[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 66 (Wednesday, May 5, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3169-S3171]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. McCONNELL (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. McCain, Mr. 
        Durbin, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Lieberman, and Mr. Dodd):
  S.J. Res. 29. A joint resolution approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce a joint 
resolution that would renew sanctions against the Burmese junta. As in 
years past, I am joined in this effort by my good friend Senator 
Feinstein. Senators McCain, Durbin, Gregg, and Lieberman are original 
cosponsors of this bipartisan legislation and continue to be leaders on 
the issue.
  Renewing sanctions against the military regime in Burma is as timely 
and as important as ever. Over the past year, the regime has not only 
made clear that it has no intention of reforming, it is also trying to 
stand up a new sham constitution and to legitimize itself in the eyes 
of the world through a sham election. In my view, the United States 
must deny the regime that legitimacy.
  By way of background, a little history is in order. For nearly half a 
century, Burma has been under some kind of military rule, and every 
popular effort to reverse that situation has failed. In 1988, military 
authorities violently put down a popular uprising. Two years later, the 
Burmese people went to the polls and handed an overwhelming victory to 
the prodemocracy opposition, and the junta ignored the results. It 
never seated these popularly elected candidates. It jailed prodemocracy 
leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, and it has maintained its brutal 
rule ever since.
  In response to these events, the United States established on a 
bipartisan basis various sanctions against the Burmese regime. These 
include a 1997 Executive order; the annual import ban, which has been 
renewed annually since 2003; and restrictions on Burmese jade, which 
were enacted in 2008.
  On a number of occasions since 1990, the United States and the U.N. 
have attempted to engage Burma diplomatically. These include, during 
the Clinton administration, a delegation led by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard; various efforts by former U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright; and two trips to Burma by 
then-Congressman Bill Richardson in the mid-1990s.
  Other diplomatic efforts included Assistant Secretary of State 
Christopher Hill's ``roadmap'' in 2006, and overtures made by the 
United States through China in 2007. In 2008, ADM Timothy Keating met 
with Burmese officials as part of United States efforts to provide 
humanitarian assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.
  The U.N., for its part, has dispatched a human rights envoy to Burma 
15 times and special envoys 26 times over the past two decades. U.N. 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has visited Burma on two occasions.
  None of these efforts has yielded anything in the way of reform. 
Indeed, when Burmese citizens, led by Buddhist monks, took to the 
streets in peaceful protest against the government and its policies in 
the fall of 2007, these prodemocracy protesters, much like their 
predecessors, were brutally suppressed.
  Nonetheless, the regime has sought at various times to save face 
internationally. In response to this last major challenge to its 
authority in the fall of 2007, for example, the regime unveiled a 
proposed constitution. But a quick look at the document shows that it 
could scarcely have been less democratic. It precluded Suu Kyi from 
participating in the electoral process and ensured that the charter may 
not be amended without the military's blessing. The noted 
constitutional law professor, David Williams, of Indiana University, 
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year it was ``one of 
the worst constitutions [he had] ever seen.''
  What is more, the vote to adopt this constitution took place 2 years 
ago in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the worst natural 
disaster in modern Burmese history, and international election 
observers were not permitted access to the country during the vote. If 
the regime was interested in legitimacy, holding a vote such as this in 
the middle of a natural disaster without election observers is not 
exactly the way to do it.
  The results of this vote were roundly condemned, and for good reason. 
Still, despite widespread condemnation of this constitution and the 
circumstances surrounding its adoption, some held out hope that a 
subsequent election law might lead to democratic reform. But those 
hopes were dashed earlier this year when the regime actually issued the 
long-awaited election law. Among other things, the law would force the 
democratic opposition, the National League for Democracy, to expel Suu 
Kyi if the party chose to enter any of its candidates in the upcoming 
national election and it forbids political prisoners and Buddhist monks 
from political participation.
  The deadline for registering candidates and political parties under 
the new law is later this week, and parties that fail to register 
before then will be deemed illegal. In other words, the law's practical 
effect would be to sideline Burma's most prominent democratic reformer 
and force its leading opposition party out of business.
  We also get periodic press reports of ties between Burma and North 
Korea, including a particularly alarming report in recent days about an 
alleged weapons transfer from Pyongyang.
  Last year, the Obama administration initiated a review of United 
States policy with respect to Burma. As a result of that review, the 
administration decided it is time for the United States to take another 
run at engaging the regime. That is why last summer Secretary Clinton 
reportedly proposed to

[[Page S3170]]

her Burmese counterpart at an international conference in Southeast 
Asia that the United States remove its investment ban on Burma in 
exchange for the unconditional release of Suu Kyi. Whatever the merits 
of this overture, this was a serious offer from a high ranking U.S. 
official aimed at improving bilateral relations.
  Yet not only was Secretary Clinton's offer ignored and Suu Kyi not 
freed, the regime actually extended Suu Kyi's detention for another 
year and a half, and several months later, the junta denied her appeal. 
It was shortly after that that the regime released the antidemocratic 
election law I just referred to. So however well intentioned, the 
administration's policy of engagement has, unfortunately, met with the 
same fate as earlier engagement efforts, notwithstanding the fig leaves 
the regime occasionally holds out as supposed proof of its willingness 
to reform.
  Clearly, the regime craves legitimization of its rule. Why else would 
it suddenly move to finalize the constitution it had been working on 
intermittently for 14 years after its rule was challenged by the 
nonviolent Saffron Revolution in the fall of 2007? They did it for the 
same reason they trotted out a transparently flawed election law 
earlier this year: They wanted to provide the appearance of reform 
where there was none. But they cannot have it both ways. If the regime 
wants legitimization, it must show real progress.

       Secretary Clinton's policy review toward Burma concluded 
     that engagement along with sanctions might produce results 
     where sanctions alone had failed. Although we have yet to see 
     any positive results from engagement, the administration 
     itself concedes that sanctions should remain in place. But 
     the administration, to its credit, has been quite candid 
     about the lack of tangible progress by the regime.

  Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell acknowledged as much after 
the release of the Burmese election law. He said:

       [T]he U.S. approach was to try to encourage domestic 
     dialogue between the key stakeholders . . . and the recent 
     promulgation of the election criteria doesn't leave much room 
     for such a dialog.

  It should be noted parenthetically the absence of any tangible result 
from engagement has nothing to do with the work of American diplomats. 
It has everything to do with the type of regime we are dealing with in 
Burma. But, again, the fact remains that no progress--none--has been 
made.
  Legitimacy is the one thing the regime cannot impose by force. But if 
legitimacy is what it wants, a first step would be credible elections. 
At this point there is no reason to believe that is even possible under 
the current constitution, under the current election law, and in the 
current political climate in Burma.
  Renewing sanctions is important because it denies the junta the 
legitimacy it so craves. A sanctions regime says to the junta and the 
world, in no uncertain terms, the United States does not view this 
government as having the support of its citizens. It says the United 
States will not be a party to recognizing the junta's attempts to 
overturn the democratic elections of 1990, the last true expression of 
the Burmese voters.
  Sanctions should remain in place against the junta for the same 
reason the term ``Burma'' is used by friends of democracy instead of 
the junta's chosen name of ``Myanmar''--because Myanmar is the name of 
a government that has not been chosen by its people.
  In short, sanctions should remain in place because lifting sanctions 
would give the regime precisely what it wants; namely, legitimacy.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support sanctions renewal against 
the Burmese regime.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me commend the minority leader for his 
comments on Burma. It was a good education for me here to listen to it. 
I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to the 
legislation.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank my friend from Connecticut.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint 
resolution be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the joint resolution was 
ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 29

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress 
     approves the renewal of the import restrictions contained in 
     section 3(a)(1) and section 3A(b)(1) and (c)(1) of the 
     Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today once again with Senator 
McConnell to introduce a joint resolution renewing the ban on all 
imports from Burma for another year.
  We are proud to be joined by Senators McCain, Durbin, Gregg, and 
Lieberman and we look forward to swift action by the Senate, House, and 
the President on this important matter.
  Now, more than ever, the people of Burma need to know that we stand 
by them and support their vision of a free and democratic Burma.
  On May 6th, the National League for Democracy, NLD, led by Nobel 
Peace Prize Laureate and political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi, will 
cease to exist.
  Let me be clear: the NLD is not shutting down out of its own free 
will.
  It is being forced to disband by an unjust and undemocratic 
constitution and election law, both drafted in secret and behind closed 
doors by the ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development 
Council, SPDC, to solidify its grip on power.
  Let me explain.
  Under the terms of the new constitution, 25 percent of the seats must 
be set aside for the military.
  Think about that: before any vote has been cast, the military is 
guaranteed a quarter of the seats in the new 440 member House of 
Representatives.
  How will this new institution be any different from the current 
military regime?
  If that is not enough to raise doubts about the military's commitment 
to a truly representative government, it should also be pointed out 
that last week the regime's Prime Minister, Thein Sein, and 22 cabinet 
ministers resigned from the army to form a new ``civilian'' political 
party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party.
  Any seats won by this new ``party'' in the upcoming elections will be 
in addition to the 25 percent set aside for active military members.
  Does anyone really believe the regime has embraced democracy and the 
concept of civilian rule? Unfortunately, it will be business as usual 
for the people of Burma and the democratic opposition.
  What about Suu Kyi and her National League of Democracy, winners of 
the last free parliamentary elections in 1990?
  First, last month, the regime, which never allowed the NLD to assume 
power, officially annulled its 1990 victory.
  Second, under the new constitution, as a convicted ``criminal'' Suu 
Kyi is barred from running in the elections.
  Finally, under the terms of the election law, in order to participate 
in the upcoming parliamentary elections and remain legally active, a 
political party has to cut ties with any members who are convicted 
criminals.
  Thus, the NLD had to either kick Suu Kyi out of the party and 
participate in the elections or face extinction.
  It should come as no surprise that the NLD refused to turn its back 
on Suu Kyi and give its stamp of approval to the regime's sham 
constitution and electoral law.
  I applaud their courage and their devotion to democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law.
  While I am saddened to see the regime close its doors, the spirit and 
the principles of the NLD will live on in the hearts and minds of the 
people.
  I know they will one day be able to elect a truly representative 
government.
  As Tin Oo, the NLD's deputy leader and former political prisoner 
said: ``We do not feel sad. We have honor. One day we will come back; 
we will be reincarnated by the will of the people.''
  This is a clear message to the regime that an illegitimate 
constitution and election law cannot suppress the unyielding democratic 
aspirations of the people of Burma.
  Now, we must send our own signal to the regime that its quest for 
legitimacy has failed.
  We must send our own signal to the democratic opposition that we 
stand in solidarity with them and we will not abandon them.

[[Page S3171]]

  Now is the time to renew the import ban on all products from Burma 
for another year.
  Let me be clear--I am disappointed that the ban has not moved Burma 
any closer to national reconciliation and a democratic government.
  Indeed, as I have noted, the regime has taken several steps in the 
wrong direction.
  But we have the opportunity to review these sanctions every year.
  Last year we passed legislation allowing the sanctions to be renewed, 
once a year, for up to three more years until 2012.
  Simply put, if we fail to renew the import ban, we will reward the 
military regime for its decades' long record of oppression.
  We will reward them for keeping the true leader of Burma, Suu Kyi, 
behind bars and under house arrest for the better part of 20 years.
  We will reward them for forcing the National League for Democracy to 
close its doors.
  We will reward them for 2,100 political prisoners, the use of child 
soldiers, the persecution of ethnic minorities, the use of rape as an 
instrument of war, the use of torture, the use of forced labor, and the 
displacement of civilians.
  Indeed, the standards for lifting the sanctions are clear. The regime 
must make ``substantial and measureable progress'' towards ending 
violations of internationally recognized human rights; releasing all 
political prisoners; allowing freedom of speech and press; allowing 
freedom of association; permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; 
and bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPDC and the 
National League for Democracy and Burma's ethnic nationalities on the 
restoration of a democratic government.
  By every measure, the regime has failed to even come close to meeting 
these conditions. So we must act to renew the import ban.
  But we cannot act alone.
  I urge the United Nations and the international community to follow 
our lead and put pressure on the regime to abandon this process, 
release political prisoners, and draft a truly democratic and 
representative constitution.
  I urge my colleagues to support this joint resolution.

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