[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 52 (Wednesday, April 14, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2258-S2262]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FINANCIAL REFORM
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise this morning to try and set the
record straight, if I can, on some of the rhetoric I have heard over
the last 24 hours or so regarding the financial reform efforts I have
been engaged in along with my colleagues on the Senate Banking
Committee for the past 38 months.
I became chairman of the Banking Committee in January of 2007, about
38, 39 months ago. Since that time, of course, we have held countless
hearings and meetings to deal with the financial crisis beginning in
January and February of 2007. In fact, the very first hearings we held
were on the foreclosure crisis in the Nation and trying to get the
attention of the previous administration, Secretary Paulson and others,
to pay attention to the situation that was emerging. Our economy was
collapsing and too many people were losing their homes, an economic
catastrophe was looming, and, frankly, there was not enough attention
being paid initially to this issue by the previous administration.
Nonetheless, we worked forward. So, today, we find ourselves on the
brink of making an effort to deal with this problem.
After listening to some of the rhetoric of the last 24 hours, I
wonder if we are in not only the same Chamber in the same city but on
the same planet when it comes to the efforts that have been made to try
and reach bipartisan agreement to deal with financial reform. I have
almost unlimited patience, as many of my colleagues know, but that
unlimited patience is being tested by some of the comments I have
heard. So I felt incumbent to respond this morning to some of these
accusations about the effort being made to achieve a proposal on
financial reform that might attract broad support in this Chamber,
unlike other efforts that have been made over the past several years,
as I have said repeatedly during the many months we have been working
on this important legislation.
These are complex issues. We have gone through the most serious
financial crisis since the Great Depression. That is how serious this
is. In the words of financial leaders in this country and elsewhere, we
were on the brink of a meltdown of the entire financial system in this
country, and we came perilously close to having that occur. For those 7
million who lost their homes or the 8.5 million who have lost their
jobs, it might as well have been a financial meltdown, not to mention
the retirement incomes that evaporated and, of course, the loss of
confidence in our future, along with health care and a variety of other
things that have happened to working families in this country.
During the course of this debate, as critical as it is, of these
complex matters that make up the structure of the architecture of our
financial system, it is critical to the future of our economy and the
livelihoods of millions of middle-class Americans across this Nation
that this debate should not be sullied by misinformation or derailed by
those who would try and make it just another partisan game. Playing
politics with this issue is dangerous indeed. Unfortunately, the
talking points deployed by the Wall Street lobbyists, in an effort to
protect the status quo, leave my constituents and many Americans
vulnerable to yet another economic crisis. Those arguments are littered
with falsehoods--outright falsehoods--that I regret to say are now
being repeated by people who should know better and, frankly, do know
better.
[[Page S2259]]
So today and this morning I wish to set the record straight. I wish
to start by attacking one of the wildest and, frankly, most dishonest
objections to this legislation, which is the notion that it is somehow
a partisan document. I consider the minority leader and the ranking
member of the Banking Committee to be good friends. They are patriots,
with whom I have worked over many years on many issues. Senator Shelby
and I have been working together for over 1 year on these issues, and I
cannot, for the life of me, understand how anyone can claim with a
straight face that what I have tried to achieve on this bill is a
partisan effort. I have spent the last year seeking bipartisan
consensus.
In February of 2009, over 1 year ago, with the new Obama
administration freshly sworn in, I insisted from the very beginning
that Senator Shelby's staff be included in meetings with the White
House and Treasury Department on all financial matters. When I had the
opportunity to take over the chairmanship of the HELP Committee, the
committee charged with the responsibility of writing the health care
reform legislation, I chose to stay as chairman of the Banking
Committee, in no small part because I received commitments from Senator
Shelby and others that we would work together on this financial reform
legislation.
When I introduced a discussion draft of this proposal back in
November--almost 6 months ago--Senator Shelby indicated we had
bipartisan consensus on at least 70 percent of the bill back in
November. To get closer to a full agreement, I created four bipartisan
working groups almost 6 months ago, each of which was charged with
achieving real and meaningful progress in various sections of the bill.
Even when Senator Shelby and I found areas where we could not agree, I
continued to reach out to other members of the committee, including my
friend and colleague from Tennessee, Senator Corker, and others,
spending weeks working to try to achieve a consensus on financial
reform. It is not even a slight exaggeration to say we spent countless
hours--phone calls, meetings, e-mails, discussion drafts--day after
day, week after week, month after month, to try to get closer and
closer to a proposal our colleagues could support.
We can see the results. The bill we marked up in our committee last
month was much changed from the proposal I made in November, the
initial discussion draft, to reflect the work that had gone on over
those many weeks and months and the ideas brought to the table by
colleagues of both parties from members of that committee and others.
My friends on the other side of the aisle may not like every line in
the bill that will now be before us in a few short days, but at the
very least let us not pretend the bipartisan work that produced this
legislation didn't happen. It did happen. That is a disservice to
yourselves--those who make these allegations--and their good staffs who
worked hard over these many weeks with my Democratic staff and others
to produce this product.
If Members wish to vote against the bill, they can do that. That is
their right to do so. They can go on record in support of leaving their
constituents vulnerable to more lost jobs, more foreclosures, more
shuttered small businesses, more wiped out retirement accounts. It is
up to each individual Member to decide for themselves that is the vote
they wish to cast when it comes to this effort. But the outcome of this
debate will, mark my words, affect the economic security of ordinary
Americans, and they deserve to know the truth of what has happened.
Today, I wish to talk about bailouts. Nobody likes them.
Under our proposal, they will never happen again. As the President
said in his State of the Union Address, bailing out some of the large
banks whose own mismanagement caused the crisis was ``about as popular
as a root canal.'' That, of course, happened under the previous
administration, I should note.
But serious legislators of both parties realized that we had no
choice. Our system was so broken that these companies had become too
big to fail. If we did nothing else, our entire economy could collapse,
we were told.
You would think that if you wanted to avoid being backed into that
corner again, if you wanted to avoid more bailouts, you would oppose
efforts to protect the status quo. But Wall Street special interests
needed a way to defend this broken system. After all, for many of them,
the kind of mismanagement that costs us millions of jobs is the way
they pad their profits and pay their lobbyists. So they turned to Frank
Luntz, their political strategist.
Let me tell you what he came up with. I will quote from Mr. Luntz's
memo that was leaked, I will quote from his partisan memo:
The single best way to kill this legislation is to link it
to the big bank bailout.
No matter what is proposed, no matter what is in the bill, no matter
what protections it includes, call it a bailout. It is a naked
political strategy. If it succeeds and this legislation goes down, and
another crisis sinks the American economy, then the next recession and
all of the damage it will bring to the working families of this country
will have happened for the sake of that false talking point that Mr.
Luntz has been proposing. I don't expect Frank Luntz to care about the
truth of what we are engaged in here. That is not his job. He is a
political strategist. He is to provide political talking points to
people when you want to defeat something. I don't expect the bank
lobbyists and special interests to care about the truth; they don't
seem to worry about that. But the American people deserve better from
us in this Chamber.
That is why I have been so dismayed over these last 24 hours to hear
Members of this body repeat the utter falsehood--concocted by special
interests whose jobs and pensions are plenty secure, thank you very
much--that this bill will lead to more bailouts.
Frank Luntz suggested that allies of the big banks say:
If there is one thing we can all agree on, it's that the
bad decisions and harmful policies by Washington bureaucrats
that in many ways led to the economic crash must never be
repeated.
The minority leader, speaking yesterday, said:
If there's one thing Americans agree on when it comes to
financial reform, it's this: Never again should taxpayers be
expected to bail out Wall Street from its own mistakes. We
cannot allow endless taxpayer-funded bailouts for big Wall
Street banks. That's why we must not pass the financial
reform bill that's about to hit the floor.
Remember what Frank Luntz said:
The single best way to kill any legislation is to link it
to the big bank bailout.
It is straight from the Wall Street special interest talking points.
That is what they are determined to do to defeat this bill--suggest
somehow that there is a bailout provision in this bill. Nothing could
be further from the truth.
The bill, as drafted, ends bailouts. Nothing can be more clear in the
legislation. For the very first time, our Nation will have someone with
the job of monitoring risks to the financial system and sounding the
alarm before those risks can take down the entire system, as it almost
did. The bill imposes sufficient standards on Wall Street firms that
create those risks.
Our bill establishes a financial stability oversight council to
monitor risks and requires the Federal Reserve to write strict rules,
including stronger requirements regarding capital, leverage, liquidity,
and risk management on the largest financial companies, making it hard
for them to get too large and limiting the risk they represent.
Cracking down on the biggest players is critical to ending bailouts.
If a Wall Street firm does become too large or too complex and poses
a grave threat to our financial stability, the Federal Reserve has the
power to restrict its risky activities, restrict its growth, and even
to break up those institutions. I will repeat that. If a Wall Street
firm becomes too large and too complex, the Federal Reserve has the
power under our bill to prohibit those activities, including even
breaking up those institutions.
Additionally, our bill extends oversight to dangerous nonbank
financial companies, such as AIG, that could pose a risk to our
financial stability, as it did.
It prohibits banks and other financial institutions that own banks
from engaging in proprietary trading, making risky bets with money that
doesn't even belong to them.
Second, our bill eliminates the Federal Reserve's ability to prop up
individual institutions using what is called
[[Page S2260]]
the 13(3) authority, another way to stop banks from thinking that they
could be bailed out if in fact they engage in activities that cause
them to begin to fail. The Fed's lending authority is strictly
restricted, not expanded, as some have claimed.
Third, our bill sets up predictable, orderly, and safe processes for
shutting down dangerous Wall Street firms that fail without endangering
the entire economy. No financial firm will ever again be ``too big to
fail.'' Quite the opposite. We insist that the provisions be in place
so that it can never again make the claim that they are too big to
fail.
Large, complex financial companies will be required to submit plans
for their own shutdown--we call them living wills--if the company goes
under. Companies that fail to produce a realistic plan will be hit with
tougher capital requirements, restricted in how much they can grow, and
even can be broken up.
Most large financial companies would be resolved through the normal
bankruptcy process. That is the presumption in our bill--receivership.
Where bankruptcy is not an option, the bill creates a mechanism for
the FDIC to unwind those companies. The management will be fired,
shareholders will be wiped out, and creditors will take their losses.
Middle-income families on Main Street won't have to pay a penny. The
largest Wall Street firms would have to put up money for a $50 billion
fund to cover the costs of liquidating the failed financial firm, and
any shortfall will be made up by the largest and riskiest financial
firms. Why should the American taxpayer have to pay for unwinding these
companies? They should put up the money themselves. Let them pay for
the unwinding that goes on. Don't charge it to the American taxpayer.
Our bill includes those provisions.
Wall Street doesn't like this fund, and they are plenty content to
let taxpayers continue to pay the price for industry mistakes. Let me
be clear, despite what their apologists may claim, these funds can only
be used by the FDIC and only used to liquidate the failed company, not
prop it up.
To review, our bill imposes tougher standards on large, risky Wall
Street firms. It eliminates the Federal Government's capacity to bail
out individual companies. It requires that financial firms write their
own shutdown plans and even pay for the liquidation process if it is
needed.
Here is what I have to say to Wall Street. If you have a better idea,
let's hear it. If you have other ideas, let's debate them. But if all
you have is black-and-white talking points that bear no relation to
reality, don't reflect the efforts that have gone on for months to try
to produce a proposal that might gain broad support here in this
Chamber, then get out of the way and let the serious legislators work.
Don't write this off by quoting a political strategist's talking
points, when all of this effort has been made over these many months.
I am told by my staff--and I have dealt with 42 pieces of legislation
in 39 months--that about 37 have become the law of the land. I made a
determination as chairman to work together, wherever possible, to
achieve common points. So my history is to try to achieve that wherever
possible, and I take great offense at the suggestion that it has been
otherwise.
The outcome of this debate affects the economic security of every
single American and every single American family. What we have been
through, we should never have to go through again. Our bill takes steps
to try to achieve that. It is not that we are going to stop every
economic crisis in the future. That would be a foolish suggestion. But
what we have done is fill in the gaps that allowed this crisis to occur
and provide tools for the coming generation so they can address future
economic crises and still allow for the vitality of a financial
services sector to produce jobs, create wealth, allow credit to flow
and capital to form so our economy can prosper again.
Trying to achieve those three goals has been the hallmark of what I
have tried to put together with the bill, along with my colleagues on
the committee. I believe we have done a good job in achieving that. I
would be the last one to claim perfection. If people have other ideas,
that is what the process is for. But to castigate it and label it as
nothing more than a partisan debate and suggest that somehow what we
have done here is to perpetuate ``too big to fail'' is poppycock. It is
unfortunate that at this hour in this debate, that is all we hear from
on the other side.
The door is still open. We are not yet on the floor debating this
bill. I will have meetings with Senator Shelby and others. My patience
is running out. I have extended the hand, and I have written provisions
in the bill to accommodate various interests. I will not continue doing
this if all I am getting from the other side is a suggestion that this
is a partisan effort. We have been through it over and over on the
floor for the last year and a half. I think the American people are
sick of it. They want to see us work together to achieve results that
benefit them, not some political party, or narrow ideology, and
certainly not the narrow interests on Wall Street.
In the coming days, I will give you a bill I think we can vote for
and stand up and proudly support and, more importantly, one that we can
say to the American people we will not have to go through what we have
been through in the last 2 years, and never again should another
generation face the kinds of risks we did because of the gaps that
existed in our financial regulatory structure.
I ask unanimous consent that the entire Frank Luntz memo be printed
in the Record. I want the public to read it so they will know what we
are up against here with this political chicanery.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Language of Financial Reform
(By Dr. Frank Luntz, Jan. 2010)
The Financial Reform Climate
setting the context
This document is based on polling results and an Instant
Response dial session conducted after the House of
Representatives passed ``Financial Reform'' legislation and
prior to the Senate's consideration of the bill. The document
helps capture not just how Americans feel about the
``financial crisis'' (they believe it still exists) and
potential reform initiative (they're against)--and how they
want to address the issue (carefully).
When it comes to the financial crisis, there is one clear
consensus--the crisis is a stain on the fabric of America's
economy that will linger for years to come. The impact of the
crisis is real and has reverberated throughout every part of
our society. Rule #1:
When addressing the crisis, never forget its impact on your
audience. Above all else, never EVER minimize the pain.
1. Americans are divided on the cause of the crisis. The
consequences of the crisis may be undeniable, but its cause
is debatable.
--To conservatives: government policies caused the bubble
and its ultimate crash. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal
Reserve, and the Community Reinvestment Act all had a role in
the catastrophe. The government inflated economic bubbles
with easy credit policies. Interest rates were kept
intentionally low. Low-income families were encouraged to
become homeowners despite the knowledge that many would never
be able to pay them back. Government bought and backed these
subprime loans, essentially encouraging brokers to find more
subprime clients--risk be damned.
--To liberals: the roots of the crisis lie in Big Business
and the marketplace. Mortgage companies peddled adjustable
rate mortgages without ever explaining the future costs.
Credit card companies flooded college campuses with high
interest credit cards. Wall Street firms traded mortgage-
backed securities and created credit default swaps that
played key roles in the economic calamity. Contracts written
in legalese, coupled with the risks of adjustable rate
mortgages, were never explained to the average consumer--
perhaps intentionally. Those that blame the market are
passionate about the need for more reform.
--But to a majority of Americans believe that individuals
who ran up their credit cards and took out mortgages they
couldn't afford are also responsible for the calamity that
ensued.
What industries bear the brunt of the blame? Home mortgage
companies (33%) and banks (31%) are seen as primarily
responsible. But it is not the companies so much as the
leadership of the companies that are to blame. . .
But the largest percentage of Americans believes ``all of
them'' played a role in today's economic conditions.
2. You must acknowledge the need for reform that ensures
this NEVER happens again. Despite the different perspectives
on the causes of the crash, there is an agreement that the
crisis must be addressed--that changes must be made so the
mistakes that led to this point are never repeated. The
status quo is not an option. The system failed
[[Page S2261]]
us--all of us--and the causes of the failure must be
corrected.
3. Now, more than ever, the American people question the
government's ability to effectively address the issue.
Billions in handouts to Wall Street. A stimulus bill that
isn't creating jobs. Cash for Clunkers. Health Care. A
``Credit Card Bill of Rights'' that increases fees and
interest rates on consumers. The American people believe
Washington has gone wrong, and these legislative initiatives
have become symbols of Washington's inability to do anything
right. A majority of both Republican and Democrats believe
that. . .
words that work
If there is one thing we can all agree on, it's that the
bad decisions and harmful policies by Washington bureaucrats
that in many ways led to the economic crash must never be
repeated.
This is your critical advantage. Washington's incompetence
is the common ground on which you can build support.
Ordinarily, calling for a new government program ``to
protect consumers'' would be extraordinarily popular. But
these are not ordinary times. The American people are not
just saying ``no.'' They are saying ``hell no'' to more
government agencies, more bureaucrats, and more legislation
crafted by special interests.
Incredibly, these results are PRIOR to efforts to educate
voters about the inherent problems of the legislation. One
reason why initial support for more government action is
rooted in the simple belief that government cannot
effectively regulate the financial markets at any level . . .
4. Public outrage about the bailout of banks and Wall
Street is a simmering time bomb set to go off on Election
Day. To put it mildly, the public dislikes taxpayer bailouts
of private companies. Actually, they HATE it.
In fact, a vote in favor of creating a permanent bailout
fund of private companies is like committing political hari-
kari. Frankly, the single best way to kill any legislation is
to link it to the Big Bank Bailout.
WORDS THAT WORK
Taxpayer-funded bailouts reward bad behavior. Taxpayers
should not be held responsible for the failure of big
business any longer. If a business is going to fail, no
matter how big, let it fail.
5. The public is angriest about lobbyist loopholes. Part of
public perception that Washington cannot do anything right is
the belief that lobbyists write most of the bills. The
American people are tired of add-ons, earmarks, and backroom
deals--but they are mad as hell at ``lobbyist loopholes.''
This bill is riddled with such loopholes. You must put
proponents of the legislation on the defensive, forcing them
to attempt to justify the ``lobbyist loopholes'' and
exemptions placed in the bill:
--Why were pawnbrokers exempted?
--What about car dealers?
--Vegas casinos and their credit lines?
The power of this argument cannot be underestimated. When
participants in our dial sessions heard that the casinos and
pawnbrokers were exempted from the legislation, someone
remarked, ``We have become the Roman Senate.''
Highlight the exemptions. Broadcast them. Remind them,
``The legislation is filled with lobbyist loopholes that
exclude certain wealthy, powerful industries from
regulations.'' As Churchill would say, that statement is the
``soft white underbelly.'' When the participants were
presented a list of nearly a dozen objections to the bill,
the lobbyist loopholes blew away virtually every other
argument against the legislation.
6. You must be an agent of change. We have spent so much
time in this analysis on general economic perceptions because
that's what you need to address. You have to be on the side
of change. Always. The financial crisis is not a theoretical
economic textbook concern. The pain felt by the crisis is
real and omnipresent. Retirement funds were depleted. Homes
were foreclosed. Jobs were eliminated. The status quo is
unacceptable. However, it's wrong to assume government can
correct the problem without addressing its role in the
crisis, yet that is what Congress is trying to do. What to
say? ``It addresses market excesses but keeps government
excesses in place.'' The American consumer wants more easily
understood contract language so that consumers have all the
information they need.
7. Demand accountability--government accountability.
Despite creating economic conditions comparative to the Great
Depression, it is important to ask some basic questions--What
government regulator lost their job for their hand in the
crisis? What government policies were changed? What laws were
repealed? The obvious answer is none.
WORDS THAT WORK
We don't need another Federal government agency. We don't
need bigger government. What we need is a better approach
that promotes accountability, responsibility and effective
oversight.
Yet, Congress is poised to add another Washington agency
with more Washington bureaucrats on top of existing laws and
regulations. In fact, the proponents of the new government
agency and regulations are the same members of Congress who
created and supported the housing bubble.
WORDS THAT WORK
The architects of failure are now designing the rescue.
Many of the same members of Congress responsible for the
legislation that helped create the housing bubble and the
Wall Street financial crisis are now attempting to create
another new government agency with an unlimited budget and
almost unlimited regulatory powers.
I'm sorry to say this but they don't know what they're
doing. They have gotten it wrong time and time again and now
they want to do it yet again.
The perceived incompetence of Washington extends to its
leadership. Barney Frank, the Chairman of the House Financial
Services Committee, is an example. Frank's favorable rating
is 13%. His unfavorable rating is 30% (though a majority
don't give him any rating at all--so don't make him the
enemy. Washington is the enemy.)
8. More bloated government bureaucracy is not the solution.
We're witnessing out-of-control federal spending. The
Government takeover of health care and other industries has
Americans questioning the competence of government. They want
smarter solutions, not more of the same. ``A new agency with
new bureaucrats is not change we can believe in.'' It's not
change at all. As our dial session participants agreed,
``It's another agency to clean up a mess from a different
agency.''
WORDS THAT WORK
The financial crisis hurt all of us. Homes were lost. Jobs
were destroyed. Businesses closed. There is enough blame to
go around. We need a solution to the problem, not more of the
same. Creating another costly government bureaucracy on top
of existing bureaucracy isn't a solution--it helped cause the
problem. This time, let's get it right.
9. Devil is in the details. Every bill passed by Congress
is larded up with pork, handouts, and earmarks. The American
people have lost faith in Congress, and no matter how good a
bill sounds, they want to know ``What is in the fine print?''
10. Caution: Unintended consequences ahead. The government
caused the Savings and Loan crisis by changing the rules.
Congress jacked up fees and interest rates on consumers after
enacting the ``Credit Card Bill of Rights.'' What will be the
effects and impact of the CFPA? How will small business be
affected? Will choices be limited? Will consumer fees be
impacted? Evidence suggests the answer is definitely ``yes''.
Language Findings
11. Enforcement of current law trumps creation of new laws.
Despite the need for reform, the public believes real reform
means ensuring current laws are enforced rather than adding
another layer of agencies, laws, regulations, and red tape on
top of the existing agencies, laws, regulations, and red
tape.
WORDS THAT WORK
We don't need more laws. We need better enforcement of
current laws. We don't need more bureaucrats. We need the
people in charge to do their jobs as they were meant to be
done. We don't need layers and layers of additional federal
bureaucracy. What we need is to instill accountability,
responsibility and effective oversight to what is being done
already.
12. The bailout provisions get the most visceral reaction.
It is not often you come across an issue where people of all
political stripes come together so stridently on an issue.
Taxpayer bailouts of CEOs and companies are such an issue.
WORDS THAT WORK
Bailouts for Wall Street. Government takeovers of insurance
companies. Trillions of taxpayer dollars to bail out CEOs and
their risky investment schemes. And now Congress is preparing
to enact legislation to pass a law with $4 trillion more for
more bailouts. Should people who write the financial reform
laws be the same ones who helped cause the crisis? Should
taxpayers be punished and the big banks and credit card
companies be rewarded? The time has come to take a stand.
Oppose the big bank bailout bill.
13. ``Bureaucrats'' are worse than ``bureaucracies.'' While
Americans don't like bureaucracy, they loathe bureaucrats
even more. In fact, America's disdain of bureaucrats is
almost as high as Americans' dislike and mistrust of
lobbyists.
14. Americans want to end the legalese and confusion in
contracts. The strongest argument in favor of the CFPA is the
claim the agency would somehow end confusing contracts
written by lawyers in language only lawyers can understand.
When was the last time a government agency made things easier
to comprehend?
WORDS THAT WORK
We must require greater transparency and more easily
understood contract language so that consumers have all the
information they need.
15. Just the facts, ma'am. In the testing of the ads and
other communications, it is clear that Americans want more
than just red meat rhetoric. You have to give them two
concrete facts to prove your case--or you will be just
another special interest group playing politics with their
lives. Two facts. Two statistics. Two clear-cut statements of
evidence.
16. Personalize the impact. It's small business owners, and
not small businesses, that will be harmed by this
legislation. Yes, they recognize small business as a key
component of the economy, but stronger arguments against
creation of the CFPA lie elsewhere. Americans want to support
small businesses, but are more willing to support a person
who owns a small business. Make it personal.
17. It's not ``reform.''--This is not a reform bill. It is
the ``Stop the Big Bank Bailout bill.'' This is important.
[[Page S2262]]
18. Small business ownership is about the American Dream.
The most popular images of small business owners both
projected optimism with signs saying ``grand opening'' or
``open.''
WORDS THAT WORK
Owning a small business is part of the American Dream and
Congress should make it easier to be an entrepreneur. But the
Financial Reform bill and the creation of the CFPA makes it
harder to be a small business owner because it will choke off
credit options to small business owners. That will make it
harder to start a new company and harder to expand an
existing one.
19. No surprise here. The strongest image ad we tested
pertained to the bailout provisions and the ``lobbyist
loopholes'' for the casino industry.
20. The Final Word. The department store Syms used the
slogan ``an educated consumer is our best customer.'' We
could easily say an educated citizen is the biggest opponent
or, your biggest ally against the creation of the Financial
Reform bill and the CFPA.
Words to Use
Accountability, Transparency & Oversight, Lobbyist
Loopholes, Enforcement of Current Laws, Bureaucrats, Wasteful
Washington Spending, Never Again, Government Failures and
Incompetence, Let's Help Small Businesses, Big Bank Bailout
Bill, Bloated Bureaucracy, Fine Print, Unintended
Consequences, Special Interests, Hard Working Taxpayers,
Another Washington Agency, Unlimited Regulatory Powers, Devil
Is in the Details, Red Tape.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burris). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
____________________