[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 3 (Wednesday, January 13, 2010)]
[House]
[Pages H113-H115]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  BIPARTISAN COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, earlier this week, the co-chairs of the 9/11 
Commission, Lee Hamilton and Thomas Kean, in an op-ed for the USA 
Today, wrote that ``national security is too important to become a 
partisan issue.'' And I could not agree more.
  That is why I wrote President Obama yesterday with three specific 
actions that I recommended he could take immediately, with strong 
bipartisanship support, to help prevent future terrorist attacks 
against America. First, I recommended that he immediately bring back 
the two co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission for a six-month period to 
conduct a formal review and follow-up to the 9/11 report. Mr. Hamilton 
and Mr. Kean would be charged with evaluating which of the commission's 
original recommendations have been implemented and to what end, and 
which have failed to be implemented and at what cost.
  Second, I urged the creation of a Team B concept, separate from the 
review that would be conducted by the 9/11 Commission co-chairs. 
Historically, the phrase Team B refers to a group of outside experts 
brought together to analyze the threats posed by the Soviet Union to 
the United States and counter the positions of intelligence officials 
within the CIA and government, known as Team A. The Team B concept has 
been successful in previous administrations when fresh eyes were needed 
to provide the commander in chief with objective information to make 
informed policy decisions. I believe it can work now.
  Third, I urged the President to support the legislation that I 
introduced today to establish a 10-year term of office for the 
administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, 
similar to what the Congress has done in the past for the appointment 
process for the director of the FBI. Bob Mueller has done an 
outstanding job, and that process has worked well.
  Since TSA's creation following 9/11, TSA has had six administrators, 
six, averaging terms of just 1.5 years. The attempted Christmas Day 
bombing of a U.S. airliner points to the need for long-term, strong, 
and capable leadership that is outside of the political process.
  In a separate letter to Deputy National Security Adviser John 
Brennan, I posed a series of pointed questions concerning the security 
situation in Yemen and the circumstances surrounding the failed 
Christmas Day attack. Specifically, I asked the administration how it 
plans to deal with the possible radicalization of some 55,000 
Americans, 55,000 Americans that are currently visiting, living, or 
studying in Yemen, pointing out that these individuals can fly back to 
the United States with American passports.
  The dangers of radicalization in Yemen are very troubling. The 
alleged Fort Hood terrorist, Major Nidal Hasan was radicalized by 
Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al Aulaqi. The alleged terrorist who 
killed a U.S. Army recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas, was also 
radicalized by al Aulaqi. And now we have learned that the alleged 
Christmas Day terrorist was reportedly also in contact with al Aulaqi 
in Yemen. Convicted terrorist John walker Lindh was radicalized in 
Yemen while studying Arabic in 1998 and 2000, leading to his 
collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
  Last week, President Obama said, ``Now is not the time for 
partisanship, it is the time for citizenship--a time to come together, 
work together with the seriousness of purpose that our national 
security demands.'' However, working together demands that this 
administration work with Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, in 
good faith to provide information, answer questions, and consider 
solutions, and to develop a strategy to defeat al Qaeda, whenever and 
however we can.
  The administration must live up to the President's challenge to 
involve Congress in the active participation on counterterrorism 
matters. This can only happen, however, if the legislative branch, 
Republicans and Democrats, are included in the process.
  In closing, I urge my colleagues in the House to support bringing 
back the 9/11 team, Kean and Hamilton, for 6 months, create a Team B to 
consider innovative solutions to disrupt and defeat al Qaeda, and to 
make the TSA administrator position independent and nonpartisan, that 
will go for a long term, similar to what we currently do with regards 
to the FBI. These are good bipartisan steps to protect the homeland, 
and ultimately to defeat al Qaeda.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I thank you for your courtesy, and yield back 
the balance of my time.

                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, January 12, 2010.
     Hon. Barack H. Obama,
     The President, The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: ``National Security is too important to 
     become a partisan issue.'' This sentence was the opening line 
     in a January 11 USA Today op-ed jointly authored by Lee 
     Hamilton and Thomas Kean, co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission. 
     Last week, you, too, said, ``Now is not a time for 
     partisanship, it's a time for citizenship--a time to come 
     together and work together with the seriousness of purpose 
     that our national security demands.'' I could not agree more 
     with this sentiment.
       No nation, including America, can hope to win this long 
     battle against al Qaeda and like foes if the war effort is 
     marked by partisanship. Sadly, not only has partisanship 
     infused the rhetoric surrounding national security 
     discussions, it has actually obstructed the critical role of 
     congressional oversight. Too often in recent months 
     partisanship has resulted in withholding of information, 
     unanswered letters and briefings denied by this 
     administration.
       The stakes are too high and the cost of failure is too 
     great for petty politics to rule the day. The White House has 
     a moral obligation to actively and consistently reach out to 
     the minority party in Congress, to be forthcoming with 
     information and to provide access to all levels of 
     government.
       Hamilton and Kean go on to write, ``We intend to monitor 
     the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations 
     and report on new national security threats.'' I urge you to 
     encourage this effort by bringing back these two co-chairs 
     for a six-month period to conduct a formal review and 9/11 
     Commission follow-up. They would be charged with evaluating 
     which of the Commission's original recommendations have been 
     implemented and to what end, and which have failed to be 
     implemented and at what cost.
       This past weekend, The Washington Post featured an op-ed by 
     Bruce Hoffman, respected professor of security studies at 
     Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the U.S. 
     Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center. Hoffman wrote, 
     ``(W)hile al-Qaeda is finding new ways to exploit our 
     weaknesses, we are stuck in a pattern of belated responses, 
     rather than anticipating its moves and developing preemptive 
     strategies. The `systemic failure' of intelligence analysis 
     and airport security that Obama recently described was not 
     just the product of a compartmentalized bureaucracy or 
     analytical inattention, but a failure to recognize al-Qaeda's 
     new strategy. The national security architecture built in the 
     aftermath of Sept. 11 addresses yesterday's threats--but not 
     today's and certainly not tomorrow's. It is superb at 
     reacting and responding, but not at outsmarting . . . a new 
     approach to counterterrorism is essential.''
       Distinct from temporarily bringing back the two 9/11 
     Commission co-chairs, I also urge the creation of a ``Team 
     B.'' As you may know, historically the phrase ``Team B'' 
     refers to a group of outside experts, commissioned by the 
     Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970's and headed by 
     Richard Pipes, to analyze the threats posed by the Soviet 
     Union to the United States and counter the positions of 
     intelligence officials within the CIA, known as ``Team A.'' 
     In your remarks last week following the review of the 
     attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack, you rightly 
     referred to our enemy as ``nimble.'' Too often our response 
     to the evolving threat posed by al Qaeda, and others 
     sympathetic to their murderous aims, is anything but.

[[Page H114]]

       The Team B concept has been successful in previous 
     administrations when fresh eyes were needed to provide the 
     commander-in-chief with objective information to make 
     informed policy decisions. I believe it can work now, too, 
     and suggest that among the individuals, but not exclusively, 
     whose expertise and forward-thinking would be well-suited to 
     a Team B are: Bruce Hoffman; Andrew McCarthy and Patrick 
     Fitzgerald, both of whom were involved in the prosecution of 
     Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in the first World Trade Center 
     bombings; Fouad Ajami, professor at the School of Advanced 
     International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University; Jean 
     Bethke Elshtain, professor of social and political ethics at 
     the University of Chicago; economist Judy Shelton, National 
     Endowment for Democracy board member; foreign policy 
     columnist and author Anne Applebaum; Andrew F. Krepinevich 
     Jr., author of Seven Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist 
     Explores War in the 21st Century; Elliot Cohen, professor of 
     Strategic Studies at SAIS; Philip D. Zelikow, diplomat and 
     author who worked as executive director of the 9/11 
     Commission; and Joshua Muravchik, formerly a scholar at the 
     American Enterprise Institute and presently a Foreign Policy 
     Institute fellow at SAIS.
       The 9/11 Commission report was issued nearly six years ago. 
     Even if every recommendation had been implemented, which it 
     has not, our enemy has evolved since that time. Our current 
     intelligence infrastructure is at times overwhelmed by data, 
     information and the urgency of daily events, and as such is 
     unable to dedicate the time and resources necessary to think 
     outside the box and better comprehend this multidimensional 
     threat. ``Team B'' would possess the necessary expertise but 
     would be free from these daily pressures. The team would 
     represent a ``new approach to counterterrorism'' which 
     focuses not just on connecting the dots of intelligence, but 
     which seeks to stay a step ahead in understanding how to 
     break the radicalization and recruitment cycle that sustains 
     our enemy, how to disrupt their network globally and how to 
     strategically isolate them.
       I also believe there is an urgent need to make the 
     Transportation Security Agency (TSA) administrator a long-
     term position. Since TSA's inception following the 9/11 
     attacks, there have been six Transportation Security Agency 
     administrators and acting administrators. For a position of 
     this import to turn over with such frequency and to 
     automatically change hands with each new administration 
     simply does not make sense. I am introducing legislation that 
     mirrors the language used to establish a 10-year term and 
     Senate confirmation for FBI directors. I am hopeful that 
     members of both parties will see the merits of this proposal 
     and I urge your support for this change.
       America is a great nation facing an enemy unlike any other 
     we have ever known. We must steel ourselves for the struggle 
     ahead, frankly assessing the nature and scope of the threat 
     we face and guarding against partisanship at all costs. The 
     people of this country deserve nothing less.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Frank R. Wolf,
     Member of Congress.
                                  ____



                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, January 12, 2010.
     Mr. John Brennan,
     Deputy National Security Adviser, The White House, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear John: I write today in light of the proliferation of 
     attempted al Qaeda-sponsored attacks against the U.S. 
     homeland last year to request that you work to engage both 
     Congress and the administration in the process of making the 
     prevention of future attacks our nation's paramount priority. 
     I come to this issue as the author of the language in 1998 
     creating the National Commission on Terrorism and the ranking 
     Republican on the House Commerce-Justice-Science 
     Appropriations Subcommittee that funds key counterterrorism 
     programs, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
     and the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG)--which 
     was established by your administration to address the 
     concerns about detainee interrogations in Guantanamo Bay--and 
     the U.S. Marshals Service. From that experience, I am 
     concerned that there has been inadequate oversight by this 
     Congress on federal counterterrorism programs and responses.
       I have recently learned from the State Department 
     legislative affairs office that there are an estimated 55,000 
     Americans currently visiting, living, or studying in Yemen, 
     along with other Westerners. As you know, alleged Fort Hood 
     terrorist Major Nidal Hasan was radicalized by Yemeni-
     American cleric Anwar al Aulaqi. The alleged terrorist who 
     killed the U.S. Army recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas, was 
     also reportedly radicalized by al Aulaqi. Now we have learned 
     that the alleged Christmas Day terrorist, Umar Farouk 
     Abdulmutallab, was also in contact with al Aulaqi in Yemen. 
     You may also be aware that convicted terrorist John Walker 
     Lindh was radicalized in Yemen while studying Arabic in 1998 
     and 2000, leading to his collaboration with the Taliban in 
     Afghanistan. How many of the 55,000 Americans now in Yemen 
     are subject to radicalization by al Aulaqi and other al Qaeda 
     recruiters? How is your administration planning to deal with 
     the possible radicalization of those who can fly back to the 
     U.S. with American passports? This is especially troubling in 
     light of the fact that the Yemeni government does not control 
     large portions of the country outside the capital city.
       In his remarks last week, President Obama said, ``Now is 
     not a time for partisanship, it's a time for citizenship--a 
     time to come together and work together with the seriousness 
     of purpose that our national security demands.'' I could not 
     agree more. However, working together demands that both the 
     Congress, including Republicans and Democrats, and the 
     administration work in good faith to provide information, 
     answer questions, consider solutions, and to develop a 
     strategy to defeat al Qaeda wherever it may be active.
       It is disappointing that this administration has been, thus 
     far, unresponsive to my letters and requests for information 
     as well as letters from other Republican members of the House 
     and Senate. I have sent six letters to the president and 
     administration officials since October 1, 2009, expressing 
     concern over the security situation in Yemen and the efforts 
     of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to attack the U.S. I 
     have read the classified biographies of the Guantanamo Bay 
     detainees that have been released to Yemen and other unstable 
     countries and have urged that this information be provided in 
     unclassified form to the American people. If the American 
     people could see the backgrounds of some of these detainees 
     being sent back to these countries, I believe they would be 
     shocked. For example, Ayman Batarfi, one of the Yemeni 
     detainees released by this administration on December 19, 
     2009, has worked closely with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan 
     and trained with a microbiologist who taught al Qaeda how to 
     produce anthrax in August 2001, according to unclassified 
     Pentagon documents from 2004. These detainees are, in many 
     cases, highly trained terrorists with close ties to al Qaeda.
       In December, I offered an amendment to the fiscal year 2010 
     omnibus appropriations legislation that would have required 
     unclassified notifications about impending detainee releases. 
     Unfortunately, my amendment was defeated along party lines. 
     We can and must do better to end this reflexive partisan 
     opposition. To this end, I would appreciate your responses to 
     the following questions relating to Yemen and the recent 
     terrorist acts committed against the United States:
       1. The president has indicated that six Guantanamo 
     detainees released to Yemen in December remain in government 
     custody, although other accounts indicate that they may have 
     been paroled to their families. What is the current custody 
     status of these former detainees?
       2. According an article in today's Washington Post, 
     ``Yemen's fragile government fears that Somali fighters from 
     al-Shabab will swell the ranks of Yemen's Islamist militants 
     at a time when links between the Somali group and al-Qaeda in 
     the Arabian Peninsula are growing.'' Do the same security 
     concerns expressed by the administration with regard to Yemen 
     apply to Somaliland?
       3. Does the U.S. government now recognize Somaliland as an 
     independent state? Does it have relations with the region's 
     government? Are U.S. officials receiving cooperation from the 
     Somaliland regional government?
       4. It is my understanding that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
     indicated to authorities that he had trained in Yemen with 
     other al Qaeda members prepared to launch similar attacks 
     targeting U.S. airliners. Is this correct? If so, what 
     countries are these suspected terrorists from?
       5. Following the thwarted Christmas Day attack, who 
     interrogated Mr. Abdul-mutallab? Which agencies were 
     consulted for questions prior to the interrogation? Which 
     agencies submitted questions for the interrogation? Was he 
     interrogated prior to being read Miranda rights? Given that 
     this attack occurred on the Christmas holiday, did the 
     appropriate high-level officials come to Detroit to conduct 
     or support the interrogation?
       6. Was Mr. Abdulmutallab considered a ``high-value'' 
     detainee upon his arrest? What qualifies a detainee to be 
     considered of ``high-value''? Was the new High-Value Detainee 
     Interrogation Group (HIG) involved in his interrogation? Did 
     every agency (that is represented on the HIG) participate in 
     the interrogation?
       7. I was told in September 2009 that the Interrogation Task 
     Force had made recommendations to the president, which he had 
     approved. What is the new interrogation policy and how was it 
     applied, if at all, in the interrogation of Mr. 
     Abdulmutallab? If it was not applied, why not?
       8. Does the new interrogation policy draw distinctions 
     based upon whether the detainee is apprehended inside or 
     outside the U.S.? If so, please specify.
       9. What are the restrictions--legal, policy or procedure--
     that limit which agencies can take part in such 
     interrogations? Were other intelligence agencies involved?
       10. Who made the decision to arrest Mr. Abdulmutallab 
     rather than transfer him to military custody to be held as an 
     enemy combatant? Which agencies were consulted in this 
     decision?
       11. Was Mr. Abdulmutallab advised to stop cooperating with 
     interrogators after being provided with legal counsel? If so, 
     did he?
       12. Why were the terms ``al Qaeda,'' ``Yemen,'' 
     ``terrorism,'' or ``jihad'' not mentioned to describe Mr. 
     Abdulmutallab's activities in the seven-page charging 
     instrument?

[[Page H115]]

       13. Was Christmas Day chosen for attack by al Qaeda for 
     symbolic value?
       14. What connections exist between the radical cleric al 
     Aulaqi and the Christmas Day, Fort Hood, and Arkansas 
     attacks--as well as other terrorist plots last year?
       15. How many former Guantanamo detainees have returned to 
     terrorism?
       16. Has the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on 
     detainee recidivism been revised upward? If so, when will 
     this report be released publicly? Has the president seen the 
     updated report?
       17. In a recent op-ed in The Washington Post, Professor 
     Bruce Hoffman, a respected professor of security studies at 
     Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the U.S. 
     Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center, wrote, 
     ``During the past 18 months, American and British 
     intelligence officials have said, well over 100 individuals 
     from such countries have graduated from terrorist training 
     camps in Pakistan and have been sent West to undertake 
     terrorist operations.'' Is this assessment low or high?
       18. Does al Qaeda monitor congressional hearings or think 
     tank publications relating to U.S. counterterrorism strategy?
       19. What are the primary strategies al Qaeda uses to 
     recruit Westerners? Which strategies have been most 
     successful?
       I would appreciate a response to these questions as soon as 
     possible. The answers to these questions will be critical in 
     helping Congress play an active and participatory role in 
     working with the administration on counterterrorism matters. 
     This can only happen, however, if the legislative branch--
     including the minority party--is included in this process.
       I look forward to your response. Please do not hesitate to 
     contact me or my staff member, Thomas Culligan, at 202-225-
     5136 if I can be of assistance.
       Best wishes.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Frank R. Wolf,
     Member of Congress.

                          ____________________