[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 167 (Monday, November 9, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11286-S11287]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I wish to commemorate the sixth 
anniversary of what is known today as the Office of the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Six years ago, on November 
6, 2003, President Bush signed Public Law 108-106, the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction 
of Iraq and Afghanistan. The reconstruction effort at the time was 
under the direction of the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, and 
Congress, appropriately, provided for an Inspector General of the 
Authority to oversee the CPA's expenditures.

[[Page S11287]]

  As the administration moved toward ending the CPA and transferring 
sovereignty back to the Iraqi people through its interim government, it 
became clear that it was important to maintain oversight of the 
multiagency reconstruction effort underway in Iraq. In Public Law 108-
375, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2005, Congress decided to redesignate the CPA IG as the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, or SIGIR, with 
responsibility for reviewing programs funded with amounts appropriated 
or otherwise made available for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 
Fund.
  The law provided, uniquely at the time, that the SIGIR report 
directly to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, 
and that its quarterly reports be sent directly to the Congress.
  As the reconstruction effort for Iraq grew in complexity Congress 
asked SIGIR to review additional funding streams; it is now responsible 
for reviewing ``all funds appropriated or otherwise made available for 
the reconstruction of Iraq.''
  Since SIGIR reviews reconstruction funds expended by all agencies, it 
can compare the effectiveness of different agencies' practices and 
approaches to related problems. In addition, the frequent 
reorganizations of the reconstruction effort and the widespread pattern 
of having some agencies carry out work on behalf of others has made 
cross-agency reviews critical to providing accountability for 
expenditures. SIGIR has been able to provide precisely that type of 
cross-agency scrutiny.
  SIGIR's productivity is notable. It has submitted 23 quarterly 
reports to Congress and published 4 ``lessoned learned'' reports, 
including the comprehensive account entitled ``Hard Lessons: The Iraq 
Reconstruction Experience.'' It has issued 155 audit reports, 159 
project assessments, inspections, and 96 limited onsite assessments.
  SIGIR's staff in Baghdad and Arlington, VA, produces timely, useful 
reporting to program managers, senior Department leadership, and 
Congress. Its quarterly reports present a comprehensive, closely 
documented, snapshot of the reconstruction effort and conditions on the 
ground to provide context for understanding progress, or lack of 
progress, in Iraq's reconstruction. In recent quarters, reports have 
included province-by-province descriptions of the status of 
reconstruction and the pace of political change. The audit and 
inspections groups work in ``real time,'' so that managers can improve 
processes quickly, often before reports are formally published.
  SIGIR's reviews have been extremely useful to both the administration 
and Congress in assessing the many challenges of the reconstruction. 
The performance by the SIGIR office has also been recognized by the 
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, formerly the 
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, PCIE, for 
demonstrating integrity, determination and courage in providing 
independent oversight and unbiased review of U.S. reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq, and for exemplifying the highest ideals of government 
services as envisioned by the tenets of the Inspector General Act.
  SIGIR's auditors and investigators carry out their work under 
dangerous and difficult circumstances. Its employees in Baghdad, in 
addition to being separated from their families and living under 
difficult conditions, are subject to considerable physical danger. Five 
have been wounded by indirect fire. Today I would especially like to 
pay tribute to SIGIR auditor Paul Converse, who died of wounds 
sustained in the Easter 2008 rocket attack on Baghdad's International 
Zone. Mr. Converse made the ultimate sacrifice in service to his 
country.
  As my colleagues know, the reconstruction effort in Iraq suffered 
initially from uncoordinated and insufficient planning and has been 
characterized too often by poor contract oversight. The security 
situation in Iraq also increased the complexity of executing 
reconstruction projects. From its audits of specific projects such as 
the Basrah Children's Hospital and the Mosul Dam, to its broad reviews 
of thematic issues such as human capital management and contract 
administration, the SIGIR reports have provided a frank look at, and a 
better understanding of, the shortcomings, the successes, and the 
challenges of reconstruction.
  So today I salute all the hard-working current and former staff of 
SIGIR, SIGIR's long-serving Deputy Inspector General, Ginger Cruz, and, 
of course, Stuart Bowen, who has ably served as the Special Inspector 
General for 6 years. Their work has been extremely influential on the 
evolution of reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and undoubtedly will help 
inform future U.S. relief and reconstruction efforts. Their efforts are 
greatly appreciated by this Senator.

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