[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 12 (Thursday, January 28, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S324-S332]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 
                                  2009

  Mr. REID. Madam President, this has been a long time in coming--I 
think 7 or 8 months--and I have had the distinguished Republican leader 
contact me on more than one occasion asking when we were going to be 
able to move this bill. I appreciate his continuing to press to move 
this bill forward. We are at a point now where we think we have an 
opportunity to complete this today.
  I also want to express my appreciation to my friend from the class of 
1982 in the House of Representatives, John McCain, who has worked on 
this as hard as anyone and has pushed this as much as anyone, for his 
understanding as to how we should move forward.
  So, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed 
to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 215, S. 2799; that the 
bill be

[[Page S325]]

read three times, passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the 
table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I reserve the right to object, though I 
will not object, but I just want to point out the importance of this 
legislation. I think it deserves a rollcall vote. In discussions with 
the majority leader and the Republican leader, we will hopefully get a 
rollcall vote on the conference report.
  This situation in Iran is terrible, and it is worsening. People are 
dying in the streets of Iran as we speak. The amendment I had proposed 
and that I had hoped for--and maybe we can have the conferees include 
it--would have required the President to draw up a list of persons in 
Iran who have committed human rights abuses or actions of violence 
against Iranian civilians engaging in peaceful political activity. The 
amendment I would have proposed would require that the list be made 
public so the enemies and oppressors of the Iranian people can't hide 
from their crimes--the world would know their names--and then we could 
impose visa bans, asset freezes, financial and banking sanctions, et 
cetera.
  In the streets of Iran today the Iranian students are chanting: 
Obama, Obama, are you with us or are you with them? I appreciate the 
President's recent statements in support of democracy in Iran. I am 
pleased to hear that. I am pleased to see articles, such as this one in 
Newsweek magazine--``Enough Is Enough''--and other support for serious 
action against Iran that some months ago did not support such action.
  The time of the majority leader and the Republican leader is 
valuable, so I would just summarize by saying: This is an important 
issue, Madam President. We have a country on the road to acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. We have brutality and oppression in the streets. We 
have unspeakable brutality taking place in the prisons, and people have 
been killed. A young woman by the name of Neda bled to death on the 
street of Tehran before the entire world.
  So I hope we will be able to impose these and other necessary actions 
against this tyrannical, oppressive, brutal regime in Iran that I think 
is coming apart. We want to be on their side, and we want the Iranian 
people to know we are on their side.
  I appreciate the accommodation of the majority leader as well as the 
Republican leader, and I know they share my commitment, as does my 
esteemed and wonderful friend from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman.
  So I will not object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. The Senator from Arizona has the assurance of the two 
leaders--Reid and McConnell--that there will be a vote when this matter 
comes back from conference, and I am committed to getting it back just 
as quickly as we can.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Obviously, I will not be objecting. I just want to 
associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Arizona and to 
thank him, as well as Senator Lieberman, for their involvement in this 
issue, as well as the majority leader, and just make one comment.
  Frequently, these kinds of unilateral sanction measures make little 
or no difference. This measure, however, is crafted in such a way that 
it could actually become effective, with America alone not having to 
depend on the cooperation of the other countries that tend to be less 
concerned about whether Iran ultimately becomes armed with nuclear 
weapons.
  So this is an important piece of legislation, as the majority leader 
said, as Senator McCain has said, and Senator Lieberman has said. It 
can actually make a difference.
  The time to act on this measure is long overdue.
  A year ago, the administration came into office with the idea it 
would try to engage Tehran diplomatically in order to get it to halt 
its uranium enrichment program. And yet the past year has shown us that 
the Iranian regime is intent on acquiring the ability to develop a 
nuclear weapon. This is now abundantly clear.
  Our straightforward proposal to provide Iran with nuclear fuel for 
civilian purposes in exchange for its stockpile of low enriched uranium 
failed to produce any concessions.
  The Iranian regime has shown no interest in limiting its nuclear 
ambitions. And an entire year was lost as Iran moved closer and closer 
to its goal.
  Some recent highlights from that lost year:
  In September, the world learned of Iran's covert uranium enrichment 
facility in Qom.
  That same month, Iran test fired a series of medium and longer range 
missiles that put U.S. bases in the gulf and our ally, Israel, within 
range.
  In October, the U.N. Security Council and Germany offered to enrich 
Iran's uranium abroad--an offer that was met by more delay and 
obfuscation by Tehran.
  Deadlines came and went. And just a few days ago, the U.N. Security 
Council failed to agree on a new round of sanctions.
  So here we are, a year later. And what has been the result of 
diplomatic engagement?
  Iran is closer to realizing its nuclear aspirations, and the U.S. has 
nothing to show for the outreach.
  And here is what is at stake:
  Standing by and permitting Tehran to satisfy its nuclear ambitions 
would pose a grave threat to American interests in the Middle East and 
South Asia. The Iranian government is already a profoundly 
destabilizing influence in the region. It supports proxies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that have killed U.S. and allied troops. It has threatened 
to wipe one of our closest allies, Israel, off the map. It supports 
terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. It ruthlessly 
suppresses its own citizens for peaceful demonstrations.
  If the Obama administration will not take action against this regime, 
then Congress must.
  That is why we are proposing the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions 
Act.
  This act would direct sanctions at one of Iran's biggest 
vulnerabilities: its low level refining capacity.
  This is a point of leverage we must use sooner rather than later. 
Time is of the essence.
  This legislation cleared the Republican side of the aisle several 
weeks ago.
  We are eager for this measure to pass.
  So I urge the Democratic leadership to call this legislation up 
immediately.
  We have lost a year already. We can't afford any further delay.
  I urge my colleagues to pass this bill.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, today we consider important legislation to 
confront a serious threat to the security of the U.S., of our close 
ally Israel, and of our other allies in the Middle East and Europe--the 
prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. This is one of the most serious 
foreign policy challenges facing the United States today.
  Before we move forward on this measure, let me outline briefly where 
we have been. In 2008, after careful consideration, the Banking 
Committee reported out a bipartisan bill to put pressure on the Iranian 
regime to come clean on its nuclear program, and end its illicit 
nuclear activities. Unfortunately, that bill never was considered on 
the Senate floor because of the obstruction of a handful of Senators.
  In recent months, all of us have been deeply troubled to see the 
Iranian regime violently punishing its own citizens for pressing for 
fair elections.
  And we have watched with growing concern the activities of the 
leaders of this troubled regime, including the continuing repression of 
their people, their deception about the previously secret nuclear 
enrichment facility at Qom, and their more recent threats to expand 
substantially Iran's uranium enrichment activity, in defiance of the 
demands of the international community and the U.N. Security Council.
  Last fall, the committee held additional hearings, where we 
considered the views of a wide range of outside witnesses, and relevant 
administration officials, on policy options toward Iran. Senator Shelby 
and I then worked with our committee colleagues to craft a 
comprehensive, bipartisan bill that was reported out of the Banking 
Committee unanimously in late October, by a vote of 23-0. The bill is 
comprehensive, and includes tougher sanctions;

[[Page S326]]

provisions which enable divestment by States and local governments from 
firms working in Iran's energy sector; and measures to combat the black 
market diversion of sensitive technology to Iran. On December 15, the 
House acted to approve overwhelmingly a more limited package of 
sanctions. I am pleased we will be able to finally act today on this 
comprehensive measure, also with the overwhelming support of this body.
  Madam President, when he took office, President Obama adopted a two-
track policy of engagement backed by the prospect of further sanctions, 
and I have supported his approach. He has worked tirelessly with our 
allies to try to bring Iran's leaders to the table to negotiate an end 
to their illicit nuclear activities or, failing that, to impose a range 
of new sanctions in hopes of changing Iran's behavior through more 
coercive diplomatic efforts.
  Our legislation strengthens what has come to be known as the 
``pressure track.'' Today we must send a clear signal to Iran's leaders 
that if they continue to defy the will of the international community, 
our Nation and other nations are prepared to confront them with tough 
new sanctions. I believe that the administration shares this conviction 
and applaud their work with our allies to develop multilateral 
agreements on a powerful new set of sanctions, should ongoing 
diplomatic efforts toward Iran fall short.
  We must convince Iran's leaders that they face a clear choice. They 
can end the suppression of their people, come clean on their nuclear 
program, suspend enrichment, and stop supporting terrorists around the 
world. Or they can face sustained, progressively intensifying 
multilateral economic and diplomatic pressure--including tougher 
sanctions--and deepen their international isolation. And if they 
continue to refuse, they will then face the unilateral sanctions 
contained in this bill.

  Our approach acknowledges the gross human rights abuses that Iran's 
people continue to suffer at the hands of Iran's security forces and 
the widening chasm that has opened between the regime and the people of 
Iran, as we witnessed again recently in the violent reaction of 
security forces to peaceful demonstrations. It contains a number of 
important human rights provisions, including Senator Schumer's measure 
to impose a sweeping ban on U.S. Govemment contracts on companies which 
provide communications monitoring or jamming technology to the 
government of Iran. Iran has reportedly expanded its monitoring and 
suppression activities, employing them widely again this month. This 
bill makes clear that those who help Iran's government to suppress the 
everyday speech and internet communications of its people will be 
punished. That same point was made in the resolution adopted by the 
Senate just before Christmas, which I cosponsored, expressing our 
support for the human rights of the Iranian people. Senator McCain has 
also raised with me today the prospect of his offering some additional 
human rights language, and I intend to work with him as we move toward 
conference on that issue.
  Our bill also takes direct aim at Iran's illicit nuclear activities. 
It is clear that Iran's leaders are beginning to feel the heat of 
increased international pressure and the specter of biting sanctions, 
but more must be done. Following its public disclosure, Tehran has 
provided international inspectors with access to the nuclear site at 
Qum, but has taken other steps to limit cooperation with the IAEA. 
Iran's government had committed to sending most of its low-enriched 
uranium abroad for processing for medical purposes in October, but now 
rejects that approach and has decided to further provoke the 
international community by expanding its enrichment activities.
  I suspect that only the prospect of intensified, sustained pressure 
by a coalition of countries will prompt these leaders to reconsider 
their position.
  In order to maximize that pressure, just as we did last year, we have 
incorporated a number of ideas from our Senate colleagues into one 
committee bill.
  Senators Bayh, Lieberman, and Kyl proposed penalties on companies 
that support Iran's import of refined petroleum products or bolster its 
domestic capacity.
  Senators Brownback and Casey proposed authorizing state and local 
governments to divest from companies involved in critical business with 
Iran.
  As I mentioned, Senator Schumer proposed banning government contracts 
to firms that provide technology used by the Iranian regime to monitor 
or disrupt communications of its citizens with one another and the 
outside world.
  Senator Menendez proposed targeting sanctions against Iran's 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, its affiliates and front organizations for 
supporting terrorism and contributing to proliferation, and Senator 
Johanns pressed for renewed targeting of Iran's proxy Hezbollah in the 
same way. Senator Bunning urged tighter reporting requirements on 
sanctions.
  In addition, we have incorporated our own proposals to tighten our 
trade embargo, enhance Treasury's mandate to freeze assets tied to 
terrorism and proliferation, crack down on the black market export of 
technology to the regime, expand the scope of other sanctions, and take 
other measures.
  Madam President, instead of finalizing the preliminary agreement on 
low-enriched uranium struck between Iranian negotiators and the P5 + 1 
group in October, Iran's leadership now appears to have definitively 
rejected that offer, and has continued a pattern of belligerent 
behavior that is almost certain to result in tougher sanctions being 
imposed soon.
  While some have argued that increased economic sanctions are unlikely 
to change the behavior of Iran's leaders, I believe a comprehensive 
approach coordinated with our allies--including the Europeans, moderate 
Arab states throughout the Middle East, India, and Russia and China who 
hold great sway with Iran's leaders--must contain a tough sanctions 
component if it is to succeed. I recognize that sanctions alone are not 
sufficient, and that multilateral sanctions are likely to be more 
effective than those we impose unilaterally.
  Sanctions must be used as effective leverage, undertaken as part of a 
coherent, coordinated, comprehensive diplomatic and political strategy 
which tips the scale such that it is more beneficial for Iran to 
forswear its nuclear weapons ambitions and other behaviors that are 
undermining regional peace and stability.
  We have worked closely with administration officials as we developed 
and refined this measure. They support much of what is in the bill. 
Even so, I recognize there are still some lingering concerns. Before we 
left for the holidays, the State Department sent a letter to Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairman Kerry, describing some of these concerns. 
They sought a general exemption from sanctions for companies from 
countries that are closely cooperating with the U.S. on multilateral 
efforts on Iran, a mechanism which could provide an additional 
incentive for certain countries to work with us on imposing tougher 
sanctions. I am open to discussing such an incentive mechanism as we 
move toward conference, as long as it would contain strict criteria for 
the President to make a determination about what, precisely, 
constitutes ``close cooperation.'' There have been a number of 
discussions in recent weeks on how to craft such an exception, and we 
have made some progress. There are diplomatic efforts underway, led by 
the U.S. and others, to achieve a united approach at the U.N. Security 
Council on sanctions. I believe we can come to some agreement with the 
other body, and with the administration, on the remaining issues on 
this bill. I know that the administration shares our belief that we 
must augment current economic sanctions, and will continue to work with 
us on an appropriate mix of pressure tools as this process moves 
forward and the final version of the bill is developed.
  Madam President, ultimately, I expect that different layers of 
additional sanctions--from the U.N. Security Council, from a U.S.-led 
coalition of like-minded allies, and unilaterally from the U.S.--may 
prove necessary if we are to actually have a powerful effect on Iran's 
behavior. And even then there are no guarantees that they will be 
persuaded to reverse course. I hope our legislation will complement and 
reinforce ongoing diplomatic efforts, and send a clear signal to Iran's 
leaders of

[[Page S327]]

what is in store if they continue to flout the will of the 
international community.
  I am grateful to Senator Shelby and all of my colleagues on the 
Banking Committee, and those off the committee who have worked so hard 
in recent months to ensure that ours is a smart, targeted, yet 
comprehensive approach to Iran policy. Overwhelming Senate support for 
passage of this bill will send a clear signal of our resolve to bring 
an end to Iran's illicit nuclear activities, as the President continues 
to build a broad coalition of nations who share our concerns about 
Iran, and who are willing to join with us in imposing a tough, 
comprehensive regime of new sanctions. I know there are still some 
differences to be worked out with the House version, which is less 
comprehensive, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to 
develop a final version that will enjoy broad bipartisan support within 
both bodies, and the support of the President, as soon as possible. I 
thank my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The bill (S. 2799) was passed, as follows:

                                S. 2799

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2009''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress regarding illicit nuclear activities and 
              violations of human rights in Iran.

                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Definitions.
Sec. 102. Expansion of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
Sec. 103. Economic sanctions relating to Iran.
Sec. 104. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by 
              foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export 
              sensitive technology to Iran.
Sec. 106. Increased capacity for efforts to combat unlawful or 
              terrorist financing.
Sec. 107. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 108. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of sanctions on 
              the Central Bank of Iran.
Sec. 109. Policy of the United States regarding Iran's Revolutionary 
              Guard Corps and its affiliates.
Sec. 110. Policy of the United States with respect to Iran and 
              Hezbollah.
Sec. 111. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of multilateral 
              sanctions with respect to Iran.

    TITLE II--DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN

Sec. 201. Definitions.
Sec. 202. Authority of State and local governments to divest from 
              certain companies that invest in Iran.
Sec. 203. Safe harbor for changes of investment policies by asset 
              managers.
Sec. 204. Sense of Congress regarding certain ERISA plan investments.

TITLE III--PREVENTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION OF 
                        SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAN

Sec. 301. Definitions.
Sec. 302. Identification of locations of concern with respect to 
              transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain 
              items to Iran.
Sec. 303. Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and Destinations 
              of Diversion Concern.
Sec. 304. Report on expanding diversion concern system to countries 
              other than Iran.

                    TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET

Sec. 401. Effective date; sunset.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The illicit nuclear activities of the Government of 
     Iran and its support for international terrorism represent 
     threats to the security of the United States, its strong ally 
     Israel, and other allies of the United States around the 
     world.
       (2) The United States and other responsible countries have 
     a vital interest in working together to prevent the 
     Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons 
     capability.
       (3) The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly 
     called attention to Iran's illicit nuclear activities and, as 
     a result, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a 
     range of sanctions designed to encourage the Government of 
     Iran to cease those activities and comply with its 
     obligations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
     and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the 
     ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'').
       (4) The serious and urgent nature of the threat from Iran 
     demands that the United States work together with its allies 
     to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
       (5) The United States and its major European allies, 
     including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have 
     advocated that sanctions be strengthened should international 
     diplomatic efforts fail to achieve verifiable suspension of 
     Iran's uranium enrichment program and an end to its illicit 
     nuclear activities.
       (6) There is an increasing interest by States, local 
     governments, educational institutions, and private 
     institutions to seek to disassociate themselves from 
     companies that conduct business activities in the energy 
     sector of Iran, since such business activities may directly 
     or indirectly support the efforts of the Government of Iran 
     to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
       (7) Black market proliferation networks continue to 
     flourish in the Middle East, allowing countries like Iran to 
     gain access to sensitive dual-use technologies.
       (8) The Government of Iran continues to engage in serious, 
     systematic, and ongoing violations of human rights and 
     religious freedom, including illegitimate prolonged 
     detention, torture, and executions. Such violations have 
     increased in the aftermath of the presidential election in 
     Iran on June 12, 2009.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ILLICIT NUCLEAR 
                   ACTIVITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
                   IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) international diplomatic efforts to address Iran's 
     illicit nuclear efforts and support for international 
     terrorism are more likely to be effective if the President is 
     empowered with the explicit authority to impose additional 
     sanctions on the Government of Iran;
       (2) additional measures should be adopted by the United 
     States to prevent the diversion and transshipment of 
     sensitive dual-use technologies to Iran;
       (3) the concerns of the United States regarding Iran are 
     strictly the result of the actions of the Government of Iran;
       (4) the people of the United States--
       (A) have a long history of friendship and exchange with the 
     people of Iran;
       (B) regret that developments in recent decades have created 
     impediments to that friendship;
       (C) hold the people of Iran, their culture, and their 
     ancient and rich history in the highest esteem; and
       (D) remain deeply concerned about continuing human rights 
     abuses in Iran;
       (5) the President should--
       (A) continue to press the Government of Iran to respect the 
     internationally recognized human rights and religious 
     freedoms of its citizens;
       (B) identify the officials of the Government of Iran that 
     are responsible for continuing and severe violations of human 
     rights and religious freedom in Iran; and
       (C) take appropriate measures to respond to such 
     violations, including by--
       (i) prohibiting officials the President identifies as being 
     responsible for such violations from entry into the United 
     States; and
       (ii) freezing the assets of those officials; and
       (6) additional funding should be provided to the Secretary 
     of State to document, collect, and disseminate information 
     about human rights abuses in Iran, including serious abuses 
     that have taken place since the presidential election in Iran 
     conducted on June 12, 2009.

                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

     SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural 
     commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (3) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 4 of the Office of 
     Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
       (4) Family member.--The term ``family member'' means, with 
     respect to an individual, the spouse, children, 
     grandchildren, or parents of the individual.
       (5) Information and informational materials.--The term 
     ``information and informational materials'' includes 
     publications, films, posters, phonograph records, 
     photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD 
     ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds.
       (6) Investment.--The term ``investment'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14(9) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (7) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other 
     government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of 
     iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and representatives of 
     other government and military or quasi-governmental 
     institutions of Iran'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 14(11)

[[Page S328]]

     of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (8) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the 
     meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the 
     Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       (9) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, 
     and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

     SEC. 102. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT 
                   OF 1996.

       (a) In General.--Section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by 
     striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
       ``(a) Sanctions With Respect to the Development of 
     Petroleum Resources of Iran, Production of Refined Petroleum 
     Products in Iran, and Exportation of Refined Petroleum 
     Products to Iran.--
       ``(1) Development of petroleum resources of iran.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6(a) with 
     respect to a person if the President determines that the 
     person, with actual knowledge, on or after the effective date 
     of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2009--
       ``(i) makes an investment described in subparagraph (B) of 
     $20,000,000 or more; or
       ``(ii) makes a combination of investments described in 
     subparagraph (B) in a 12-month period if each such investment 
     is at least $5,000,000 and such investments equal or exceed 
     $20,000,000 in the aggregate.
       ``(B) Investment described.--An investment described in 
     this subparagraph is an investment that directly and 
     significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's 
     ability to develop petroleum resources.
       ``(2) Production of refined petroleum products.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 
     6(b) (in addition to any other sanctions imposed under this 
     subsection) with respect to a person if the President 
     determines that the person, with actual knowledge, on or 
     after the effective date of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, sells, leases, or 
     provides to Iran any goods, services, technology, 
     information, or support described in subparagraph (B)--
       ``(i) any of which has a fair market value of $200,000 or 
     more; or
       ``(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate 
     fair market value of $1,000,000 or more.
       ``(B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support 
     described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support that could directly and 
     significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of 
     Iran's domestic production of refined petroleum products, 
     including any assistance with respect to construction, 
     modernization, or repair of petroleum refineries.
       ``(3) Exportation of refined petroleum products to iran.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 
     6(b) (in addition to any other sanctions imposed under this 
     subsection) with respect to a person if the President 
     determines that the person, with actual knowledge, on or 
     after the effective date of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009--
       ``(i) provides Iran with refined petroleum products--

       ``(I) that have a fair market value of $200,000 or more; or
       ``(II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate 
     fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

       ``(ii) sells, leases, or provides to Iran any goods, 
     services, technology, information, or support described in 
     subparagraph (B)--

       ``(I) any of which has a fair market value of $200,000 or 
     more; or
       ``(II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate 
     fair market value of $1,000,000 or more.

       ``(B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support 
     described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, 
     technology, or support that could directly and significantly 
     contribute to the enhancement of Iran's ability to import 
     refined petroleum products, including--
       ``(i) underwriting or otherwise providing insurance or 
     reinsurance for the sale, lease, or provision of such goods, 
     services, technology, information, or support;
       ``(ii) financing or brokering such sale, lease, or 
     provision; or
       ``(iii) providing ships or shipping services to deliver 
     refined petroleum products to Iran.''.
       (b) Description of Sanctions.--Section 6 of such Act is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``The sanctions to be imposed on a 
     sanctioned person under section 5 are as follows:'' and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(a) In General.--The sanctions to be imposed on a 
     sanctioned person under subsections (a)(1) and (b) of section 
     5 are as follows:''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Additional Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed on 
     a sanctioned person under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
     5(a) are as follows:
       ``(1) Foreign exchange.--The President shall, pursuant to 
     such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     transactions in foreign exchange by the sanctioned person.
       ``(2) Banking transactions.--The President shall, pursuant 
     to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit 
     any transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or 
     to any financial institution, to the extent that such 
     transfers or payments involve any interest of the sanctioned 
     person.
       ``(3) Property transactions.--The President shall, pursuant 
     to such regulations as the President may prescribe and 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, prohibit 
     any person from--
       ``(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, 
     withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any 
     property with respect to which the sanctioned person has any 
     interest;
       ``(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or 
     privilege with respect to such property; or
       ``(C) conducting any transactions involving such 
     property.''.
       (c) Report Relating to Presidential Waiver.--Section 
     9(c)(2) of such Act is amended by striking subparagraph (C) 
     and inserting the following:
       ``(C) an estimate of the significance of the conduct of the 
     person in contributing to the ability of Iran to, as the case 
     may be--
       ``(i) develop petroleum resources, produce refined 
     petroleum products, or import refined petroleum products; or
       ``(ii) acquire or develop--

       ``(I) chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related 
     technologies; or
       ``(II) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
     conventional weapons; and''.

       (d) Clarification and Expansion of Definitions.--Section 14 
     of such Act is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (13)(B)--
       (A) by inserting ``financial institution, insurer, 
     underwriter, guarantor, and any other business organization, 
     including any foreign subsidiary, parent, or affiliate 
     thereof,'' after ``trust,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``, such as an export credit agency'' 
     before the semicolon at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (14), by striking ``petroleum and natural 
     gas resources'' and inserting ``petroleum, refined petroleum 
     products, oil or liquefied natural gas, natural gas 
     resources, oil or liquefied natural gas tankers, and products 
     used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil 
     or liquefied natural gas'';
       (3) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) as paragraphs 
     (16) and (17), respectively; and
       (4) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following:
       ``(15) Refined petroleum products.--The term `refined 
     petroleum products' means diesel, gasoline, jet fuel 
     (including naphtha-type and kerosene-type jet fuel), and 
     aviation gasoline.''.
       (e) Conforming Amendment.--Section 4 of such Act is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``(in addition to 
     that provided in subsection (d))'';
       (2) by striking subsection (d); and
       (3) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections 
     (d) and (e), respectively.

     SEC. 103. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, and in addition to any other sanction in effect, 
     beginning on the date that is 15 days after the effective 
     date of this Act, the economic sanctions described in 
     subsection (b) shall apply with respect to Iran.
       (b) Sanctions.--The sanctions described in this subsection 
     are the following:
       (1) Prohibition on imports.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no 
     article of Iranian origin may be imported directly or 
     indirectly into the United States.
       (B) Exception.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) does 
     not apply to imports from Iran of information and 
     informational materials.
       (2) Prohibition on exports.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no 
     article of United States origin may be exported directly or 
     indirectly to Iran.
       (B) Exceptions.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) does 
     not apply to exports to Iran of--
       (i) agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical 
     devices;
       (ii) articles exported to Iran to provide humanitarian 
     assistance to the people of Iran;
       (iii) except as provided in subparagraph (C), information 
     or informational materials;
       (iv) goods, services, or technologies necessary to ensure 
     the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft produced 
     in the United States if the exportation of such goods, 
     services, or technologies is approved by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, 
     pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury regarding the exportation of such goods, services, 
     or technologies, if appropriate; or
       (v) goods, services, or technologies that--

       (I) are provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     and are necessary to support activities of that Agency in 
     Iran;
       (II) are necessary to support activities, including the 
     activities of nongovernmental

[[Page S329]]

     organizations, relating to promoting democracy in Iran; or
       (III) the President determines to be necessary to the 
     national interest of the United States.

       (C) Special rule with respect to information and 
     informational materials.--Notwithstanding subparagraph 
     (B)(iii), information and informational materials of United 
     States origin may not be exported directly or indirectly to 
     Iran--
       (i) if the exportation of such information or informational 
     materials is otherwise controlled--

       (I) under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404) (as in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)); or
       (II) under section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to 
     the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or 
     antiterrorism policies of the United States; or

       (ii) if such information or informational materials are 
     information or informational materials with respect to which 
     acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18, United States 
     Code.
       (3) Freezing assets.--
       (A) In general.--At such time as the United States has 
     access to the names of persons in Iran, including Iranian 
     diplomats and representatives of other government and 
     military or quasi-governmental institutions of Iran 
     (including Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and its 
     affiliates), that satisfy the criteria for designation with 
     respect to the imposition of sanctions under the authority of 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.) or are otherwise subject to sanctions under any 
     other provision of law, the President shall take such action 
     as may be necessary to freeze, as soon as possible, the funds 
     and other assets belonging to anyone so named and any family 
     members or associates of those so named to whom assets or 
     property of those so named were transferred on or after 
     January 1, 2009. The action described in the preceding 
     sentence includes requiring any United States financial 
     institution that holds funds and assets of a person so named 
     to report promptly to the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
     information regarding such funds and assets.
       (B) Asset reporting requirement.--Not later than 14 days 
     after a decision is made to freeze the property or assets of 
     any person under this paragraph, the President shall report 
     the name of such person to the appropriate congressional 
     committees. Such a report may contain a classified annex.
       (4) United states government contracts.--The head of an 
     executive agency may not procure, or enter into a contract 
     for the procurement of, any goods or services from a person 
     that meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under 
     section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
     172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of the 
     sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report describing the reasons for the determination.

     SEC. 104. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
                   SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
     association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other 
     organization.
       (2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       (A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by 
     vote or value in the entity;
       (B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors 
     of the entity; or
       (C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       (3) Subsidiary.--The term ``subsidiary'' means an entity 
     that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a 
     United States person.
       (4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a natural person who is a citizen, resident, or 
     national of the United States; and
       (B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the 
     United States, any State or territory thereof, or the 
     District of Columbia, if natural persons described in 
     subparagraph (A) own or control the entity.
       (b) In General.--A United States person shall be subject to 
     a penalty for a violation of the provisions of Executive 
     Order 12959 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or Executive Order 13059 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or any other prohibition on 
     transactions with respect to Iran imposed under the authority 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), if--
       (1) the President determines, pursuant to such regulations 
     as the President may prescribe, that the United States person 
     establishes or maintains a subsidiary outside of the United 
     States for the purpose of circumventing such provisions; and
       (2) that subsidiary engages in an act that, if committed in 
     the United States or by a United States person, would violate 
     such provisions.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
     subsection (b) if the President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report describing the reasons for the determination.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to 
     acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are--
       (A) commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act; or
       (B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before 
     such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after 
     such date of enactment.
       (2) Exception.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect 
     to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned 
     or controlled by a United States person if the United States 
     person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary 
     not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS 
                   THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, and pursuant to such regulations as the President may 
     prescribe, the head of an executive agency may not enter into 
     or renew a contract for the procurement of goods or services 
     with a person that exports sensitive technology to Iran.
       (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of the 
     prohibition under subsection (a) if the President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (2) submits to Congress a report describing the reasons for 
     the determination.
       (c) Sensitive Technology Defined.--The term ``sensitive 
     technology'' means hardware, software, telecommunications 
     equipment, or any other technology that the President 
     determines is to be used specifically--
       (1) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in 
     Iran; or
       (2) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of 
     the people of Iran.

     SEC. 106. INCREASED CAPACITY FOR EFFORTS TO COMBAT UNLAWFUL 
                   OR TERRORIST FINANCING.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the work of the Office of 
     Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the 
     Treasury, which includes the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
     and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, is critical to 
     ensuring that the international financial system is not used 
     for purposes of supporting terrorism and developing weapons 
     of mass destruction.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations for Office of Terrorism 
     and Financial Intelligence.--There are authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Office 
     of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence--
       (1) $64,611,000 for fiscal year 2010; and
       (2) such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
     years 2011 and 2012.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations for the Financial 
     Crimes Enforcement Network.--Section 310(d)(1) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``such sums as may 
     be necessary for fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005'' 
     and inserting ``$104,260,000 for fiscal year 2010 and such 
     sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2011 
     and 2012''.

     SEC. 107. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Report on Investment and Activities That May Be 
     Sanctionable Under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report containing--
       (A) a description of--
       (i) any foreign investments of $20,000,000 or more that 
     contribute directly and significantly to the enhancement of 
     Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources made during the 
     period described in paragraph (2);
       (ii) any sale, lease, or provision to Iran during the 
     period described in paragraph (2) of any goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support that would facilitate the 
     maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic production of 
     refined petroleum products; and
       (iii) any refined petroleum products provided to Iran 
     during the period described in paragraph (2) and any other 
     activity that could contribute directly and significantly to 
     the enhancement of Iran's ability to import refined petroleum 
     products during that period;
       (B) with respect to each investment or other activity 
     described in subparagraph (A), an identification of--
       (i) the date or dates of the investment or activity;
       (ii) the steps taken by the United States to respond to the 
     investment or activity;
       (iii) the name and United States domiciliary of any person 
     that participated or invested in or facilitated the 
     investment or activity; and
       (iv) any Federal Government contracts to which any person 
     referred to in clause (iii) are parties; and
       (C) the determination of the President with respect to 
     whether each such investment or activity qualifies as a 
     sanctionable offense under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (2) Period described.--The period described in this 
     paragraph is the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and 
     ending on the date on which the President submits the report 
     under paragraph (1).

[[Page S330]]

       (b) Subsequent Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an updated version of the report 
     required under subsection (a) that contains the information 
     required under that subsection for the 180-day period 
     preceding the submission of the updated report.
       (c) Form of Reports; Publication.--A report submitted under 
     subsection (a) or (b) shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may contain a classified annex. The unclassified 
     portion of the report shall be published in the Federal 
     Register.

     SEC. 108. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF 
                   SANCTIONS ON THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.

       Congress urges the President, in the strongest terms, to 
     consider immediately using the authority of the President to 
     impose sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any other 
     Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or support 
     of terrorist groups.

     SEC. 109. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING IRAN'S 
                   REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND ITS AFFILIATES.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
       (1) continue to target Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps 
     persistently with economic sanctions for its support for 
     terrorism, its role in proliferation, and its oppressive 
     activities against the people of Iran; and
       (2) impose sanctions, including travel restrictions, 
     sanctions authorized pursuant to this Act, and the full range 
     of sanctions available to the President under the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.), on--
       (A) any foreign individual or entity that is an agent, 
     alias, front, instrumentality, official, or affiliate of 
     Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and is designated for the 
     imposition of sanctions by the President;
       (B) any individual or entity who--
       (i) has provided material support to Iran's Revolutionary 
     Guard Corps or any of its affiliates designated for the 
     imposition of sanctions by the President; or
       (ii) has conducted any financial or commercial transaction 
     with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its 
     affiliates so designated; and
       (C) any foreign government found--
       (i) to be providing material support to Iran's 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its affiliates designated 
     for the imposition of sanctions by the President; or
       (ii) to have conducted any commercial transaction or 
     financial transaction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps 
     or any of its affiliates so designated.

     SEC. 110. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN 
                   AND HEZBOLLAH.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
       (1) continue to counter support received by Hezbollah from 
     the Government of Iran and other foreign governments in 
     response to Hezbollah's terrorist activities and the threat 
     Hezbollah poses to Israel, the democratic sovereignty of 
     Lebanon, and the national security interests of the United 
     States;
       (2) impose the full range of sanctions available to the 
     President under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) on Hezbollah, its designated 
     affiliates and supporters, and persons providing Hezbollah 
     with commercial, financial, or other services;
       (3) urge the European Union, individual countries in 
     Europe, and other countries to classify Hezbollah as a 
     terrorist organization to facilitate the disruption of 
     Hezbollah's operations; and
       (4) renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah and 
     disband its militias in Lebanon, as called for by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 
     (2006).

     SEC. 111. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF 
                   MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) in general, multilateral sanctions are more effective 
     than unilateral sanctions at achieving desired results from 
     countries such as Iran;
       (2) the President should continue to work with allies of 
     the United States to impose such sanctions as may be 
     necessary to prevent the Government of Iran from acquiring a 
     nuclear weapons capability; and
       (3) the United States should continue to consult with the 5 
     permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and 
     Germany (commonly referred to as the ``P5-plus-1'') and other 
     interested countries regarding imposing new sanctions with 
     respect to Iran in the event that diplomatic efforts to 
     prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability 
     fail.

    TITLE II--DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN

     SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Energy sector.--The term ``energy sector'' refers to 
     activities to develop petroleum or natural gas resources or 
     nuclear power.
       (2) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
     institution'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     14(5) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 
     50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (3) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or 
     instrumentality of Iran.
       (4) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
       (A) a natural person, corporation, company, business 
     association, partnership, society, trust, or any other 
     nongovernmental entity, organization, or group;
       (B) any governmental entity or instrumentality of a 
     government, including a multilateral development institution 
     (as defined in section 1701(c)(3) of the International 
     Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(3))); and
       (C) any successor, subunit, parent company, or subsidiary 
     of any entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       (5) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several 
     States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
     Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, 
     and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
       (6) State or local government.--The term ``State or local 
     government'' includes--
       (A) any State and any agency or instrumentality thereof;
       (B) any local government within a State, and any agency or 
     instrumentality thereof;
       (C) any other governmental instrumentality; and
       (D) any public institution of higher education within the 
     meaning of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 
     et seq.).

     SEC. 202. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DIVEST 
                   FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States Government should support the decision of 
     any State or local government that for moral, prudential, or 
     reputational reasons divests from, or prohibits the 
     investment of assets of the State or local government in, a 
     person that engages in investment activities in the energy 
     sector of Iran, as long as that country is subject to 
     economic sanctions imposed by the United States.
       (b) Authority To Divest.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and 
     enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d) 
     to divest the assets of the State or local government from, 
     or prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local 
     government in, any person that the State or local government 
     determines, using credible information available to the 
     public, engages in investment activities in Iran described in 
     subsection (c).
       (c) Investment Activities Described.--A person engages in 
     investment activities in Iran described in this subsection if 
     the person--
       (1) has an investment of $20,000,000 or more in the energy 
     sector of Iran, including in a person that provides oil or 
     liquified natural gas tankers, or products used to construct 
     or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquified 
     natural gas, for the energy sector in Iran; or
       (2) is a financial institution that extends $20,000,000 or 
     more in credit to another person, for 45 days or more, if 
     that person will use the credit to invest in the energy 
     sector in Iran.
       (d) Requirements.--Any measure taken by a State or local 
     government under subsection (b) shall meet the following 
     requirements:
       (1) Notice.--The State or local government shall provide 
     written notice to each person to which a measure is to be 
     applied.
       (2) Timing.--The measure shall apply to a person not 
     earlier than the date that is 90 days after the date on which 
     written notice is provided to the person under paragraph (1).
       (3) Opportunity for hearing.--The State or local government 
     shall provide an opportunity to comment in writing to each 
     person to which a measure is to be applied. If the person 
     demonstrates to the State or local government that the person 
     does not engage in investment activities in Iran described in 
     subsection (c), the measure shall not apply to the person.
       (4) Sense of congress on avoiding erroneous targeting.--It 
     is the sense of Congress that a State or local government 
     should not adopt a measure under subsection (b) with respect 
     to a person unless the State or local government has made 
     every effort to avoid erroneously targeting the person and 
     has verified that the person engages in investment activities 
     in Iran described in subsection (c).
       (e) Notice to Department of Justice.--Not later than 30 
     days after adopting a measure pursuant to subsection (b), a 
     State or local government shall submit written notice to the 
     Attorney General describing the measure.
       (f) Nonpreemption.--A measure of a State or local 
     government authorized under subsection (b) is not preempted 
     by any Federal law or regulation.
       (g) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Investment.--The ``investment'' of assets, with respect 
     to a State or local government, includes--
       (A) a commitment or contribution of assets;
       (B) a loan or other extension of credit; and
       (C) the entry into or renewal of a contract for goods or 
     services.
       (2) Assets.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the term ``assets'' refers to public monies and includes any 
     pension, retirement, annuity, or endowment fund, or similar 
     instrument, that is controlled by a State or local 
     government.
       (B) Exception.--The term ``assets'' does not include 
     employee benefit plans covered

[[Page S331]]

     by title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
     1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).
       (h) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this 
     section applies to measures adopted by a State or local 
     government before, on, or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (2) Notice requirements.--Subsections (d) and (e) apply to 
     measures adopted by a State or local government on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 203. SAFE HARBOR FOR CHANGES OF INVESTMENT POLICIES BY 
                   ASSET MANAGERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 13(c)(1) of the Investment Company 
     Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-13(c)(1)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     Federal or State law, no person may bring any civil, 
     criminal, or administrative action against any registered 
     investment company, or any employee, officer, director, or 
     investment adviser thereof, based solely upon the investment 
     company divesting from, or avoiding investing in, securities 
     issued by persons that the investment company determines, 
     using credible information available to the public--
       ``(A) conduct or have direct investments in business 
     operations in Sudan described in section 3(d) of the Sudan 
     Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note); or
       ``(B) engage in investment activities in Iran described in 
     section 202(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009.''.
       (b) SEC Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and 
     Exchange Commission shall issue any revisions the Commission 
     determines to be necessary to the regulations requiring 
     disclosure by each registered investment company that divests 
     itself of securities in accordance with section 13(c) of the 
     Investment Company Act of 1940 to include divestments of 
     securities in accordance with paragraph (1)(B) of such 
     section, as added by subsection (a).

     SEC. 204. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CERTAIN ERISA PLAN 
                   INVESTMENTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that a fiduciary of an employee 
     benefit plan, as defined in section 3(3) of the Employee 
     Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(3)), 
     may divest plan assets from, or avoid investing plan assets 
     in, any person the fiduciary determines engages in investment 
     activities in Iran described in section 202(c) of this Act, 
     without breaching the responsibilities, obligations, or 
     duties imposed upon the fiduciary by section 404 of the 
     Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 
     1104), if--
       (1) the fiduciary makes such determination using credible 
     information that is available to the public; and
       (2) such divestment or avoidance of investment is conducted 
     in accordance with section 2509.08-1 of title 29, Code of 
     Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date 
     of the enactment of this Act).

TITLE III--PREVENTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION OF 
                        SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAN

     SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) End-user.--The term ``end-user'' means an end-user as 
     that term is used in the Export Administration Regulations.
       (3) Export administration regulations.--The term ``Export 
     Administration Regulations'' means subchapter C of chapter 
     VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (4) Government.--The term ``government'' includes any 
     agency or instrumentality of a government.
       (5) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or 
     instrumentality of Iran.
       (6) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor 
     of terrorism'' means any country the government of which the 
     Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided 
     support for acts of international terrorism pursuant to--
       (A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor 
     thereto);
       (B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)); or
       (C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)).
       (7) Transshipment, reexportation, or diversion.--The term 
     ``transshipment, reexportation, or diversion'' means the 
     exportation, directly or indirectly, of items that originated 
     in the United States to an end-user whose identity cannot be 
     verified or to an entity in Iran in violation of the laws or 
     regulations of the United States by any means, including by--
       (A) shipping such items through 1 or more foreign 
     countries; or
       (B) by using false information regarding the country of 
     origin of such items.

     SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS OF CONCERN WITH RESPECT 
                   TO TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION 
                   OF CERTAIN ITEMS TO IRAN.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the Secretary of Commerce, the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies 
     all countries that the Director determines are of concern 
     with respect to transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of 
     items subject to the provisions of the Export Administration 
     Regulations to an entity in Iran.

     SEC. 303. DESTINATIONS OF POSSIBLE DIVERSION CONCERN AND 
                   DESTINATIONS OF DIVERSION CONCERN.

       (a) Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern.--
       (1) Designation.--The Secretary of Commerce shall designate 
     a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern if 
     the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State 
     and the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that such 
     designation is appropriate to carry out activities to 
     strengthen the export control systems of that country based 
     on criteria that include--
       (A) the volume of items that originated in the United 
     States that are transported through the country to end-users 
     whose identities cannot be verified;
       (B) the inadequacy of the export and reexport controls of 
     the country;
       (C) the unwillingness or demonstrated inability of the 
     government of the country to control diversion activities; 
     and
       (D) the unwillingness or inability of the government of the 
     country to cooperate with the United States in interdiction 
     efforts.
       (2) Strengthening export control systems of destinations of 
     possible diversion concern.--If the Secretary of Commerce 
     designates a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion 
     Concern under paragraph (1), the United States shall initiate 
     government-to-government activities described in paragraph 
     (3) to strengthen the export control systems of the country.
       (3) Government-to-government activities described.--The 
     government-to-government activities described in this 
     paragraph include--
       (A) cooperation by agencies and departments of the United 
     States with counterpart agencies and departments in a country 
     designated as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern 
     under paragraph (1) to--
       (i) develop or strengthen export control systems in the 
     country;
       (ii) strengthen cooperation and facilitate enforcement of 
     export control systems in the country; and
       (iii) promote information and data exchanges among agencies 
     of the country and with the United States; and
       (B) efforts by the Office of International Programs of the 
     Department of Commerce to strengthen the export control 
     systems of the country to--
       (i) facilitate legitimate trade in high-technology goods; 
     and
       (ii) prevent terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism, 
     including Iran, from obtaining nuclear, biological, and 
     chemical weapons, defense technologies, components for 
     improvised explosive devices, and other defense items.
       (b) Destinations of Diversion Concern.--
       (1) Designation.--The Secretary of Commerce shall designate 
     a country as a Destination of Diversion Concern if the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of the Treasury, determines--
       (A) that the government of the country allows substantial 
     transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of items that 
     originated in the United States to end-users whose identities 
     cannot be verified or to entities in Iran; or
       (B) 12 months after the Secretary of Commerce designates 
     the country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern 
     under subsection (a)(1), that the country has failed--
       (i) to cooperate with the government-to-government 
     activities initiated by the United States under subsection 
     (a)(2); or
       (ii) based on the criteria described in subsection (a)(1), 
     to adequately strengthen the export control systems of the 
     country.
       (2) Licensing controls with respect to destinations of 
     diversion concern.--
       (A) Report on suspect items.--
       (i) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
     Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     containing a list of items that, if the items were 
     transshipped, reexported, or diverted to Iran, could 
     contribute to--

       (I) Iran obtaining nuclear, biological, or chemical 
     weapons, defense technologies, components for improvised 
     explosive devices, or other defense items; or
       (II) support by Iran for acts of international terrorism.

       (ii) Considerations for list.--In developing the list 
     required under clause (i), the Secretary of Commerce shall 
     consider--

       (I) the items subject to licensing requirements under 
     section 742.8 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling) and other 
     existing licensing requirements; and
       (II) the items added to the list of items for which a 
     license is required for exportation to North Korea by the 
     final rule of the Bureau

[[Page S332]]

     of Export Administration of the Department of Commerce issued 
     on June 19, 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 38148; relating to export 
     restrictions on North Korea).

       (B) Licensing requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Commerce shall require a license to export an item on the 
     list required under subparagraph (A)(i) to a country 
     designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern.
       (C) Waiver.--The President may waive the imposition of the 
     licensing requirement under subparagraph (B) with respect to 
     a country designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern if 
     the President--
       (i) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (ii) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report describing the reasons for the determination.
       (c) Termination of Designation.--The designation of a 
     country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern or a 
     Destination of Diversion Concern shall terminate on the date 
     on which the Secretary of Commerce determines, based on the 
     criteria described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of 
     subsection (a)(1), and certifies to Congress and the 
     President that the country has adequately strengthened the 
     export control systems of the country to prevent 
     transshipment, reexportation, and diversion of items through 
     the country to end-users whose identities cannot be verified 
     or to entities in Iran.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section.

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON EXPANDING DIVERSION CONCERN SYSTEM TO 
                   COUNTRIES OTHER THAN IRAN.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
     State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that--
       (1) identifies any country that the Director determines may 
     be transshipping, reexporting, or diverting items subject to 
     the provisions of the Export Administration Regulations to 
     another country if such other country--
       (A) is seeking to obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical 
     weapons, defense technologies, components for improvised 
     explosive devices, or other defense items; or
       (B) provides support for acts of international terrorism; 
     and
       (2) assesses the feasability and advisability of expanding 
     the system established under section 303 for designating 
     countries as Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and 
     Destinations of Diversion Concern to include countries 
     identified under paragraph (1).

                    TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET

     SEC. 401. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.

       (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in sections 104, 
     202, and 303(b)(2), the provisions of, and amendments made 
     by, this Act shall take effect on the date that is 120 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Sunset.--The provisions of this Act shall terminate on 
     the date that is 30 days after the date on which the 
     President certifies to Congress that--
       (1) the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for 
     acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the 
     requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism 
     under--
       (A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor 
     thereto);
       (B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)); or
       (C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)); and
       (2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and 
     development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and 
     ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.

  Mr. REID. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
bill was passed and to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I am pleased that the Senate just passed 
S. 2799, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2009 and I thank Senators Dodd, Kerry, Shelby, 
Lieberman, Bayh, Kyl and many others who have worked so hard to get 
this important legislation passed.
  I believe that passing this legislation is critical to send Iran the 
message that the United States is serious about keeping Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons capability. This legislation would impose new 
sanctions on Iran's refined petroleum sector and tighten existing U.S. 
sanctions in an effort to create new pressure on the Iranian regime and 
help stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
  We have all watched the Iranian regime oppress its own people on the 
streets of Iran. And we have watched them continue to defy the 
international community on nuclear issues.
  That is why it is so important that we move this legislation forward 
quickly. I know that a number of Senators had concerns, or changes they 
wanted to make to this legislation, including Senator McCain, who has 
an amendment he wanted to offer on human rights on Iran. I am committed 
to working with him, and others, as we move forward in conference.

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