[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 12 (Thursday, January 28, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S324-S332]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF
2009
Mr. REID. Madam President, this has been a long time in coming--I
think 7 or 8 months--and I have had the distinguished Republican leader
contact me on more than one occasion asking when we were going to be
able to move this bill. I appreciate his continuing to press to move
this bill forward. We are at a point now where we think we have an
opportunity to complete this today.
I also want to express my appreciation to my friend from the class of
1982 in the House of Representatives, John McCain, who has worked on
this as hard as anyone and has pushed this as much as anyone, for his
understanding as to how we should move forward.
So, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed
to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 215, S. 2799; that the
bill be
[[Page S325]]
read three times, passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the
table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I reserve the right to object, though I
will not object, but I just want to point out the importance of this
legislation. I think it deserves a rollcall vote. In discussions with
the majority leader and the Republican leader, we will hopefully get a
rollcall vote on the conference report.
This situation in Iran is terrible, and it is worsening. People are
dying in the streets of Iran as we speak. The amendment I had proposed
and that I had hoped for--and maybe we can have the conferees include
it--would have required the President to draw up a list of persons in
Iran who have committed human rights abuses or actions of violence
against Iranian civilians engaging in peaceful political activity. The
amendment I would have proposed would require that the list be made
public so the enemies and oppressors of the Iranian people can't hide
from their crimes--the world would know their names--and then we could
impose visa bans, asset freezes, financial and banking sanctions, et
cetera.
In the streets of Iran today the Iranian students are chanting:
Obama, Obama, are you with us or are you with them? I appreciate the
President's recent statements in support of democracy in Iran. I am
pleased to hear that. I am pleased to see articles, such as this one in
Newsweek magazine--``Enough Is Enough''--and other support for serious
action against Iran that some months ago did not support such action.
The time of the majority leader and the Republican leader is
valuable, so I would just summarize by saying: This is an important
issue, Madam President. We have a country on the road to acquisition of
nuclear weapons. We have brutality and oppression in the streets. We
have unspeakable brutality taking place in the prisons, and people have
been killed. A young woman by the name of Neda bled to death on the
street of Tehran before the entire world.
So I hope we will be able to impose these and other necessary actions
against this tyrannical, oppressive, brutal regime in Iran that I think
is coming apart. We want to be on their side, and we want the Iranian
people to know we are on their side.
I appreciate the accommodation of the majority leader as well as the
Republican leader, and I know they share my commitment, as does my
esteemed and wonderful friend from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman.
So I will not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. REID. The Senator from Arizona has the assurance of the two
leaders--Reid and McConnell--that there will be a vote when this matter
comes back from conference, and I am committed to getting it back just
as quickly as we can.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader.
Mr. McCONNELL. Obviously, I will not be objecting. I just want to
associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Arizona and to
thank him, as well as Senator Lieberman, for their involvement in this
issue, as well as the majority leader, and just make one comment.
Frequently, these kinds of unilateral sanction measures make little
or no difference. This measure, however, is crafted in such a way that
it could actually become effective, with America alone not having to
depend on the cooperation of the other countries that tend to be less
concerned about whether Iran ultimately becomes armed with nuclear
weapons.
So this is an important piece of legislation, as the majority leader
said, as Senator McCain has said, and Senator Lieberman has said. It
can actually make a difference.
The time to act on this measure is long overdue.
A year ago, the administration came into office with the idea it
would try to engage Tehran diplomatically in order to get it to halt
its uranium enrichment program. And yet the past year has shown us that
the Iranian regime is intent on acquiring the ability to develop a
nuclear weapon. This is now abundantly clear.
Our straightforward proposal to provide Iran with nuclear fuel for
civilian purposes in exchange for its stockpile of low enriched uranium
failed to produce any concessions.
The Iranian regime has shown no interest in limiting its nuclear
ambitions. And an entire year was lost as Iran moved closer and closer
to its goal.
Some recent highlights from that lost year:
In September, the world learned of Iran's covert uranium enrichment
facility in Qom.
That same month, Iran test fired a series of medium and longer range
missiles that put U.S. bases in the gulf and our ally, Israel, within
range.
In October, the U.N. Security Council and Germany offered to enrich
Iran's uranium abroad--an offer that was met by more delay and
obfuscation by Tehran.
Deadlines came and went. And just a few days ago, the U.N. Security
Council failed to agree on a new round of sanctions.
So here we are, a year later. And what has been the result of
diplomatic engagement?
Iran is closer to realizing its nuclear aspirations, and the U.S. has
nothing to show for the outreach.
And here is what is at stake:
Standing by and permitting Tehran to satisfy its nuclear ambitions
would pose a grave threat to American interests in the Middle East and
South Asia. The Iranian government is already a profoundly
destabilizing influence in the region. It supports proxies in Iraq and
Afghanistan that have killed U.S. and allied troops. It has threatened
to wipe one of our closest allies, Israel, off the map. It supports
terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. It ruthlessly
suppresses its own citizens for peaceful demonstrations.
If the Obama administration will not take action against this regime,
then Congress must.
That is why we are proposing the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions
Act.
This act would direct sanctions at one of Iran's biggest
vulnerabilities: its low level refining capacity.
This is a point of leverage we must use sooner rather than later.
Time is of the essence.
This legislation cleared the Republican side of the aisle several
weeks ago.
We are eager for this measure to pass.
So I urge the Democratic leadership to call this legislation up
immediately.
We have lost a year already. We can't afford any further delay.
I urge my colleagues to pass this bill.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, today we consider important legislation to
confront a serious threat to the security of the U.S., of our close
ally Israel, and of our other allies in the Middle East and Europe--the
prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. This is one of the most serious
foreign policy challenges facing the United States today.
Before we move forward on this measure, let me outline briefly where
we have been. In 2008, after careful consideration, the Banking
Committee reported out a bipartisan bill to put pressure on the Iranian
regime to come clean on its nuclear program, and end its illicit
nuclear activities. Unfortunately, that bill never was considered on
the Senate floor because of the obstruction of a handful of Senators.
In recent months, all of us have been deeply troubled to see the
Iranian regime violently punishing its own citizens for pressing for
fair elections.
And we have watched with growing concern the activities of the
leaders of this troubled regime, including the continuing repression of
their people, their deception about the previously secret nuclear
enrichment facility at Qom, and their more recent threats to expand
substantially Iran's uranium enrichment activity, in defiance of the
demands of the international community and the U.N. Security Council.
Last fall, the committee held additional hearings, where we
considered the views of a wide range of outside witnesses, and relevant
administration officials, on policy options toward Iran. Senator Shelby
and I then worked with our committee colleagues to craft a
comprehensive, bipartisan bill that was reported out of the Banking
Committee unanimously in late October, by a vote of 23-0. The bill is
comprehensive, and includes tougher sanctions;
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provisions which enable divestment by States and local governments from
firms working in Iran's energy sector; and measures to combat the black
market diversion of sensitive technology to Iran. On December 15, the
House acted to approve overwhelmingly a more limited package of
sanctions. I am pleased we will be able to finally act today on this
comprehensive measure, also with the overwhelming support of this body.
Madam President, when he took office, President Obama adopted a two-
track policy of engagement backed by the prospect of further sanctions,
and I have supported his approach. He has worked tirelessly with our
allies to try to bring Iran's leaders to the table to negotiate an end
to their illicit nuclear activities or, failing that, to impose a range
of new sanctions in hopes of changing Iran's behavior through more
coercive diplomatic efforts.
Our legislation strengthens what has come to be known as the
``pressure track.'' Today we must send a clear signal to Iran's leaders
that if they continue to defy the will of the international community,
our Nation and other nations are prepared to confront them with tough
new sanctions. I believe that the administration shares this conviction
and applaud their work with our allies to develop multilateral
agreements on a powerful new set of sanctions, should ongoing
diplomatic efforts toward Iran fall short.
We must convince Iran's leaders that they face a clear choice. They
can end the suppression of their people, come clean on their nuclear
program, suspend enrichment, and stop supporting terrorists around the
world. Or they can face sustained, progressively intensifying
multilateral economic and diplomatic pressure--including tougher
sanctions--and deepen their international isolation. And if they
continue to refuse, they will then face the unilateral sanctions
contained in this bill.
Our approach acknowledges the gross human rights abuses that Iran's
people continue to suffer at the hands of Iran's security forces and
the widening chasm that has opened between the regime and the people of
Iran, as we witnessed again recently in the violent reaction of
security forces to peaceful demonstrations. It contains a number of
important human rights provisions, including Senator Schumer's measure
to impose a sweeping ban on U.S. Govemment contracts on companies which
provide communications monitoring or jamming technology to the
government of Iran. Iran has reportedly expanded its monitoring and
suppression activities, employing them widely again this month. This
bill makes clear that those who help Iran's government to suppress the
everyday speech and internet communications of its people will be
punished. That same point was made in the resolution adopted by the
Senate just before Christmas, which I cosponsored, expressing our
support for the human rights of the Iranian people. Senator McCain has
also raised with me today the prospect of his offering some additional
human rights language, and I intend to work with him as we move toward
conference on that issue.
Our bill also takes direct aim at Iran's illicit nuclear activities.
It is clear that Iran's leaders are beginning to feel the heat of
increased international pressure and the specter of biting sanctions,
but more must be done. Following its public disclosure, Tehran has
provided international inspectors with access to the nuclear site at
Qum, but has taken other steps to limit cooperation with the IAEA.
Iran's government had committed to sending most of its low-enriched
uranium abroad for processing for medical purposes in October, but now
rejects that approach and has decided to further provoke the
international community by expanding its enrichment activities.
I suspect that only the prospect of intensified, sustained pressure
by a coalition of countries will prompt these leaders to reconsider
their position.
In order to maximize that pressure, just as we did last year, we have
incorporated a number of ideas from our Senate colleagues into one
committee bill.
Senators Bayh, Lieberman, and Kyl proposed penalties on companies
that support Iran's import of refined petroleum products or bolster its
domestic capacity.
Senators Brownback and Casey proposed authorizing state and local
governments to divest from companies involved in critical business with
Iran.
As I mentioned, Senator Schumer proposed banning government contracts
to firms that provide technology used by the Iranian regime to monitor
or disrupt communications of its citizens with one another and the
outside world.
Senator Menendez proposed targeting sanctions against Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps, its affiliates and front organizations for
supporting terrorism and contributing to proliferation, and Senator
Johanns pressed for renewed targeting of Iran's proxy Hezbollah in the
same way. Senator Bunning urged tighter reporting requirements on
sanctions.
In addition, we have incorporated our own proposals to tighten our
trade embargo, enhance Treasury's mandate to freeze assets tied to
terrorism and proliferation, crack down on the black market export of
technology to the regime, expand the scope of other sanctions, and take
other measures.
Madam President, instead of finalizing the preliminary agreement on
low-enriched uranium struck between Iranian negotiators and the P5 + 1
group in October, Iran's leadership now appears to have definitively
rejected that offer, and has continued a pattern of belligerent
behavior that is almost certain to result in tougher sanctions being
imposed soon.
While some have argued that increased economic sanctions are unlikely
to change the behavior of Iran's leaders, I believe a comprehensive
approach coordinated with our allies--including the Europeans, moderate
Arab states throughout the Middle East, India, and Russia and China who
hold great sway with Iran's leaders--must contain a tough sanctions
component if it is to succeed. I recognize that sanctions alone are not
sufficient, and that multilateral sanctions are likely to be more
effective than those we impose unilaterally.
Sanctions must be used as effective leverage, undertaken as part of a
coherent, coordinated, comprehensive diplomatic and political strategy
which tips the scale such that it is more beneficial for Iran to
forswear its nuclear weapons ambitions and other behaviors that are
undermining regional peace and stability.
We have worked closely with administration officials as we developed
and refined this measure. They support much of what is in the bill.
Even so, I recognize there are still some lingering concerns. Before we
left for the holidays, the State Department sent a letter to Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Kerry, describing some of these concerns.
They sought a general exemption from sanctions for companies from
countries that are closely cooperating with the U.S. on multilateral
efforts on Iran, a mechanism which could provide an additional
incentive for certain countries to work with us on imposing tougher
sanctions. I am open to discussing such an incentive mechanism as we
move toward conference, as long as it would contain strict criteria for
the President to make a determination about what, precisely,
constitutes ``close cooperation.'' There have been a number of
discussions in recent weeks on how to craft such an exception, and we
have made some progress. There are diplomatic efforts underway, led by
the U.S. and others, to achieve a united approach at the U.N. Security
Council on sanctions. I believe we can come to some agreement with the
other body, and with the administration, on the remaining issues on
this bill. I know that the administration shares our belief that we
must augment current economic sanctions, and will continue to work with
us on an appropriate mix of pressure tools as this process moves
forward and the final version of the bill is developed.
Madam President, ultimately, I expect that different layers of
additional sanctions--from the U.N. Security Council, from a U.S.-led
coalition of like-minded allies, and unilaterally from the U.S.--may
prove necessary if we are to actually have a powerful effect on Iran's
behavior. And even then there are no guarantees that they will be
persuaded to reverse course. I hope our legislation will complement and
reinforce ongoing diplomatic efforts, and send a clear signal to Iran's
leaders of
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what is in store if they continue to flout the will of the
international community.
I am grateful to Senator Shelby and all of my colleagues on the
Banking Committee, and those off the committee who have worked so hard
in recent months to ensure that ours is a smart, targeted, yet
comprehensive approach to Iran policy. Overwhelming Senate support for
passage of this bill will send a clear signal of our resolve to bring
an end to Iran's illicit nuclear activities, as the President continues
to build a broad coalition of nations who share our concerns about
Iran, and who are willing to join with us in imposing a tough,
comprehensive regime of new sanctions. I know there are still some
differences to be worked out with the House version, which is less
comprehensive, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to
develop a final version that will enjoy broad bipartisan support within
both bodies, and the support of the President, as soon as possible. I
thank my colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
The question is on the passage of the bill.
The bill (S. 2799) was passed, as follows:
S. 2799
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2009''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress regarding illicit nuclear activities and
violations of human rights in Iran.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS
Sec. 101. Definitions.
Sec. 102. Expansion of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
Sec. 103. Economic sanctions relating to Iran.
Sec. 104. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by
foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export
sensitive technology to Iran.
Sec. 106. Increased capacity for efforts to combat unlawful or
terrorist financing.
Sec. 107. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 108. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of sanctions on
the Central Bank of Iran.
Sec. 109. Policy of the United States regarding Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps and its affiliates.
Sec. 110. Policy of the United States with respect to Iran and
Hezbollah.
Sec. 111. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of multilateral
sanctions with respect to Iran.
TITLE II--DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN
Sec. 201. Definitions.
Sec. 202. Authority of State and local governments to divest from
certain companies that invest in Iran.
Sec. 203. Safe harbor for changes of investment policies by asset
managers.
Sec. 204. Sense of Congress regarding certain ERISA plan investments.
TITLE III--PREVENTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION OF
SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAN
Sec. 301. Definitions.
Sec. 302. Identification of locations of concern with respect to
transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain
items to Iran.
Sec. 303. Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and Destinations
of Diversion Concern.
Sec. 304. Report on expanding diversion concern system to countries
other than Iran.
TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET
Sec. 401. Effective date; sunset.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The illicit nuclear activities of the Government of
Iran and its support for international terrorism represent
threats to the security of the United States, its strong ally
Israel, and other allies of the United States around the
world.
(2) The United States and other responsible countries have
a vital interest in working together to prevent the
Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability.
(3) The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly
called attention to Iran's illicit nuclear activities and, as
a result, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a
range of sanctions designed to encourage the Government of
Iran to cease those activities and comply with its
obligations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968,
and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the
``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'').
(4) The serious and urgent nature of the threat from Iran
demands that the United States work together with its allies
to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
(5) The United States and its major European allies,
including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have
advocated that sanctions be strengthened should international
diplomatic efforts fail to achieve verifiable suspension of
Iran's uranium enrichment program and an end to its illicit
nuclear activities.
(6) There is an increasing interest by States, local
governments, educational institutions, and private
institutions to seek to disassociate themselves from
companies that conduct business activities in the energy
sector of Iran, since such business activities may directly
or indirectly support the efforts of the Government of Iran
to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
(7) Black market proliferation networks continue to
flourish in the Middle East, allowing countries like Iran to
gain access to sensitive dual-use technologies.
(8) The Government of Iran continues to engage in serious,
systematic, and ongoing violations of human rights and
religious freedom, including illegitimate prolonged
detention, torture, and executions. Such violations have
increased in the aftermath of the presidential election in
Iran on June 12, 2009.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ILLICIT NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) international diplomatic efforts to address Iran's
illicit nuclear efforts and support for international
terrorism are more likely to be effective if the President is
empowered with the explicit authority to impose additional
sanctions on the Government of Iran;
(2) additional measures should be adopted by the United
States to prevent the diversion and transshipment of
sensitive dual-use technologies to Iran;
(3) the concerns of the United States regarding Iran are
strictly the result of the actions of the Government of Iran;
(4) the people of the United States--
(A) have a long history of friendship and exchange with the
people of Iran;
(B) regret that developments in recent decades have created
impediments to that friendship;
(C) hold the people of Iran, their culture, and their
ancient and rich history in the highest esteem; and
(D) remain deeply concerned about continuing human rights
abuses in Iran;
(5) the President should--
(A) continue to press the Government of Iran to respect the
internationally recognized human rights and religious
freedoms of its citizens;
(B) identify the officials of the Government of Iran that
are responsible for continuing and severe violations of human
rights and religious freedom in Iran; and
(C) take appropriate measures to respond to such
violations, including by--
(i) prohibiting officials the President identifies as being
responsible for such violations from entry into the United
States; and
(ii) freezing the assets of those officials; and
(6) additional funding should be provided to the Secretary
of State to document, collect, and disseminate information
about human rights abuses in Iran, including serious abuses
that have taken place since the presidential election in Iran
conducted on June 12, 2009.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS
SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural
commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(3) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has
the meaning given that term in section 4 of the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
(4) Family member.--The term ``family member'' means, with
respect to an individual, the spouse, children,
grandchildren, or parents of the individual.
(5) Information and informational materials.--The term
``information and informational materials'' includes
publications, films, posters, phonograph records,
photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD
ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds.
(6) Investment.--The term ``investment'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14(9) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(7) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other
government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of
iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and representatives of
other government and military or quasi-governmental
institutions of Iran'' has the meaning given that term in
section 14(11)
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of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50
U.S.C. 1701 note).
(8) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the
meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(9) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given
the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
SEC. 102. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT
OF 1996.
(a) In General.--Section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by
striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
``(a) Sanctions With Respect to the Development of
Petroleum Resources of Iran, Production of Refined Petroleum
Products in Iran, and Exportation of Refined Petroleum
Products to Iran.--
``(1) Development of petroleum resources of iran.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions
described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6(a) with
respect to a person if the President determines that the
person, with actual knowledge, on or after the effective date
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2009--
``(i) makes an investment described in subparagraph (B) of
$20,000,000 or more; or
``(ii) makes a combination of investments described in
subparagraph (B) in a 12-month period if each such investment
is at least $5,000,000 and such investments equal or exceed
$20,000,000 in the aggregate.
``(B) Investment described.--An investment described in
this subparagraph is an investment that directly and
significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's
ability to develop petroleum resources.
``(2) Production of refined petroleum products.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose the sanctions described in section
6(b) (in addition to any other sanctions imposed under this
subsection) with respect to a person if the President
determines that the person, with actual knowledge, on or
after the effective date of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, sells, leases, or
provides to Iran any goods, services, technology,
information, or support described in subparagraph (B)--
``(i) any of which has a fair market value of $200,000 or
more; or
``(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate
fair market value of $1,000,000 or more.
``(B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support
described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in this subparagraph are goods, services,
technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of
Iran's domestic production of refined petroleum products,
including any assistance with respect to construction,
modernization, or repair of petroleum refineries.
``(3) Exportation of refined petroleum products to iran.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose the sanctions described in section
6(b) (in addition to any other sanctions imposed under this
subsection) with respect to a person if the President
determines that the person, with actual knowledge, on or
after the effective date of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009--
``(i) provides Iran with refined petroleum products--
``(I) that have a fair market value of $200,000 or more; or
``(II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate
fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or
``(ii) sells, leases, or provides to Iran any goods,
services, technology, information, or support described in
subparagraph (B)--
``(I) any of which has a fair market value of $200,000 or
more; or
``(II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate
fair market value of $1,000,000 or more.
``(B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support
described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in this subparagraph are goods, services,
technology, or support that could directly and significantly
contribute to the enhancement of Iran's ability to import
refined petroleum products, including--
``(i) underwriting or otherwise providing insurance or
reinsurance for the sale, lease, or provision of such goods,
services, technology, information, or support;
``(ii) financing or brokering such sale, lease, or
provision; or
``(iii) providing ships or shipping services to deliver
refined petroleum products to Iran.''.
(b) Description of Sanctions.--Section 6 of such Act is
amended--
(1) by striking ``The sanctions to be imposed on a
sanctioned person under section 5 are as follows:'' and
inserting the following:
``(a) In General.--The sanctions to be imposed on a
sanctioned person under subsections (a)(1) and (b) of section
5 are as follows:''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Additional Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed on
a sanctioned person under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
5(a) are as follows:
``(1) Foreign exchange.--The President shall, pursuant to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
transactions in foreign exchange by the sanctioned person.
``(2) Banking transactions.--The President shall, pursuant
to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit
any transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or
to any financial institution, to the extent that such
transfers or payments involve any interest of the sanctioned
person.
``(3) Property transactions.--The President shall, pursuant
to such regulations as the President may prescribe and
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, prohibit
any person from--
``(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring,
withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any
property with respect to which the sanctioned person has any
interest;
``(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to such property; or
``(C) conducting any transactions involving such
property.''.
(c) Report Relating to Presidential Waiver.--Section
9(c)(2) of such Act is amended by striking subparagraph (C)
and inserting the following:
``(C) an estimate of the significance of the conduct of the
person in contributing to the ability of Iran to, as the case
may be--
``(i) develop petroleum resources, produce refined
petroleum products, or import refined petroleum products; or
``(ii) acquire or develop--
``(I) chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related
technologies; or
``(II) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons; and''.
(d) Clarification and Expansion of Definitions.--Section 14
of such Act is amended--
(1) in paragraph (13)(B)--
(A) by inserting ``financial institution, insurer,
underwriter, guarantor, and any other business organization,
including any foreign subsidiary, parent, or affiliate
thereof,'' after ``trust,''; and
(B) by inserting ``, such as an export credit agency''
before the semicolon at the end;
(2) in paragraph (14), by striking ``petroleum and natural
gas resources'' and inserting ``petroleum, refined petroleum
products, oil or liquefied natural gas, natural gas
resources, oil or liquefied natural gas tankers, and products
used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil
or liquefied natural gas'';
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) as paragraphs
(16) and (17), respectively; and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following:
``(15) Refined petroleum products.--The term `refined
petroleum products' means diesel, gasoline, jet fuel
(including naphtha-type and kerosene-type jet fuel), and
aviation gasoline.''.
(e) Conforming Amendment.--Section 4 of such Act is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``(in addition to
that provided in subsection (d))'';
(2) by striking subsection (d); and
(3) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(d) and (e), respectively.
SEC. 103. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, and in addition to any other sanction in effect,
beginning on the date that is 15 days after the effective
date of this Act, the economic sanctions described in
subsection (b) shall apply with respect to Iran.
(b) Sanctions.--The sanctions described in this subsection
are the following:
(1) Prohibition on imports.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no
article of Iranian origin may be imported directly or
indirectly into the United States.
(B) Exception.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) does
not apply to imports from Iran of information and
informational materials.
(2) Prohibition on exports.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no
article of United States origin may be exported directly or
indirectly to Iran.
(B) Exceptions.--The prohibition in subparagraph (A) does
not apply to exports to Iran of--
(i) agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical
devices;
(ii) articles exported to Iran to provide humanitarian
assistance to the people of Iran;
(iii) except as provided in subparagraph (C), information
or informational materials;
(iv) goods, services, or technologies necessary to ensure
the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft produced
in the United States if the exportation of such goods,
services, or technologies is approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce,
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
Treasury regarding the exportation of such goods, services,
or technologies, if appropriate; or
(v) goods, services, or technologies that--
(I) are provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency
and are necessary to support activities of that Agency in
Iran;
(II) are necessary to support activities, including the
activities of nongovernmental
[[Page S329]]
organizations, relating to promoting democracy in Iran; or
(III) the President determines to be necessary to the
national interest of the United States.
(C) Special rule with respect to information and
informational materials.--Notwithstanding subparagraph
(B)(iii), information and informational materials of United
States origin may not be exported directly or indirectly to
Iran--
(i) if the exportation of such information or informational
materials is otherwise controlled--
(I) under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404) (as in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.)); or
(II) under section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to
the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or
antiterrorism policies of the United States; or
(ii) if such information or informational materials are
information or informational materials with respect to which
acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18, United States
Code.
(3) Freezing assets.--
(A) In general.--At such time as the United States has
access to the names of persons in Iran, including Iranian
diplomats and representatives of other government and
military or quasi-governmental institutions of Iran
(including Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and its
affiliates), that satisfy the criteria for designation with
respect to the imposition of sanctions under the authority of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) or are otherwise subject to sanctions under any
other provision of law, the President shall take such action
as may be necessary to freeze, as soon as possible, the funds
and other assets belonging to anyone so named and any family
members or associates of those so named to whom assets or
property of those so named were transferred on or after
January 1, 2009. The action described in the preceding
sentence includes requiring any United States financial
institution that holds funds and assets of a person so named
to report promptly to the Office of Foreign Assets Control
information regarding such funds and assets.
(B) Asset reporting requirement.--Not later than 14 days
after a decision is made to freeze the property or assets of
any person under this paragraph, the President shall report
the name of such person to the appropriate congressional
committees. Such a report may contain a classified annex.
(4) United states government contracts.--The head of an
executive agency may not procure, or enter into a contract
for the procurement of, any goods or services from a person
that meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under
section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of the
sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national
interest of the United States; and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report describing the reasons for the determination.
SEC. 104. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership,
association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other
organization.
(2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means,
with respect to an entity--
(A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by
vote or value in the entity;
(B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors
of the entity; or
(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.
(3) Subsidiary.--The term ``subsidiary'' means an entity
that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a
United States person.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a natural person who is a citizen, resident, or
national of the United States; and
(B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the
United States, any State or territory thereof, or the
District of Columbia, if natural persons described in
subparagraph (A) own or control the entity.
(b) In General.--A United States person shall be subject to
a penalty for a violation of the provisions of Executive
Order 12959 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or Executive Order 13059
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or any other prohibition on
transactions with respect to Iran imposed under the authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), if--
(1) the President determines, pursuant to such regulations
as the President may prescribe, that the United States person
establishes or maintains a subsidiary outside of the United
States for the purpose of circumventing such provisions; and
(2) that subsidiary engages in an act that, if committed in
the United States or by a United States person, would violate
such provisions.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
subsection (b) if the President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national
interest of the United States; and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report describing the reasons for the determination.
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to
acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are--
(A) commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act; or
(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before
such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after
such date of enactment.
(2) Exception.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect
to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned
or controlled by a United States person if the United States
person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS
THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, and pursuant to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, the head of an executive agency may not enter into
or renew a contract for the procurement of goods or services
with a person that exports sensitive technology to Iran.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of the
prohibition under subsection (a) if the President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national
interest of the United States; and
(2) submits to Congress a report describing the reasons for
the determination.
(c) Sensitive Technology Defined.--The term ``sensitive
technology'' means hardware, software, telecommunications
equipment, or any other technology that the President
determines is to be used specifically--
(1) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in
Iran; or
(2) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of
the people of Iran.
SEC. 106. INCREASED CAPACITY FOR EFFORTS TO COMBAT UNLAWFUL
OR TERRORIST FINANCING.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that the work of the Office of
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the
Treasury, which includes the Office of Foreign Assets Control
and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, is critical to
ensuring that the international financial system is not used
for purposes of supporting terrorism and developing weapons
of mass destruction.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations for Office of Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Office
of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence--
(1) $64,611,000 for fiscal year 2010; and
(2) such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal
years 2011 and 2012.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations for the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network.--Section 310(d)(1) of title 31,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``such sums as may
be necessary for fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005''
and inserting ``$104,260,000 for fiscal year 2010 and such
sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2011
and 2012''.
SEC. 107. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Report on Investment and Activities That May Be
Sanctionable Under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report containing--
(A) a description of--
(i) any foreign investments of $20,000,000 or more that
contribute directly and significantly to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources made during the
period described in paragraph (2);
(ii) any sale, lease, or provision to Iran during the
period described in paragraph (2) of any goods, services,
technology, information, or support that would facilitate the
maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic production of
refined petroleum products; and
(iii) any refined petroleum products provided to Iran
during the period described in paragraph (2) and any other
activity that could contribute directly and significantly to
the enhancement of Iran's ability to import refined petroleum
products during that period;
(B) with respect to each investment or other activity
described in subparagraph (A), an identification of--
(i) the date or dates of the investment or activity;
(ii) the steps taken by the United States to respond to the
investment or activity;
(iii) the name and United States domiciliary of any person
that participated or invested in or facilitated the
investment or activity; and
(iv) any Federal Government contracts to which any person
referred to in clause (iii) are parties; and
(C) the determination of the President with respect to
whether each such investment or activity qualifies as a
sanctionable offense under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2) Period described.--The period described in this
paragraph is the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and
ending on the date on which the President submits the report
under paragraph (1).
[[Page S330]]
(b) Subsequent Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an updated version of the report
required under subsection (a) that contains the information
required under that subsection for the 180-day period
preceding the submission of the updated report.
(c) Form of Reports; Publication.--A report submitted under
subsection (a) or (b) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may contain a classified annex. The unclassified
portion of the report shall be published in the Federal
Register.
SEC. 108. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF
SANCTIONS ON THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.
Congress urges the President, in the strongest terms, to
consider immediately using the authority of the President to
impose sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any other
Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or support
of terrorist groups.
SEC. 109. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING IRAN'S
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND ITS AFFILIATES.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) continue to target Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
persistently with economic sanctions for its support for
terrorism, its role in proliferation, and its oppressive
activities against the people of Iran; and
(2) impose sanctions, including travel restrictions,
sanctions authorized pursuant to this Act, and the full range
of sanctions available to the President under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), on--
(A) any foreign individual or entity that is an agent,
alias, front, instrumentality, official, or affiliate of
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and is designated for the
imposition of sanctions by the President;
(B) any individual or entity who--
(i) has provided material support to Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps or any of its affiliates designated for the
imposition of sanctions by the President; or
(ii) has conducted any financial or commercial transaction
with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its
affiliates so designated; and
(C) any foreign government found--
(i) to be providing material support to Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its affiliates designated
for the imposition of sanctions by the President; or
(ii) to have conducted any commercial transaction or
financial transaction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
or any of its affiliates so designated.
SEC. 110. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN
AND HEZBOLLAH.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) continue to counter support received by Hezbollah from
the Government of Iran and other foreign governments in
response to Hezbollah's terrorist activities and the threat
Hezbollah poses to Israel, the democratic sovereignty of
Lebanon, and the national security interests of the United
States;
(2) impose the full range of sanctions available to the
President under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) on Hezbollah, its designated
affiliates and supporters, and persons providing Hezbollah
with commercial, financial, or other services;
(3) urge the European Union, individual countries in
Europe, and other countries to classify Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization to facilitate the disruption of
Hezbollah's operations; and
(4) renew international efforts to disarm Hezbollah and
disband its militias in Lebanon, as called for by United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701
(2006).
SEC. 111. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF
MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) in general, multilateral sanctions are more effective
than unilateral sanctions at achieving desired results from
countries such as Iran;
(2) the President should continue to work with allies of
the United States to impose such sanctions as may be
necessary to prevent the Government of Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapons capability; and
(3) the United States should continue to consult with the 5
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and
Germany (commonly referred to as the ``P5-plus-1'') and other
interested countries regarding imposing new sanctions with
respect to Iran in the event that diplomatic efforts to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability
fail.
TITLE II--DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN
SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Energy sector.--The term ``energy sector'' refers to
activities to develop petroleum or natural gas resources or
nuclear power.
(2) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' has the meaning given that term in section
14(5) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172;
50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(3) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or
instrumentality of Iran.
(4) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
(A) a natural person, corporation, company, business
association, partnership, society, trust, or any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group;
(B) any governmental entity or instrumentality of a
government, including a multilateral development institution
(as defined in section 1701(c)(3) of the International
Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(3))); and
(C) any successor, subunit, parent company, or subsidiary
of any entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(5) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
(6) State or local government.--The term ``State or local
government'' includes--
(A) any State and any agency or instrumentality thereof;
(B) any local government within a State, and any agency or
instrumentality thereof;
(C) any other governmental instrumentality; and
(D) any public institution of higher education within the
meaning of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001
et seq.).
SEC. 202. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DIVEST
FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States Government should support the decision of
any State or local government that for moral, prudential, or
reputational reasons divests from, or prohibits the
investment of assets of the State or local government in, a
person that engages in investment activities in the energy
sector of Iran, as long as that country is subject to
economic sanctions imposed by the United States.
(b) Authority To Divest.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and
enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d)
to divest the assets of the State or local government from,
or prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local
government in, any person that the State or local government
determines, using credible information available to the
public, engages in investment activities in Iran described in
subsection (c).
(c) Investment Activities Described.--A person engages in
investment activities in Iran described in this subsection if
the person--
(1) has an investment of $20,000,000 or more in the energy
sector of Iran, including in a person that provides oil or
liquified natural gas tankers, or products used to construct
or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquified
natural gas, for the energy sector in Iran; or
(2) is a financial institution that extends $20,000,000 or
more in credit to another person, for 45 days or more, if
that person will use the credit to invest in the energy
sector in Iran.
(d) Requirements.--Any measure taken by a State or local
government under subsection (b) shall meet the following
requirements:
(1) Notice.--The State or local government shall provide
written notice to each person to which a measure is to be
applied.
(2) Timing.--The measure shall apply to a person not
earlier than the date that is 90 days after the date on which
written notice is provided to the person under paragraph (1).
(3) Opportunity for hearing.--The State or local government
shall provide an opportunity to comment in writing to each
person to which a measure is to be applied. If the person
demonstrates to the State or local government that the person
does not engage in investment activities in Iran described in
subsection (c), the measure shall not apply to the person.
(4) Sense of congress on avoiding erroneous targeting.--It
is the sense of Congress that a State or local government
should not adopt a measure under subsection (b) with respect
to a person unless the State or local government has made
every effort to avoid erroneously targeting the person and
has verified that the person engages in investment activities
in Iran described in subsection (c).
(e) Notice to Department of Justice.--Not later than 30
days after adopting a measure pursuant to subsection (b), a
State or local government shall submit written notice to the
Attorney General describing the measure.
(f) Nonpreemption.--A measure of a State or local
government authorized under subsection (b) is not preempted
by any Federal law or regulation.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Investment.--The ``investment'' of assets, with respect
to a State or local government, includes--
(A) a commitment or contribution of assets;
(B) a loan or other extension of credit; and
(C) the entry into or renewal of a contract for goods or
services.
(2) Assets.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the term ``assets'' refers to public monies and includes any
pension, retirement, annuity, or endowment fund, or similar
instrument, that is controlled by a State or local
government.
(B) Exception.--The term ``assets'' does not include
employee benefit plans covered
[[Page S331]]
by title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).
(h) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this
section applies to measures adopted by a State or local
government before, on, or after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(2) Notice requirements.--Subsections (d) and (e) apply to
measures adopted by a State or local government on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 203. SAFE HARBOR FOR CHANGES OF INVESTMENT POLICIES BY
ASSET MANAGERS.
(a) In General.--Section 13(c)(1) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-13(c)(1)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
Federal or State law, no person may bring any civil,
criminal, or administrative action against any registered
investment company, or any employee, officer, director, or
investment adviser thereof, based solely upon the investment
company divesting from, or avoiding investing in, securities
issued by persons that the investment company determines,
using credible information available to the public--
``(A) conduct or have direct investments in business
operations in Sudan described in section 3(d) of the Sudan
Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note); or
``(B) engage in investment activities in Iran described in
section 202(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009.''.
(b) SEC Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and
Exchange Commission shall issue any revisions the Commission
determines to be necessary to the regulations requiring
disclosure by each registered investment company that divests
itself of securities in accordance with section 13(c) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to include divestments of
securities in accordance with paragraph (1)(B) of such
section, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 204. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CERTAIN ERISA PLAN
INVESTMENTS.
It is the sense of Congress that a fiduciary of an employee
benefit plan, as defined in section 3(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(3)),
may divest plan assets from, or avoid investing plan assets
in, any person the fiduciary determines engages in investment
activities in Iran described in section 202(c) of this Act,
without breaching the responsibilities, obligations, or
duties imposed upon the fiduciary by section 404 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.
1104), if--
(1) the fiduciary makes such determination using credible
information that is available to the public; and
(2) such divestment or avoidance of investment is conducted
in accordance with section 2509.08-1 of title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date
of the enactment of this Act).
TITLE III--PREVENTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION OF
SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAN
SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) End-user.--The term ``end-user'' means an end-user as
that term is used in the Export Administration Regulations.
(3) Export administration regulations.--The term ``Export
Administration Regulations'' means subchapter C of chapter
VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
(4) Government.--The term ``government'' includes any
agency or instrumentality of a government.
(5) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or
instrumentality of Iran.
(6) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor
of terrorism'' means any country the government of which the
Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism pursuant to--
(A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor
thereto);
(B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780(d)); or
(C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2371(a)).
(7) Transshipment, reexportation, or diversion.--The term
``transshipment, reexportation, or diversion'' means the
exportation, directly or indirectly, of items that originated
in the United States to an end-user whose identity cannot be
verified or to an entity in Iran in violation of the laws or
regulations of the United States by any means, including by--
(A) shipping such items through 1 or more foreign
countries; or
(B) by using false information regarding the country of
origin of such items.
SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS OF CONCERN WITH RESPECT
TO TRANSSHIPMENT, REEXPORTATION, OR DIVERSION
OF CERTAIN ITEMS TO IRAN.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies
all countries that the Director determines are of concern
with respect to transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of
items subject to the provisions of the Export Administration
Regulations to an entity in Iran.
SEC. 303. DESTINATIONS OF POSSIBLE DIVERSION CONCERN AND
DESTINATIONS OF DIVERSION CONCERN.
(a) Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern.--
(1) Designation.--The Secretary of Commerce shall designate
a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern if
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that such
designation is appropriate to carry out activities to
strengthen the export control systems of that country based
on criteria that include--
(A) the volume of items that originated in the United
States that are transported through the country to end-users
whose identities cannot be verified;
(B) the inadequacy of the export and reexport controls of
the country;
(C) the unwillingness or demonstrated inability of the
government of the country to control diversion activities;
and
(D) the unwillingness or inability of the government of the
country to cooperate with the United States in interdiction
efforts.
(2) Strengthening export control systems of destinations of
possible diversion concern.--If the Secretary of Commerce
designates a country as a Destination of Possible Diversion
Concern under paragraph (1), the United States shall initiate
government-to-government activities described in paragraph
(3) to strengthen the export control systems of the country.
(3) Government-to-government activities described.--The
government-to-government activities described in this
paragraph include--
(A) cooperation by agencies and departments of the United
States with counterpart agencies and departments in a country
designated as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern
under paragraph (1) to--
(i) develop or strengthen export control systems in the
country;
(ii) strengthen cooperation and facilitate enforcement of
export control systems in the country; and
(iii) promote information and data exchanges among agencies
of the country and with the United States; and
(B) efforts by the Office of International Programs of the
Department of Commerce to strengthen the export control
systems of the country to--
(i) facilitate legitimate trade in high-technology goods;
and
(ii) prevent terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism,
including Iran, from obtaining nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, defense technologies, components for
improvised explosive devices, and other defense items.
(b) Destinations of Diversion Concern.--
(1) Designation.--The Secretary of Commerce shall designate
a country as a Destination of Diversion Concern if the
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of the Treasury, determines--
(A) that the government of the country allows substantial
transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of items that
originated in the United States to end-users whose identities
cannot be verified or to entities in Iran; or
(B) 12 months after the Secretary of Commerce designates
the country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern
under subsection (a)(1), that the country has failed--
(i) to cooperate with the government-to-government
activities initiated by the United States under subsection
(a)(2); or
(ii) based on the criteria described in subsection (a)(1),
to adequately strengthen the export control systems of the
country.
(2) Licensing controls with respect to destinations of
diversion concern.--
(A) Report on suspect items.--
(i) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
containing a list of items that, if the items were
transshipped, reexported, or diverted to Iran, could
contribute to--
(I) Iran obtaining nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, defense technologies, components for improvised
explosive devices, or other defense items; or
(II) support by Iran for acts of international terrorism.
(ii) Considerations for list.--In developing the list
required under clause (i), the Secretary of Commerce shall
consider--
(I) the items subject to licensing requirements under
section 742.8 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling) and other
existing licensing requirements; and
(II) the items added to the list of items for which a
license is required for exportation to North Korea by the
final rule of the Bureau
[[Page S332]]
of Export Administration of the Department of Commerce issued
on June 19, 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 38148; relating to export
restrictions on North Korea).
(B) Licensing requirement.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Commerce shall require a license to export an item on the
list required under subparagraph (A)(i) to a country
designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern.
(C) Waiver.--The President may waive the imposition of the
licensing requirement under subparagraph (B) with respect to
a country designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern if
the President--
(i) determines that such a waiver is in the national
interest of the United States; and
(ii) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report describing the reasons for the determination.
(c) Termination of Designation.--The designation of a
country as a Destination of Possible Diversion Concern or a
Destination of Diversion Concern shall terminate on the date
on which the Secretary of Commerce determines, based on the
criteria described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of
subsection (a)(1), and certifies to Congress and the
President that the country has adequately strengthened the
export control systems of the country to prevent
transshipment, reexportation, and diversion of items through
the country to end-users whose identities cannot be verified
or to entities in Iran.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section.
SEC. 304. REPORT ON EXPANDING DIVERSION CONCERN SYSTEM TO
COUNTRIES OTHER THAN IRAN.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that--
(1) identifies any country that the Director determines may
be transshipping, reexporting, or diverting items subject to
the provisions of the Export Administration Regulations to
another country if such other country--
(A) is seeking to obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, defense technologies, components for improvised
explosive devices, or other defense items; or
(B) provides support for acts of international terrorism;
and
(2) assesses the feasability and advisability of expanding
the system established under section 303 for designating
countries as Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and
Destinations of Diversion Concern to include countries
identified under paragraph (1).
TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET
SEC. 401. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.
(a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in sections 104,
202, and 303(b)(2), the provisions of, and amendments made
by, this Act shall take effect on the date that is 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Sunset.--The provisions of this Act shall terminate on
the date that is 30 days after the date on which the
President certifies to Congress that--
(1) the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for
acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the
requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism
under--
(A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor
thereto);
(B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780(d)); or
(C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2371(a)); and
(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and
development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
bill was passed and to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I am pleased that the Senate just passed
S. 2799, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2009 and I thank Senators Dodd, Kerry, Shelby,
Lieberman, Bayh, Kyl and many others who have worked so hard to get
this important legislation passed.
I believe that passing this legislation is critical to send Iran the
message that the United States is serious about keeping Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons capability. This legislation would impose new
sanctions on Iran's refined petroleum sector and tighten existing U.S.
sanctions in an effort to create new pressure on the Iranian regime and
help stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
We have all watched the Iranian regime oppress its own people on the
streets of Iran. And we have watched them continue to defy the
international community on nuclear issues.
That is why it is so important that we move this legislation forward
quickly. I know that a number of Senators had concerns, or changes they
wanted to make to this legislation, including Senator McCain, who has
an amendment he wanted to offer on human rights on Iran. I am committed
to working with him, and others, as we move forward in conference.
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