[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 58 (Thursday, April 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2538-S2539]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IMPROPER PRACTICES ON WALL STREET
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank the Chair. I have sought
recognition to comment briefly on a hearing which will be held by the
Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on May 4
concerning allegations of improper practices on Wall Street.
In light of the allegations of misconduct on Wall Street in recent
years and the consequential damages to the economy of the United States
and worldwide, serious consideration should be given to whether civil
liability and fines are sufficient or whether jail sentences are
required to deal with such conduct and as a deterrence to others. With
civil liability or a fine, the companies or individuals calculate it as
part of the cost of doing business, but a jail sentence is enormously
different.
The charges brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
accusing Goldman Sachs of securities fraud in a civil lawsuit has
brought intense public concern to conduct on Wall Street which has long
been questioned. According to the SEC complaint, Goldman permitted a
client who was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence
which mortgage securities to include in the portfolio. Goldman then
sold the investments to pension funds, insurance companies, and banks.
The client was betting the securities would decline in value based on
his knowledge of the underlying value. Similar practices have been
defended by investment bankers on the ground that the investors are
sophisticated and have a duty to protect themselves without relying on
the investment counsel. There is a contention that the only issue is
whether the investments are suitable, with the denial that there is a
fiduciary duty. That defense further contends that there is no conflict
of interest.
Some of the issues to be considered at the hearing to be held by the
Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on May 4 are the
following:
First: Precisely what are the structures of the complex commercial
transactions involving securitizing mortgages, selling short hedge
funds, derivatives, et cetera?
Second: Under what circumstances, if any, do the investment bankers
have a fiduciary duty to the investors?
Third: Where, if at all, do conflicts of interest arise in such
transactions?
Fourth: Is there a legitimate distinction between the investment
council's duty to provide only a ``suitable'' investment without a
fiduciary duty involved?
Fifth: When the investment banker recommends or offers an investment,
is there an implicit representation that it is a good investment?
In my judgment, Congress should examine these complicated
transactions with a microscope and make a public policy determination
as to whether such conduct crosses the criminal line. Congress should
investigate and hold hearings to find the facts. Congress should then
define what is a fiduciary relationship, what is a conflict of
interest, and what conduct is sufficiently antisocial to warrant
criminal liability and a jail sentence.
As a starting point, it should be emphasized that the SEC complaint
contains allegations which have yet to be proved. The numerous
newspaper stories and other media reports are hearsay, so the task
remains to find the facts. These inquiries on Wall Street practices are
being made in the context that they triggered or at least contributed
to a global financial crisis.
Larry Summers, on March 13, 2009, said:
On a global basis, $50 trillion in global wealth has been
erased over the last 18 months. That includes $7 trillion in
the U.S. stock market wealth which has vanished, $6 trillion
in housing wealth which has been destroyed, 4.4 million jobs
which have already been lost, and the unemployment rate now
exceeds 8 percent.
In the intervening year, a total of 6.5 million jobs are now the
total lost, and the unemployment rate stands at 9.7 percent.
I have long been concerned about the acceptance of fines instead of
jail sentences in egregious cases. There are many illustrative cases,
but three will suffice to make the point. In each of these cases, I
registered my complaint with the Department of Justice.
First: On September 2, 2009, Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion to
resolve criminal and civil liability for committing health care fraud
for selling Bextra, for off-label uses the FDA declined to approve
because they were unsafe. For a company with revenues in excess of $48
billion and an income in excess of $8 billion in fiscal year 2008, it
was chalked off as the cost of doing business.
The second case: On December 15, 2008, Siemens AG entered guilty
pleas to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and agreed to
pay $1.6 billion in fines, penalties, and disgorgements with no jail
sentences. Again, that amounts to a calculation as part of the cost of
doing business for a company which had revenues of $104 billion and a
net income of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2008, after the penalty.
The third case, briefly: On May 8, 2007, Purdue Pharma agreed to pay
$19.5 million to 26 States to settle complaints that Purdue encouraged
physicians which prescribed excessive doses of OxyContin in violation
of an FDA ruling which resulted in numerous deaths. Company officials
paid fines, nobody went to jail; again, part of the cost of doing
business.
From my days as district attorney of Philadelphia, where my office
convicted the chairman of the Housing Authority, the Stadium
Coordinator, the deputy commissioner of Licenses and Inspections, and
others, my experience has convinced me that criminal prosecutions are
an effective deterrent.
The deterrent effect of prison was succinctly stated by Mr. William
Mercer, chairman of the Sentencing Guideline Subcommittee of the
Attorney General's Advisory Committee, on behalf of the Department of
Justice, in a 2003 publication. He said:
[W]e believe that the certainty of real and significant
punishment best serves the purpose of deterring fraud
offenders and particularly white collar criminals.
[O]ffenders usually decide to commit fraud and other forms of
white collar crimes not with passion, but only after
evaluating the cost and benefits of their actions. If the
criminally inclined think the risk of prison is minimal, they
will view fines, probation, home arrest, and community
confinement merely as a cost of doing business. We aim to
remove the price tag from a prison term. We believe that if
it is unmistakable that the automatic consequence for one who
commits a fraud offense is prison, many will be deterred, and
at least those who do the crime will indeed do the time.
[[Page S2539]]
These are some of the considerations which will be taken up at the
subcommittee hearing.
I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
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