[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 51 (Tuesday, April 13, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2242-S2245]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
By Mr. KAUFMAN (for himself, Mr. Voinovich, Mr. Akaka, and Mr.
Lieberman):
S. 3196. A bill to amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to
provide that certain transition services shall be available to eligible
candidates before the general election; to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I rise to discuss a bill I am introducing
today, the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010, bipartisan
legislation that concerns both our national security and America's
democratic institutions.
I am proud to be joined by my colleague from Ohio, Senator Voinovich
in introducing this bill. I also want to thank our cosponsors, Chairman
Akaka of the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee as well as
Chairman Lieberman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee.
I am appreciative of their support and for their input while drafting
this bill.
I also would like to thank the Partnership for Public Service, a
leading nonpartisan, nonprofit organization in the area of government
accountability and reform. Their recent ``Ready to Govern'' report on
the 2008-2009 transition made a number of important recommendations
that are included in our bill.
As the strong, bipartisan support for this bill demonstrates, this is
not a political issue.
After the attacks of September 11, we face new security challenges
that require close cooperation between outgoing and incoming
administrations, and the recent economic crisis underscores the
importance of a smooth handoff on domestic policy as well.
This was highlighted in a recent article by Martha Kumar, a respected
political scientist at Towson University and Director of the
nonpartisan White House Transition Project. As Professor Kumar recounts
in her December 2009 article in Presidential Studies Quarterly, a
threat to President Obama's inauguration brought together the incoming
and outgoing senior national security personnel in the White House
Situation Room the morning of his swearing-in.
In the hours before then-President-elect Obama was to take office,
intelligence sources had indicated a possible plot to attack the
National Mall during the ceremony. Thankfully, this threat proved a
false alarm.
But, as Kumar explains, that Situation Room meeting between advisers
to President Bush and President-elect Obama was a powerful example of
why transition planning is so important.
In their meeting that morning, those on both sides worked well
together as a team. This was so because they had met frequently in the
weeks beforehand and had undergone joint emergency preparedness
exercises together.
This occurred in no small part because the administration of former
President George W. Bush made it a high priority. The former President
and his White House staff deserve great credit for their work during
their final months in office. By appointing his chief of staff, Joshua
Bolton, as his transition point-person and convening a formal
Transition Coordinating Council, President Bush created a successful
model for a 21st century transfer of power.
Presidential inaugurations have always been moments of celebration
for Americans, as we reaffirm the elective nature of our government.
But they also represent moments of potential vulnerability.
In the earliest years of our history, that vulnerability inhabited
the untested nature of our institutions. In an era when elected
government was rare, the transition from one executive administration
to another, particularly those between parties, brought fears of
political or social unrest.
The primary example of such a transition remains that from the
administration of John Adams to that of Thomas Jefferson, the first
between opponents of different parties to contest the Presidency.
The peaceful nature of the 1801 transition came as a welcome surprise
to some. The early American writer and novelist, Margaret Bayard Smith,
whose brother, James Bayard, held the Senate seat from Delaware I now
occupy, attended that inauguration. In a letter to her daughter, she
described it thus:
I have this morning witnessed one of the most interesting
scenes a free people can ever witness. The changes of
administration, which in every government and in every age
have most generally been epochs of confusion, villainy, and
bloodshed, in this our happy country take place without any
species of distraction or disorder.
It is also notable that the greatest political crisis in our history
occurred during the period between election day in November 1860 and
Abraham Lincoln's inauguration the following March. The States that
seceded did so amid a palpable uncertainty of national leadership.
Today, however, our concern is less with political stability than
with national security.
During the Cold War, when fears of a power vacuum caused a renewed
focus on continuity of government, Congress passed the Presidential
Transition Act of 1963. It formalized several important elements of a
successful transition, including public funds for transition staff, use
of office space and equipment from the General Services Administration,
reimbursement for travel by the President-elect and Vice President-
elect, and their use of franked mail. It was amended in 1998 to permit
the President-elect and Vice President-elect to supplement public
transition funding with private donations and laid out requirements for
disclosing their sources.
In 2004, Congress took an important step by including provisions in
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that allow
transition personnel to request FBI background checks for potential
appointees. This helps ensure that, on January 20 when the new
President is sworn in, the most critical national security positions
are immediately filled.
While some aspects of a successful Presidential transition process
have been formalized by these acts, much of what has become necessary
for a safe and smooth transition is still left to chance.
Fortune favors the prepared.
We were very lucky that the first transition of the post-September 11
era was carried out smoothly and with great preparation by both the
outgoing and incoming administrations.
As I said a few moments ago, we owe great thanks to former President
Bush for making this a priority and committing staff and resources to
the process.
I also commend those who worked on both the Obama transition team as
well as those from Senator McCain's campaign who engaged in some
transition planning before election day.
Most importantly, our bill will go a long way in removing the stigma
that has historically caused candidates to hide or even delay important
transition planning until after election day.
We all recognize that the first priority of any Presidential campaign
is to win the election. I certainly understand why, in the past,
candidates have been wary of revealing that they have engaged in pre-
election transition planning.
But we cannot afford to lose critical planning time because of fears
that a candidate might be accused by a rival of ``measuring the
drapes'' prematurely. We must also ensure that incumbents make the
necessary preparations in case they lose bids for reelection.
Candidate transition planning is an act of responsibility, not
presumptuousness.
[[Page S2243]]
With the security and domestic policy challenges we face today, it
must become the norm for any major party nominee to begin making
arrangements for a transition long before election day.
The bill my colleagues and I are introducing will both formalize many
of the recent transition's successes and provide additional resources
to help nominees begin their transition efforts earlier.
The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 encourages
eligible Presidential candidates to accept transition office space and
a broad array of services from the General Services Administration
immediately after their nominating conventions.
Presently, candidates must wait until after election day before these
resources become available. We know that this is too late, since both
campaigns in 2008, and others in recent years, began informal
transition planning months in advance.
Under our bill, salaries for candidates' transition staff, travel
expenses, and allowances are funded exclusively by separate funds
raised by their campaigns prior to the election.
Eligible candidates would be authorized to set up a separate account
to support these activities. They would be able to transfer money from
their campaign accounts into this transition account as well as raise
funds separately.
Those candidates eligible to receive GSA-provided services and access
to facilities include major party candidates. Third-party candidates
would be eligible if they met the same criteria used by the Commission
on Presidential Debates to participate in general election debates.
The GSA would distribute to candidates a report on modern
transitions, including a bibliography of resources. This report would
also be released to the public and posted on the Internet to educate
the press and public on the importance of early transition planning.
Of course, under the bill services and information to candidates
would be provided on an equal basis and without regard to political
affiliation, and they would have to be used only for transition
purposes.
Because a transition depends on the careful attention of those both
preparing to assume power and those leaving it, our bill also
authorizes appropriations for the outgoing administration to use in
planning and coordinating transition activities across departments and
agencies. It recommends adopting the Bush model of a transition
coordinating council, staffed by both outgoing appointees and career
managers from each agency. This council would meet regularly with
representatives from the major nominees and update them on transition
matters.
The bill also encourages the outgoing administration to prepare
comprehensive briefing materials for incoming officials on a range of
issues and potential areas of concern.
My colleagues and I approach this as pragmatists, and our goal is not
to tie the hands of an administration. It is to inspire responsible
preparation. This bill is not about telling an outgoing President what
to do; rather, it lays out a strongly suggested model for how to do the
right thing.
The only new requirement it sets for the outgoing President is the
submission of two reports to Congress in the months before election day
describing the activities being undertaken to prepare for the transfer
of power.
But the model it suggests has worked and can serve as a blueprint for
transitions to come.
My first job in politics after Joe Biden was elected to the Senate in
1972 was to help him set up his Senate office in Delaware. My last job,
before I was appointed to his Senate seat was as co-chair of his Vice
Presidential Transition Team.
I can tell you from experience, setting up a Senate office is tough,
but it is nothing like setting up a White House.
I was there in the room when then-President-elect Obama and Vice
President-elect Biden convened their first transition meetings right
after election day. I cannot stress more forcefully how important it
was in those meetings that the Obama-Biden transition had begun much
earlier.
There simply is not enough time between November and January to get
everything done that needs to be done.
These are the reasons why I hope my colleagues will join us in
supporting this legislation to make our presidential transitions
smoother and safer.
We cannot afford to leave something this important to chance.
Again, I want to thank my friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator
Voinovich, for his help in pulling this bill together as well as
Senators Akaka and Lieberman for their support and leadership.
I look forward to working with them on the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee to move this measure through the
Congress.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 3196
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Pre-Election Presidential
Transition Act of 2010''.
SEC. 2. CERTAIN PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION SERVICES MAY BE
PROVIDED TO ELIGIBLE CANDIDATES BEFORE GENERAL
ELECTION.
(a) In General.--Section 3 of the Presidential Transition
Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(h)(1)(A) In the case of an eligible candidate, the
Administrator--
``(i) shall notify the candidate of the candidate's right
to receive the services and facilities described in paragraph
(2) and shall provide with such notice a description of the
nature and scope of each such service and facility; and
``(ii) upon notification by the candidate of which such
services and facilities such candidate will accept, shall,
notwithstanding subsection (b), provide such services and
facilities to the candidate during the period beginning on
the date of the notification and ending on the date of the
general elections described in subsection (b)(1).
The Administrator shall also notify the candidate of the
services provided under sections 7601(c) and 8403(b) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
``(B) The Administrator shall provide the notice under
subparagraph (A)(i) to each eligible candidate--
``(i) in the case of a candidate of a major party (as
defined in section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986), on one of the first 3 business days following the last
nominating convention for such major parties; and
``(ii) in the case of any other candidate, as soon as
practicable after an individual becomes an eligible candidate
(or, if later, at the same time as notice is provided under
clause (i)).
``(C)(i) The Administrator shall, not later than January 1
of 2012 and of every 4th year thereafter, prepare a report
summarizing modern presidential transition activities,
including a bibliography of relevant resources.
``(ii) The Administrator shall promptly make the report
under clause (i) generally available to the public (including
through electronic means) and shall include such report with
the notice provided to each eligible candidate under
subparagraph (A)(i).
``(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
services and facilities described in this paragraph are the
services and facilities described in subsection (a) (other
than paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (7) thereof), but only to
the extent that the use of the services and facilities is for
use in connection with the eligible candidate's preparations
for the assumption of official duties as President or Vice-
President.
``(B) The Administrator--
``(i) shall determine the location of any office space
provided to an eligible candidate under this subsection;
``(ii) shall, as appropriate, ensure that any computers or
communications services provided to an eligible candidate
under this subsection are secure;
``(iii) shall offer information and other assistance to
eligible candidates on an equal basis and without regard to
political affiliation; and
``(iv) may modify the scope of any services to be provided
under this subsection to reflect that the services are
provided to eligible candidates rather than the President-
elect or Vice-President-elect, except that any such
modification must apply to all eligible candidates.
``(C) An eligible candidate, or any person on behalf of the
candidate, shall not use any services or facilities provided
under this subsection other than for the purposes described
in subparagraph (A), and the candidate or the candidate's
campaign shall reimburse the Administrator for any
unauthorized use of such services or facilities.
``(3)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an
eligible candidate may establish a separate fund for the
payment of expenditures in connection with the eligible
candidate's preparations for the assumption of official
duties as President or Vice-President, including expenditures
in connection
[[Page S2244]]
with any services or facilities provided under this
subsection (whether before such services or facilities are
available under this section or to supplement such services
or facilities when so provided). Such fund shall be
established and maintained in such manner as to qualify such
fund for purposes of section 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
``(B)(i) The eligible candidate may--
``(I) transfer to any separate fund established under
subparagraph (A) contributions (within the meaning of section
301(8) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.
431(8))) the candidate received for the general election for
President or Vice-President or payments from the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund under chapter 95 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 the candidate received for the general
election; and
``(II) solicit and accept amounts for receipt by such
separate fund.
``(ii) Any expenditures from the separate fund that are
made from such contributions or payments described in clause
(i)(I) shall be treated as expenditures (within the meaning
of section 301(9) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 431(9))) or qualified
campaign expenses (within the meaning of section 9002(11) of
such Code), whichever is applicable.
``(iii) An eligible candidate establishing a separate fund
under subparagraph (A) shall (as a condition for receiving
services and facilities described in paragraph (2)) comply
with all requirements and limitations of section 5 in
soliciting or expending amounts in the same manner as the
President-elect or Vice-President-elect, including reporting
on the transfer and expenditure of amounts described in
subparagraph (B)(i) in the disclosures required by section 5.
``(4)(A) In this subsection, the term `eligible candidate'
means, with respect to any presidential election (as defined
in section 9002(10) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)--
``(i) a candidate of a major party (as defined in section
9002(6) of such Code) for President or Vice-President of the
United States; and
``(ii) any other candidate who has been determined by the
Administrator to be among the principle contenders for the
general election to such offices.
``(B) In making a determination under subparagraph (A)(ii),
the Administrator shall--
``(i) ensure that any candidate determined to be an
eligible candidate under such subparagraph--
``(I) meets the requirements described in Article II,
Section 1, of the United States Constitution for eligibility
to the office of President;
``(II) has qualified to have his or her name appear on the
ballots of a sufficient number of States such that the total
number of electors appointed in those States is greater than
50 percent of the total number of electors appointed in all
of the States; and
``(III) has demonstrated a significant level of public
support in national public opinion polls, so as to be
realistically considered among the principal contenders for
President or Vice-President of the United States; and
``(ii) consider whether other national organizations have
recognized the candidate as being among the principal
contenders for the general election to such offices,
including whether the Commission on Presidential Debates has
determined that the candidate is eligible to participate in
the candidate debates for the general election to such
offices.''.
(b) Administrator Required To Provide Technology
Coordination Upon Request.--Section 3(a)(10) of the
Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is
amended to read as follows:
``(10) Notwithstanding subsection (b), consultation by the
Administrator with any President-elect, Vice-President-elect,
or eligible candidate (as defined in subsection (h)(4)) to
develop a systems architecture plan for the computer and
communications systems of the candidate to coordinate a
transition to Federal systems if the candidate is elected.''.
(c) Coordination With Other Transition Services.--
(1) Security clearances.--Section 7601(c) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50
U.S.C. 435b note) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting:
``(1) Definition.--In this section, the term `eligible
candidate' has the meaning given such term by section 3(h)(4)
of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102
note).'', and
(B) by striking ``major party candidate'' in paragraph (2)
and inserting ``eligible candidate''.
(2) Presidentially appointed positions.--Section
8403(b)(2)(B) of such Act (5 U.S.C. 1101 note) is amended to
read as follows:
``(B) Other candidates.--After making transmittals under
subparagraph (B), the Office of Personnel Management shall
transmit such electronic record to any other candidate for
President who is an eligible candidate described in section
3(h)(4)(B) of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3
U.S.C. 102 note) and may transmit such electronic record to
any other candidate for President.''.
(d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 3 of the Presidential
Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(8)(B), by striking ``President-
elect'' and inserting ``President-elect or eligible candidate
(as defined in subsection (h)(4)) for President''; and
(2) in subsection (e), by inserting ``, or eligible
candidate (as defined in subsection (h)(4)) for President or
Vice-President,'' before ``may designate''.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSITION ACTIVITIES BY THE
OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION.
(a) In General.--The President of the United States, or the
President's delegate, may take such actions as the President
determines necessary and appropriate to plan and coordinate
activities by the Executive branch of the Federal Government
to facilitate an efficient transfer of power to a successor
President, including--
(1) the establishment and operation of a transition
coordinating council comprised of--
(A) high-level officials of the Executive branch selected
by the President, which may include the Chief of Staff to the
President, any Cabinet officer, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the Administrator of the General
Services Administration, and the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, and
(B) any other persons the President determines appropriate;
(2) the establishment and operation of an agency transition
directors council which includes career employees designated
to lead transition efforts within Executive Departments or
agencies;
(3) the development of guidance to Executive Departments
and agencies regarding briefing materials for an incoming
administration, and the development of such materials; and
(4) the development of computer software, publications,
contingency plans, issue memoranda, memoranda of
understanding, training and exercises (including crisis
training and exercises), programs, lessons learned from
previous transitions, and other items appropriate for
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of a Presidential
transition that may be disseminated to eligible candidates
(as defined in section 3(h)(4) of the Presidential Transition
Act of 1963, as added by section 2(a)) and to the President-
elect and Vice-President-elect.
Any information and other assistance to eligible candidates
under this subsection shall be offered on an equal basis and
without regard to political affiliation.
(b) Reports.--
(1) In general.--The President of the United States, or the
President's delegate, shall provide to the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate reports describing the
activities undertaken by the President and the Executive
Departments and agencies to prepare for the transfer of power
to a new President.
(2) Timing.--The reports under paragraph (1) shall be
provided six months and three months before the date of the
general election for the Office of President of the United
States.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, every 4 to 8 years our country achieves
a feat that is very much the exception to the rule when placed in the
context of the long roll of history: through universal suffrage the
people select a new president, and the president-elect assumes power in
a peaceful manner.
It is a testament to the dedication and professionalism of past
presidents, presidents-elect, civil servants and private citizens that
this latter task, the presidential transition, is now seen by many
Americans as routine; a new president is selected in November, and in
January, he or she swaps places with the incumbent president. Life goes
on as normal.
Of course, the task of transferring command of an organization with
more than 5 million employees and a $3.7 trillion annual budget is a
bit more complex than our recent successful track record may suggest.
Domestic and international threats further complicate this process.
Perhaps more than any of its counterparts, the Bush-Obama transition
was dealt the longest odds for attaining the uneventful standard our
country has come to expect from transfers of power. As my colleagues
well know, the Bush-Obama transition was the first of the modern era to
occur during wartime, and the first to follow a general election in
which the incumbent president or vice-president did not vie for the
presidency. The Bush-Obama transition was also the first to occur in
the post-September 11th world, and the first since the largest
reorganization of government in over 6 decades. As the candidates
entered the last week of the campaign season, the second worst month in
the history for the Standard & Poor's 500 was drawing to a close after
that index had plunged 27 percent in 4 weeks' time.
These challenges would be more than enough for any well-disciplined
transition effort to confront. Yet in January
[[Page S2245]]
2010, shortly before the anniversary of President Obama's inauguration,
the American public learned through press accounts of still another
threat confronted by the outgoing and incoming administrations. In the
days preceding the Presidential Inauguration, intelligence reports
surfaced that al-Shabaab, a Somali terrorist organization with ties to
al-Qaeda, was planning an attack on the crowds that would gather to
witness the administration of the oath of office to the 44th President
of the U.S. The threat was taken so seriously that the Secretary of
Defense did not attend the inaugural ceremonies in order to ensure
continuity of the Nation's national security apparatus.
Fortunately this plot did not materialize. But threats like these
emphasize the importance of a new president being ready to govern from
day one.
Despite the challenges faced by the Bush-Obama transition, this most
recent transfer of power most closely approached our transition ideal.
Both the President and President-elect understood the gravity of the
tasks before them, and undertook early and robust planning efforts.
President Bush began preparing his administration for the transition
earlier than any other presidency when he directed then White House
Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten in late 2007 to ensure ``that the
transition is as effective as possible, especially in the national
security area.'' For his part, President-elect Obama established the
largest transition organization to date. At its peak, the Obama-Biden
Transition Project's staff numbered 450, with a total budget of more
than $12 million, $7 million of which came from private contributions.
In many ways, this most recent transition effort was the best case
scenario. The transition succeeded because of the character and values
of those tasked with leading the effort, individuals like Gail
Lovelace, Joshua Bolten, Clay Johnson, John Podesta, and Christopher
Lu.
But for critical events like a presidential transition, we cannot
always be assured that such productive organizations and working
relationships will develop. One need look no further than the
acrimonious relationship between the outgoing Clinton administration
and the incoming Bush administration, or the internal dissension in
President-elect Carter's transition team, to find examples of
dysfunctional transitions.
Of course, presidential personalities and uncontrollable
circumstances will always be a driving factor in the success of future
presidential transitions. But we in Congress can contribute to future
successes by providing sufficient assistance and formal avenues to more
robust transition planning, and by working to address the stigma that
has unfortunately been associated with so-called ``presumptuous''
transition planning before the general election.
As my colleagues know, the formal mechanisms used by the federal
government to transfer power were established in March 1964 with
enactment of the Presidential Transition Act, PTA. The Presidential
Transition Act of 1963 extends certain government services to the
president-elect, including staff salaries, travel expenses, office
space, postal reimbursement, and communications equipment. With the
exception of substantive amendments in 2000 to provide for a transition
directory and activities designed to ``acquaint key prospective
Presidential appointees with the types of problems and challenges that
most typically confront new political appointees,'' and a provision of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to provide
for expedited security clearances for transition team members and
prospective presidential appointees, the architecture our country uses
to achieve a successful transition remains largely the same almost a
half-century on.
So I am pleased to today join the distinguished junior Senator from
Delaware, Senator Edward Kaufman, in introducing legislation to
contribute to the future success of presidential transitions. Prior to
returning to the U.S. Senate as a Member, Senator Kaufman served as one
of the Obama-Biden Transition Project's twelve board members, where he
gained first-hand experience in the challenges associated with
transitioning the Federal Government.
I am happy to also be joined by two of the U.S. Senate's most ardent
champions of good governance: the Chairman and of the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senator Joseph Lieberman,
and my longtime friend and colleague on the Subcommittee on Oversight
of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Senator Daniel Akaka.
The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 would extend to
the major party candidates and certain third-party candidates a select
list of the services currently provided to the president-elect under
the PTA. These benefits include office space, communications services,
printing and binding expenses, and briefings and workshops designed to
acquaint key potential administration staff with the problems and
challenges they are likely to face. The bill would also provide
candidates with assistance from the General Services Administration in
designing systems architecture compatible with federal systems.
To encourage more deliberate transition preparation in the executive
branch, the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act also authorizes
funding for the establishment of a transition coordinating council and
an agency transition directors council modeled on the coordinating
bodies that functioned so successfully during the Bush-Obama
transition. The assistance extended to the candidates by these
authorized functions would be provided on the same terms as those
employed during the last transition, on an equal basis and without
regard to a candidate's political affiliation. The bill would also
require the President, or the President's designee, to report to
Congress in presidential election years on the preparations being made
to ensure a smooth transition.
We in Congress cannot, and should not, dictate the roles and
decision-making processes employed by the outgoing and incoming
administrations; as a former mayor and governor, I know how fluid and
dynamic transfers of power can be. So I am especially pleased that
Senator Kaufman's bill is not prescriptive. Rather, the Pre-Election
Presidential Transition Act provides assistance that candidates can
reject or accept at their discretion, and the authorized activities
included in the bill for coordinating bodies in the executive branch
respect separation of powers issues by allowing, but not requiring, the
use of these best practices.
Perhaps most importantly, the Pre-Election Presidential Transition
Act provides valuable transition assistance to candidates at an earlier
time than ever before. Regardless of the various unique obstacles a
president-elect faces, each transition since the Nixon administration
has been provided formal assistance for a very short period of time--76
days during the most recent transition. Of course, candidates can begin
preparing for the transition before the general election. But in the
home stretch of a presidential election, every spare dollar and body
are employed to help the candidate win, and preparing to govern often
falls by the wayside.
Senator Kaufman's bill will contribute to earlier, more robust
transition planning by providing candidates with the means, the
architecture, and the sanction associated with an equitable and
impartial assistance mechanism to combat unfortunate dispersions of the
transition planning process, like the comments directed at then Senator
Obama's transition activities during the campaign.
Candidates taking deliberate steps to ensure a smooth transition
should not be criticized as presumptuously ``measuring the White House
drapes'' before the election; they should be encouraged and supported.
The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act seeks to achieve that
goal.
I urge my colleagues to join in supporting the Pre-Election
Presidential Transition Act.
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