[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 32 (Monday, March 8, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Page S1263]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. McCAIN):
  S. 3088. A bill to reduce the number of executive branch political 
appointments; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am pleased to be joined by my good 
friend the senior Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, in introducing 
legislation to reduce the number of presidential political appointees. 
Specifically, the bill caps the number of political appointees at 
2,000. When I previously introduced this legislation, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates it would save $382 million over the next 5 
years and over $872 over the next 10 years.
  The bill is based on recommendations of a number of distinguished 
panels, including the 1996 Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the 
Presidential Appointment Process. The Task Force findings, which are 
still very relevant today, are part of a long line of recommendations 
that we reduce the number of political appointees in the Executive 
Branch. For many years, the proposal has been included in CBO's annual 
publication Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, and it 
was one of the central recommendations of the National Commission on 
the Public Service, chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman 
and current economic advisor to President Obama, Paul Volcker.
  This proposal is also consistent with the recommendations of former 
Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review, which called for 
reductions in the number of federal managers and supervisors, arguing 
that ``over-control and micro management'' not only ``stifle the 
creativity of line managers and workers, they consume billions per year 
in salary, benefits, and administrative costs.''
  Those sentiments were also expressed in the 1989 and 2003 Volcker 
Commission reports, which argued the growing number of presidential 
appointees may ``actually undermine effective presidential control of 
the executive branch.'' The first Volcker Commission recommended 
limiting the number of political appointees to 2,000, as this 
legislation does.
  It is essential that any administration be able to implement the 
policies that brought it into office in the first place. Government 
must be responsive to the priorities of the electorate. But as the 
Volcker Commissions noted, the great increase in the number of 
political appointees in recent years has not made government more 
effective or more responsive to political leadership.
  Between 1980 and 2008 the ranks of political appointees rose by more 
than 27 percent whereas between that same period, excluding the defense 
sector, the civilian workforce remained consistent at about 1.1 to 1.2 
million.
  In recommending a cap on political appointees, the 1989 and 2003 
Volcker Commission reports noted that the large number of presidential 
appointees simply cannot be managed effectively by any President or 
White House. The 1989 Commission argued that this lack of control and 
political focus ``may actually dilute the President's ability to 
develop and enforce a coherent, coordinated program and to hold cabinet 
secretaries accountable.''
  Adding organizational layers of political appointees can also 
restrict access to important resources, while doing nothing to reduce 
bureaucratic impediments.
  In commenting on this problem, author Paul Light noted, ``As this 
sediment has thickened over the decades, presidents have grown 
increasingly distant from the lines of government, and the front lines 
from them.'' Light added that ``Presidential leadership, therefore, may 
reside in stripping government of the barriers to doing its job 
effectively. . .''
  The Volcker Commission also asserted that this thickening barrier of 
temporary appointees between the President and career officials can 
undermine development of a proficient civil service by discouraging 
talented individuals from remaining in government service or even 
pursuing a career in government in the first place.
  Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson put it well when he noted:

       But a White House personnel assistant sees the position of 
     deputy assistant secretary as a fourth-echelon slot. In his 
     eyes that makes it an ideal reward for a fourth-echelon 
     political type--a campaign advance man, or a regional 
     political organizer. For a senior civil servant, it's irksome 
     to see a position one has spent 20-30 years preparing for 
     pre-empted by an outsider who doesn't know the difference 
     between an audit exception and an authorizing bill.

  The 2003 Volcker Commission report identified another problem 
aggravated by the mushrooming number of political appointees, namely 
the increasingly lengthy process of filling these thousands of 
positions. As the Commission reported, both President Bush and 
President Clinton were into their presidencies for many months before 
their leadership teams were fully in place. The Commission noted that 
on average, appointees in both administrations were confirmed more than 
eight months after the inauguration, one-sixth of an entire 
presidential term. By contrast, the report noted that in the 
presidential transition of 1960, Kennedy appointees were confirmed, on 
average, 2\1/2\ months after the inauguration.
  In addition to leaving vacancies among key leadership positions in 
government, the appointment process delays can have a detrimental 
effect on potential appointees. The 2003 Volcker Commission reported 
that, ``Potential appointees sometimes decline to enter government 
service when confronted by this process. Others drop out along the way. 
But the principal impact of the modern appointments process is the 
delay it imposes on the staffing of new administrations.''
  The Clinton administration made modest reductions in the number of 
political appointees but the numbers have steadily increased in the 
past decade.
  As we scour the Federal budget for wasteful or unnecessary spending, 
we can't overlook spending that many in Washington may well wish to 
retain. The test of commitment to deficit reduction is not simply to 
support measures that impact someone else. By reducing the number of 
political appointees, we can ensure a sufficient number remain to 
implement the policies of any administration without burdening the 
Federal budget with unnecessary, possibly counterproductive political 
jobs.
  Reducing the Federal deficit and balancing the budget is something 
that has been central to my Senate career, from the 82 point plan I 
brought to the Senate in 1993 to my most recent Control Spending Now 
Act, which would cut the deficit by around $500 billion.
  The legislation I am introducing today reflects one of the points 
included on the original 82 point plan calling for streamlining various 
Federal agencies and reducing agency overhead costs, and it will be 
added to my Control Spending Now Act. I urge my colleagues to join me 
in reducing the deficit and reforming government.

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