[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 138 (Tuesday, September 29, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9910-S9918]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2010--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, as the Senate realizes the business today 
is the administration's fiscal year 2010 Defense budget proposal, our 
Committee on Appropriations, as everyone knows, in the regular order, 
had hearings and took advantage of advice from testimony and 
suggestions received by other Senators on and off the committee about 
the provisions of this important legislation. It sets out, as the 
Senate appreciates, the funding that will be permitted by the 
Department of Defense for the next fiscal year. So the subject we have 
today before us is specifically an issue involving a funding provision 
in the administration's fiscal year 2010 Defense budget proposal.
  The administration proposed several funding cuts for weapons programs 
they deemed unneeded. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its 
hearings and in its deliberations, reviewed each of the proposals and 
generally agreed with the recommendations set forth in the 
administration's budget submittal.
  This bill does not include additional funding for F-22 aircraft, the 
Presidential helicopter, the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine, the 
combat search and rescue helicopter, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, 
and several other programs which were proposed for funding cuts by this 
administration.
  The C-17 aircraft is an area where we did not agree. The committee 
proposed $2.5 billion be included in the bill for 10 additional 
aircraft. As we all know, the Defense Department is not infallible. It 
was wrong and overruled by Congress when it recommended program 
terminations of the F-117 stealth fighter and the V-22 Osprey.
  The C-17 is the current backbone of our strategic airlift capability, 
and it will be for decades to come. C-17s are being utilized all over 
the world at a much faster pace than previously anticipated. While they 
comprise only 60 percent of the Air Force's strategic airlift fleet, 
they are flying 80 percent of all worldwide strategic airlift missions.
  This demand for C-17 lift capability is only going to grow as new 
airlift missions emerge. Other missions we know about already are rapid 
deployment of theater missile defenses, counterinsurgency operations, 
as well as growing airlift demands for an expanding Army and Marine 
Corps.
  Failure to fund the C-17 will result in the United States shutting 
down its airlift manufacturing base at a time when the demand for 
airlift is likely to grow. Allowing the C-17 supply base and production 
line to shut down and then trying to reconstitute it would cost 
billions of dollars and take years to accomplish.
  The Quadrennial Defense Review and the upcoming Mobility Capability 
and Requirements Study are reassessing our strategic airlift 
requirements. Until those requirements are reevaluated, the C-17s 
should be included in this bill. The Air Force Chief of Staff has 
stated that he believes 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s are needed to meet 
strategic airlift requirements and that procuring more than the 205 C-
17s already purchased should involve a light reduction and retirement 
of C-5A aircraft.
  Prior to enactment of the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental 
Appropriations Act in June of this year, the Air Force was prohibited 
from retiring the older and less capable C-5As. Now that the Department 
has authority to retire these aircraft, we should replace a number of

[[Page S9911]]

them with a highly capable aircraft in production today. The Government 
Accountability Office has concluded:

       It will take seven fully modernized C-5s at a cost of $132 
     million each to attain the equivalent capability achieved 
     from buying one additional C-17 at a cost of $276 million.

  In other words, it would cost $924 million to modernize seven C-5s to 
get the same capability of one C-17 costing $276 million.
  Based on the growing airlift needs and the new authority to retire 
the aging and hard-to-maintain C-5 aircraft, we added the $2.5 billion 
to sustain production of the C-17 program for 1 additional year. This 
additional year will give the Department of Defense time to complete 
its airlift reviews and preserve the option of adding to our strategic 
airlift fleet.
  If funding for C-17s is eliminated in this bill and the ongoing 
studies determine additional airlift is needed, at best there will be 
significant cost increases and delays in getting the aircraft to the 
fleet; at worst, it will be cost prohibitive to restart the line and 
our service men and women will be denied equipment needed to perform 
their missions. That would be totally unacceptable, and I urge a ``no'' 
vote on the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the statement I am about to present may 
appear a bit redundant after listening to the great statement of the 
senior Senator from Mississippi, vice chairman of this committee. But 
as chairman of this committee, I want to, by this redundancy, emphasize 
that Senator Cochran and I work as a team, and we agree with the 
provisions in this measure. For the interest of this body, it should be 
noted that this measure was passed and presented to the Senate by a 
vote of 30 to zero--unanimous. A $636 billion bill coming out of the 
committee, after due consideration, unanimously is historic.
  The amendment of the Senator from Arizona seeks to eliminate funds 
provided in this bill to sustain the C-17 program. As I indicated, Vice 
Chairman Cochran and I proposed, and the committee accepted, our 
recommendation to relocate $2.5 billion to procure an additional 10 C-
17 aircraft. If approved, this will bring the total C-17 inventory to 
223 aircraft. We believe this is a critical investment which will 
support our national security strategy and add much to the needed 
airlift capability.
  There are three main reasons the committee supported adding funding 
for the C-17:
  First, as everyone in the military, from senior leadership to the 
soldiers being transported, will agree, it is, simply put, a superb 
aircraft. The C-17 represents the finest in military technology. It is 
efficient, cost-effective, and highly capable. In short, it has no 
detractors.
  Second, we believe the facts now show that additional aircraft are 
needed to meet military requirements despite that it is being 
recommended by the Pentagon for cancellation.
  Third, the C-17 embodies the only strategic airlift production 
program in our Nation. As the Senator from Missouri pointed out, there 
is nothing on the planning ledger to replace it. If we cut off the 
production at this moment, it will be unaffordable to restart this 
program.
  The C-17 provides the U.S. military with the essential flexibility to 
respond on short notice--and I emphasize short notice--anywhere in the 
world. Our air fleet assets are a major enabler of strategy and 
operational plans. There is not a military scenario in existence today 
which can be put into effect without a strong airlift fleet. The C-17 
was designed specifically to meet virtually all of the needs of our 
warfighters. It is the only airlift aircraft that has the ability to 
fly both great distances and to land on austere airfields anywhere in 
the world. That is very important because we don't have long runways 
prepared for us in far-off countries. When teamed with the tactical C-
130 and the C-5, the C-17 fleet provides the Nation with the capability 
to deliver outsized cargo to our forces wherever they may be located.
  We believe the C-17 is today the finest airlift aircraft in the U.S. 
arsenal. With its new avionics and structures, it can maintain a very 
high mission capability rate. This is a term used by the Air Force to 
denote the aircraft's ability to perform. Comparative data filed by the 
Government Accountability Office in November 2008 showed that the C-17 
was able to successfully perform its mission in excess of 85 percent of 
the time. And I think we should note that--85 percent of the time, they 
are able to perform their mission. On the other hand, the aging C-5 was 
only able to meet its performance demands 58 percent of the time. For 
our men and women in uniform, what this means is that if they are 
depending on a C-5, their needs will be only addressed a little more 
than half the time, while a C-17 will meet their needs more than 8 
times out of 10.
  In addition, the C-17 is much cheaper to operate than the C-5. It is 
true that a C-5 has the capacity to carry more cargo, but in the actual 
usage by the Air Force, the cost per flying hour of the C-17 is only 40 
percent of the cost of the C-5. The Air Force has informed us that 
today its current statistics show that it costs $6.42 to fly 1 pound of 
cargo from South Carolina to Baghdad on a C-17--that is $6.42 from 
South Carolina to Baghdad--but $13.76 to fly the same item on a C-5. 
Why? Because the C-5 is unreliable, because we rarely need to fill 
either plane to its maximum capacity on an average mission, and because 
the C-17 is newer and modernized in comparison to the C-5. We simply 
cannot rely on the older, outdated C-5.
  Opponents might argue that when we modernize the C-5 it will be able 
to overcome many of these problems. I would concur that a modernized C-
5 will be a far better aircraft. However, I would point out that the C-
5 Modernization Program has been plagued with delays and cost overruns. 
Because of the high cost of the C-5 Modernization Program, the Defense 
Department decided that it could no longer afford to modernize all 111 
C-5s and it cut the program to 52. That means our military will be 
dependent on 59 of the old and often broken C-5s that cost twice as 
much to operate as the C-17 for the foreseeable future. That is 47 
percent of the C-5 fleet that won't be updated and will be unable to 
operate efficiently to meet our military needs.
  The Government Accountability Office noted that additional 
investments in the C-17 may be attractive. It calculated that the 
Defense Department would need to modernize, as Senator Cochran pointed 
out, seven C-5s--to modernize seven C-5s--to get the equivalent 
capability gained from acquiring one C-17. It is going to take seven C-
5s to do the work of one C-17, but it would cost three times as much to 
modernize the seven C-5s as it would to purchase one C-17.
  I would like to point out that the C-17 is a fully matured program 
with stable costs and little uncertainty, while the C-5 Modernization 
Program is still in its infancy. If there is one thing we know about 
Defense programs, it is that new program costs generally increase 
during their early years.
  Some may address the Senate and say we don't need any more C-17s. 
They note that today the Air Force now says we only need the 213 we 
already have purchased. I would like to point out that in 2002 the 
commander of the U.S. Transportation Command testified that his C-17 
requirement was for 222 C-17s. Moreover, the 2005 Mobility Capabilities 
Study also raises questions about how many aircraft are required. This 
study, which is supposed to be the basis of our strategic airlift 
capability requirements, identified the need for between 292 and 383 
strategic airlift aircraft, a combination of C-17s and modernized C-5s. 
In the force today, we have 111 C-5s and 205 C-17s--a total of 315 
aircraft--near the bottom of the requirement level. But that doesn't 
tell the whole story.
  In the last Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006, the Defense 
Department opted to keep its total inventory near the bottom of this 
requirement range with 180 C-17s and 112 C-5s.
  Although we have added C-17s since that time and lost one C-5, the 
more important fact is that the QDR based this recommendation on a plan 
to modernize all 112 C-5s. With the plan to only modernize 52 C-5s, the 
airlift capability of the fleet is drastically diminished.
  In 2008, the commander of the Air Force Air Mobility Command 
expressed his concern with this plan. He testified that the plan with 
52 modernized C-5s and 205 C-17s will not provide the strategic airlift 
that he required.

[[Page S9912]]

  I would also note that these earlier studies did not take into 
account today's force structure. That is a very important point. Since 
the mobility study and the QDR were completed we have transformed our 
Army creating additional combat capability that requires lift. We have 
increased the end strength of our Marine Corps, and we have created the 
U.S. Africa command. All of these have increased our airlift needs.
  At the same time, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are aging our 
airlift fleet beyond anticipated rates. We are flying the wings off our 
C-17 fleet. In November, 2007, the Air Force Chief of Staff recommended 
buying an additional 44 C-17s to meet the required force level. On the 
2009 Unfunded Requirements List the Air Force asked for an additional 
15 C-17 aircraft with a stated inventory objective of 248 C-17s. Our 
military leaders have called for additional aircraft, our forces have 
grown since our last studies were written and our plans have been 
altered to cut back on our modernization program.
  It seems to me that notwithstanding the plan offered by the Defense 
Department, the country has a choice--we can either agree to modernize 
all the C-5s or we can continue to procure additional C-17s. As noted 
earlier, as the GAO discovered a new C-17 offers greater capability at 
a lower price. To me and to many of my colleagues this just makes 
sense.
  Unless we act this year and approve the recommendation from the 
Appropriations Committee, we won't have a choice. Without the funds in 
this bill the C-17 program will begin to shut down. I say to my 
colleagues this is a critical decision and we have to be certain on our 
course. As the GAO noted, ``careful planning is needed to ensure C-17 
production is not ended prematurely . . . Restarting production would 
not be feasible or cost effective.'' That is the GAO.
  Earlier this decade, on several occasions the Defense Department 
urged the Congress to allow it to begin to retire the oldest and least 
capable C-5s. It too believed that purchasing additional C-17s was a 
far superior choice to meet our airlift needs. However, each year the 
Congress refused to allow DoD to retire any C-5s. Eventually, the 
Pentagon gave up trying and decided it would be stuck with the old 
unreliable C-5s. While it originally sought to upgrade all the old C-5s 
to at least make the best of a bad situation, the cost overruns and 
delays in the C-5 modernization program made that decision 
unaffordable. I would point out that the Congress rectified this 
problem this year in the supplemental and allowed the Air Force to 
begin to retire these aged aircraft. We know that it makes economical 
sense to retire these poorly performing aircraft and to replace them 
with new C-17s. We are looking forward to the Air Force revisiting this 
issue in the fiscal year 2011 budget with a renewed plan to retire the 
older C-5s and hopefully a desire to replace them with new C-17s.
  In this year's budget the Secretary of Defense has made some tough 
decisions'' He has opted to kill the F-22, the JSF second engine, the 
VH-71 Presidential helicopter, the combat search and rescue helicopter 
and the kinetic energy interceptor. In the bill before the Senate we 
have supported each of these recommendations. I will be candid that I 
am not confident that each of these recommendations is in our Nation's 
interest, but in general I support the Secretary's plans.
  There is only one program that the vice chairman and I felt strongly 
enough about to reverse the recommendation of the Secretary, the C-17.
  I have explained at some length why, it is cost effective, it is 
capable, and it is needed. I urge all my colleagues to reject the 
amendment of the Senator from Arizona and to vote to support the 
continuation of the C-17 program.
  It is in our Nation's interest.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. JOHANNS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Udall of Colorado). Without objection, it 
is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2484

  Mr. JOHANNS. Mr. President, I ask the current amendment be set aside 
and we call up amendment No. 2484.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Johanns] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2484.

  Mr. JOHANNS. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: Prohibiting use of funds to fund the Association of Community 
                 Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN))

       On page 263, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:
       Sec. 9__.  None of the funds made available under this Act 
     may be distributed to the Association of Community 
     Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) or its subsidiaries.

  Mr. JOHANNS. Mr. President, I rise to present amendment No. 2484. 
Actually, this is an amendment we have acted on in previous 
appropriations bills. In fact, this is the amendment that deals with no 
funding for the organization ACORN.
  In the previous Interior bill this passed in a very bipartisan way 
with a 85-to-11 vote; in the Housing and Transportation bill, again a 
very bipartisan vote, 83 to 7.
  This is an amendment that has overwhelming support of this body. My 
comments relative to this organization are a matter of the record. I do 
not feel a need to lay those out again, but I want to present this 
amendment on this appropriations bill and we have reached an 
understanding that this can be accepted by voice vote. I want to 
indicate that will be acceptable to me.
  Mr. INOUYE. The Senator is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2484) was agreed to.
  Mr. JOHANNS. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the pending business before the Senate is 
the DOD appropriations bill for fiscal year 2010. This measure contains 
approximately $636 billion, including nearly $130 billion to continue 
the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and all around Southwest 
Asia.
  It contains funds to pay our men and women in uniform, as well as 
funds to operate our forces and to take care of our wounded. It 
provides the money required to equip the warfighters and to develop new 
weapons systems so that they may be protected in the future.
  Today is September 29. The fiscal year ends tomorrow. I believe all 
of us should know that. On Thursday, the Department of Defense will 
begin to operate on a continuing resolution, a stopgap measure required 
because the Congress has not completed action on its 12 appropriations 
measures.
  I want to point out that the Appropriations Committee reported its 
first fiscal year 2010 bill in the Senate on June 18, more than 3 
months ago, and this last bill on September 10, nearly 3 weeks ago. All 
of the other bills were reported before the August recess.
  However, because of the scheduling problems we have had, this Senate 
has passed just six bills. We have spent the better part of 7 weeks on 
the floor to pass these bills. I wish to note that in years past, most 
appropriations measures were taken up and passed by this body in 1 or 2 
days. Now it is nearly 1 week on each bill. The Senate is known for 
being a deliberative body, but this is the third day the Senate has 
been on this important bill, and up until a few minutes ago, not a 
single amendment had yet to be offered.
  Moreover, at this point, only eight amendments have been filed, and 
we have seen this pattern week after week. Our colleagues are waiting 
days before getting serious about these bills. The impact of these 
delays is that the end of the fiscal year is upon us, and

[[Page S9913]]

we are nearly only halfway done completing Senate action on our bills, 
and only one of the 12 bills has reported out of conference committee.
  At this juncture, I wish to note that we have had 12 measures. Of the 
12 subcommittees, 3 reported the bill to the Senate on a vote of 29 to 
1--not quite unanimous, 29 to 1. The remaining nine subcommittee bills, 
after due deliberation, debate, and discussion, were passed on to the 
Senate. The Senate committee reported to this Senate with a 
recommendation that it be passed by a vote of 30 to 0.
  This measure before us was adopted by the Appropriations Committee, 
made up of liberal members, conservative members, middle of the road 
and whatever you want, men, women, by a vote of 30 to 0.
  In January, when I became chairman of this committee, it was apparent 
to me that the Senate and the legislative branch were losing control 
over the budget process. We had not passed all of our spending bills as 
freestanding measures since 2005. We only accomplished that feat once 
during the past decade.
  In many cases, we have resorted to large omnibus bills to complete 
our work. The Senate has not been allowed to debate or amend many of 
the measures that were passed. This is no way to run the government.
  Vice-Chairman Cochran and I agreed to put a stop to this practice. We 
vowed to pass 12 bills and to send them to the President 
individually. We have passed those 12 bills in a timely fashion and 
presented them to the Senate. Our leaders fully supported us in this 
plan.

  I remind my colleagues that the entire Republican caucus sent a 
letter to the majority leader urging him to follow this approach. But 
when it came to putting this in practice, instead of working to get 
this accomplished, we have been hamstrung by slow progress on each and 
every bill.
  We are well aware that Members have amendments they wish to have 
considered on this and other appropriations bills. We understand that 
and have been waiting to debate them. Senator Cochran and I came to the 
floor Thursday night but were told there was nothing to do. We came 
here on Friday morning with the same results. We are back this 
afternoon, and we have one amendment.
  The go-slow approach that has been taken by a few of our colleagues 
has put us in a position in which the government must now begin to 
operate on a continuing resolution. What does that mean to our 
agencies? It means they must throw out their plans for operations and 
streamline activities so that only the most essential operations are 
funded. Continuing resolutions will continue programs that have expired 
and are no longer needed, and the new programs that will replace them 
will not be in place. It means they must delay purchases until they are 
sure the resources they are seeking will be approved.
  In the case of the Defense Department, it means they have to delay 
starting new weapons development and procurement programs. Some of my 
fiscally conservative colleagues might applaud this, thinking it means 
they are cutting spending. But, unfortunately, they are wrong. In fact, 
we are only running up expenses, as we follow penny-wise, pound-foolish 
practices which cost more in the long run than they save.
  Senate rules are written to protect the rights of the minority and to 
ensure that legislation is carefully reviewed. But it is also true that 
when time is of the essence, the deliberative process is frequently 
turned on its head and complex matters rushed through with no time to 
debate or opportunity to offer amendments. Rather than delay these 
bills, which have minimal controversy, leaving the body no choice but 
to adopt expedited procedures to complete action, let's proceed apace 
and get this and the other five bills through the Senate as quickly as 
possible because it is the responsibility of the Congress to ensure 
that taxpayer funds can be expended efficiently by passing each of 
these appropriations measures without depending on continuing 
resolutions or omnibus measures.
  I urge all of my colleagues to work with us so we can complete our 
work, the work of this Nation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am going to take a few minutes to address 
the pending amendment, if I may. Then, at the conclusion of those 
remarks, I wish to speak as if in morning business for a few minutes to 
address another matter that will not be the subject of the pending 
legislation, if that is permissible.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment 
offered by my friend and colleague from Arizona that could wipe out a 
highly skilled American workforce. It would irreparably damage our 
combat readiness, deprive our troops in the field of critical resources 
and threaten our national security. Those are strong words, but that is 
what is involved if the amendment being offered by the Senator from 
Arizona is adopted.
  I wish to introduce my colleagues to three workers at Pratt & Whitney 
in Middletown, CT. We see three individuals working on this engine. 
They are removing test equipment after completing testing on a 
powerful, cutting-edge engine, preparing it for delivery to the U.S. 
Air Force. The man on the left is Doug. He has been working for Pratt & 
Whitney for 24 years. He is married with three children, 8-year-old 
twins and a 4-year-old.
  The man in the middle is Steve. He spent 4 years in the Air Force 
before coming to Pratt & Whitney and boasts a quarter of a century in 
aviation experience. On the right is his coworker Michael, with 15 
years of experience on the floor and 8 as a supervisor at this 
facility. If we effectively lay off these workers and the 30,000 
Americans like them in 43 States who build the C-17, we will be causing 
tremendous pain and financial hardship at a time when our communities 
can least afford it.
  In my home State of Connecticut--29th in total population, but 6th in 
total aerospace employment--we just received word that Pratt & Whitney 
is going to close maintenance facilities in Cheshire, CT, and East 
Hartford, CT, costing 1,000 jobs. If this amendment prevails, my 
State's largest private employer tells me that they will stand to lose 
another 3,000 jobs. That means the loss of decades of experience and 
expertise that has allowed us to maintain not parity with the world, 
but superiority, in the aerospace industry.
  Perhaps my colleagues aren't persuaded by the imminent loss of 
thousands of jobs in my state or even their own. Perhaps some might be 
tempted to threaten the livelihoods of 30,000 people at a time when we 
can ill afford it. To them I say, think about these three individuals 
are doing for our troops.
  According to the Air Force, over the last 3 years in the military's 
Central Command alone, the C-17 has flown more than 100,000 airlift 
sorties, moved more than 2 million personnel, delivered nearly 300,000 
tons of cargo, and executed nearly 2,000 air drops. According to the 
Government Accountability Office, C-17s have delivered more than 2.4 
million tons of cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan alone. That is 2.4 
million tons of supplies--everything from critical gear to large 
vehicles--sustaining our troops on the battlefield.
  The Government Accountability Office also notes that this aircraft 
has ``drawn praise during combat operations''--listen to this--with an 
86-percent readiness rate, compared to the 53-percent readiness rate of 
the 40-year-old C-5 fleet that shares the cargo lift mission with the 
C-17s. The C-17 is the most reliable airlift plane in our arsenal, and 
it is also the most versatile. Unlike any other aircraft we have, the 
C-17 can complete combat, humanitarian, and other transport missions 
all over the world, thanks to its unique ability to take off and land 
in difficult environments, in remote airfields, or in situations where 
runways are shortened or degraded.
  The Air Force reports that the C-17 is able to take off and land on 
65 percent of the world's soils, whereas older airlift planes can only 
land on 6 percent.

[[Page S9914]]

This incredible versatility makes the C-17 vital to the success of 
counterinsurgency, humanitarian, and research missions the world over. 
It can operate not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in places such as 
Bosnia, Rwanda, Sudan, and even Antarctica.
  But today I feel this versatility is taken for granted. Our 
commitments overseas, especially since 2001, have imposed far greater 
burdens on these aircraft than we had originally planned for.
  The Congressional Research Service reports that the C-17 was designed 
to fly 1,000 hours per year, with an expected lifespan of 30 years. But 
as our overseas commitments have grown since 2001, the fleet has 
averaged 1,250 hours per aircraft and some have even reached 2,400 
flying hours in a single year.
  GEN Arthur Lichte, the Air Force's air mobility commander, has said 
that at this rate, the C-17s may have a lifespan as short as 22 years. 
When a mission-critical aircraft is due to retire 8 years earlier than 
intended, as this one may be, we who are charged with equipping our 
troops in the field must address our procurement plans and we must do 
it now. Some of our newest C-17s are already 15 years old.
  I wish to remind my colleagues that last July the Senate voted 93 to 
1 to authorize the expansion of the Army by 30,000 soldiers. I, along 
with nearly all of my colleagues, supported that increase to meet our 
growing security demands and relieve the combat burden on our already 
overstretched forces. When we took that vote, we incurred an obligation 
as well to provide those troops with the support they will need in 
order to do their jobs.
  Chairman Inouye and the members of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee have demonstrated incredible foresight by acting quickly to 
prevent these future shortfalls in this very important fleet. If this 
amendment to undo their good work prevails, we are doing a disservice 
to our troops. We are also doing a great disservice to our taxpayers.
  The author of this amendment has said we should kill the C-17 now and 
wait for a government study down the road to see whether we need more 
of these aircraft. Well, if we kill the C-17, we will lose our only 
wide-body assembly line in the United States. According to the 
Government Accountability Office, it will cost up to $1 billion to 
restart the line when it inevitably dawns on us that we need additional 
military cargo planes to support our troops in the field. If we hand 
these three individuals and the 30,000 of their fellow workers around 
the country pink slips in the next few days, who do we think is going 
to build those planes down the road?
  By the way, if we choose to try to make up the capability by 
extending the lives of the C-5As, we would need to overhaul and repair 
seven of them at a cost of nearly $1 billion to equal the capability we 
would get from buying just one additional C-17 at a cost of $276 
million.
  This amendment would hurt our workers, our troops, and our national 
security. It is a massive expenditure disguised as a short-term 
savings. It is the very definition of cutting off our nose to spite our 
face when it comes to the critical needs of our troops in the field. 
Whatever views one may have on Afghanistan or Iraq, we want to make 
sure that our troops, wherever they are, receive the support they need.
  Today, when the vote occurs, I urge my colleagues to support the 
committee and reject the amendment to cut out these critical aircraft.
  With that, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to move to a matter 
other than the one I just discussed as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska). Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.


                                  IRAN

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, it has been a tumultuous year in Iran.
  The Iranian regime has continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions, 
fund terrorist activities throughout the Middle East, and repress its 
own people. The world watched this repression play out in the wake of 
this summer's illegitimate elections, when brave and peaceful 
protestors were violently attacked.
  If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons capability, it would pose a 
significant threat to peace and security in the Middle East, especially 
to our close ally Israel and others in the region.
  For years, the Iranian regime has refused reasonable requests by the 
international community. And it has failed to meet its obligations 
under international nonproliferation rules.
  That is a threat to both national security and global stability, and 
it cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged.
  President Obama has undertaken an aggressive dual-track approach. He 
has offered high-level engagement with Tehran, but has matched that 
carrot with the stick of sustained pressure through economic sanctions. 
As the President has warned, Iran won't be allowed to run out the 
clock.
  As chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, I intend to introduce 
legislation that will arm the administration with the ability to impose 
tough, targeted sanctions if Iran does not respond to our final 
diplomatic efforts in the coming weeks.
  We must confront Iran's government with its long record of duplicity 
and deception on the issue of its nuclear facilities.
  Last week, President Obama revealed that Iran is building a secret 
uranium enrichment facility in violation of international rules.
  The President and our allies have rightly insisted that IAEA 
inspectors be allowed to access this facility promptly. And over the 
weekend, Iran moved forward on provocative missile tests.
  In two days, the United States and our allies will begin key talks 
with Iran's leaders. Unfortunately, Iran's President has already 
suggested that appropriate limits to his country's nuclear enrichment 
program are off the table.
  Clearly, in light of this growing threat, there is cause for great 
concern and prompt action on our part.
  But there is also cause for hope that Iran might be forced to change 
course. We have received renewed support from our allies. We have been 
encouraged by the strong international rejection of election abuses. 
And we have seen tensions within the Iranian regime begin to break into 
the open.
  It is not too late for a proper resolution. But the road ahead is 
difficult. It will require sustained diplomatic effort to ensure all of 
our strategic partners--the Europeans, the Russians, the Chinese, the 
Indians and moderate Arab states throughout the Middle East join this 
effort.
  We will only succeed if Iran is confronted by the prospect of 
sustained, progressively intensifying multilateral economic and 
diplomatic pressure on its government including tougher sanctions.
  This week's negotiations should confront Iran's leaders with a clear 
choice: end its illegitimate efforts to enrich uranium, halt its 
proliferation efforts, and stop supporting terrorists around the 
world--or continue to deepen this regime's isolation, and ruin the 
Iranian economy.
  The administration is right to attempt engagement with Iran even as 
we make clear that biting sanctions will follow if international 
demands for greater transparency continue to meet with stubborn 
refusal.
  Administration officials have outlined to me a menu of additional 
tough multilateral sanctions that they are considering imposing. 
Congress must equip President Obama with a full range of tools to deal 
with the threats posed by Iran.
  In the last Congress, the Banking Committee approved comprehensive 
legislation to impose tough new sanctions on the Iranian regime; 
authorize investors to divest from companies active in Iran's energy 
sector; and combat black-market networks spreading weapons around the 
world. Unfortunately, floor consideration was repeatedly blocked by a 
small minority.
  Given the rising stakes, I intend to work with my committee 
colleagues, including Ranking Member Senator Shelby, to press forward 
similar sanctions legislation in the next few weeks.
  I want to congratulate Senators Lieberman and Bayh for their 
leadership on this issue, including their legislation to impose further 
sanctions on entities involved in importing gasoline to Iran or in 
assisting Iran's efforts to expand its domestic refining capacity.
  Iran's energy sector is a key source of revenue to the government--
and Iran is especially susceptible because of its dependence on 
imported gasoline. I will integrate these critical provisions into the 
legislation.

[[Page S9915]]

  Our legislation will be targeted and strategic, maximizing the 
economic leverage of the U.S., our partners and allies, and investors 
while avoiding the risks of a more indiscriminate approach.
  The bill would also expand coverage under the Iran Sanctions Act to 
include financial institutions, underwriters, guarantors, and other 
business entities, and extend the applicability of sanctions to oil and 
gas pipelines and tankers.
  It would impose a broad ban on direct imports from Iran to the U.S. 
and exports from the U.S. to Iran of those few items still able to be 
so shipped, exempting food and medicines.
  It will strengthen existing authority to freeze the assets of 
Iranians active in weapons proliferation or terrorist activity, and 
make it clear that U.S. entities who establish a subsidiary to get 
around sanctions laws will be held liable for the activities of their 
subsidiaries.
  Finally, it would impose new requirements that the President actually 
make a determination, and report every 6 months to Congress, regarding 
the sanctionability of eligible investments in Iran's energy sector.
  In addition to expanding U.S. sanctions, the bill would also 
establish a simple formula authorizing divestment from firms which 
invest significant amounts in Iran's energy sector, with provisions 
patterned after the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act enacted 2 
years ago.
  Many of us believe that Americans should be able to divest from 
energy firms doing business with the Iranian regime whose policies they 
abhor, and which indirectly help to prop up the regime.
  They should be given the tools they need to make socially responsible 
decisions. And investors who choose to divest--States, large pension 
and mutual funds, and others should be held harmless for these 
decisions. Investing in Iran is risky business, and investors should be 
fully informed of those risks going in. The bill does not require 
divestment; it simply permits it.
  Finally, this bill will provide incentives for countries to 
strengthen their export control systems to stop the illegal diversion 
of sensitive dual-use technology to countries like Iran, and impose 
tough new licensing requirements on those who refuse to cooperate.
  As we confront the realities of a global marketplace, with 
manufacturers assembling parts of complex machinery such as aircraft 
and computers from a supply chain spanning the globe, and as regimes 
like Iran, North Korea, and Syria trawl various trans-shipment hubs for 
such parts to assemble high-tech weapons, it makes sense to address 
this problem head-on.
  We have developed a way to do this, with an array of carrots and 
sticks to prod unwilling countries to get serious about developing and 
implementing tough, comprehensive export control rules and systems.
  Our allies continue to work closely with the US to increase economic 
and diplomatic pressure on Iran.
  I believe our legislation will complement and reinforce those ongoing 
diplomatic efforts, and send a clear signal to Iran's government of 
what's in store if they continue to flaunt the will of the 
international community.
  Congress will be moving forward on the same timetable that the 
President and our allies have set for this fall, to underscore to 
Iran's leaders the huge price they will pay economically, politically, 
diplomatically, and otherwise if they do not change course.
  The government of Iran must come clean on its nuclear program, which 
as President Obama observed last week represents a direct challenge to 
the basic foundation of the international nonproliferation regime. I 
hope my colleagues will join me in supporting efforts in the coming 
weeks to make clear to the Iranians that we in Congress stand with 
President Obama in our determination to confront this problem 
forcefully, and urgently, before it is too late.
  Mr. President, we will have our hearing on October 6 in the Senate 
Banking Committee. My intention is to, shortly thereafter, a week or 
so, combine the proposals offered into one strong, comprehensive 
sanctions bill. I, as well as others, believe we should take no options 
off the table and that we understand the implications of the statement.
  Most of us agree every effort ought to be made to resolve this matter 
short of the use of military force. Obviously, that option remains. I 
believe we are proposing a sanctions regime, along with the needed 
cooperation of other nations around the world, that will send an 
unequivocal message--and nothing would be more important at this hour 
than to send that clear united message from this body and the other 
body--of our determination to use all the tools available to us to 
bring about the desired change we seek.
  By adopting this strong legislation, my hope is they will understand 
how serious we are in our determination to achieve the common goal 
sought by the administration and us in this body.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise with respect to Iran's nuclear 
program. I commend the Senator from Connecticut, chairman of the 
Banking Committee, for his presentation a few moments ago. Similar to 
so many Americans, we have learned a lot in the last couple days that 
is troubling.
  The Iranian regime, discredited this summer by the deplorable 
repression of peaceful prodemocracy demonstrators across the country, 
has reached a new low on the international stage. Again, I speak of the 
Iranian regime--the Government--and not the people of Iran. The 
disclosure of the uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qum 
should serve as a wakeup call for those who believed Iran's nuclear 
program was only for peaceful purposes. The regime continues to deceive 
the international community about its nuclear intentions and program 
development. It continues to threaten our ally Israel; it continues to 
disregard its international commitments; and, yes, the regime continues 
to directly threaten the national security interests of the United 
States.
  As the administration begins talks on Thursday, we in the Senate 
should be prepared to do our part and pass tougher sanctions on the 
Iranian regime to compel its compliance with international standards. 
We have a responsibility to provide the administration with the tools 
it needs to maximize pressure on this increasingly intransigent Iranian 
regime.
  I applaud the administration's approach to recalibrating U.S. 
engagement around the world. At a minimum, this international effort 
will restore America's long-held reputation of being an honest broker, 
of a country that values diplomacy and relationships with allies and 
welcomes new ones. Internationally, the United States is on a better 
footing than it has been in years. Ties with allies have been 
strengthened. Those on the fence, such as Russia and China, in this 
particular question, are showing signs of cooperation on issues that 
are critical to our national interests. Our adversaries, not sure how 
to demonize the United States such as they used to do, are on their 
heels. The administration's diplomatic offensive has put us into a 
position where we have a strong coalition going into these important 
discussions on Thursday.
  The events of the last week are unfortunate evidence of the Iranian 
regime's deceit, defiance, and disregard for international standards 
for peace and security.
  First, on Monday, the Iranian regime sent a letter to the IAEA 
disclosing the existence of the second enrichment and refining 
facility, a site that the United States and Israeli intelligence 
reportedly have tracked for years. This missive denies that the site 
was intended for nuclear purposes, though the 3,000 centrifuges were 
clearly meant for weapons-grade refinement. Moreover, the site was 
buried deep underground and under protection by the elite Revolutionary 
Guard--not the typical protocol for a peaceful energy site.

  On Wednesday, the Iranian President, Mr. Ahmadinejad, used his time 
on the rostrum at the United Nations not to welcome a new day of 
engagement with the international community but in typical fashion to 
rail against Israel. This desperate attempt to divert attention from 
his own internal political

[[Page S9916]]

problems, as well as his government's deceitful nuclear program, once 
again showed this regime is not a responsible actor on the world's 
stage. Iran's people recognized this last June by voting against Mr. 
Ahmadinejad and his brand of politics. The world witnessed on live 
television how Mr. Ahmadinejad viewed the democratic process as his 
people paid dearly for the audacity of their vote.
  Finally, over the weekend, Iran's news service reported three rounds 
of missile tests, including those capable of hitting Israel. GEN 
Hossein Salami, head of the Revolutionary Guard Air Force, said the 
drills were meant to show that Tehran is prepared to crush any military 
threat from another country. This erratic display will actually weaken, 
not strengthen, Iran's hand in Geneva and will hopefully serve to 
convince our Russian and Chinese friends that the Iranian regime is not 
a credible actor nor a reliable trading partner.
  After this disturbing but strangely predictable week of Iranian 
regime behavior, American negotiators will head to Geneva. This is the 
first official and direct meeting with Iranian negotiators in 30 years. 
Leading the American delegation is Ambassador Bill Burns, one of 
America's most respected diplomats. Having served in Russia, Ambassador 
Burns is well placed to address the complex international dimensions to 
this diplomatic problem. We will be well represented in Geneva, and I 
wish Ambassador Burns and his team all the best in what will surely be 
a challenging assignment.
  Iran is not going into these negotiations on sure footing, while the 
international community has never been more united. Led by the United 
States, Britain, Germany, and France, opposition to Iran's nuclear 
program is based in fact, rooted in a willingness to engage, and backed 
up with a clear and firm message: An Iran with nuclear weapons is 
unacceptable under any circumstances. Let me repeat. An Iran with 
nuclear weapons is unacceptable under any circumstances.
  This message is gaining stronger resonance with Russia and China. The 
Russian President's comments at the University of Pittsburgh last week 
indicated a willingness to consider sanctions. This is a potentially 
remarkable breakthrough because if the Russians are willing to support 
international sanctions, the Chinese could be left alone among the P5+1 
group in that determination. While China relies on Iran for substantial 
fuel imports, I trust they are carefully weighing their need for energy 
against Iran's increasingly erratic and irresponsible behavior. The 
opportunity cost of doing business with this regime has increased 
considerably and may now be too high a price to pay. I hope the Chinese 
will support international efforts to pressure this Iranian regime at 
this critical time with the understanding that these efforts could 
ultimately result in a more reliable and stable partner in Tehran.
  It is next to impossible that the Iranian regime will be able to 
prove that its nuclear sites are for peaceful purposes by this 
Thursday. The Obama administration needs to be ready to move quickly 
and build on international momentum created over the past week to 
pressure this regime. That is why we in the Senate need to be ready to 
play our part, support the administration, and move on sanctions.
  We currently have two proposals on Iran pending before us. First, the 
Iran Sanctions Enabling Act is a measure introduced by Senator 
Brownback and myself. We introduced this bill last May. This would 
allow State and local government pension funds to divest from companies 
that do more than $20 million in business with the Iranian energy 
sector. The second bill, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, 
introduced by Senators Bayh and Kyl, explicitly empowers the President 
to impose new economic sanctions on foreign firms involved in the 
export of gasoline and other refined petroleum products to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. I am cosponsor of this bill, along with more than 75 
of my Senate colleagues.
  The Iran Sanctions Enabling Act is modeled on similar legislation 
passed in response to the genocide in Sudan. Eighteen State 
legislatures have passed individual Iran sanction measures, and our 
legislation would bring these State efforts into line with Federal law. 
When President Obama was in the Senate, he introduced an earlier 
version of this legislation. It was right in 2007, and it is right in 
2009.
  Analysts have estimated that Iran requires $20 billion annually in 
investments for its oil and natural gas sector. This sector directly 
provides funding for Iran's nuclear program, as well as its support for 
international terrorism. Iran will only cease its illicit nuclear 
program, end its support for terrorists in Hamas and Hezbollah, and 
stop arming militant groups in Iraq when it is compelled to pay an 
economic price.
  We are entering a critical phase in President Obama's strategy of 
engagement with Iran where Tehran will face a true test. I hope the 
October 1 negotiation will lead to a freeze in Iran's nuclear 
enrichment efforts and ultimately a nuclear weapons-free Iran. Will the 
regime accept the President's genuine offer of dialog and comply with 
international nuclear standards or will it continue a losing strategy 
that serves to deepen its own isolation? These are questions for the 
Iranian regime, and they must answer these questions.
  If last week is any indication, Congress should be prepared to hand 
the President the leverage he needs to send a message to the regime 
that America cannot and will not accept an Iran with nuclear weapons. 
The administration needs all the tools at its disposal to increase 
pressure on the regime diplomatically, politically, and through more 
stringent economic sanctions.
  I call on my colleagues to listen to legislatures in so many States 
across the country that have passed divestment measures already. The 
American people do not want anything to do with investing in this 
regime. Let's pass divestment and petroleum sanctions and send a 
message to this regime and to the international community that a 
nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2558

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, earlier, the Senator from Arizona raised 
concerns that the Committee on Appropriations had reduced funding in 
the operation and maintenance accounts. As I noted in my opening 
statement, this committee of ours reviews the entire budget and adjusts 
funds based on that review. That review came out with various results, 
and I would like to discuss some of them with you.
  Before I do the analysis, I would just point out to my colleagues the 
budget that we are considering at this moment was formulated about a 
year ago--a year ago. That is when the process began. I am certain all 
of us will agree that since that time much has changed. Therefore, the 
committee believed we owe it to the Senate to apply the funds we 
recommended where they are most needed at this moment, not where they 
were needed a year ago.
  For example, the reductions to operations and maintenance programs we 
recommended are based on a lack of justification or of changed 
requirements. The funds are not reduced because of a need to transfer 
funding to other appropriations.
  The Senator from Arizona suggested we are taking out certain funding 
to pay for earmarks. The O&M accounts--operation and maintenance 
accounts--were reduced in this fiscal year 2010 base budget for many 
reasons, and just let me explain a few.
  Five hundred million dollars, or half a billion dollars, was not a 
cut as suggested by the Senator from Arizona, but it was, rather, a 
transfer from the base budget request to the overseas contingency 
operations budget because the resources for certain programs were more 
appropriately funded for the Iraq and Afghanistan war. This is what 
they suggested.
  One hundred million dollars was reduced based on administrative 
savings proposals. In April of this year the Office of Management and 
Budget was directed by the President to work with agencies to identify 
cuts to their administrative budgets separate and apart from those 
identified by the fiscal year 2010 budget--beyond that.

[[Page S9917]]

  The DOD savings identified by the administration was $100 million in 
fiscal year 2010, and we allocated these funds to other worthy 
projects.
  Finally, $100 million was cut from the Security and Stabilization 
Program because that was not authorized by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  Mr. President, we do this type of review every year. Every year 
someone complains their programs are cut, but we stand by our 
recommendations. We do more to enhance the readiness of the forces in 
this bill than was requested. Keep in mind since this budget was 
drafted, we have requested and added 30,000 more troops. We do so by 
providing equipment to our National Guard and Reserves. Everyone 
supports the National Guard, but we give them secondhand tools. It is 
about time they got some good ones. We do so by applying resources to 
buy MRAPs to protect our troops. And, yes, we do so to buy more C-17s 
to carry our forces wherever our leaders send them.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support the McCain amendment that would 
strike the $2.5 billion in additional funding for C-17 aircraft in the 
committee-reported bill and restore serious cuts that were made in the 
readiness accounts, in part to shift funds to support continued C-17 
production.
  Terminating production, like closing a base, can involve some 
economic loss for the communities involved. It involves pain--we 
understand that--up close and personal. But we must do so from time to 
time and make these difficult decisions. We have to do that for what is 
best for the Nation and for the men and women in the Armed Forces 
because, as Secretary Gates said in a letter to me today expressing 
support for ending C-17 production: The Department does not need 
additional C-17s to meet strategic needs.
  First, I want to agree with Chairman Inouye that the C-17 is a fine 
aircraft. I have been a strong supporter of the C-17 program, even when 
it was having growing pains early in the program. If we did not already 
have a C-17 aircraft fleet, we would have to create one. But this is 
not a question of whether we should buy the C-17. We have bought them, 
for a total of 213 aircraft. It is a question of ``How many C-17s do we 
need?''
  On that very point, I wrote a letter to the current Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force, General Schwartz, who was then commander of the U.S. 
Transportation Command, on November 6, 2007.
  I had asked for his professional opinion as to whether we needed C-17 
aircraft beyond the 190 C-17 aircraft the Air Force had already bought, 
and he gave us his personal and professional opinion. He said:

       Since you asked for my personal and professional opinion, I 
     believe that 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s is the correct fleet mix 
     for the future.

  He explained how he reached that opinion.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my letter to General 
Schwartz and his letter to me be printed in the Record, and also a 
letter I received from Secretary Gates be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                 Washington, DC, November 6, 2007.
     General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF,
     Commander, U.S. Transportation Command,
     Scott AFB, IL.
       Dear General Schwartz: The conferees on the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 are meeting 
     now to reach agreement on the contents of this bill. One of 
     the issues before the conferees is the question of buying 
     more C-17 aircraft as recommended in the House-passed bill.
       Before we come to a conclusion on the best way to proceed, 
     we need to hear your personal and professional opinion on two 
     issues: (1) what is your requirement, if any, for C-17 
     aircraft beyond the 190 C-17 aircraft that the Air Force has 
     already bought; and (2) what is the basis of your 
     requirement, if any, for aircraft beyond the 190 C-17 
     aircraft that the Air Force has already bought.
       Due to the urgency of completing our conference, we 
     appreciate receiving your response to these questions no 
     later than 5 p.m., Tuesday, November 6, 2007.
            Sincerely,
                                                       Carl Levin,
     Chairman.
                                  ____



                                  U.S. Transportation Command,

                       Scott Air Force Base, IL, November 6, 2007.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: Sir, thank you for the opportunity to 
     respond to your questions concerning the strategic airlift 
     fleet. I support the programmed strategic airlift fleet of 
     180 C-17s, extended by the Fiscal Year 2007 Bridge 
     Supplemental to 190 aircraft, combined with 111 modernized 
     and reliability improved C-5s. This fleet mix, augmented with 
     the capability of the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF), 
     provides sufficient airlift capacity to meet strategic and 
     operational objectives during large-scale deployments, while 
     supporting other high priority operations and forward 
     deployed forces,
       However. the outcome of the C-5 modernization program will 
     have a direct impact on the capacity the C-17 will shoulder. 
     Therefore, given the uncertainty surrounding the C-5 
     modernization program, I cannot recommend terminating C-17 
     production at this time.
       Since you asked for my personal and professional opinion, I 
     believe 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s is the correct fleet mix for 
     the future. I reach this opinion by combining the analysis of 
     available million-ton-miles per day (MTM/D) capability, fleet 
     mission capable rates, the annual flying hour program, 
     average cost per flying hour, total number of organic 
     aircraft tails, available pallet capacity, and average age of 
     the fleet. Taking these factors together, I personally 
     conclude 205/111 is the sweet spot.
       My top airlift priority, however, remains the 
     recapitalization of our aging tanker fleet. The KC-X will not 
     only fulfill its primary refueling role, but will multiply 
     our transportation options. The strategic airlift fleet mix 
     should be calibrated as necessary to account for this 
     strategic necessity and to ensure we don't over-build overall 
     organic capacity to the detriment of our commercial partners.
       Thank you for considering my input on these very important 
     issues. And as always, thank you for the outstanding 
     leadership you provide our country and for the excellent 
     support you provide the Armed Forces of the United States.
           Sincerely,
                                               Norton A. Schwartz,
     General, USAF, Commander.
                                  ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                  Washington, DC., Sept. 29, 2009.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman,Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing as a follow up to our 
     discussion last week regarding the retirement of strategic 
     airlift aircraft.
       The Department fully supports the language in Section 311 
     of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009 (Public Law 
     111-32) which requires a minimum of 292 strategic airlift 
     aircraft as reflected in the Department's 2005 Mobility 
     Capability Study.
       Since the release of MCS-05, Congress has funded an 
     additional 33 C-17s the Department did not request. The 
     addition of these C-17 aircraft influenced our decision to 
     upgrade only 52 of 111 C-5s with the Reliability Enhancement 
     and Re-engining Program (RERP). Congress is now considering 
     adding another 10 C-17s in the FY2010 budget.
       The Department's current fleet of 324 aircraft (213 C-17/
     111 C-5) is in excess of strategic airlift needs, driving 
     increased operating costs at the expense of other priorities. 
     Each C-5A costs over $13 million in annual operating 
     expenses. Since we are over our current requirement by eight 
     aircraft, as determined by the analysis conducted during the 
     C-5 RERP Nunn-McCurdy recertification, it costs the 
     Department over $100 million a year in excess expenditures. 
     These costs will only grow if we receive additional C-17s 
     and/or delay the ability for the Department to retire excess 
     aircraft.
       Initial indications from Mobility Capability Requirements 
     Study 2016 show the strategic balance will not fundamentally 
     change. This leads me to believe: (1) the Department does not 
     need additional C-17s to meet strategic needs; and (2) the 
     Department needs to begin shedding excess strategic airlift 
     inventory by retiring a portion of the C-5A fleet now. The 
     Department requests your support and authority to allow the 
     proper management of the strategic airlift fleet to meet the 
     Nation's requirements.
       Thank you for your strong interest and continued support of 
     the Department.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Robert M. Gates.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, for those members of the Senate not 
familiar with the phrase ``personal and professional opinion,'' let me 
explain. In the Armed Services Committee, we require that military 
officers, appointed to senior positions such as the Transportation 
Command position, affirm that, when asked for their personal and 
professional opinion on any matter, they are obliged to give their own 
opinion, whether that opinion agrees with that of the Secretary of 
Defense, the President, or anyone else in the executive branch.
  General Schwartz replied to my letter on November 6, 2007:

       Since you asked for my personal and professional opinion, I 
     believe that 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s is the correct fleet mix 
     for the future. I reach that opinion by combining the 
     analysis of available million-tonmiles per day (MTM/D) 
     capability, fleet mission capable rates, the annual flying 
     hour program,

[[Page S9918]]

     average cost per flying hour, total number of organic 
     aircraft tails, available pallet capacity. And average age of 
     the fleet. Taking these factors together, I personally 
     conclude 201/111 is the sweet spot.

  It is clear from his letter that General Schwartz and the members of 
TRANSCOM had given serious thought to the question of how many C-17s we 
should have.
  More recently, in the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act, we 
required that the Department conduct a Study on Size and Mix of Airlift 
Force. That study was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses, 
IDA, and was completed in February, 2009. Among the questions that the 
study answered were the following:
  What are the cost and other implications for stopping production of 
the C-17 line and then restarting it later, if needed?

       Our assessment of the C-17 line shutdown and restart is 
     that continued production, even at low rates, is expensive 
     relative to restart costs. Moreover, under the scenarios and 
     other assumptions considered in this study, additional C-17s 
     were not needed to meet the MCS (Mobility Capability Study) 
     moderate-acceptable-risk delivery rates used as a benchmark 
     by the analyses conducted here. We also found that retiring 
     C-5As to release funds to buy and operate more C-17s is not 
     cost-effective.

  Mr. President, the time has come to stop C-17 production at 213 C-17 
aircraft. That is all we need to buy, that is all we can afford to buy, 
and that is all we should buy.
  The money that would be freed up by the McCain amendment would be 
transferred to the operation and maintenance, O&M, accounts. The bill 
cut roughly $2.4 billion from the budget request. I fear that this 
overall reduction could force the Department to make serious reductions 
in O&M activities, if not, in fact, forcing the Department to ask for 
another supplemental funding request. We should do all we can to avoid 
that possibility.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise to offer for the record, the Budget 
Committee's official scoring of H.R. 3326, the Departments of Defense 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2010.
  The bill, as reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 
provides $636.3 billion in discretionary budget authority for fiscal 
year 2010, which will result in new outlays of $401.7 billion. When 
outlays from prior-year budget authority are taken into account, 
discretionary outlays for the bill will total $646 billion.
  The Senate-reported bill is $1 million below its section 302(b) 
allocation for budget authority and is $28 million below its allocation 
for outlays.
  The bill includes $128.2 billion in budget authority designated as 
being for overseas deployments and other activities. Pursuant to 
section 401(c)(4) for the 2010 Budget Resolution, adjustments to the 
Appropriations Committee's section 302(a) allocation and to the 2010 
discretionary spending limits were made for that amount and for the 
outlays flowing therefrom.
  No budget points of order lie against the committee-reported bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that the table displaying the Budget 
Committee scoring of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

        H.R. 3326, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2010
  [Spending comparisons--Senate-Reported Bill (in millions of dollars)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate-Reported Bill:
    Budget Authority.......................................      636,270
    Outlays................................................      646,043
Senate 302(b) Allocation:
    Budget Authority.......................................      636,271
    Outlays................................................      646,071
House-Passed Bill:-
    Budget Authority.......................................      636,293
    Outlays................................................      647,932
President's Request:-
    Budget Authority.......................................      640,137
    Outlays................................................      650,641
 
                    SENATE-REPORTED BILL COMPARED TO:
 
Senate 302(b) allocation:
    Budget Authority.......................................           -1
    Outlays................................................          -28
House-Passed Bill:
    Budget Authority.......................................          -23
    Outlays................................................       -1,889
President's Request:
    Budget Authority.......................................       -3,867
    Outlays................................................       -4,598
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: The table does not include 2010 outlays stemming from emergency
  budget authority (BA) provided in the 2009 Supplemental Appropriations
  Act (P.L. 111-32) but does include outlays from regular BA designated
  as being for overseas deployments and other activities. The 2010 BA
  total includes $5 million in non-defense BA resulting from that Act.
  The remaining BA is classified as defense.

  

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