[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 183 (Tuesday, December 8, 2009)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2909-E2910]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         SPEECH ON AFGHANISTAN

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. IKE SKELTON

                              of missouri

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, December 8, 2009

  Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, on Friday December 4, 2009, I had an 
opportunity to address the American Security Project Conference 
regarding the situation in Afghanistan. This speech followed a hearing 
of the House Armed Services Committee, which I chair, the day before. 
My address is as follows:

  [Speech given at the American Security Project Conference, Dec. 4, 
                                 2009]

    Beyond the Surge: Assessing the President's Afghanistan Strategy

                            (By Ike Skelton)

       First, let me take a moment to thank Admiral Gunn for that 
     introduction. You're too kind. I'd like to extend that thanks 
     to Senator Hart and the American Security Project as a whole. 
     You're doing great work, and I appreciate your efforts. I'd 
     also like to say happy birthday to Evelyn Farkas, here at 
     ASP. I would also like to thank our brave men and women in 
     uniform. We have asked much of them in the past decade, and 
     they have not failed to deliver.
       Two months ago, I wrote a letter to the President saying, 
     essentially, that he should listen to his commanders in the 
     field. Being a member of Congress, it took six pages to say 
     that, but that was the basic message. I made that same point 
     in private conversations with the President. And so it 
     pleased me the other night when the President agreed to 
     provide General McChrystal with additional forces needed to 
     make this new strategy work.
       But before assessing the overall strategy, I think we 
     should take a moment to remind ourselves why we're in 
     Afghanistan and the threat we face there.
       Al Qa'ida presents a serious threat to our nation. Osama 
     bin Laden and his minions have attacked us or attempted to 
     attack us many times over the years. The most remarkable 
     attack involved the murder of 3000 civilians--men, women, and 
     children--but it was hardly the only attack. And I do not 
     believe that anyone has a good reason to believe that they 
     have given up their attempts to attack us.
       Following our invasion of Afghanistan in response to this 
     attack, al Qa'ida largely fled to the border regions of 
     Pakistan. Their Taliban allies, meanwhile, continue to 
     escalate their attacks in an attempt to overthrow the Afghan 
     government and drive out the international coalition.
       Others have differing opinions on this, but I do not 
     believe that we can ultimately destroy al Qa'ida if we cannot 
     prevent them from recreating a safe haven in Afghanistan.

[[Page E2910]]

     I also do not believe that we can be successful in rooting 
     them out of Pakistan if we fail in Afghanistan.
       Afghanistan and Pakistan have some inherent advantages for 
     al Qa'ida that other places may not. Having been in the 
     region for over 20 years, they have married into local tribes 
     and made contacts with other extremist organizations. These 
     connections have allowed the senior leaders to hide 
     successfully for many years.
       Afghanistan is also of strategic value to al Qa'ida. In 
     losing Afghanistan, they lost not only the support of a 
     government and the use of an entire country as a safe haven, 
     but suffered a tremendous blow to their image. Reestablishing 
     a safe haven in Afghanistan could rehabilitate this image 
     among those who resent or oppose the United States, leading 
     to increases in recruiting and funding.
       Nor can we consider Afghanistan and Pakistan in isolation--
     the security situation in Afghanistan can have a negative 
     impact on the stability of Pakistan. It is foolish to think 
     that if the Taliban and al Qa'ida were able to reestablish 
     themselves in all or part of Afghanistan, they would not lend 
     support to those militants seeking to overthrow or 
     destabilize the Pakistani state. Al Qa'ida has already 
     assisted the Pakistani Taliban in carrying out attacks on the 
     Pakistani government, and I would expect this aid to increase 
     if al Qa'ida regained a base in Afghanistan. There was an 
     attack at a mosque earlier today that killed dozens. With a 
     secure base for al Qa'ida, I would expect many more such 
     attacks. And the only thing worse than al Qa'ida loose in 
     Afghanistan again is a destabilized, nuclear-armed Pakistan.
       On Tuesday night, the President proposed what I think is a 
     good way ahead as we address this threat. From the extensive 
     media reporting on the process, we all know how thorough a 
     review was conducted by the White House, lasting months and 
     including somewhere around 10 cabinet secretary level 
     meetings and extensive consultation with every expert they 
     could find.
       President Obama's strategy rightly focuses on seizing the 
     initiative from the enemy, building Afghan capacity, and 
     ultimately allowing the Afghan government and security forces 
     to take the lead in fighting this war.
  The President has appropriately called for additional troops from our 
allies--this is not just America's war, and we must not allow it to 
become that. Perhaps more importantly, the President has put the burden 
of reform squarely on the Afghan government, laying out clear 
expectations of performance and promising support for those ministries 
and local leaders that perform.
       The President has also rightly acknowledged the importance 
     of Pakistan. Pakistan remains a challenge, playing a key and 
     often contradictory role in the region. Pakistan, by 
     assisting in the pursuit of al Qa'ida and Afghan Taliban 
     leaders, could help bring the war in Afghanistan to an end. 
     Conversely, if Pakistan were to return to old habits of 
     supporting the Afghan Taliban, the war may be almost 
     impossible to win. More concerning, the continued ascendency 
     of militant movements in the region could destabilize 
     Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons. This could be 
     disastrous for all of us.
       I think this is a good strategy. Perhaps most importantly, 
     it is a strategy that I believe has a good chance of success. 
     In the past, I have often said that we lacked a strategy for 
     the first 7 years of the war in Afghanistan. Some of my 
     colleagues have suggested that this assertion may not be 
     entirely fair. But, the result of whatever the prior 
     Administration thought it was doing, ultimately resembled 
     conducting combat operations without any thought of what we 
     were trying to accomplish. So having a strategy, much less a 
     good one, is a great start.
       President Obama also, I am pleased to say, took my advice. 
     He listened to his military leaders, including Generals 
     McChrystal and Petraeus, Admiral Mullen, and Secretary Gates. 
     Ultimately, the President endorsed adding 30,000 troops to 
     carry out his strategy. This is on top of the 21,000 he 
     dispatched to Afghanistan earlier this year. In January 2009, 
     there were about 33,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. In about 
     7 months, there will be three times that. That is, I believe, 
     a clear sign of the President's resolve and willingness to do 
     what it takes to be successful in Afghanistan.
       Yesterday, the House Armed Services Committee, which I have 
     to honor to chair, hosted Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, 
     and Deputy Secretary of State Lew. Next Tuesday, we will hear 
     from General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry. Members, 
     properly, have a lot of questions about the strategy, and we 
     want to make sure that the details have been thought through. 
     I'll list a few of the areas we have explored or will next 
     week.
       Many members are concerned about the July 2011 date to 
     begin redeployment. So far, most have focused on that date as 
     being set, rather than completely conditions based, but to me 
     it looks like this is a case where there isn't much to 
     complain about. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen were 
     pretty clear that not only were they comfortable with the 
     date, but that they thought it served the useful purpose of 
     motivating the Afghans.
       To me, what happens after that date is at least as 
     important as the date itself. Secretary Gates testified that 
     the process of transition that begins on that date would 
     itself be slow and conditions-based, so that while the start 
     of the process was fixed in time, the end could be adjusted 
     as required. And I think that flexibility and realistic 
     approach to a difficult process is exactly right.
       One other concern, and one that in my mind might be more 
     realistic, is the unintended consequences of setting out such 
     a message. The message of a gradual, conditions-based 
     transition may not be understood the same way by all 
     audiences. The Pakistanis may well believe that it signals 
     that the United States is once again leaving the region, and 
     that might undermine our hopes of gaining their cooperation. 
     Various ethnic groups in Afghanistan, fearing a civil war 
     after we begin to depart, could start stockpiling weaponry or 
     hedge their bets in other unhelpful ways. I think we have to 
     keep our eyes open for this possibility and be creative in 
     reassuring the Afghans and the Pakistanis that we are not 
     abandoning them.
       Corruption in the Afghan government, and the legitimacy or 
     illegitimacy of that government, is also frequently a subject 
     of questioning. It's a concern I share, and one that 
     President Karzai's recent election reinforced. On the 
     positive side, there are ministers and ministries in 
     Afghanistan that have functioned well--Minister Wardak at the 
     Defense Ministry and Minister Atmar at the Interior Ministry 
     are honest effective ministers. The Health Ministry, 
     Education Ministry, and the National Solidarity Program, run 
     by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, all 
     seem to be functioning well.
       But there are also legitimate concerns. High level 
     corruption among ministers and governors; shakedowns by 
     police, judges, and other authorities; and perceptions that 
     warlords are untouchable by the law feed the belief among the 
     Afghan people that their government does not serve them. And 
     President Karzai has not always been helpful--his family is 
     perceived to be part of the problem, and his unwillingness to 
     remove the immunity from some ministers so the Afghan 
     Attorney General can indict them is not helpful.
       There are ways we can help push for reform--for example, 
     not working with those leaders who prove to be corrupt so 
     that their ability to deliver for their followers or to make 
     money is hampered--but we have to take this seriously. 
     President Karzai, in his inauguration speech also promised to 
     crack down on corruption and to hold a loya jirga of national 
     reconciliation. I would like to hear from General McChrystal 
     and Ambassador Eikenberry how we can hold him to these 
     promises and push to have the jirga also help develop a 
     compact of what the Afghan people have a right to expect from 
     their government.
       Members will also likely ask about the promised assessment 
     of efforts in December 2010. I think that is a good time to 
     begin such an assessment--six months after all the promised 
     troops arrive in country--but members will likely have many 
     questions about it. What will we assess? What is an 
     acceptable level of progress? What are the options if 
     progress is insufficient? These are all obvious questions. 
     The one thing I would say is that I think it will behoove all 
     of us to offer the Administration some breathing space before 
     we make judgments about the success of the plan. Asking 
     questions is fair, drawing conclusions about the success or 
     failure of the strategy before it is really implemented 
     probably isn't.
       So, in the first few days after the announcement of the new 
     strategy, those are some of my thoughts. I think the 
     President is to be commended for the strategy and the resolve 
     he is showing. I believe he is fully aware of the threat 
     posed by al Qa'ida and the potential posed by a sanctuary for 
     terror in Afghanistan and a possibly destabilized Pakistan. 
     These are serious threats we are facing, and the President is 
     clearly prepared to take realistic, effective and fully 
     resourced steps to address them.
       So I conclude as I started, by thanking all of you for what 
     you do, and by asking you to think of the brave men and women 
     in uniform, and the civilians who will assist them, who will 
     have to do the hard, dangerous work to make this strategy a 
     success. We owe them a great deal, and we should never forget 
     it.
       Thank you.

                          ____________________