[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 50 (Monday, April 12, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2181-S2184]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COURT OF IMPEACHMENT
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate convene
as a Court of Impeachment to process the answer of Judge G. Thomas
Porteous, Jr.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Pursuant to rule IX of the Rules and Procedures in the Senate when
sitting on impeachment trials, the Secretary of the Senate will now
swear the Sergeant at Arms.
The SECRETARY of the SENATE. Do you, Drew Willison, solemnly swear
that the return made by you upon the process issued on the 19th of
March, 2010, by the Senate of the United States against G. Thomas
Porteous, Jr., is truly made and that you have performed such service
as therein described, so help you God?
The DEPUTY SERGEANT at ARMS. I do.
Mr. President, I send to the desk the return of service I executed
upon service of the summons upon Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Friday,
March 19, 2010, at 8:55 a.m.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The return of service will be
spread upon the Journal and printed in the Record.
The return of service is as follows:
The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to G. Thomas
Porteous, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Louisiana and the foregoing precept, addressed to
me, were duly served upon the said G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. by
my delivering true and attested copies of the same to G.
Thomas Porteous, Jr., at his home, 4801 Neyrey Drive,
Metairie, LA, on the 19th day of March 2010, at 8:55 a.m.
Terrance W. Gainer,
Sergeant at Arms.
Witness: Andrew B. Willison,
Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
Dated 23 March 2010.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask that the Secretary of the Senate
communicate to the House of Representatives an attested copy of the
answer of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, to the articles of
impeachment.
[[Page S2182]]
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. REID. I further ask that the answer be referred to the
Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles Against Judge G. Thomas
Porteous, Jr., established by the Senate on March 17, 2010; and that
the answer of the respondent, G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., to the Articles
of Impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives be
printed for the use of the Senate sitting in the trial of said
impeachment.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. It is so ordered.
The Answer to the Articles of Impeachment is as follows:
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF AN IMPEACHMENT
In re:
Impeachment of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.,
United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Louisiana
Answer of Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. to the Articles of Impeachment
The Honorable G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., a Judge of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, as commanded by the summons of the Senate of the
United States, answers the accusations made by the House of
Representatives of the United States in the four Articles of
Impeachment it has exhibited to the Senate as follows:
Preamble
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE PORTEOUS IS
UNPRECEDENTED AND UNJUSTIFIED
For the first time in modern history, the House of
Representatives has impeached a sitting Article III Judge who
has never been charged with a crime. Indeed, it has been more
than 74 years since the House of Representatives has brought
Articles of Impeachment against a judge that were not
preceded by that judge's indictment in the criminal courts.
The Articles of Impeachment brought against Judge Porteous
are also unprecedented in two additional ways. First, this is
the only time since the ratification of the Constitution that
the House of Representatives has brought Articles of
Impeachment against a judge after the Executive Branch,
having conducted a thorough investigation, has declined to
prosecute. Second, it is the only time in the same period
that the House of Representatives has based an Article of
Impeachment against a judge, or any other officer, upon
allegations that pre-date his or her entry into federal
office.
These actions are unprecedented and they are also
unjustified by the facts of this case. The four Articles of
Impeachment do not allege a single offense that supports the
conviction and removal of a sitting Article III Judge under
the impeachment clause of the Constitution. Article II,
Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the civil
officers shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles against Judge
Porteous do not rise to the constitutionally required level
of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Indeed, in some
instances, the Articles allege violations of the canons of
judicial ethics or criticize Judge Porteous' handling of
matters before the Court. While Judge Porteous vehemently
denies violating those canons or mishandling matters,
noncriminal ethical violations or incorrect decisions have
never been found to be a sufficient basis for conviction and
removal from office. Such issues simply do not rise to the
level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated by
the Framers. To the extent that a trial on the Articles in
this case is permitted to convert--in contravention of both
the Constitution and impeachment precedent--such acts into
grounds for removal of an Article III Judge, it will set a
new standard. A standard that treads deeply and dangerously
into the realm of an independent judiciary that was at the
very core of the Framers' vision of three co-equal branches
of government.
In devising the three branches, the Framers divided the
ability to impeach and remove Executive and Judicial Branch
officers between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
By doing so, the Framers, through the Constitution, empowered
the House to allege the standard for impeachment based upon
the language of the impeachment clause. But history has shown
the power to impeach is not the power to remove. The power to
try impeachments and remove officers upon conviction was
vested solely in the Senate. It is the Senate--a uniquely
deliberative body, free from the passions and prejudices of
the majority--that sits in judgment and determines whether a
given Article of Impeachment is sufficient, both legally and
factually, to justify the removal of an Article III Judge.
In striking this careful balance, the Framers made clear
that the trial and removal process is not one that should
embrace unprecedented or novel impeachments. In vesting the
power in the Senate, the Framers' intent was that the process
would not be exercised easily or quickly, but carefully and
deliberately. The Framers, through the Constitution,
positioned the Senate along the path between the possibility
of ill-considered and novel uses of the power to impeach and
the decision to remove, confident that the Senate would stand
as a safeguard against removal when constitutional standards
had not been met. The Articles of Impeachment returned by the
House are unprecedented, unjustified, and fail to meet the
constitutionally required standard. Accordingly, Judge
Porteous, in answer, asks the Senate to fulfill its
constitutionally mandated role by dismissing the articles or,
alternatively, acquitting him of the charges.
General Denial of Facts Not Admitted
Judge Porteous denies each and every material allegation of
the four Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in
this ANSWER.
Article I
ANSWER TO ARTICLE I
Without waiving his affirmative defenses, Judge Porteous
admits that he presided as a United States District Judge
over the Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg
Enterprises litigation and that on October 17, 1996 he denied
a motion seeking to recuse him from presiding over the case.
Judge Porteous denies that he engaged in any corrupt conduct
in connection with his handling of the litigation or in
denying the motion for recusal. Judge Porteous denies that he
intentionally made any misleading statements during the
recusal hearing. Judge Porteous also denies engaging in a
corrupt scheme of any sort with Jacob Amato, Jr. and Robert
Creely and that he, at any time, deprived the parties or the
public of the right to the honest services of his office.
Judge Porteous further denies that he engaged in any corrupt
conduct after the bench trial in Lifemark Hospitals of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises or at any time while
the case was under advisement.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE I
Article I does not allege an offense that supports the
conviction and removal of a sitting Article III United States
District Judge under the impeachment clause of the
Constitution. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution
provides that the civil officers shall be removed from office
only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The charges
in the articles against Judge Porteous do not rise to the
constitutionally required level of ``high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.'' Because Article I does not meet the rigorous
constitutional standard for conviction and removal, it should
be dismissed.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE I
Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person
could know what specific charges are being leveled against
Judge Porteous or what allegations rise to the level of
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as required by the
Constitution. In essence, Article I alleges that Judge
Porteous took several judicial actions while presiding as a
United States District Judge in Lifemark Hospitals of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, including failing
to grant a recusal motion and failing to disclose certain
facts. In doing so, the Article alleges that Judge Porteous
``deprived the parties and the public of the right to the
honest services of his office.'' This ``deprivation of the
right to honest services'' language is borrowed from Title
18, United States Code, Section 1346, a statute that is
fraught with vagueness concerns. Indeed, its constitutional
viability is currently pending before the United States
Supreme Court in a series of cases. See Weyhrauch v. United
States, No. 08-1196; Black v. United States, No. 08-876; and
Skilling v. United States, No. 08-1394. The inclusion of this
standard, as well as the nonspecific allegations regarding
the allegedly improper judicial actions taken by Judge
Porteous, render Article I unconstitutionally vague.
It is a fundamental principle of our law and the
Constitution that a person has a right to know what specific
charges he is facing. Without such notice, no one can prepare
the defense to which every person is entitled. The law and
the Constitution also require that the charges provide
adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the
vote they must make. Without a definite and specific
identification of specific ``high Crime and Misdemeanor''
upon which the Article of Impeachment is grounded, a trial
becomes a moving target for the accused.
Article I fails to provide the required definite and
specific identification. As an article of impeachment, it is
constitutionally defective and should be dismissed.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE I
Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple
instances of allegedly corrupt conduct in a single article.
The Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.'' Senate Rule XXIII provides that ``an article of
impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose of voting
thereon at any time during the trial.''
Despite these clear pronouncements, the House of
Representatives, in Article I, has alleged a series of
allegedly wrongful acts. In doing so, the House of
Representatives has returned an Article of Impeachment which
might permit a Senator to vote for impeachment if he or she
finds that Judge Porteous committed even a single allegedly
wrongful act, even where two-thirds of the Senators do not
agree on which wrongful act was committed. This creates the
very real possibility
[[Page S2183]]
that conviction could occur even though Senators were in wide
disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. The structure
of Article I presents the possibility that Judge Porteous
could be convicted even though he would have been acquitted
if separate votes were taken on each allegedly wrongful acts
included in the article. As written, Article I does not
require the constitutionally required number of Senators
to agree on the specific conduct forming the basis for
conviction and removal. By charging multiple wrongs in one
article, the House of Representatives has made it
impossible for the Senate to comply with the
Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the
concurrence of two-thirds of the members. Accordingly,
Article I should fail.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE I
Article I was returned by the House of Representatives in
violation of Judge Porteous' constitutional rights in that it
is based, in part, upon his compelled testimony provided
under a grant of immunity. Because the process of
impeachment, conviction and removal is a quasi-criminal one
and under the circumstances here, Judge Porteous has
constitutional rights that are violated by the use of his
prior compelled, immunized testimony, Article I must be
dismissed. Further, because the immunity grant by Judge Edith
Jones, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
Chair of the Special Committee of the Judicial Conference of
the Fifth Circuit, was not proper under the immunity statute,
the compelled testimony was wrongly procured and any Article
of Impeachment based upon that testimony must be dismissed.
Article II
ANSWER TO ARTICLE II
Without waiving his affirmative defenses, Judge Porteous
denies that he engaged in a longstanding pattern of corrupt
conduct demonstrating his unfitness to serve as a United
States District Court Judge as alleged in Article II. Judge
Porteous further denies that he improperly set aside or
expunged felony convictions for two Marcotte employees. Judge
Porteous also denies that he at any time took any action in
his capacity as a United States District Judge that related
in any way to the Marcottes or their business interests.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE II
Article II does not allege an offense that supports the
conviction and removal of a sitting Article III United States
District Judge under the impeachment clause of the
Constitution. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution
provides that the civil officers shall be removed from office
only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The charges
in the articles against Judge Porteous do not rise to the
constitutionally required level of ``high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.'' Because Article II does not meet the rigorous
constitutional standard for conviction and removal, it should
be dismissed.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE II
Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable
person could know what specific charges are being leveled
against Judge Porteous or what allegations rise to the level
of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as required by the
Constitution. Article II alleges that Judge Porteous engaged
in certain corrupt actions prior to his appointment and
confirmation to the position of Untied States District Judge.
Article II makes no specific allegations concerning actions
taken by Judge Porteous while on the federal bench. Indeed,
the only allegations concerning Judge Porteous tenure on the
federal bench is that he in some unidentified way ``used the
power and prestige of his office to assist the Marcottes in
forming relationships with State judicial officers and
individuals important to the Marcottes' business.'' The
vagueness problem here cannot be overstated. It is simply not
possible to begin to defend against this type of allegation.
It is wholly lacking in any factual basis and clearly fails
to frame a set of facts that amount to ``high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.''
As we set forth in the SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO
ARTICLE I, it is a fundamental principle of our law and the
Constitution that a person has a right to know what specific
charges he is facing. Without such notice, no one can prepare
the defense to which every person is entitled. The law and
the Constitution also require that the charges provide
adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the
vote they must make. Without a definite and specific
identification of specific ``high Crime and Misdemeanor''
upon which the Article of Impeachment is grounded, a trial
becomes a moving target for the accused.
Article II fails to provide the required definite and
specific identification. As an article of impeachment, it is
constitutionally defective and should be dismissed.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE II
For the reasons set forth in the THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
TO ARTICLE I, Article II is constitutionally defective
because it charges multiple alleged wrongs in a single
article, which makes it impossible for the Senate to comply
with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the
concurrence of the two-thirds of the members. Accordingly,
Article II should fail.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE II
Article II cannot support the conviction and removal of an
Article III United States District Judge because the alleged
conduct preceded Judge Porteous' service as a United States
District Judge. The constitutional impeachment mechanism
provides a procedure to remove a judge for the commission of
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' while in federal office. The
impeachment precedents do not provide a single example of an
Article of Impeachment that has ever been based upon conduct
that allegedly occurred prior to the impeached officer's
entry into federal office. In contrast, the precedents
suggest that while the House of Representatives may have
investigated such allegations, that such conduct has never
provided the basis for an impeachment and, significantly, the
House has, on occasion, refused to take action because the
allegations preceded the officer's entry into federal
service. Moreover, while Judge Porteous contends that any
attempt to use Article III's ``good behaviour'' clause to
lower the standard necessary to impeach a federal judge is
unsupported by the Constitution's impeachment clause, the
House has clearly applied that lower standard in returning
the four Articles of Impeachment. To the extent that the
House has relied on the ``good behaviour'' clause, that
clause states that judges ``shall hold their offices during
good behaviour'' and clearly relates to a judge's conduct
while in federal judicial office. Because the allegations of
Article II relate to a period prior to Judge Porteous taking
the federal bench, Article II must be dismissed.
Article III
ANSWER TO ARTICLE III
Without waiving his affirmative defenses, Judge Porteous
denies that he knowingly and intentionally made material
false statements and representatives in connection with his
personal bankruptcy or that he knowingly and intentionally
repeatedly violated a court order in his bankruptcy case.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE III
Article III does not allege an offense that supports the
conviction and removal of a sitting Article III United States
District Judge under the impeachment clause of the
Constitution. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution
provides that the civil officers shall be removed from office
only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The charges
in the articles against Judge Porteous do not rise to the
constitutionally required level of ``high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.'' Because Article III does not meet the
rigorous constitutional standard for conviction and removal,
it should be dismissed.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE III
Article III is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable
person could know what specific charges are being leveled
against Judge Porteous or what allegations rise to the level
of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as required by the
Constitution. In essence, Article III alleges a number of
actions taken by Judge Porteous in connection with his
personal bankruptcy, but it unclear as to the specific acts
are claimed to violate the constitutional standard. Moreover,
it is also does not clearly state the specific allegations
regarding what transaction Judge Porteous concealed during
the bankruptcy process or what new debts he allegedly
incurred.
As we set forth in the SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO
ARTICLE I, it is a fundamental principle of our law and the
Constitution that a person has a right to know what specific
charges he is facing. Without such notice, no one can prepare
the defense to which every person is entitled. The law and
the Constitution also require that the charges provide
adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the
vote they must make. Without a definite and specific
identification of specific ``high Crime and Misdemeanor''
upon which the Article of Impeachment is grounded, a trial
becomes a moving target for the accused.
Article III fails to provide the required definite and
specific identification. As an article of impeachment, it is
constitutionally defective and should be dismissed.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE III
For the reasons set forth in the THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
TO ARTICLE I, Article II is constitutionally defective
because it charges multiple alleged wrongs in a single
article, which makes it impossible for the Senate to comply
with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the
concurrence of the two-thirds of the members. Accordingly,
Article II should fail.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE III
For the reasons set forth in the FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
TO ARTICLE I, Article III was returned by the House of
Representatives in violation of Judge Porteous'
constitutional rights in that it is based, in part, upon
his compelled testimony provided under a grant of
immunity. Because the process of impeachment, conviction
and removal is a quasi-criminal one and under the
circumstances here, Judge Porteous has constitutional
rights that are violated by the use of his prior
compelled, immunized testimony, Article 1 must be
dismissed. Further, because the immunity grant by Judge
Edith Jones, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and Chair of the Special Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the Fifth Circuit, was not proper under the
immunity statute, the compelled testimony
[[Page S2184]]
was wrongly procured and any Article of Impeachment based
upon that testimony must be dismissed.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE III
The allegations in Article III do not rise to the level of
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' because they address purely
personal conduct that is not criminal. Prior impeachment
precedent has never before sought to convict and remove a
judge from office based upon personal non-criminal conduct.
The very nature of the impeachment process is focused first
and foremost upon the official actions of judges. Where
allegations in the Articles of Impeachment address non-
official personal acts by judges, longstanding precedent has
limited ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' to those personal
acts that are also indictable offenses. Article III ignores
this precedent in seeking to convict and remove Judge
Porteous from office for non-official, non-criminal acts.
While it is possible that the House of Representatives would
claim that the actions taken in relation to the personal
bankruptcy were indictable offenses, this claim would
conflict with the multi-year investigation of the United
States Department of Justice which concluded that prosecution
was not warranted in light of the concern that the issues
related to the bankruptcy were not material. It would also
conflict with the criminal bankruptcy statutes, which require
that any alleged false statement not be made simply knowingly
or willfully, but fraudulently, before criminal liability may
attach to such conduct. In framing Article III, the House of
Representatives is seeking to convict and remove a sitting
United States District Judge based upon a lowered standard,
one that does not constitute ``high Crimes and
Misdemeanors,'' and one that has never before provided a
basis for impeachment, much less conviction and removal from
office. Article III of the Articles of Impeachment should be
dismissed.
Article IV
ANSWER TO ARTICLE IV
Without waiving his affirmative defenses, Judge Porteous
denies that he knowingly made material false statements in
order to obtain the office of United States District Court
Judge.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE IV
Article IV does not allege an offense that supports the
conviction and removal of a sitting Article III United States
District Judge under the impeachment clause of the
Constitution. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution
provides that the civil officers shall be removed from office
only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The charges
in the articles against Judge Porteous do not rise to the
constitutionally required level of ``high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.'' Because Article IV does not meet the rigorous
constitutional standard for conviction and removal, it should
be dismissed.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE IV
Article IV is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable
person could know what specific charges are being leveled
against Judge Porteous or what allegations rise to the level
of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as required by the
Constitution. In essence, Article IV alleges that Judge
Porteous gave false answers on various forms that were
presented in connection with the background investigation
that was used to evaluate his appointment and confirmation as
a United States District Judge. However, it is not clear
whether Article IV contends that simply providing a single
one of the alleged false statements is a ``high Crime or
Misdemeanor'' or whether the ``high Crime or Misdemeanor'' is
based upon all of the acts alleged, i.e., several alleged
false statements and other conduct alleged. Moreover, the
nature of the questions on the forms that are the focus of
this Article themselves add to the vagueness problem.
As we set forth in the SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO
ARTICLE I, it is a fundamental principle of our law and the
Constitution that a person has a right to know what specific
charges he is facing. Without such notice, no one can prepare
the defense to which every person is entitled. The law and
the Constitution also require that the charges provide
adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the
vote they must make. Without a definite and specific
identification of specific ``high Crime and Misdemeanor''
upon which the Article of Impeachment is grounded, a trial
becomes a moving target for the accused.
Article IV fails to provide the required definite and
specific identification. As an article of impeachment, it is
constitutionally defective and should be dismissed.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE IV
For the reasons set forth in the THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
TO ARTICLE I, Article IV is constitutionally defective
because it charges multiple instances of alleged acts of
making false statements in one article, which makes it
impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional
mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of the two-
thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article IV should fail.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ARTICLE IV
Article IV cannot support the conviction and removal of an
Article III United States District Judge because the alleged
conduct preceded Judge Porteous' service as a United States
District Judge. The constitutional impeachment mechanism
provides a procedure to remove a judge for the commission of
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' while in federal office. The
impeachment precedents do not provide a single example of an
Article of Impeachment that has ever been based upon conduct
that allegedly occurred prior to the impeached officer's
entry into federal office. In contrast, the precedents
suggest that while the House of Representatives may have
investigated such allegations, that such conduct has never
provided the basis for an impeachment and, significantly, the
House has, on occasion, refused to take action because the
allegations preceded the officer's entry into federal
service. Moreover, while Judge Porteous contends that any
attempt to use Article III's ``good behaviour'' clause to
lower the standard necessary to impeach a federal judge is
unsupported by the Constitution's impeachment clause, the
House has clearly applied that lower standard in returning
the four Articles of Impeachment. To the extent that the
House has relied on the ``good behaviour'' clause, that
clause states that judges ``shall hold their offices during
good behaviour'' and clearly relates to a judge's conduct
while in federal judicial office. Because the allegations of
Article IV relate to a period prior to Judge Porteous taking
the federal bench, Article IV must be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard W. Westling,
Chelsea S. Rice,
Jackson B. Boyd,
Anthony J Burba,
Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, P.C.
Samuel S. Dalton,
Attorney at Law.
Remy Voisin Starns,
Attorney At Law PLLC.
Counsel for G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Submitted: April 7, 2010.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Court of Impeachment is
adjourned.
____________________