[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 74 (Monday, May 17, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3795-S3797]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF ELENA KAGAN
Mr. KYL. Mr. President I, too, would like to address the Supreme
Court nominee. I associate myself fully with the remarks of Senator
McConnell, which raise an important point for us to consider. I will
correct the record in a couple of situations because I think, as the
debate unfolds, it is important for us to base our decisions on the
same set of facts. These are not going to be particularly newsmaking or
big surprises, but I think the record should be corrected.
I know our majority leader, for example, misspoke the other day in
commenting about Justice Sandra Day O'Connor because there is some
similarity--she being the first woman ever appointed to the Supreme
Court. I wanted to make sure the record reflected the actual situation
with respect to Justice O'Connor.
Leader Reid, I totally agreed with when he described her as ``one of
my favorite Court Justices.'' He said it is ``not because she is a
Republican but because she was a good judge.'' I subscribe to that as
well.
He said:
She had run for public office. She served in the
legislature in Arizona. That is why she could identify with
many problems created by us legislators, and she could work
her way through that.
For the record, I wanted to indicate her experience on the bench as a
judge, since it is not the case that she did not have prior judicial
experience when nominated to the Supreme Court. She was actually
appointed to the bench by our Democratic Governor at the time, Bruce
Babbitt. She was on the court of appeals and on the superior court
bench before that. She served on the Maricopa County Superior Court
bench from 1975 to 1979, and in 1979 Governor Babbitt appointed her to
serve on the Arizona Court of Appeals. So she had extensive experience,
from 1975 through 1981, as a judge, including in an appellate capacity.
[[Page S3796]]
Prior to that time, as Leader Reid noted, she served in the Arizona
State Legislature. In fact, she was the majority leader. She had an
extensive legal career before that. She was a deputy county attorney.
She was a civilian attorney. She was in the private practice of law.
She was an assistant attorney general. Therefore, she had a very varied
and rich experience both as a lawyer practicing law in regular
situations in both criminal and civil context, as well as a trial court
judge, which is great experience, I believe, and as an appellate court
judge.
In many respects, it is almost a perfect resume for someone to
demonstrate broad experience and who could understand what cases are
all about when they come from Main Street, as opposed to some of the
more high-profile cases that tend to come before the U.S. Supreme
Court. By every measure, I think anybody would agree that her tenure on
the Supreme Court reflected those values and the experience that she
had when she came to the Court.
As I said, I know the majority leader simply misspoke when he
suggested that she didn't have judicial experience. I did think it
important to make that point.
Second point: There was a statement made on TV yesterday by some
folks who were comparing Elena Kagan and Chief Justice John Roberts; in
effect, that John Roberts only had 2 years on the appellate court, so
they are pretty similar. In two respects that is not correct.
First, spending a couple a years on the court of appeals for the
circuit court is extensive and important experience. It at least gave
us an idea of how he approached judging. I think almost everybody in
the Senate who voted on his confirmation understood that whatever his
personal views were, he could clearly leave them behind and decide
cases, as he referred to it, ``like an umpire calls the balls and
strikes.'' That is one of the reasons he was overwhelmingly confirmed.
I also recall that Justice Roberts' prior legal experience
represented numerous arguments before the courts of appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court. At the time of his confirmation, he had probably
had more U.S. Supreme Court arguments than any other lawyer. So this
was a lawyer experienced in appellate work and U.S. Supreme Court work.
In contrast--and this is not to take away from Ms. Kagan--the truth
is, I don't think she ever tried a case or argued a case to an
appellate court. She certainly hadn't argued before the Supreme Court
until about 6 months ago in her capacity as Solicitor General. She has
other positions in her background. She has been a law school teacher
and a dean of a law school. But I submit that is hardly comparable to
the litigation experience and, particularly, the appellate experience
John Roberts had.
All I am suggesting is, when we make these comparisons to other
people, we need to be accurate about it. It is taking away nothing from
Elena Kagan, but she did not have the experience of Sandra Day O'Connor
or John Roberts. That is something we have to deal with--something
lacking in her record.
One other thing--and this is personal to me because my views were
mischaracterized. I hope this will be seen as a favorable comment
toward Elena Kagan. It was reported today by Al Hunt that I thought
Elena Kagan was too young for the Supreme Court. No, I don't, and I
never said that. He was wrong when he reported that.
I said she was relatively young for an appointment to the Supreme
Court, and that is true. At this point, I think she is 49. She would be
50 if she is confirmed. That is a fine age to be on the U.S. Supreme
Court. My point was, that means, assuming her health is good--and I
believe it is--she could have many decades on the Court. That is all
the more reason it is important that we know her approach to judging.
My only question about her judging has been whether she would leave
her personal views behind as she approaches the decisions in cases that
present two conflicting sides in adjudicating their dispute before the
Court. It is not hard, when somebody has been an appellate court judge
for years, to see how they approach judging and whether they can leave
any of their personal views behind them.
Most judges can, and that is a great thing about our system.
Occasionally, we find a judge who has a particular conservative or
liberal bent, and it is pretty clear they have a hard time leaving
their political views behind and that they tend to want to figure out
how they would like a case to come out and then rationalize a way for
it to come out that way. Any good lawyer or judge can probably find an
argument to support a position. But that is not the way judging should
occur.
My concern expressed about Elena Kagan is that there are a couple of
things in her background that suggest that she might have a hard time
leaving her political views behind and approaching cases, as Chief
Justice Roberts said, as ``an umpire would call balls and strikes in a
game.''
Remember, he was asked whether he would favor the little guy in a
dispute or the big guy. He said if the law was on the little guy's
side, he would favor the little guy but, if the law was on the big
guy's side, he would favor the big guy.
Why is that important? We all know Lady Justice has on a blindfold,
and there is a reason for that. The oath of office of a judge and our
tradition in this country is for a judge to approach a case not based
on how he wants that case to come out in his heart of hearts, not how
he would write the law if he were a legislator but, rather, how he has
to apply the law to the facts of that particular case.
Occasionally, a court will even say we do not necessarily like the
way this case has to come out, and we invite the legislature to change
the law. In fact, the Supreme Court did that in a bill which I
sponsored recently. I regretted the way the case came out. I do not
think the Court had to rule the way it did. But eight of the nine
Justices believed that Congress had gone too far in prohibiting a
certain kind of film-making activity called crush videos where usually
a woman with high-heeled shoes is shown crushing a small animal to
death.
That did not seem to me to be free speech, and it is something
Congress could prohibit. But the Supreme Court disagreed. Eight of the
nine Justices said: No, even though we do not necessarily like the way
this case came out because we abhor that kind of thing, it is our view
that the first amendment has to allow that kind of ``speech.''
Again, I disagree that it is speech, but I admire the Justices, both
liberal and conservative, who decided they have to apply the law even
though the result was not something they liked, and they invited the
Congress to fix the law, giving us a little bit of instruction as to
how we can do that.
I am working with colleagues in the House of Representatives to
restructure the law so we can pass it again, overwhelmingly I am sure,
and this time get it right within the first amendment because I do not,
obviously, want to violate the first amendment.
The point here is that Justices can rule in ways that force them to
make a decision even though they do not like the way the case comes
out. Then the legislature, if it involves a law we have passed, can fix
it. That is the way our system is supposed to work. Rather than--and I
much prefer that even though, in effect, I lost the case. I would much
rather that than the Justices say: We think these crush videos are
terrible, and even though the first amendment probably protects it, we
are going to try to craft an argument where we can declare this law
valid because from a public policy standpoint, we think that is a
better result. I am pleased they ruled against my bill by saying: No,
we cannot do that. We have to adhere to the law, as we read it.
What I am going to be looking for in Elena Kagan is a judge who,
despite her political views--and she has been candid about what they
are and others have been candid as to what they are. One of her Harvard
colleagues said her heart beats on the left. OK, I do not expect
President Obama to appoint somebody whose heart beats on the right as
mine does. He is going to appoint someone with his more liberal
political views, and that is fine.
The question is: Can she then approach cases the same way the judges
did in the Supreme Court case I just described where even though they
did not like the result, they felt they had
[[Page S3797]]
to rule that way in order to remain consistent with their view of the
first amendment.
There have been a couple of things in which her personal view clearly
affected her judgment as, in this case, the dean of the Harvard Law
School. The one case everybody is familiar with is she disagreed with
the congressional policy on don't ask, don't tell. But instead of
having a policy that said President Clinton, who signed the bill, was
unwelcome on the Harvard campus or the Senators and Representatives who
had passed the bill--by the way, it was a Democratic House and Senate--
that they were not welcome on the campus, she wrote at the time
extensively that this was a discriminatory policy of the military and
that, therefore, the military would not be allowed on campus to
recruit, as were all other businesses.
Eventually, she had to change her position because the Solomon
amendment said the university would not get any Federal funding, and
they got about 15 percent of their funding from the Federal Government.
They finally, after about a year, went back to the policy of allowing
military recruiters on campus.
In my view, she not only mischaracterized the situation by calling it
the military's discriminatory policy, when the military is obviously
simply following the orders of their Commander in Chief, President
Clinton, and the law passed by the Congress, but also she discriminated
by not criticizing or denying entry onto the campus the people who had
passed and signed the law into effect but instead discriminated against
the military who at the time was fighting a war. That represents a
misjudgment on her part based on, obviously, her personal convictions.
It interfered with the job she was supposed to be doing at the time.
Would she apply that same kind of rationale when she sits on the U.S.
Supreme Court? She obviously has strong personal views about this
issue. How will she apply those personal views in cases of, let's say,
``the don't ask, don't tell policy that may come before her or some
other policy that she believed discriminated against gays or
homosexuals. She will have to somehow find a way to demonstrate to us
that she will not allow those personal convictions to color her
judgment on the Court. It might be kind of hard, given it did color her
judgment in this previous situation.
More recently, she wrote to Members of the Senate deeply critical of
a bill Senator Lindsey Graham and I had introduced and was eventually
passed by the Senate and signed into law that provided a mechanism for
dealing with the terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. We defined ``military
combatants'' in this legislation. We provided for a determination of
their status, for a review of that determination of status, by a direct
appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
Nothing like that had ever been done, where after determination of
status as an enemy combatant, those people would be able to go directly
to a Federal court--and not just any Federal court, the DC Circuit
Court of Appeals, which is one step below the Supreme Court--to have
that determination reviewed. That was not sufficient for her. She said:
No, this was discriminatory; that they had to have a right to appeal to
other Federal courts any sentencing or determination of guilt, if they
stood trial in military commissions. That has never been the law. The
Supreme Court has never said that is the law. Yet she compared what we
did in that bill to the discriminatory and unlawful actions of a
dictator.
I do not like to be called or compared to a dictator, and I can
assure my colleagues Lindsey Graham, my colleague who was primarily
responsible for drafting that legislation, very much had in mind the
best way to deal with this situation from a legal standpoint, as well
as to protect American citizens. He was not trying to enact policies
similar to dictators'.
In addition to the language being quite injudicious, it seems to me
it raises questions about whether if these kinds of questions were
posed to her in the future she could lay aside what are obviously her
strong personal convictions about this issue.
There are bound to be cases involving enemy combatants and others in
this war on terror that will continue to come to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Will she recuse herself from these cases because she has
expressed strong personal views? That would seem to me to be
appropriate, unless she could somehow demonstrate she can put all that
behind her and decide these cases strictly on the law, irrespective of
her personal prejudices.
I hope I am not perceived by these comments to have made a judgment
about Elena Kagan. When I voted for her confirmation as Solicitor
General, I said I thought she was well educated, very intelligent, very
personable, and I wanted her to have a chance to do the job as
Solicitor General. I had hoped she would remain in the position for a
little bit longer than a year before being nominated for a position as
prestigious as the U.S. Supreme Court. Nonetheless, I am firmly
committed to examining her record as thoroughly as possible and then
making a judgment based on that entire record.
Despite the fact I have raised two questions, I do not want that to
be suggestive of any conclusion I have reached because I have not
reached a conclusion. In fact, I am a little bit critical of my
colleagues who have immediately reached a conclusion without even
examining the record. There is something like 160,000 pages of
documents in the Clinton Library relative to her record as a policy
adviser in the Clinton White House. Obviously, some of her views will
be reflected in those documents and I think it is important to see what
they say.
It may well be that she represents a very tempered thought that is
pragmatic and not overly ideological and which appears to suggest that
in the position she held, she could lay aside her personal views and
give good advice. It is quite possible that is what those records will
reflect. It may also reflect something different.
Until I have the benefit of reviewing those documents and then
talking with her personally and hearing her testify, it seems to me a
bit premature to be making a judgment about whether she should be
confirmed.
Again, I wanted the opportunity to reassure all of my colleagues that
Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court,
did, indeed, have a good judicial experience on the bench prior to her
nomination. That is not an absolute requirement, in my view, because
her colleague from Arizona on the Court for a while, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, had not had judicial experience. Every other nominee in the
last 40 years has. He had not. Nonetheless, he had extensive experience
of over 20 years in law practice, both in the private law practice as
well as the Department of Justice. So he, too, had a very long record
from which one could judge whether his personal views could be set
aside in judging cases.
That, at the end of the day, is the test that should apply to all
nominees, should apply to Elena Kagan. I am sure my colleagues and I
will have ample time to review the report, reflect on it, discuss it
with her, and then come to our judgments as to whether she satisfies
that judgment.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
____________________