defenses we need by agreeing to arms control
agreements like START or other agreements or unilateral
actions like the U.S. statement on missile defense
accompanying the START treaty.
Were we to ratify the CTBT, we would forever legally give
up our right to test weapons. That's a very serious
limitation.
The point is, leading by example means sacrifices on our
part that could have significant consequences. The question
is whether the risks are justified.
Zero nukes: what does President Obama want to achieve with
this strategy? Barack Obama has long advocated zero nuclear
weapons going all the way back to his writings as a college
student in 1983. In fact, he wrote then that the drive to
achieve a ban on all nuclear weapons testing would be ``a
powerful first step towards a nuclear free world.'' He's even
cast it in moral terms, saying that ``as a nuclear power, as
the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the
United States has a moral responsibility to act.''
There are four big assumptions here: that the Global Zero
idea, a world without nuclear weapons, is necessarily a good
thing; that such a world could realistically be achieved;
that our leadership here will help to reestablish previously
lost moral force behind U.S. policy; and that, if we lead by
example, others will follow.
The first three assumptions need to be carefully examined;
though this morning, I will focus only on the last.
Suffice it to say the following about the first three
assumptions: first, is ``zero'' really desirable? If nuclear
deterrence has kept the peace between superpowers since the
end of World War II, which itself cost over 60 million lives
by some estimates, are nuclear weapons really a risk to peace
or a contributor to peace?
Second, since the know-how exists to build nuclear weapons
and they can't be disinvented, is it really realistic to
think they could be effectively eliminated? For example, if
we get near to zero, any nation that can breakout and build
even a few nuclear weapons will become a superpower.
And the superpowers themselves will find it difficult to
get close to zero. For example, if Russia deploys ten extra
nuclear weapons today, that's not a big deal, we have 2,200
deployed. If, however, each side is at 100 weapons, and one
side deploys an extra ten, that's a significant military
breakout. And while we will have 1,550 deployed weapons under
the new treaty, and China will still have only several
hundred, as we go lower, China has every incentive to build
up quickly and become a peer competitor to the U.S. How do we
deal with these problems? It's not clear we know.
Third, do we really have to ``restore our moral
leadership'' and is it necessarily more moral or moral at all
to eschew weapons that have been a deterrent to conflict, but
the elimination of which could make the world again safe for
conventional wars between the great powers? Again, World War
2 cost an estimated 60 million lives. After 1945, the great
powers have been deterred from war with each other.
These three questions deserve full debate--but, it is the
last assumption I want to explore today--that if we lead,
others will follow.
Put another way: is the world just waiting for the U.S. to
further limit or eliminate its nuclear weapons? Is it true
that if we lead by example, others will follow, and nuclear
weapons will cease to exist? And, does our credibility in the
world depend on taking these actions?
The President outlined his vision in an interview with the
New York Times last year: ``it is naive for us to think that
we can grow our nuclear stockpiles, the Russians continue to
grow their nuclear stockpiles, and our allies grow their
nuclear stockpiles, and that in that environment we're going
to be able to pressure countries like Iran and North Korea
not to pursue nuclear weapons themselves.''
The first problem with that is that it's factually wrong--
we are not growing our nuclear stockpiles, we're reducing
them, and we have been for years. The second problem is that,
notwithstanding our reductions, others are not following
suit.
One of the first places President Obama chose to lead was
to modify our approach to the use of nuclear weapons in his
new Nuclear Posture Review. I previously mentioned his new
policy of non-use against certain kinds of non-nuclear
attacks.
[[Page S3981]]
A second feature of the NPR was to artificially take off
the table some necessary options like replacement of nuclear
components to make them more reliable and safe. This is
leading by example that other nuclear powers aren't following
and we shouldn't be doing if we want to ensure that our
weapons will do what we want them to do.
The Administration's next step was signing the NEW START
treaty, with significant reductions to our deployed warheads
and delivery vehicles and potential limitations on missile
defense. But Russia was going to reduce its numbers with or
without the treaty--so we should not conclude their acts were
because we led by example. And it remains to be seen whether
what we gave up will be worth the ostensible ``reset'' in our
relations.
And, after NEW START, there is another arms control treaty.
Let me quote Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller
in a speech titled ``The Long Road from Prague'': ``The
second major arms control objective of the Obama
Administration is the ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). There is no step that we
could take that would more effectively restore our moral
leadership and improve our ability to reenergize the
international nonproliferation consensus than to ratify the
CTBT.''
Is it true we have acted badly and must atone to restore
our moral leadership? Here's what we've done in disarmament
already: the U.S. has reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile
by 75 percent since the end of the Cold War and 90 percent
since the height of the Cold War (this doesn't even include
the NEW START figures). The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear
weapons test since 1992. It has not designed a new warhead
since the 80s nor has it built one since the 1990s. We have
pulled back almost all of our tactical nuclear weapons, and
in the new NPR, we will retire our sea launched cruise
missile.
And what has this ``leadership'' gotten us? Has it
impressed Iran and North Korea? Has it kept Russia and China
and France and Great Britain and India and Pakistan from
modernizing (and in some cases growing) their nuclear weapons
stockpiles?
Russia is, in fact, deploying a new multipurpose attack
submarine that can launch long range cruise missiles with
nuclear warheads against land targets at a range of 5,000
kilometers . . . just barely missing the threshold to be
considered a strategic weapon under the New START treaty. Of
course, a tactical nuclear weapon has a strategic effect if
it is detonated above a U.S. or allied city.
Will Pakistan or North Korea ratify the CTBT just because
the U.S. does? Not likely. In fact, both nations continued
their nuclear weapons tests after the U.S. unilaterally
stopped testing and even after the U.S. signed the CTBT.
Have these steps motivated our allies to be more helpful in
dealing with real threats like Iran and North Korea and with
nuclear terrorism? If we ratify CTBT, would Great Britain
suddenly have a new motivation to help us more on Iran? If we
cut more nuclear weapons from our stockpile would France now
be willing to cut back on its force de frappe?
Was Russia willing to discuss its tactical nuclear weapons
as part of the current START treaty? Russia's President has
said that ``possessing nuclear weapons is crucial to pursuing
independent policies and to safeguarding sovereignty.'' In
fact, Russia appears to be as difficult as ever, announcing
that it will build a nuclear reactor in Syria on the same day
that the U.S. announced it will begin nuclear cooperation
with Russia.
Has all of our work toward disarmament impressed Turkey to
play a constructive or obstructive role in reining in Iran?
The recent Nuclear Security Summit saw no meaningful new
commitments because of our newfound moral leadership. In fact
the most the Administration could say for it is 47 nations
signed a non-binding communique.
And with regard to the Non Proliferation Treaty review
conference, which is underway as we speak in New York, will
our moral leadership bring us any benefit there? It is not
encouraging to see the conference devolve into a discussion
of Israel's nuclear weapons program as opposed to Iran's.
When countries have cut back their nuclear weapons
programs, it was for other reasons, namely, their own
security interests or economic requirements. Nations, with
the exception of the U.S. it seems, take actions that they
perceive to be in their best interests. They do not change
their national security posture merely because of U.S.
disarmament. They may even observe these steps as weakness
and opt to double down on their aggressive outlaw actions as
a result.
For example, Russia agreed to the limits in the new START
treaty, but, as I noted, that was only because it was already
going down to those levels, not because of some U.S. moral
leadership.
Nor did South Africa abandon its nuclear weapons program
because of our leadership--it was because of the fall of the
apartheid regime.
Did Libya end its program because we opted not to go ahead
with RNEP or RRW? No, Libya saw 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq
enforcing UN Security Council Resolutions on nuclear
proliferation and feared it would be next.
These same interests, security and commercial, also dictate
nations' actions with regard to the nuclear terrorism and
proliferation issues. For example, Russia says that an Iran
with nuclear weapons is a threat. And it will go along with
some sanctions, e.g., sanctions that raise the global price
of energy, of which Russia is the world's leading exporter--
but it won't go along with sanctions cutting off Iran's flow
of weapons, which Russia sells in great quantity.
And even a European country like Germany would like the
U.S. to remove from that country the tactical nuclear weapons
we deploy there for the defense of NATO, but, at the same
time, is actually growing its economic links to Iran--and it
appears willing only to impose sanctions agreed to by the
U.N. and the E.U.
Bottom line: there is no evidence our moral leadership in
arms control and disarmament will convince countries to set
aside their calculations of the impact of nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism on their national
security, and help us address these threats.
The Administration's security agenda is based on the notion
of the U.S. making substantive changes to our national
security posture in the hopes of persuading others to act,
frequently contrary to their economic or security interests.
But this good faith assumption that others will reciprocate
is not supported by any evidence--it is certainly not
informed by any past experience. Before big changes are made
to our security posture, the President owes it to the
American people to explain exactly how the changes will
improve our security. It cannot just be a matter of change
and hope. Too much is at stake.
I also think the American people will be quite surprised to
learn that their nation lost its moral leadership somewhere
and that concessions to their security are now necessary to
reestablish it.
As a complete aside, the most recent example of the Obama
Administration's thinking in this regard is the Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights' comparison
of the immigration law passed by my state of Arizona to the
systematic policy of abuse and repression by the ``People's
Republic of China.''
As you can tell by now, I am not much impressed with the
notion that we can achieve important U.S. security goals by
leadership which stresses concession by the U.S. Rather than
change and hope, I adhere to the philosophy of President
Reagan epitomized in the words ``peace through strength.''
A strong America is the best guarantor of a peaceful world
that has ever been known. And there is nothing immoral about
strength that keeps the peace.
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