[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 55 (Monday, April 19, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2405-S2408]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Financial Reform
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank my friend from North Dakota,
because I, too, for what it is worth, have been very distressed about
the conversations around financial reform. I don't think either side of
the aisle deserves a badge of honor as it relates to the way this has
been discussed. I agree with him that this is something way beyond
using poll-tested language and should, in fact, be dealt with in a
serious manner. So although I didn't hear all the Senator's comments, I
agree with him that we ought to deal with this in a serious way.
Mr. President, you and I have had a number of conversations over the
last weekend regarding financial reform. We have had a lot of
conversations over the last year regarding financial reform. As I have
watched the public discussions over the last several days, I have been
greatly distressed. As a matter of fact, I spoke this morning to a
large number of businessmen in Nashville, TN, and, candidly, became so
angry thinking about the way this debate has evolved that I had to
think about coming here today and controlling that and using that in a
productive way.
I have noticed throughout the day that maybe the rhetoric has changed
a little, and I know that my friend and colleague from Virginia and my
friend and colleague from Connecticut had a press conference earlier
today to talk about some of the issues that are being talked about
rhetorically. Let's face it, what is happening right now--and it is
unfortunate for the American people--is that both sides of the aisle
are trying to herd up folks with language that in many ways I don't
think does justice to this issue, which is very important, is very
difficult, and something that is very much needed in our country.
There has been a lot of discussion about this funding mechanism--this
$50 billion bailout fund, if you will. Those are someone else's words,
by the way, not mine. The American people are probably tuning in, and
in some cases they are wondering how we are jumping into the middle of
this on the Senate floor without a lot of free dialogue.
The fact is, we have a financial reg bill that I hope comes before us
soon that will deal with orderly liquidation so that when a large
institution fails, it actually fails. I think that is what the American
people would like to see happen. So there has to be a mechanism in
place.
If a firm is systematically important to our country, there needs to
be the tools in place to make sure it actually goes out of business. I
don't think people in Tennessee like seeing that when a community bank
fails it actually goes out of business, but when a large Wall Street
firm fails we prop it up.
I wish the Senator from Virginia, who happens to be presiding, were
on the floor so we could have a colloquy on this because the fact is,
this is something that needs to be dealt with in legislation. We need
to know we have a process where we deal with derivatives and we don't
have a lot of people building up a lot of bad money, instead of doing
it on a daily basis and they end up in a situation where there are huge
obligations. We need to deal with some of the issues of consumer
protection.
So, Mr. President, there has been a lot of discussion about how we
create something called debtor-in-possession financing, so that when
the FDIC comes in and seizes one of these large firms that fails, it
has the money to keep the lights on and to make payroll and those kinds
of things while it is selling off the assets of the firm.
The fund that has been discussed in this bill--and that is going to
be changed, I know, and I am fine with that and think that is perfectly
good--but this fund that has been set up is anything but a bailout. It
has been set up in essence to provide upfront funding by the industry
so that when these companies are seized, there is money available to
make payroll and to wind it down while the pieces are being sold off.
Now, a lot of people have said this is a Republican idea. There is no
question this is something that Sheila Bair has proposed. The FDIC
wants to see a prefund. The Treasury would like to see a postfund; they
would like to see it come after the fact.
At this point I want to digress for one second and say I hope the
reason that Treasury wants a postfund is not because, in lieu of having
a prefund of $50 billion from these large institutions, they want to
see a bank taxed. As a matter of fact, I am going to be surprised if
after Republicans argue against a prefund and it is changed, and the
administration comes back and Chairman Dodd comes back and we end up
with postfunding--both of which do the same thing, I might add, and
both of them work--but it will be interesting to see whether that
argument basically leads to Treasury then having the ability to come
back and do a bank tax. I think at the end of the day that is something
they have been wanting to achieve.
So it is interesting how this debate is evolving. But let me go back
to this prefund. At the end of the day, I think what all of us would
like to see happen is to see these institutions go out of business. So
do we put the money upfront to take them out of business or do we put
it up on the back end where, in essence, what is happening is we are
borrowing money from the taxpayers?
Would we rather the industry put up the money so the taxpayers are
not at risk or would we rather that not happen and during a downtime,
when it is procyclical, we actually get the firms to put up the money
after the fact?
I think both of those, by the way, are nice arguments to have, and I
think they should have been debated in the committee, and we can debate
it on the Senate floor. But at the end of the day, to make the total
debate about whether it is pre or post--neither of which are central to
the argument because both work--it really doesn't matter. Either way we
have to have some moneys available as working capital to shut down a
firm. We can borrow it from the taxpayers, although I don't know if the
taxpayers would like that very much. We can do it after the fact, as I
have said, or we can put it in upfront by the industry. Either way it
is going to be paid back by industry.
I will say that in the Dodd bill today there is postfunding; that if
there are any shortfalls the industry will pay that back. So, again, it
is kind of a debate that ends up being silly. The fact is, I know it is
going to be changed. The essence of the bill, though, is the fact that
we want to make sure these firms unwind and they go out of business.
Let me just talk about some of the arguments that are being made:
Prefunding of resolution creates a system where certain participants
are effectively designated as a protected class as a result of them
paying into the fund.
I think that is ludicrous. That is a ludicrous argument. Now, what we
could do, if it would make everybody happy, is instead of getting large
firms to pay, we could get community banks to pay too. I don't think
there would be many people who would be interested in that, but if we
want to get everybody in the country and get the community banks in
Tennessee--I am not interested in that, and I don't think the Senator
from Virginia is interested in that--but if we want to do that, we can
ensure nobody is part of the protected class. So I find that to be a
ludicrous argument.
There is another argument: This allows such firms competitive funding
advantage over smaller institutions such as community banks.
So, in other words, if we are saying these large firms, if they fail,
are going to go out of business, and it is going to be more painful
than bankruptcy, that somehow they are protected or have a competitive
advantage, I find that to be kind of ludicrous, and I hope that
argument is not used again. It probably will be, but I hope it would
not.
Here is one I read recently: The fund is a signal to credit markets
that the U.S. Government stands ready to prop up, bail out, and
insulate large financial firms. Now that is an interesting one. The
fact is, we are talking about orderly liquidation.
The existence of the fund allows managers of large financial
institutions to conduct riskier practices, therefore counterparties
will not feel obliged to perform due diligence because, in the event of
stress, there is such a financial slush fund available to bail out
unsecured and short-term creditors.
You have to be kidding me. That is absolutely the opposite of what is
intended.
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Now, let me say this before somebody tunes out. I think this bill has
problems, and I think there are issues that need to be resolved around
orderly liquidation. The Senator from Virginia and I both know what
they are, and there are some flexibilities that have been granted to
the FDIC, to the Federal Reserve, and others that need to be tightened.
There are some words that instead of saying ``shall'' say ``may.'' That
is a very important word when you are telling an agency what they have
to do or what they ``may'' do. So there is much in this bill that needs
to be fixed.
I want to say that as the Dodd bill sits today, I could not vote for
it. I absolutely cannot support the bill. But what concerns me is the
rhetoric that is being used to talk about something that is very
important to our country, and it is being used on both sides, I might
add.
On one side they are saying the Republicans want to protect Wall
Street firms. Well, I can tell you this: I think there are very few
Republicans who do not want to see financial regulation take place. I
think there are very few Republicans who don't want to see it done the
right way. Candidly, I think most Republicans and Democrats are
listening to community bankers. They are not listening to Wall Street.
That would be my guess.
So that rhetoric, to me, is off base. The rhetoric on my side of the
aisle saying this orderly liquidation title basically keeps ``too big
to fail'' in place, the central pieces of it, is not true. Are there
some things around the edges that need to be fixed? Yes. My sense is,
as I have said on the Senate floor, we can fix those in about 5 minutes
if we just sit down and do it. I do not understand why the rhetoric has
gotten to where it is. I would like to see us pass a bill that makes
sense.
The kind of thing we should be talking about is not the fact that
this is a bailout fund. By the way, whether it is ``pre'' or ``post,''
that debate doesn't matter to me. The fact is, we have to have some
debtor-in-possession financing available to wind these firms down, sell
off the assets, make sure the stockholders are absolute toast, make
sure unsecured creditors are toast, make sure it is so painful that
nobody ever wants to go through this. We absolutely need to do that.
The American people need to know we in Congress are not going to prop
up a failed institution, that they are going to live the same life in
capitalism that everybody else has to live. People in Tennessee, when
they fail, they fail.
The kind of thing we ought to be talking about and have been talking
about and I think can solve is that I think we ought to have more
judicial involvement in the process. We ought to improve the bankruptcy
process so that these large institutions have a more viable route
through bankruptcy.
I think we ought to deal with the disparate treatment of similarly
situated creditors. The fact is, the way the ``post'' funding in this
bill is now set up, we do not. If a creditor receives more money than
they should, that money is not recouped. We know how to fix that. I
know the Senator from Virginia and I both know how to fix that.
Those are the kinds of things we need to be talking about.
Creditor prioritization--there is no question that right now in the
bill, certain creditors can be treated differently by the FDIC than
others.
We need to be looking at bankruptcy stacks so that people understand
how much they are going to be paid back, and they are going to be in
the same order they anticipate being in.
We need to be tightening the definition of a financial firm. Right
now in the bill, the way it reads, an auto company could end up being
part of this. Right now, it is not tight enough. An auto company may be
a stretch, but something other than a financial firm could be dealt
with, the way the language is now reading. And certainly for sure
Fannie and Freddie need to be treated the same as any other financial
firm.
We need to have a solvency test to make sure regulators--that does
not allow regulators the flexibility to protect firms in crisis.
We need to make sure there is a duration. In other words, if the FDIC
comes in and has to take over, after due process--three keys being
turned--take over one of these firms that has posed systemic risk, we
need to know there is an end date. I know the Senator from Virginia and
I absolutely agree that conservatorship should not be on the table.
This is only a receivership and those firms should go out of business,
and that, no doubt, should be language added. It is not in there right
now.
There are a number of things like this. I could go on and on. I am
probably boring much of the watching audience, if there is any, with
some of these technical issues, but those are the kinds of things we in
this body ought to be talking about. They are important. They matter.
But to use up time with rhetoric that, in essence, is used to sort of
brand something in a way that really isn't the way it is, to me, is not
productive. I did not come here to do that.
Again, I think both sides of the aisle tried to cast the characters
in certain ways. It is this herd process that happens around here.
Everybody wants to get everybody on the same team. What we do is we use
rhetoric that charges people up and gets everybody on the same team. I
do not like that process. I do not want to be a part of that process.
I have joined with other Republicans to try to make sure this bill
gets in the middle of the road. I have done that on the basis that both
sides are going to deal in good faith.
I know the Senator from Virginia knows we went through a process with
this bill where we voted it out of committee in 21 minutes--a 1,336-
page bill we voted out of committee in 21 minutes with no amendments.
The stated goal was to make sure that both sides did not harden against
each other and that we could negotiate a bill before it came to the
floor--came to the floor--we would negotiate a bipartisan bill. That is
why it was stated that we did that. How can responsible Senators, 23
Senators, all of whom have problems with this bill--how can you vote
something out of committee in 21 minutes with no amendments unless you
know that a negotiation process is going to take place afterward to
create a bipartisan bill? Nobody in their right mind would have agreed
to do that.
What I would say to my friends on the other side of the aisle and
what I would say to the folks at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue,
who seem to be turning up the rhetoric--I take it as a commitment from
my friends on the other side of the aisle that we are going to
negotiate a bipartisan bill and we are going to do it in good faith.
But I also expect the same on my side of the aisle, that we are going
to negotiate in good faith to get a bill and that before it comes to
the floor the major template pieces will be worked out, the issues
around consumers, the issues around orderly liquidation, and the issues
around consumer protection.
As I have mentioned, there are a number of issues we need to debate
here on the floor that, to me, are outside the realm of the template
itself. I hope this body--I know the Senator from Virginia and I have
worked together a great deal. I know we both came from a world that was
different from this. I have become greatly distressed. I get distressed
at both sides of the aisle when we have an important issue such as this
and we turn it into sound bites.
I hope, again, over the next several days--this bill has been through
so many iterations. Everybody who has worked on it understands what is
in it. Everybody understands what the points are on which we disagree.
As a matter of fact, if we do not end up with a bipartisan bill, it is
not going to be over philosophical issues, it is going to be over the
fact that the two sides just decided they didn't want to do it. It is
going to be over the fact that it takes both sides.
The fact is, the White House can make an issue out of this. I know
things are not going particularly well in the polling areas. I know my
friend from North Dakota talked about polling data and testing things
and all that. I realize things are not going particularly well. Maybe
this financial reform bill can be something that changes that. Maybe if
you push the bill as far to the left as you can and you dare
Republicans to vote against it, maybe that is a good thing. That is not
what I came here to do. I do not think that is what the Senator from
Virginia came here to do. I know that
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if Republicans brand this bill as prolonging too big to fail--that is
what we are doing--then we might be able to keep the bill from passing
that way too.
I hope all of us will sit down and do what we came here to do, and
that is to create good policy for the American people.
I am very distressed about where we are today. What I hope is
happening is that this is just a bunch of buzz and that our committee
staffs and the chairman and ranking member are actually sitting down,
having serious discussions, and that very soon we are going to come
forth with a bill that is bipartisan, where we can debate it on the
edges and end up passing legislation that stands the test of time.
I hope that bill will deal with the very core issues that got us into
this crisis. And we can castigate all kinds of people. There is enough
blame to go around. You almost couldn't find a regulator, a credit
rating agency, a firm, management that was not in some way involved in
helping create this crisis. There is a lot of blame to go around. But I
hope the bill, at the end of the day, will also address, as I have
stated every time I have come to the floor on this bill, the whole
issue of underwriting; the fact that at the end of the day, at the
bottom of this, whether you read what happened supposedly with Goldman
on Friday, you read about these synthetic CDOs where they were not even
really underwriting mortgages there--in reality, they were just doing
something that reflected what certain mortgages would do--at the end of
the day, it still was about the fact that in this country, we wrote a
bunch of mortgages that couldn't be paid back. You can talk about this
all you want, but the underwriting, the bad loans that were written, at
the end of the day, are what created much of this crisis. Candidly, I
don't think much of this bill addresses that. I hope we will address
that more fully before this bill comes to the floor.
With that, I think I have taken up my allotted time. I thank the
Members of this body for their patience. I hope we will do the work
that needs to be done here. As I mentioned, at this point I don't think
either side of the aisle deserves a badge of honor, but I hope over the
next several days that will change. I hope our rhetoric will be
tempered. I hope our discussions will center around those things that
really matter and will not be used to basically get people in the
public off on rabbit trails or try to herd our teams together.
Mr. President, I look forward to working with you as we try to
complete this bill.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I would like to return to the nomination
of Dr. Lael Brainard.
Today, at long last, the Senate is considering the nomination of Dr.
Lael Brainard to be Under Secretary of Treasury for International
Affairs.
President Obama nominated Dr. Brainard more than a year ago, in March
of 2009. After an extensive vetting process, the Finance Committee held
a hearing on her nomination in November of last year. And the Finance
Committee favorably reported her nomination with a bipartisan majority
in December of last year.
The path to her Senate confirmation has been neither short nor easy.
But throughout this process, Dr. Brainard has demonstrated persistence
and determination.
These vital qualities supported her well as a nominee. And these
qualities will support her well as she assumes her responsibilities as
Under Secretary of Treasury.
The world economy is emerging from a deep economic recession. America
must lead the way to recovery. And we must do so by creating jobs,
reducing unemployment, and encouraging smart, balanced growth here at
home.
But the health of the global economy does not rest on our shoulders
alone. In fact, the recent financial crisis has demonstrated how
interconnected our world is.
The world's many national economies have the potential to rise
together. And they have the potential to fall together, as well.
To ensure a stable, prosperous economic future, countries must work
together to support balanced economic growth. No country can rely
solely on export-driven growth, just as no country can rely solely on
its domestic consumption.
But this economic rebalancing will not happen overnight. The global
economic downturn has been powerful because of its persistence. And we
must be just as persistent and determined in our efforts to overcome
the effects of this crisis.
As Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Dr.
Brainard will lead our bilateral and multilateral efforts on these
issues. She will work with key trading partners such as China and the
European Union. And she must help to guide our country from an economic
recovery to economic growth.
Dr. Brainard has demonstrated that she has the knowledge, skills, and
abilities to confront the tasks that lie ahead. She is brilliant and
hard-working.
She has shown the tenacity and doggedness necessary to be successful
as Under Secretary for International Affairs. And she has revealed that
she has the persistence and determination to address the vital issues
facing America and the global economy today.
I might add, I worked with Dr. Brainard during the Clinton
administration. A very key question is, What would the U.S. economic
relation be with China? Up to that point, America had annual extensions
of MFN for China. They were contentious. They caused more problems than
they solved, and I spent some time with the President and others in the
Clinton White House and then later worked with Dr. Brainard as we moved
away from these annual extensions of MFN and more toward PNTR with
China.
It was a hallmark change in United States-China economic relations. I
think this worked out very well for our country's best interests. I
must say it has also helped China. We pursued that objective, in part,
because that meant China could then be a member of the WTO, and once
China became a member of the WTO--that is, the World Trade
Organization--that would help China live up to world standards that
other countries were living up to under WTO.
Again, Dr. Brainard, throughout this confirmation process, has shown
her dedication to serving the Treasury Department, the President, and
the American people. I am confident--and I am confident because she has
had deep experience and she is very talented; she is very good--I am
confident she is up to the task for which she has been nominated.
I urge the Senate to approve her nomination.
I now ask unanimous consent that the assistant majority leader, the
Senator from Illinois, be recognized to speak on whatever topic he
chooses.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kaufman). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank the chairman of the Finance Committee.
This is the Executive Calendar. It contains the names of the
nominations the President of the United States has sent to the Senate
for confirmation. It is an orderly process, a historic process. It has
happened thousands and thousands of times. Very few times do we have a
lot of controversy associated with these names. If there is a
controversy, ultimately there is a vote--a debate, and then a vote.
But now there is a new approach being used by the minority side. That
approach is to basically use one of three options: stall, stop, and
kill. What they are trying to do, for the 104 nominations sent by
President Obama, is to hold them on the calendar as long as possible so
it is difficult for him to organize his administration and move
forward.
There are some key positions. The one the Senator from Montana spoke
of is the nominee for Under Secretary of the Treasury for International
Affairs. We are concerned about the state of the American economy, our
competition in the world, how we stack up against countries such as
China.
There is an allegation, which I think is valid, that the Chinese are
manipulating their currency so they continue to take jobs away from the
United States. It gives them too big a competitive advantage. Here is
the Under
[[Page S2408]]
Secretary for International Affairs who would be tasked with looking
into that issue to try to help American businesses, small and large,
and to save American jobs and this nomination now sits on the calendar
with 103 others.
What you find is that of those 104 nominations, most of them went
through the committees on their way to the Senate floor with unanimous
votes or overwhelming majority votes. There is no controversy
associated with it.
Mr. DORGAN. Would the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. DURBIN. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Illinois
knows who has a hold on that nomination.
Mr. DURBIN. I do not know. Does the Senator know?
Mr. DORGAN. No, I do not. The reason I asked the question is these
holds are, in some cases, anonymous. I spoke earlier today about a hold
on a promotion for one of the generals in the Army to be a major
general that has now been held up for nearly 6 or 7 months by Senator
Vitter.
I use his name because I told him I was going to because he is
demanding of this general something the general cannot do. I mean, that
is an example. We happen to know where that hold is from.
But of these other 100-plus nominations, they sit here, day after
day, month after month, and someone has put a hold on them for some
reason. If I might mention one other, the woman who was to head the
GSA, that was vacant for nearly a year because of a hold of one
Senator, and when we finally got around to voting for her, it was 94 to
zero.
The Senator who held her up for a year even voted for her. That is
the kind of game that is being played. It is unfair.
Mr. DURBIN. I agree with the Senator from North Dakota. I would say
to those Senators who have holds on nominees: Come to the floor and
explain to the American people why you believe these people should not
be serving in our government. If you think there is something wrong
with them, if you think they are unqualified or there is some issue
involving their character or integrity, do you not owe it to these
nominees to step forward and say so?
I have held some nominees in the past but was open and public about
it for a specific purpose. Recently, under the Bush administration, I
was looking for a report from the Department of Justice. The report was
sent. The hold was lifted as quickly as it was sent. Those things I
understand.
But to hold these people indefinitely in anonymous holds, secret
holds, and never state the reason why is fundamentally unfair. It is
unfair to the nominee who has gone through this process of FBI checks,
background checks, poring through income tax returns, questions about
their personal and private lives most Americans would not want to face.
They finally get through the nomination process, the President sends
their name, and now they are being held up on the calendar
indefinitely, 104 different people. I think we owe it to them, we owe
it to the President and to the country to do this in an honest, orderly
way.
During the course of this week, Members of the Senate are going to
come to the floor and ask to move these nominees forward. I hope those
on the other side who have the courage to hold them will have the
courage to stand and explain why. That, I think, is critical.