[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 136 (Thursday, September 24, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9766-S9767]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN STRATEGY

  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I rise today to call for the testimony 
before Congress of our top military commanders in Afghanistan, GEN 
Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus. Congress and the American 
people need to hear directly and as soon as possible from the generals 
to ensure that political motivations in Washington do not override the 
vital needs of our commanders and our troops on the ground.
  Ordinarily, I don't like the idea of calling generals away from their 
duties in theater but, unfortunately, in the often surreal world of 
Washington politics, all the hard work by our military and intelligence 
professionals on the battlefield in Afghanistan can be undone very 
quickly. Unfortunately, the latest verbal wavering by the 
administration and some of my colleagues in Congress can do just that.
  Last November, when I sent my report, the Roadmap to Success in South 
Asia, to then President-elect Obama and his national security team, I 
outlined the importance of messaging to our overall success in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. For too long, the United States has flailed 
about with an uncoordinated communication plan. In other words, we have 
been off message.
  Unfortunately, the enemy has continued to hone its own message. 
Radical Islamic terrorists have staged suicide attacks for maximum 
publicity, propagandizing their message on the Internet, and convinced 
their fellow terrorists-at-arms that they will defeat the international 
community.
  Negative and indecisive comments by the President, broadcast 
worldwide, have now given the enemy a big win in the public information 
battle.
  On CNN, the President questioned: ``Are we pursuing the right 
strategy?''
  On NBC's ``Meet the Press,'' the President's words were even more 
disturbing, signaling a lack of confidence in his earlier strategy. The 
President said:

       If an expanded counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan 
     contributes to the goal of defeating al-Qaida, then we will 
     move forward. But, if it doesn't, then I'm not interested in 
     just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in 
     Afghanistan or saving face or . . . sending a message that 
     America is here for the duration.

  Comments such as these call into doubt America's commitment to 
Afghanistan. They give hope to the terrorists--hope that America's 
resolve is not real, and that they only need to wait us out to win the 
war.
  The people of Afghanistan get the message that we are leaving soon. 
The implied message is that you better work with the Taliban and al-
Qaida, because they will be here after America leaves. This is a public 
bonanza in diplomacy for our terrorist enemies.
  At the same time, these comments have done a great disservice to our 
men and women serving in harm's way. These heroes need our country's 
unwavering support, not vacillation because of political pressures.
  President Obama's recent comments present a stark and dangerous 
contrast to his earlier resolve--resolve that I applauded on this floor 
and publicly and proudly supported. When President Obama commissioned 
General McChrystal's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, I 
believed that he was genuinely interested in receiving the general's 
expert, on-the-ground perspective and his informed opinion of what 
strategic and tactical changes would be required for success.
  Unfortunately, it now appears that the President has developed a 
sudden case of buyer's remorse. It seems increasingly clear to me the 
Obama administration is inclined to reject the counterinsurgency 
strategy recently recommended by General McChrystal and endorsed by the 
head of the U.S. Central Command, GEN David Petraeus and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Mike Mullen. In a bewildering twist, 
this is the same counterinsurgency strategy the President himself 
endorsed this past March.
  I have been a strong and vocal supporter of the administration's new 
strategy in Afghanistan, so I was particularly disappointed by the 
President's suggestion this past Sunday that he is reconsidering the 
American commitment to the war in Afghanistan.
  I am also deeply disturbed by press reports that Defense Secretary 
Gates will delay sending General McChrystal's troop request to the 
White House because the White House is not ready to receive it. Given 
the President's resolve this spring, I am somewhat puzzled by the 
strange treatment of General McChrystal's assessment and troop request. 
Unnecessary delay is not our friend in this war.
  The clearest reason for this delay seems to be that the President is 
considering not granting General McChrystal's request. Instead, we are 
now hearing that he may push for a more aggressive covert war against 
al-Qaida leadership in Pakistan.
  We all want to eliminate the al-Qaida leadership that plotted and 
planned the attacks that claimed more than 3,000 American lives on 
September 11. And depending on the details, more aggressive action in 
Pakistan may be a good thing. But such action should be in addition to, 
not a substitute for, giving our troops in Afghanistan all the 
resources and supporting personnel they need to succeed.
  While denying al-Qaida and Taliban militants sanctuary in the border 
regions of Pakistan is critical, a counterterrorism-only approach, 
focusing on one part of this regional conflict, will ultimately hand 
victory to the world's most violent and feared terrorists. This type of 
counterterrorism-only approach failed us in Iraq and it has failed us 
in Afghanistan for the last 7 years.

[[Page S9767]]

  I have consistently called for--and President Obama had promised--a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy designed to meet a set of 
clearly defined goals for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The Obama 
administration has rightly characterized the problem as involving both 
of these two countries. But right now, we have a plan only for one 
country.
  I am not suggesting it is General McChrystal's job to set that wider. 
As directed by the President and by our NATO allies whom he represents 
as commander of ISAF, the general has laid out a good strategy for 
success in Afghanistan and that strategy includes a request for more 
boots on the ground. I understand there is a lot of hand-wringing in 
Washington right now over Afghanistan. We saw the same reaction over 
sending more troops into Iraq 2 years ago. The political courage shown 
by the White House and Congress back then proved to be successful. 
Today, we must marshal the same courage and give General McChrystal 
what he needs to get the job done.
  Amid the reports of wavering and hand-wringing, an important question 
comes into mind: What has changed? During the campaign and after his 
inauguration, the President spoke repeatedly about the importance of 
winning the war in Afghanistan.
  For example, on March 27, 2009, when he rolled out his comprehensive 
new strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, the President declared that:

       To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the 
     Taliban's games and promote a more capable and accountable 
     Afghan government. Our troops have fought bravely against a 
     ruthless enemy. Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our 
     allies have borne a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and 
     sacrificed for their future. But for six years, Afghanistan 
     has been denied the resources that it demands because of the 
     war in Iraq. Now, we must make a commitment that can 
     accomplish our goals.

  I was heartened by these words. I agreed with the President on the 
need for a fully resourced counterinsurgency campaign and a solid 
commitment to ensure the security of the Afghan people and our own 
vital interests. I applauded his recognition of winning this war when 
he told our veterans, the VFW, this past August:

       Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so 
     again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will be an 
     even larger safe haven from which al-Qaida would plot to kill 
     more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting; 
     this is fundamental to the defense of our people.

  But our troops in the field have now been waiting over 6 months for 
the President to follow through on his promises. As General 
McChrystal's recently leaked assessment points out, time is of the 
essence, and we cannot afford more stalling by the administration on 
this vital national security issue.

  The general said the next 9 to 12 months are critical and that is why 
we need a decision now. I call on the President to heed his own words 
from this past weekend. Let's ignore the politics of the moment and 
finish the job in Afghanistan.
  I recognize we have not yet seen any official numbers associated with 
General McChrystal's troop request, but I am very encouraged by the 
general's emphasis on putting more of an Afghan face on operations. I 
believe our ultimate success depends on our ability to hand 
responsibility for security over to Afghans.
  I was also gratified to see the report's strong emphasis on the 
importance of ``smart power'' to achieving success. While the 
assessment does not actually use the term, the concept is woven into 
the core of the report. General McChrystal and others have been clear 
that traditional kinetic military efforts alone will not achieve the 
success we need. Success will be attainable only if we maximize the 
ability of nonmilitary agencies of the United States Government to work 
through Afghan institutions to achieve stability, reconstruction, and 
the rule of law.
  As I have said repeatedly on the floor, the efforts by the National 
Guard, led by my own Missouri National Guard, to bring agricultural 
experts, including full-time farmers who also serve as trained military 
soldiers, who have gone into Nangarhar Province and in 1 year 
transformed the agriculture of Afghanistan so they could make a greater 
profit from raising legitimate crops and taking Afghanistan and 
Nangarhar Province from the No. 2 poppy-producing province in the 
nation down to almost zero poppy production. Six more National Guards 
from different States are there now. More are coming. Two weeks ago, I 
challenged all of the Nation's National Guard and their commanders at 
their meeting in Nashville to commit to send a National Guard unit from 
every State to an appropriate province where they can help, and they 
can make a difference. That is part of smart power. They need to bring 
the economic resources and the structures and the information and 
experience we have, protected by soldiers and airmen of the National 
Guard who can defend themselves and those they are protecting. That is 
smart power.
  In the McChrystal report, the Afghan Defense Minister rejected the 
popular myth that Afghanistan is a graveyard of empires and we are 
destined to fail there. I couldn't agree more. As General McChrystal 
affirmed in his report: ``While the situation is serious, success is 
still achievable.'' The Obama administration and Congress must each do 
its own part to give our troops the resources and time they need to 
make that success a reality.
  Let's not snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory in Afghanistan 
just because a few pundits are pedaling political pessimism in 
Washington. All the experts, including General McChrystal, agree we 
need a properly resourced counterinsurgency strategy, and we need it 
now. It is time to listen to our commanders on the ground, not the 
ever-changing political winds whispering defeat in Washington.
  Madam President, I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as 
in morning business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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