[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 65 (Tuesday, May 4, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3093-S3095]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Isakson, and Mr. Kerry):
  S. 3297. A bill to update United States policy and authorities to 
help advance a genuine transition to democracy and to promote recovery 
in Zimbabwe; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce the 
Zimbabwe Transition to Democracy and Economic Recovery Act with Senator 
Isakson and Senator Kerry. This legislation aims to update U.S. policy 
and to provide the necessary direction and flexibility for the United 
States to proactively push for democracy and economic recovery in 
Zimbabwe. In September 2008, the parties in Zimbabwe signed the Global 
Political Agreement, the GPA, and committed to work together to chart a 
new political direction for the country. Unfortunately, that commitment 
has not yet been fulfilled and political and human rights abuses 
continue at a disturbing rate. Nonetheless, the GPA and the formation 
of the transitional government have created new political realities and 
realignment in Zimbabwe, and subsequently, new opportunities to push 
for a genuine transition to democracy and for economic recovery. The 
United States and other international stakeholders can seize those 
opportunities by supporting reformers, while renewing and ramping up 
pressure on those who obstruct implementation of the GPA. Our bill aims 
to promote such a dynamic approach.
  We are all familiar with the tragic story of Zimbabwe's descent. 
Zimbabwe was one of Africa's most prosperous countries, a major food 
producer and home to the continent's best education system. Its leader 
Robert Mugabe was considered one of the great liberation leaders of 
southern Africa. Yet over time, Mugabe and his regime moved to tighten 
their grip on power, using increasingly violent tactics to stop the 
political opposition, stifle independent media, and take over private 
property. The results, particularly in the last decade, have been 
disastrous. Mugabe has presided over the collapse of Zimbabwe's economy 
and a dramatic decline in the living conditions of his people. At the 
end of 2008, Zimbabwe's economy reached a low point with world-record 
inflation, millions of people at risk of starvation, and unemployment 
over 90 percent. Meanwhile, Mugabe and his party have had to resort to 
increasing violence to repress the will of the people. Most recently, 
following the March 2008 election, the Mugabe regime and its cronies 
launched a brutal campaign of violence against members and supporters 
of the opposition MDC after Morgan Tsvangirai won the first round of 
voting.
  I have closely followed the situation in Zimbabwe since 1999 when I 
traveled to Harare and witnessed then the early stages of this 
political crisis. During that trip, I also met some incredibly dynamic, 
committed and inspiring civil society leaders. Upon returning, I said 
on the Senate floor that we must not abandon these leaders; that the 
international community should move to arrest Zimbabwe's descent before 
it became more complex. I teamed up then with Senator Bill Frist to 
author legislation on U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe.

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And in 2001, President Bush signed that legislation, the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, into law. ZDERA, as that bill is 
known, placed restrictions on U.S. support for any new international 
loan, credit or debt reduction for Zimbabwe until the President 
certifies that a number of political conditions have been met, namely 
an end to abuses and the restoration of rule of law. The bill also 
called for targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for 
politically motivated violence.
  At the same time, ZDERA also spelled out the United States' 
commitment to the Zimbabwean people in their struggle to effect 
peaceful and democratic change. And it stated our commitment to be a 
strong partner in helping the Zimbabwean people to rebuild their 
country when that change was achieved. I have not given up on that 
commitment, despite the Mugabe regime's relentless and violent efforts 
to hold onto power. In 2002, I tried to return to the country, but my 
visa was revoked and the government blocked my entry into the country. 
In 2003, I traveled to South Africa and Botswana, in part to discuss 
the crisis in Zimbabwe and the regional consequences. Most recently, in 
2008 and 2009, in my capacity as the Chairman of the Africa 
Subcommittee, I have held hearings specifically on Zimbabwe and U.S. 
policy options.
  With the signing of the GPA, I was skeptical that Robert Mugabe and 
his allies had any real intention to share power and respect the 
agreement. I remain skeptical as at almost every turn, hardliners in 
the transitional government have resisted any moves that would 
undermine their historic patronage system and power structures. Mugabe 
has refused to implement several parts of the agreement, continuing to 
use Western sanctions as a scapegoat. Meanwhile, state security forces 
remain largely under the control of ZANU-PF and continue to harass 
civil society activists and participate in illegal, often violent, 
seizures of private land and property. In this sense, little has 
changed in Zimbabwe.
  Yet at the same time, for many Zimbabweans, the establishment of a 
transitional government that includes former opposition leaders who 
were imprisoned and tortured as part of Zimbabwe's democratic struggle 
has brought forth a sense of possibility that has not existed for 
years. It has brought their struggle for democracy into the halls of 
government. And over the last year, some progress has been made toward 
enacting reforms. Most notably, the Finance Ministry has managed to 
halt Zimbabwe's economic decline and put an end to some of the 
disastrous fiscal activities of the previous regime. That said, 
progress has been slow and limited mostly to the economic sector. We 
cannot deceive ourselves into thinking that the return of food and 
other goods to stores is an indication that true democracy has taken 
root. Reformist elements in the government continue to lack the 
leverage as well as the qualified personnel and resources to overcome 
the resistance of hardliners and to break their hold on the security 
sector. They need greater support if they are going to win this 
struggle and achieve a genuine transition to democracy and economic 
recovery.
  I respect those who are cautious about changing the international 
posture toward Zimbabwe until there is greater progress and a clear 
transition underway. I too am cautious, as there is good reason to be 
so. But at the same time, I also believe we must support the Zimbabwean 
people in their ongoing struggle for peaceful, democratic change and we 
can best do that by reconsidering some of the strict polices of years 
prior. We must realize that the dynamics of that struggle have 
changed--not as much as we would like them to go, not even close but 
there has been change. Adhering to a strict wait-and-see approach 
allows Mugabe and his allies to continue to marginalize reformers in 
the transitional government and manipulate the political environment, 
while relying on their usual anti-Western propaganda to win local and 
regional support. Alternatively, through proactive and targeted 
engagement, there may be ways that we can better support reformers in 
government, create incentives for others in the government to embrace 
such reform, and isolate the hardliners. If we are to see institutional 
change in Zimbabwe, it is in our interest to pursue those 
possibilities.
  The United States has a key role to play in this regard. We continue 
to be very active in Zimbabwe, providing humanitarian assistance and 
support for civil society. In Fiscal Year 2009, the United States 
provided nearly $300 million to Zimbabwe, over half of which was food 
assistance. Over the last year, some within the administration have 
begun to explore ways we can better target our assistance to help 
reformers in order to consolidate democratic reforms and lay the 
groundwork for economic recovery. We have already provided some 
technical assistance to help certain ministries in the government. This 
is the right approach and we should continue to look for ways to 
proceed, both symbolically and substantively. At the same time, we 
should continue to update and increase targeted pressure on those 
individuals and institutions that are actively obstructing reform. We 
should also look for innovative ways to address illegal activities that 
are in violation of the GPA.
  The Zimbabwe Transition to Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 
2010 seeks to encourage and provide the authority and flexibility for 
the Obama administration to pursue such a dynamic approach toward 
Zimbabwe. Our bill authorizes continued and expanded technical 
assistance to reformist ministries of the transitional government as 
well as to the Parliament as it seeks to repeal or amend repressive 
laws. It also amends the funding restrictions on Zimbabwe in the fiscal 
year 2010 State and Foreign Operations appropriations bill to allow for 
greater engagement in the areas of health and education. Furthermore, 
it encourages the United States to promote agricultural development as 
much as possible within our food assistance efforts, while we actively 
press the government to reestablish security of tenure for all 
landowners.
  In addition, our bill would amend ZDERA to allow the United States 
greater flexibility and leverage when engaging with the International 
Financial Institutions on Zimbabwe. The law from 2001 restricts U.S. 
support for any international loan, credit or debt reduction to 
Zimbabwe until the President certifies that certain political 
conditions have been achieved in the country. This restriction 
currently has no discernible impact as Zimbabwe can only be eligible 
for such international support when it deals with its arrears, which 
now total billions of dollars. Nonetheless, this restriction has become 
a powerful symbol and it functionally ties the hands of the State and 
Treasury Departments to actively engage with the IMF, African 
Development Bank and other institutions to develop plans for supporting 
Zimbabwe's longer-term recovery when there is a genuine transition. Our 
bill would amend ZDERA to allow for such engagement, making U.S. 
support conditional on the proposed assistance itself, specifically 
whether there are sufficient controls for transparency and oversight, 
and whether funds will be administered by ministries that have 
demonstrated a commitment to reform.
  Amending ZDERA will help to provide flexibility and leverage for the 
U.S. government, but also to undercut Mugabe's propaganda. Over the 
years, Mugabe and his allies have conveniently portrayed ZDERA as a 
symbol of Western hostility and blanket sanctions on Zimbabwe. While 
those allegations are clearly false, the changes made by our bill will 
go a long way towards ensuring they have a much harder time spinning 
this lie and deflecting responsibility from their own disastrous 
policies.
  ZDERA, of course, is not to be conflated with our targeted sanctions 
against specific individuals and financial institutions that are 
directly involved in the breakdown of the rule of law and abuses of 
power. Our bill calls for the continuation of that program as I see no 
reason to terminate this sanctions program until we see an end to 
widespread abuses. Instead, our bill calls for the continued review and 
updating of those sanctions. It also encourages new action to address 
illegal activities involving diamonds in Zimbabwe that are reportedly 
fueling abuses and undermining democratic progress. Specifically, it 
urges the

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Obama administration to consider new sanctions on individuals 
overseeing these activities and to press for Zimbabwe's suspension from 
the Kimberley Process. Zimbabwe's continued participation in the 
Kimberley Process undermines the integrity and important work of that 
process.
  Finally, whenever it happens, Zimbabwe's next election will be a 
critical step toward any genuine transition to democratic rule and a 
sustainable economic recovery. The past elections have been flashpoints 
for increased violence and the breakdown of the rule of law. This 
cannot be the case this next time around if Zimbabwe is to move 
forward. The international community needs to prepare a coordinated 
strategy to help reduce the risk of violence and other abuses around 
such elections. Our bill directs the Obama administration to begin 
engaging with international partners now toward developing such a 
strategy.
  International actions alone will not determine whether real and 
lasting democratic change is achieved in Zimbabwe; that will ultimately 
be determined by the Zimbabwean people themselves. But I do believe 
that we can help Zimbabweans pursue a genuine transition toward 
democracy and economic recovery. To do this, we need an approach that 
is flexible and responsive to evolving conditions and challenges on the 
ground. I believe this bill helps move us toward such an approach.
  Nearly a decade ago, in passing ZDERA, the U.S. Congress committed to 
support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, 
democratic change, achieve economic growth and restore the rule of law. 
Today, we can reaffirm that commitment by passing the Zimbabwe 
Transition to Democracy and Economic Recovery Act. I hope my colleagues 
will join us in doing so.
                                 ______