[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 13 (Friday, January 29, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S356-S357]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DENYING AL-QAIDA SAFE HAVENS
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the attempt to blow up a U.S. airliner
on Christmas Day has shined a spotlight squarely, if belatedly, on
Yemen. I cannot overstate the importance of denying al-Qaida safe
havens in Yemen and countries like it, an issue on which I have been
working for years. The threat from al-Qaida in Yemen, as well as the
broader region, is increasing, and our attention to this part of the
world is long overdue.
That is why I welcome the President's increased focus on Yemen. But
we need to remember, as we focus needed resources and attention on
Yemen, that it shouldn't be seen as the new Afghanistan, or the new
Iraq. Instead, Yemen highlights the importance of a comprehensive,
global counterterrorism strategy that takes into account security
sector reform, human rights, economic development, transparency, good
governance, accountability, and the rule of law.
We must seize the opportunity to focus attention on the strategy and
policies we need to deny al-Qaida safe havens around the world,
including in Yemen. Concurrently, we need to examine our policy in
Yemen and better understand how we can develop a partnership that is
both in our national security interest and helps Yemen to move towards
becoming a more stable, secure nation for its people. The recognition
at the recent high-level international meeting on Yemen in London of
the importance of addressing broader economic, social and political
factors in Yemen is thus very welcome.
Any serious effort against al-Qaida in Yemen will require
strengthening the
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weak capacity of the government as well as its legitimacy in the eyes
of its citizens. We need to be careful about providing assistance to a
government that isn't always aligned with the needs of the Yemeni
people, as last year's State Department report on human rights notes. I
am pleased to be an original cosponsor with Senators Kerry and
Feinstein of a resolution that urges the implementation of a
comprehensive strategy to address instability in Yemen that also calls
on the Yemeni government to strengthen efforts to address corruption,
to respect human rights and to work with its citizens and the
international community to address the factors driving instability in
the country.
Yemen is a fragile state whose government has limited control in many
parts of the country. It faces a multitude of challenges including
poverty, a young and growing population, resource scarcities, and
corruption. It is also distracted from the counterterrorism effort by
two other sources of domestic instability--the al-Houthi rebellion in
the North and tensions with a southern region with which Sana'a was
united less than 20 years ago. In other words, counterterrorism is
hampered by weak governance and by internal conflicts that would not
appear on the surface to threaten our interests. With this in mind, we
must also work to ensure that, in the provision and use of our
counterterrorism assistance to Yemen, care is taken to protect
civilians and prevent the alienation of the local population and
attention is given to the local conditions that enable militants to
recruit followers.
Instability in Yemen is, of course, also closely linked to conflict
in the Horn of Africa. Last year, Somali pirates attacked a U.S.
vessel, which briefly raised awareness of maritime insecurity fostered
by a lack of effective governance and insufficient naval capacity on
both sides of the Gulf of Aden. This problem continues, even when it is
not on the front pages, and is both a symptom and a driver of overall
instability in the region. Meanwhile, refugees from the conflict in
Somalia, as well as from the broader region, are fleeing to Yemen.
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, more than 70,000 Somalis and Ethiopians arrived on
Yemen's shores in 2009--a dramatic increase from previous years. The
human cost to this exodus, as well as the potentially destabilizing
effects, demand our attention.
Congress and the executive branch need to work together to ensure
that the weak states, chronic instability, vast ungoverned areas, and
unresolved local tensions that have created safe havens in which
terrorists can recruit and operate do not get short shrift in our
counterterrorism efforts. We cannot continue to jump from one perceived
``central front in the war on terror'' to the next. Local conditions in
places like Yemen--as well as Somalia, north Africa and elsewhere--will
continue to enable al-Qaida affiliates and sympathizers to recruit new
followers. As a result, although we should aggressively pursue al-Qaida
leaders, and our efforts to track individual operatives are critical,
we will not ultimately be successful if we treat counterterrorism
merely as a manhunt with a finite number of al-Qaida members. I am
pleased to see that Ambassador Daniel Benjamin has underscored the
importance of our counterterrorism efforts addressing conditions that
facilitate recruitment to terrorism and extremism. I hope this
understanding is shared throughout our government agencies and in the
implementation process.
To effectively fight the threat from al-Qaida and its affiliates in
Yemen and elsewhere, we also need to change the way our government is
structured and how it operates.
In this regard, we need better intelligence. For example, we need to
improve the intelligence that relates directly to al-Qaida affiliates--
where they find safe haven and why and the local conflicts and other
conditions that create a fertile ground for terrorist recruitment. And
we need to pay attention to all relevant information--including the
information that the State Department and others in the Federal
Government openly collect. Conditions around the world that allow al-
Qaida to operate are often apparent to our diplomats, and do not
necessarily require clandestine collection. The information diplomats
and others collect therefore should be fully integrated with the
intelligence community.
That is why I have proposed and the Senate has approved a bipartisan
commission to provide recommendations to the President and to the
Congress on how to integrate and otherwise reform our existing national
security institutions. Unless we reform how our government collects,
reports and analyzes information from around the world, we will remain
a step behind al-Qaida's global network.
We also need better access to important countries and regions. When
our diplomats aren't present, not only will we never truly understand
what is going on, but we also won't be able to build relationships with
the local population. In some cases, we can and should establish new
embassy posts, such as in northern Nigeria. In other cases, such as
Yemen, where security concerns present obstacles, we should develop
policies that focus on helping to reestablish security, for the sake of
the local populations as well as for our own interests.
In addition, as Yemen makes clear, we need strong, sustained policies
aimed directly at resolving conflicts that allow al-Qaida affiliates to
operate and recruit. These policies must be sophisticated and informed.
We have suffered from a tendency to view the world in terms of
extremists versus moderates, good guys versus bad guys. These are
blinders that prevent us from understanding, on their own terms,
complex conflicts such as the ones in Yemen that undermine broader
counterterrorism goals. This approach has led us to prioritize tactical
counterterrorism over long-term strategies. And it has contributed to
the misperception that regional conflicts, which are often the breeding
grounds for al-Qaida affiliates, are obscure and unimportant and can be
relegated to small State Department teams with few resources and
limited influence outside the Department. We must change this dangerous
pattern, which is why my resolution with Senators Kerry and Feinstein
urges a comprehensive policy toward Yemen, approved at the highest
levels and agreed upon by the entirety of the U.S. Government.
We have an opportunity to take a smarter approach. By recognizing al-
Qaida as a global network that takes advantage of local conditions,
instead of a monolithic threat, we can get ahead of the curve and
identify threats before the next attack.
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