[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 20, 2010)]
[House]
[Pages H226-H229]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT
Ms. CLARKE. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in
the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 730) to strengthen efforts in
the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics
capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear material,
and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:
Senate amendment:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Forensics and
Attribution Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American
interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most
serious threats to the national security of the United
States. In the wake of an attack, attribution of
responsibility would be of utmost importance. Because of the
destructive power of a nuclear weapon, there could be little
forensic evidence except the radioactive material in the
weapon itself.
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing
techniques and those under development, it may be possible to
identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after
it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying
intercepted smuggled material is now possible in some cases,
pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field.
The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature,
and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time
constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or
radiological attack.
(3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the
source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or
used in an act of terror could also deter prospective
proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective
attribution could compel improved security at material
storage facilities, preventing the unwitting transfer of
nuclear or radiological materials.
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and
other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to
have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely
manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples
against known signatures of nuclear and radiological
material.
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of
a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely
acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the
past several decades, the ability of the United States to
gather atmospheric samples--often the preferred method of
sample acquisition--has diminished. This ability must be
restored and modern techniques that could complement or
replace existing techniques should be pursued.
(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a
relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a
nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional
forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation
scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools
for analysis and characterization of samples. The number of
radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States
National Laboratories and universities has dramatically
declined over the past several decades. The narrowing
pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a
serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible
nuclear forensics program.
(5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it
is necessary to compare the results against samples of known
material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities,
and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities
containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of
these samples are available to the International Atomic
Energy Agency
[[Page H227]]
through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain
internal sample databases. Access to samples in many
countries is limited by national security concerns.
(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is
necessary to have the capability to positively identify the
source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential
traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware
of that capability. International cooperation may be
essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or
radiological material.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR
FORENSICS COOPERATION.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should--
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international
agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the
auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an
international framework for determining the source of any
confiscated nuclear or radiological material or weapon, as
well as the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or
radiological material used in such a weapon;
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or
radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or
radiological materials, to the extent required by the
agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and
(3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and
dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly
identify the source of a nuclear detonation.
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
OFFICE.
(a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 1902 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by Public Law
110-53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (14); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
``(10) lead the development and implementation of the
national strategic five-year plan for improving the nuclear
forensic and attribution capabilities of the United States
required under section 1036 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010;
``(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to
provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap
analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all
Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities--
``(A) to ensure an enduring national technical nuclear
forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of
the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear
attacks; and
``(B) to coordinate and implement the national strategic
five-year plan referred to in paragraph (10);
``(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise
Development Program, which--
``(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a vibrant
and enduring academic pathway from undergraduate to post-
doctorate study in nuclear and geochemical science
specialties directly relevant to technical nuclear forensics,
including radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear physics,
nuclear engineering, materials science, and analytical
chemistry;
``(B) shall--
``(i) make available for undergraduate study student
scholarships, with a duration of up to 4 years per student,
which shall include, if possible, at least 1 summer
internship at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal
agency in the field of technical nuclear forensics during the
course of the student's undergraduate career;
``(ii) make available for doctoral study student
fellowships, with a duration of up to 5 years per student,
which shall--
``(I) include, if possible, at least 2 summer internships
at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency in the
field of technical nuclear forensics during the course of the
student's graduate career; and
``(II) require each recipient to commit to serve for 2
years in a post-doctoral position in a technical nuclear
forensics-related specialty at a national laboratory or
appropriate Federal agency after graduation;
``(iii) make available to faculty awards, with a duration
of 3 to 5 years each, to ensure faculty and their graduate
students have a sustained funding stream; and
``(iv) place a particular emphasis on reinvigorating
technical nuclear forensics programs while encouraging the
participation of undergraduate students, graduate students,
and university faculty from historically Black colleges and
universities, Hispanic-serving institutions, Tribal Colleges
and Universities, Asian American and Native American Pacific
Islander-serving institutions, Alaska Native-serving
institutions, and Hawaiian Native-serving institutions; and
``(C) shall--
``(i) provide for the selection of individuals to receive
scholarships or fellowships under this section through a
competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit
and the nuclear forensics and attribution needs of the United
States Government;
``(ii) provide for the setting aside of up to 10 percent of
the scholarships or fellowships awarded under this section
for individuals who are Federal employees to enhance the
education of such employees in areas of critical nuclear
forensics and attribution needs of the United States
Government, for doctoral education under the scholarship on a
full-time or part-time basis;
``(iii) provide that the Secretary may enter into a
contractual agreement with an institution of higher education
under which the amounts provided for a scholarship under this
section for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are
paid directly to the institution with respect to which such
scholarship is awarded;
``(iv) require scholarship recipients to maintain
satisfactory academic progress; and
``(v) require that--
``(I) a scholarship recipient who fails to maintain a high
level of academic standing, as defined by the Secretary, who
is dismissed for disciplinary reasons from the educational
institution such recipient is attending, or who voluntarily
terminates academic training before graduation from the
educational program for which the scholarship was awarded
shall be liable to the United States for repayment within 1
year after the date of such default of all scholarship funds
paid to such recipient and to the institution of higher
education on the behalf of such recipient, provided that the
repayment period may be extended by the Secretary if the
Secretary determines it necessary, as established by
regulation; and
``(II) a scholarship recipient who, for any reason except
death or disability, fails to begin or complete the post-
doctoral service requirements in a technical nuclear
forensics-related specialty at a national laboratory or
appropriate Federal agency after completion of academic
training shall be liable to the United States for an amount
equal to--
``(aa) the total amount of the scholarship received by such
recipient under this section; and
``(bb) the interest on such amounts which would be payable
if at the time the scholarship was received such scholarship
was a loan bearing interest at the maximum legally prevailing
rate;
``(13) provide an annual report to Congress on the
activities carried out under paragraphs (10), (11), and (12);
and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Alaska native-serving institution.--The term `Alaska
Native-serving institution' has the meaning given the term in
section 317 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1059d).
``(2) Asian american and native american pacific islander-
serving institution.--The term `Asian American and Native
American Pacific Islander-serving institution' has the
meaning given the term in section 320 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059g).
``(3) Hawaiian native-serving institution.--The term
`Hawaiian native-serving institution' has the meaning given
the term in section 317 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1059d).
``(4) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic-
serving institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1101a).
``(5) Historically black college or university.--The term
`historically Black college or university' has the meaning
given the term `part B institution' in section 322(2) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
``(6) Tribal college or university.--The term `Tribal
College or University' has the meaning given that term in
section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1059c(b)).''.
(b) Joint Interagency Annual Reporting Requirement to
Congress and the President.--
(1) In general.--Section 1907(a)(1) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596a(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
and each of the relevant departments that are partners in the
National Technical Forensics Center--
``(i) include, as part of the assessments, evaluations, and
reviews required under this paragraph, each office's or
department's activities and investments in support of nuclear
forensics and attribution activities and specific goals and
objectives accomplished during the previous year pursuant to
the national strategic five-year plan for improving the
nuclear forensic and attribution capabilities of the United
States required under section 1036 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010;
``(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the Joint Interagency
Annual Review, the most current version of such strategy and
plan; and
``(iii) includes a description of new or amended bilateral
and multilateral agreements and efforts in support of nuclear
forensics and attribution activities accomplished during the
previous year.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
New York (Ms. Clarke) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. King) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Clarke).
General Leave
Ms. CLARKE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and to insert extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from New York?
There was no objection.
Ms. CLARKE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in support of concurring in the Senate
amendment to H.R. 730.
[[Page H228]]
H.R. 730, the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act, was first
introduced in the 110th Congress by the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff).
To strengthen our Nation's ability to prepare for and to respond to a
conventional nuclear or dirty bomb threat, that measure, H.R. 2631, was
marked up and adopted unanimously by the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology in October 2007,
which is the subcommittee I now chair.
It was unanimously approved by the full Committee on Homeland
Security on May 20, 2008, and in the House of Representatives on June
18, 2008. Though the measure was taken up, amended and passed by the
Senate in late September, the stars didn't align, and it didn't clear
the last hurdle to arrive on the President's desk. In this Congress, we
started early and brought the measure directly to the floor where it
passed on March 24, 2009. Now the Senate has acted, and it is time to
pass this bill into law.
I would like to congratulate Congressman Schiff and my colleagues on
the committee for recognizing the need to move quickly.
We know that our enemies, both terrorists and rogue nations, are
interested in developing and using nuclear or radiological weapons. In
the case of an attempted or, heaven forbid, a successful nuclear or
radiological attack, rapid attribution is critical. Our government must
have the capacity to quickly determine the source of the nuclear
material so that key decision-makers have the information needed to
respond.
The deterrent effect of a robust nuclear forensics capability should
not be underestimated. Certainly, if terrorists know that we have a
nuclear forensics capability that can pinpoint their role in creating a
bomb, they are bound to have second thoughts. Unfortunately, today, the
U.S. must rely on forensic expertise and technology developed during
the Cold War to address both nuclear weapons and the emerging threat of
a radiological dirty bomb.
The nuclear weapons workforce is aging just as its mission has
shifted from traditional deterrent policy to the more complicated
challenge of containing the terrorist threat. Our Nation's capabilities
in the scientific fields of radiochemistry and geochemistry must be
fostered to meet this new threat. That is the purpose of this bill.
H.R. 730 expresses the sense of Congress that the President should
pursue international agreements and develop protocols to share
sensitive information needed to identify the source of a nuclear
detonation.
I am heartened that the Obama administration has indicated its
willingness to engage in and to reenergize such activities.
It also tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security with the mission of
developing methods to attribute nuclear or radiological material both
within the Department's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, and in
partnership with other Federal agencies.
The legislation emphasizes that the development of a robust nuclear
forensics capability depends chiefly on an expertly trained workforce
in this area, and it provides support for education programs relevant
to nuclear forensics.
H.R. 730 also authorizes the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center, NTNFC, to enhance the centralized planning and integration of
Federal nuclear forensics activities. It requires the Secretary to
report annually to Congress on the Federal Government's efforts to
enhance its nuclear forensics capabilities, including the status of
workforce development programs; and it authorizes $30 million per year
for the next 3 fiscal years for this effort.
H.R. 730 continues the Homeland Security Committee's practice of
authorizing programs and offices within DHS that are of value to the
agency's mission in order to assure that the work can continue and that
progress can be achieved in the years to come.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KING of New York. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, again, let me thank Congresswoman Clarke for her
leadership on this. Let me also thank Ranking Member Dan Lungren for
his work.
Let me especially thank Mr. Schiff for his efforts on this and for so
many other efforts on behalf of our national security. I have the
privilege of serving with Mr. Schiff on the Intelligence Committee, so
I have firsthand knowledge of the dedication which he brings to issues
such as this.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 730. Let me just say
that, in many ways, this is the other side of the same coin. We just
adopted H.R. 2611, which is to prevent nuclear attacks against our
cities. H.R. 730 will enable us to detect where those nuclear devices
came from. It's absolutely essential that we deal with the process of
determining the source of confiscated nuclear material. This is a
grave, grave threat to our homeland, and it must be addressed
immediately and robustly. We must have a rigorous attribution program
to find the culprits of these crimes and to offer a deterrent to
nuclear terrorism.
The one concern I do have is that the bill, as amended, coming back
from the Senate does not authorize the appropriation of $30 million. I
believe that is important. It is essential that we have it; but, again,
this is a major step forward, so I am pleased to support the
legislation even though I wish that the $30 million had been included
in it.
This bill targets an ongoing threat in a unique way. It will
reinvigorate the workforce pipeline to guarantee the Nation a resource
of technical experts in this vital and critical field, and it will
strengthen America's attribution capabilities.
Again, this is a bipartisan effort. It's the Homeland Security
Committee working with Mr. Schiff and the Intelligence Committee. It is
important that we pass this and that we really, again, send a strong
signal of how we do believe in layered defenses, of how we realize the
need of staying ahead of the terrorist threat and of doing all we can
to protect the American people in a way which certainly transcends
Republican or Democrat lines or liberal-conservative lines. It is an
issue that should galvanize all Americans.
So, with that, I strongly urge support of H.R. 730.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. CLARKE. Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the author of this bill.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, at the outset, I want to thank and
congratulate the Homeland Security Committee and Chairman Thompson. The
committee has taken an important step forward towards preventing
nuclear terrorism by persevering with this legislation, and I
appreciate all of the hard work that the chairman and staff have put
into it.
I also want to thank other Members who have contributed greatly to
the effort, one being the ranking member, Peter King.
Mr. King, once again, I thank you for your leadership in this area.
I want to thank the former chairman of the Emerging Threats
Subcommittee, an early supporter, Jim Langevin; the current chairwoman
of that subcommittee, Yvette Clarke; as well as the ranking member of
the subcommittee, Dan Lungren; and in the last Congress, Michael
McCaul.
The Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act will help us fight one of
the most important national security threats we face, that of nuclear
proliferation. Countries around the world now have access to technology
that was once the realm of the few; and dangerous nuclear materials
are, unfortunately, sprinkled around the world. This is not a new
problem. Illicit nuclear material has been intercepted in transit out
of the former Soviet Union many times since the end of the Cold War,
and the material we catch is surely only a small fraction of the total
amount trafficked.
Last year, Graham Allison wrote in Newsweek that the only thing that
could keep nuclear bombs out of the hands of terrorists is a brand-new
science of nuclear forensics. He continued that the key to a new
deterrent is coming up with some way of tracing the nuclear material
backward from an explosion in New York City to the reactor that forged
the fissile material, even to the mines that yielded the original
uranium ore.
The Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act is designed to do just
that. It is aimed at the decision-makers in
[[Page H229]]
North Korea, Pakistan, Iran or elsewhere who could sell nuclear
material, as well as the smugglers and corrupt officials around the
world who could steal it. Those parts of the nuclear network can be
deterred by the knowledge that, if their material is later intercepted,
the United States will find out and will hold them responsible.
This bill expands our ability to determine the source of nuclear
material by authorizing the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
in the Department of Homeland Security. This center will coordinate the
various agencies, and it will ensure an efficient combined response
when nuclear material is intercepted or used, God forbid, in a weapon.
It will also advance the science of nuclear forensics, bringing in new
radiochemists and physicists to rejuvenate a rapidly aging workforce
and funding research on new methods to identify materials. It also
takes an important step toward building the nuclear forensic database
we will need to effectively track nuclear material.
The bill asks the President to negotiate agreements with other
nations to share forensic data on their nuclear materials, both
civilian and military.
This effort is vital, and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center must play a key role in negotiations to ensure that the data we
obtain is the data we need for quick attribution and response.
{time} 1400
Nuclear terrorism is an indistinct threat of devastating consequence
and therefore difficult to guard against. But as communications and
transportation revolutions bring us ever closer to our allies, they
bring our enemies close as well. I believe this bill will help make
sure that our ability to prevent a nuclear terror attack keeps up with
our enemies' ability to attempt one.
Again, I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for their
leadership and urge all Members to support the bill.
Mr. KING of New York. Madam Speaker, I would like to close by stating
that all of us realize that a terrorist attack is a nightmare scenario.
The fact that we came so close to the loss of life on Christmas Day
reminded us dramatically of the dangerous world in which we live. Those
of us from New York will never forget September 11, 2001. But just
think of the ultimate nightmare scenario, and that would be a nuclear
attack. That is almost beyond our imagination. That is why everything
must be done to stop those attacks, and to also have the deterrent, as
Congressman Schiff said, the deterrent of retaliation against any
country, against any entity, against any individual, any organization,
which was in any way involved in providing nuclear weaponry to be used
against the United States.
I strongly urge the adoption of this legislation.
I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Ms. CLARKE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
In closing, I would encourage my colleagues to vote ``aye'' on the
pending question. Doing so will allow this important homeland security
legislation to be sent to the President's desk for his signature
without delay.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Clarke) that the House suspend the rules
and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 730.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Ms. CLARKE. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
____________________