[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 132 (Thursday, September 17, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9491-S9495]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       U.S. POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment 
about U.S. policy in Afghanistan. During the course of the August 
recess, and of course with my customary practice, I traveled to 
Pennsylvania's 67 counties to take the pulse of my constituents. While 
there are many problems, there was considerable concern about what our 
policy is going to be in Afghanistan. I note at this time, according to 
yesterday's New York Times, there have been 821 American servicemembers 
killed in Afghanistan, some $189 billion has been appropriated for 
Afghanistan, and by the end of this year there will be 68,000 American 
military personnel and an additional 38,000 NATO troops from other 
countries in Afghanistan.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that an extensive floor 
statement be included in the text of the Congressional Record at the 
conclusion of my statement.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I intend now to summarize the substance 
of my concerns.
  The approach on our policy has been outlined in testimony earlier 
this week by ADM Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
in these two statements: Our policy

       . . . [is] to deny sanctuary to al-Qaida and the Taliban 
     now and to generate a stable and secure Afghanistan capable 
     of denying al-Qaida return after withdrawal of our combat 
     forces and while we sustain partnership and commitment to 
     political and economic development in that nation.

  Admiral Mullen told the committee:

       A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more 
     forces, without question more time and more commitment to the 
     protection of the Afghan people and to the development of 
     good governance.

  While I think it is laudable to want to protect the Afghan people and 
to provide good governance there, it is my view that is not of 
sufficient national interest for the United States to put our troops at 
risk or to expend substantial additional sums there. The principal 
question, as I see it, is whether Afghanistan is indispensable to be 
secured to prevent al-Qaida from launching another attack against the 
United States. If that is the purpose, that is the necessity, then we 
must undertake anything, whatever it costs, to stop al-Qaida from again 
attacking the United States.
  But I believe there is a series of questions which have to be 
answered before we can assess whether that is an indispensable part of 
U.S. policy. Toward that end, I have written to the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, 
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on a series of 
questions which I think requires answers before we can make an informed 
judgment as to whether the expenditures in Afghanistan are in our 
specific and key national interests. These are the questions which I 
have posed for these leaders:
  What are the prospects for military success in Afghanistan against 
al-Qaida and the Taliban? What will the requirements be in the next 
year as to additional U.S. troops and the cost of our involvement in 
Afghanistan? What may we reasonably expect NATO or other allies to 
contribute in troops and dollars to our efforts in Afghanistan? What 
other areas around the world are open to al-Qaida as potential bases 
for another attack on the United States? What will be done besides 
military action, such as nation building and stabilizing and developing 
Afghanistan, so that they will be prepared to handle their own problems 
so we can withdraw? What assistance can we reasonably expect from 
Pakistan in fighting al-Qaida and the Taliban and stopping both from 
seeking refuge by moving in and out of Pakistan? How does the 
questionable legitimacy of President Karzai's status as result of 
allegations of proof of election fraud impact on our ability to succeed 
in Afghanistan? How does the illegal drug trafficking and alleged 
involvement of high-ranking officials in the Karzai government in such 
drug trafficking impact on our efforts in Afghanistan? What does U.S. 
intelligence show as to any possible plans by al-Qaida to attack the 
United States or anyone else? What does U.S. intelligence show as to 
whether India poses a real threat to attack Pakistan? What does U.S. 
intelligence show as to whether Pakistan poses a real threat to attack 
India? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan could 
reasonably devote additional military force to assist us in the fight 
against the Taliban? What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
Government of Pakistan or influential officials in the Pakistani 
Government would consider negotiating with India for reducing nuclear 
weapons or other confidence-building measures to diffuse the tension 
with India if actively encouraged to do so by the United States? What 
does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the Government of India or 
some influential officials in the Indian Government would consider 
negotiating with Pakistan for reducing nuclear weapons or other 
confidence-building measures to diffuse the tension with Pakistan if 
actively encouraged by the United States to do so?
  We have learned a bitter lesson from Iraq--that we did not have 
answers to important questions in formulating our policy there. Had we 
known that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, I 
think the United States would not have gone into Iraq.
  These questions were posed by me when we had the debate on the 
resolution for authorizing the use of force. On October 7, 2002, I said 
the following:

       What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over 
     weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of 
     casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the 
     consequences in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was 
     toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the 
     Arab world, and the impact on Israel?

  The President, as Commander in Chief, as we all know, has primary 
responsibility to conduct war but the Constitution vests in the 
Congress the sole authority to declare war. Regrettably, the 
congressional authority and responsibility has been dissipated with 
what we have seen in Korea and in Vietnam and in the authorizations for 
the use of force in the two incursions into Iraq. We do not have the 
authority under separation of powers to delegate that authority. And 
had we asked the tough questions and had we gotten correct, honest, 
accurate answers, it would have been a great help to President George 
W. Bush in formulating a policy as to Iraq. I think now it would be a 
great help to President Barack Obama for the Congress to exercise our 
persistence in finding correct answers to these kinds of tough 
questions.

  We have a situation with Pakistan today which gives great pause. The 
United States has advanced $15.5 billion to Pakistan since 9/11. Some 
$10.9 billion of that money has gone for security, and there is a real 
question as to whether we have gotten our monies worth. The comments 
from the New York Times on December 24, 2007 raised these issues:

       Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems 
     designed to counter India, not al-Qaida or the Taliban . . . 
     the United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in 
     inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition 
     and other costs.

  Dr. Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, wrote on April 10 of this year:

       Far too much of the military portion of the . . . past U.S. 
     aid to Pakistan never was used to help fight the Taliban and 
     al-Qaida or can't be accounted for. Future aid should clearly 
     be tied to clearly defined goals for Pakistani action and 
     full accounting for the money.

  The New York Times, on August 30 of this year, pointed out:

       The United States has accused Pakistan of illegally 
     modifying American-made missiles to expand its capability to 
     strike land targets, a potential threat to India.

  The questions which have been posed in the series of letters which I 
have outlined go to the issue as to whether India poses a threat to 
Pakistan. It is hard for me to contemplate that is a serious problem, 
but we ought to be informed and we ought to be putting our efforts to 
seeing if we cannot broker a peace treaty between India and Pakistan, 
which would enable us to get substantial help from Pakistan in our 
fight against the Taliban.
  In 1995, when I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator 
Hank

[[Page S9492]]

Brown of Colorado and I visited India and Pakistan. When we were in 
India, we met with Prime Minister Rao, who brought up the subject of a 
potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan and said he 
would like to see the subcontinent nuclear free. He knew we were en 
route to Pakistan to see Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and he asked us 
to take up the subject with her, which we did. As a result, I wrote the 
following letter to President Clinton the day after we left India, and 
I think it is worth reading in full:

       August 28, 1995.
       Dear Mr. President: I think it important to call to your 
     personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator 
     Hank Brown and I have had in the last 2 days with Indian 
     Prime Minister Rao and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir 
     Bhutto. Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very 
     interested in negotiations which would lead to the 
     elimination of any nuclear weapons on the subcontinent within 
     10 or 15 years, including renouncing first use of such 
     weapons. His interest in such negotiations with Pakistan 
     would cover bilateral talks, a regional conference which 
     would include the United States, China, and Russia, in 
     addition to India and Pakistan. When we asked Prime Minister 
     Bhutto when she had last talked to Prime Minister Rao, she 
     said she had had no conversations with him during her tenure 
     as prime minister. Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had 
     initiated a contact through an intermediary but that was 
     terminated when a new controversy arose between Pakistan and 
     India. From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and 
     Prime Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very 
     receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United 
     States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile 
     systems. I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from 
     Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I 
     am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of 
     State Warren Christopher.

  In my letter to Secretary of State Clinton, which I sent her last 
week, I asked her what efforts have been made to broker such a peace 
treaty between India and Pakistan.
  I sent on to her a copy of a letter which I had written to President 
Clinton; if we could ease the tension between those two countries, if 
we could persuade Pakistan that India does not pose a threat so 
Pakistan would not have to marshal their forces along the Indian border 
but instead could aid the United States in our fight against the 
Taliban, it would be a very different proposition.
  The suggestion has been made now to extend $7.5 billion in additional 
funding to Pakistan. It seems to me that is not a good use of our money 
if it is to follow the same trail as the $15.5 billion which we have 
expended in the immediate past. If we can get the assistance of 
Pakistan in fighting the Taliban, it would be one thing. If we could be 
assured that the money was being used for the intended purpose and not 
diverted for other purposes, as it appears the other $15.5 billion was, 
it would be a very different picture.
  In sum, it seems to me that before we ought to commit additional 
troops to Afghanistan, it ought to be a matter of paramount importance, 
indispensable as a matter of stopping another attack by al-Qaida. But 
if al-Qaida can organize in some other spot, the issues raised by my 
questions, it would bear heavily on what our policy in Afghanistan 
should be.
  In addition to the full text of my statement being printed in the 
Record, I ask unanimous consent that copies of my letters to Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, CIA 
Director and the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, all 
be printed in the Record, and I yield the floor.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.
     Hon. Robert M. Gates,
     Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Gates: Congress will be called upon to make 
     important decisions on the war in Afghanistan. whether there 
     is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the 
     importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again 
     attacking the United States. In a related matter, in 
     evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan. Congress needs to know 
     whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the 
     Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq 
     without sufficient accurate. factual information. I write to 
     you, the Secretary of State, the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Director of the CIA (copies enclosed) on 
     related issues within their purview.
       Is U.S. success in Afghanistan critical in stopping al 
     Qaeda from maintaining a base to plan and facilitate another 
     attack on the United States?
       What are the prospects for military success in Afghanistan 
     against the Taliban?
       What will the requirements be in the next year as to 
     additional U.S. troops and the cost of our involvement in 
     Afghanistan?
       What may we reasonably expect NATO or other allies to 
     contribute in troops and dollars to our efforts in 
     Afghanistan?
       What will be done besides military action, such as nation-
     building, in stabilizing and developing Afghanistan so that 
     they will be prepared to handle their own problems so that we 
     can withdraw?
       What assistance can we reasonably expect from Pakistan in 
     fighting the Taliban and stopping the Taliban from seeking 
     refuge by moving in and out of Pakistan?
       How does the questionable legitimacy of President Karzai's 
     status as a result of allegations or proof of election fraud 
     impact on our ability to succeed in Afghanistan?
       How does the illegal drug trafficking and alleged 
     involvement of high-ranking officials in the Karzai 
     government in such drug trafficking impact on our efforts in 
     Afghanistan?
       Thank you for your consideration of this request. I am 
     available to meet with you or your designee for a briefing on 
     these questions.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.
       Enclosures.


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.
     Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary clinton: Congress will be called upon to 
     make important decisions on the war in Afghanistan. whether 
     there is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the 
     importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again 
     attacking the United States. In evaluating foreign aid to 
     Pakistan. Congress needs to know whether Pakistan could be 
     persuaded to aid us in fighting the Taliban. In retrospect. 
     important judgments were made on Iraq without sufficient 
     accurate, factual information.
       I am writing to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of 
     National Intelligence and Director of the CIA (copies 
     enclosed) to obtain information principally on military and 
     intelligence matters. My inquiries to you are principally on 
     foreign relation issues involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
     India.
       In August 1995, Senator Hank Brown and I were told by Prime 
     Minister Rao in a visit to New Delhi that India was 
     interested in negotiating with Pakistan to make their 
     subcontinent free of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Rao 
     asked Senator Brown and me to raise this issue with 
     Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto which we did. I then 
     wrote to President Clinton urging him to broker such 
     negotiations. Those discussions are summarized in a letter 
     which I sent to President Clinton:

                                                  August 28, 1995.
       Dear Mr. President: I think it important to call to your 
     personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator 
     Hank Brown and I have had in the last two days with Indian 
     Prime Minister Rao and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir 
     Bhutto.
       Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very interested 
     in negotiations which would lead to the elimination of any 
     nuclear weapons on his subcontinent within ten or fifteen 
     years including renouncing first use of such weapons. His 
     interest in such negotiations with Pakistan would cover 
     bilateral talks or a regional conference which would include 
     the United States, China and Russia in addition to India and 
     Pakistan.
       When we asked Prime Minister Bhutto when she had last 
     talked to Prime Minister Rao. she said that she had no 
     conversations with him during her tenure as Prime Minister. 
     Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had initiated a 
     contact through an intermediary but that was terminated when 
     a new controversy arose between Pakistan and India.
       From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and Prime 
     Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very 
     receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United 
     States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile 
     systems.
       I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from 
     Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I 
     am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of 
     State Warren Christopher.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.

       After returning to the United States, I discussed such a 
     presidential initiative with President Clinton, but my 
     suggestion was not pursued.
       If the current tensions and hostilities between India and 
     Pakistan could be eliminated or reduced. Pakistan might be 
     persuaded to increase its military forces to aid us in the 
     fight against the Taliban. I urge you and your Department to 
     undertake an initiative to broker a peace treaty between 
     India and Pakistan if you are not already doing so.
       I am also interested in your view as to whether India poses 
     a realistic threat to Pakistan which warrants Pakistan 
     devoting military force to that potential threat, which 
     diverts a military contribution which could aid the U.S. in 
     our fight against the Taliban?

[[Page S9493]]

       I am also interested in your view of a proposal for the 
     U.S. to grant substantial foreign aid to Pakistan. I raise 
     this question in the context of Pakistan's failure during 
     President Musharaf's tenure to fulfill its commitments on the 
     $10 billion aid granted by the U.S. from September 11, 2001 
     to 2007. When Representative Patrick Kennedy and I raised 
     this subject with President Musharaf in a December 2007 
     meeting in Islamabad, he gave a very unsatisfactory answer.
       I am available to meet with you or your designee on these 
     subjects.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.
       Enclosures.


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.
     Hon. Dennis C. Blair,
      Director of National Intelligence,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Director Blair: Congress will be called upon to make 
     important decisions on the war in Afghanistan, whether there 
     is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the 
     importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again 
     attacking the United States. In a related matter, in 
     evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan, Congress needs to know 
     whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the 
     Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq 
     without sufficient accurate, factual information. I write to 
     you, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 
     the Director of the CIA (copies enclosed) to obtain that 
     information.
       How important is Afghanistan to al Qaeda as a base for 
     another attack on the U.S.?
       Does al Qaeda have other bases which would be sufficient 
     for them to plan and facilitate another attack on the United 
     States?
       What other areas are open to al Qaeda as potential bases 
     for another attack on the United States?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to any possible plans 
     by al Qaeda to attack the United States or anyone else?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether India poses 
     a real threat to attack Pakistan?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan 
     poses a real threat to attack India?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan 
     could reasonably devote additional military force to 
     assisting us in the fight against the Taliban?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
     government of Pakistan or some influential officials in the 
     Pakistani government would consider negotiating with India 
     for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building 
     measures to defuse the tension with India if actively 
     encouraged by the U.S. to do so?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
     government of India or some influential officials in the 
     Indian government would consider negotiating with Pakistan 
     for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building 
     measures to defuse the tension with Pakistan if actively 
     encouraged by the U.S. to do so?
       What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that 
     President Karzai and his associates acted fraudulently in the 
     recent presidential elections?
       What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that 
     President Karzai and his associates are involved in illegal 
     narcotics activity?
       I am writing an identical letter to Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta.
       Thank you for your consideration of this request. I am 
     available to meet with you or your designee for a briefing on 
     these questions.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.
       Enclosures.


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 2009.
     Hon. Leon Panetta,
     Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Director Panetta: Congress will be called upon to make 
     important decisions on the war in Afghanistan, whether there 
     is a realistic prospect of succeeding there, and the 
     importance of Afghanistan in stopping al Qaeda from again 
     attacking the United States. In a related matter, in 
     evaluating foreign aid to Pakistan, Congress needs to know 
     whether Pakistan could be persuaded to aid us in fighting the 
     Taliban. In retrospect, important judgments were made on Iraq 
     without sufficient accurate, factual information. I write to 
     you, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Director of National Intelligence (copies enclosed) to obtain 
     that information.
       How important is Afghanistan to al Qaeda as a base for 
     another attack on the U.S.?
       Does al Qaeda have other bases which would be sufficient 
     for them to plan and facilitate another attack on the United 
     States?
       What other areas are open to al Qaeda as potential bases 
     for another attack on the United States?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to any possible plans 
     by al Qaeda to attack the United States or anyone else?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether India poses 
     a real threat to attack Pakistan?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan 
     poses a real threat to attack India?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan 
     could reasonably devote additional military force to 
     assisting us in the fight against the Taliban?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
     government of Pakistan or some influential officials in the 
     Pakistani government would consider negotiating with India 
     for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building 
     measures to defuse the tension with India if actively 
     encouraged by the U.S. to do so?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
     government of India or some influential officials in the 
     Indian government would consider negotiating with Pakistan 
     for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building 
     measures to defuse the tension with Pakistan if actively 
     encouraged by the U.S. to do so?
       What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that 
     President Karzai and his associates acted fraudulently in the 
     recent presidential elections?
       What does U.S. intelligence show on the allegations that 
     President Karzai and his associates are involved in illegal 
     narcotics activity?
       I am writing an identical letter to Director of National 
     Intelligence Dennis Blair.
       Thank you for your consideration of this request. I am 
     available to meet with you or your designee for a briefing on 
     these questions.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.
       Enclosure.

                               Exhibit 1

 Statement of Senator Arlen Specter--U.S. Policy Regarding Afghanistan

       Mr. President: I seek recognition today to discuss our 
     military presence in Afghanistan. We went into Afghanistan in 
     2001 following the barbaric attacks of September 11, 2001. 
     Our forces swiftly toppled the Taliban and denied Al Qaeda 
     leadership the safe haven it had enjoyed in Afghanistan. Both 
     Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership survived the attack and were 
     able to take refuge and reconstitute in the mountainous 
     regions across the border in Pakistan.
       The cost of the war has already been high: 821 American 
     servicemembers have died (New York Times--9/16/09) and, 
     according to the Congressional Research Service, $189 billion 
     appropriated to the Department of Defense, the Department of 
     State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the 
     Veterans Administration for medical costs stemming from the 
     war in Afghanistan. By the end of this year, there will be 
     68,000 American military personnel and an additional 38,000 
     NATO troops from other countries in Afghanistan (Los Angeles 
     Times--9/4/09).
       Today, according to the commander of U.S. forces in 
     Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, the Taliban again 
     poses a serious threat. U.S. military personnel casualties 
     are mounting and the Pentagon is calling for a build-up of 
     U.S. forces there. Before Congress, or at least this member, 
     can take a position on more U.S. troops for Afghanistan, 
     there is a need for answers to critical questions. To help 
     gather information to allow me to make informed decisions, I 
     sent letters last week to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
     Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Director of National 
     Intelligence Dennis Blair, Director of the CIA Leon Panetta 
     and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen 
     posing questions about the current situation in Afghanistan 
     and Pakistan, whether there is a realistic prospect of 
     succeeding there, the importance of the mission in 
     Afghanistan to stopping Al Qaeda from again attacking the 
     United States, and U.S. efforts to engage other regional 
     players such as India to ease tensions in the region [letters 
     attached]. These questions are posed in the context that 
     Congress did not get candid, direct answers to questions 
     posed before the resolution authorizing the use of force in 
     Iraq. Had we known Saddam did not have weapons of mass 
     destruction, the United States would not have gone into Iraq.
       The paramount question is whether Afghanistan is 
     indispensable for Al Qaeda as a base for organizing another 
     attack against the United States? If so, the United States 
     must do whatever it takes to stop that from happening, as 
     there is no more important national security interest than 
     protection of our citizens. Additional questions which need 
     to be answered include:
       What are the prospects for military success in Afghanistan 
     against Al Qaeda and the Taliban?
       What will the requirements be in the next year as to 
     additional U.S. troops and the cost of our involvement in 
     Afghanistan?
       What may we reasonably expect NATO or other allies to 
     contribute in troops and dollars to our efforts in 
     Afghanistan?
       What other areas around the world are open to Al Qaeda as 
     potential bases for another attack on the United States?
       What will be done besides military action, such as nation-
     building, in stabilizing and developing Afghanistan so that 
     they will be prepared to handle their own problems so that we 
     can withdraw?
       What assistance can we reasonably expect from Pakistan in 
     fighting the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and stopping both from 
     seeking refuge by moving in and out of Pakistan?
       How does the questionable legitimacy of President Karzai's 
     status as a result of allegations or proof of election fraud 
     impact on our ability to succeed in Afghanistan?

[[Page S9494]]

       How does the illegal drug trafficking and alleged 
     involvement of high-ranking officials in the Karzai 
     government in such drug trafficking impact on our efforts in 
     Afghanistan?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to any possible plans 
     by Al Qaeda to attack the United States or anyone else?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether India poses 
     a real threat to attack Pakistan?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan 
     poses a real threat to attack India?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether Pakistan 
     could reasonably devote additional military force to 
     assisting us in the fight against the Taliban?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
     government of Pakistan or some influential officials in the 
     Pakistani government would consider negotiating with India 
     for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building 
     measures to defuse the tension with India if actively 
     encouraged by the U.S. to do so?
       What does U.S. intelligence show as to whether the 
     government of India or some influential officials in the 
     Indian government would consider negotiating with Pakistan 
     for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building 
     measures to defuse the tension with Pakistan if actively 
     encouraged by the U.S. to do so?
       In prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee on September 15, 2009, Admiral Michael Mullen, 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defined the U.S. 
     mission in Afghanistan as:
       ``. . . to deny sanctuary to al Qaeda and the Taliban now, 
     and to generate a stable and secure Afghanistan capable of 
     denying al Qaeda return after the withdrawal of our combat 
     forces, and while we sustain partnership and commitment to 
     political and economic development in that nation.''
       Admiral Mullen later told the Committee:
       . . . a properly resourced counter-insurgency probably 
     means more forces, without question, more time and more 
     commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the 
     development of good governance.''
       While it would be desirable to protect the Afghan people 
     and see Afghanistan develop good governance, that mission 
     alone does not constitute, in my judgment, a vital national 
     security interest that would warrant putting U.S. troops in 
     harm's way. What has not yet been made clear to me is that a 
     larger U.S. military presence in Afghanistan will further our 
     efforts to deny Al Qaeda a base from which to organize and 
     launch attacks against the U.S. Conversely, I worry that 
     further growing our force in Afghanistan risks committing 
     ourselves to a costly counter-insurgency mission focused on 
     building Afghan governmental institutions--a mission that 
     would require years if not decades to prosecute--when what is 
     in our nation's best interest may be a much more streamlined 
     counter-terrorism mission focused on pursuing Al Qaeda 
     leadership in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.


                    Securing Pakistan's Cooperation

       Understanding that the Taliban and Al Qaeda reside in both 
     Pakistan and Afghanistan, any U.S. strategy in Afghanistan 
     must account for conditions across the border in Pakistan, 
     and Washington must effectively engage Islamabad as well as 
     Kabul. Questions remain, however, about Pakistan's interest 
     in pursuing a sustained campaign against the Taliban and Al 
     Qaeda on its own soil.
       Since 2001, the U.S. has given over $15.5 billion in overt 
     aid to Pakistan, according to the Congressional Research 
     Service, of which $10.9 billion has been security related. 
     Where has this money gone? According to a December 24, 2007 
     New York Times article:
       ``Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems 
     designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, the 
     officials said, adding that the United States has paid tens 
     of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement 
     claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs.''
       I raised this question during a December 27, 2007 meeting 
     in Islamabad with then-president Pervez Musharraf. I asked 
     Musharraf about Pakistan's record following through on its 
     commitments on the $10 billion in aid granted by the U.S. 
     between September 11, 2001 and 2007 and found his response 
     wholly inadequate. There is a new regime governing in 
     Islamabad now, and I think it crucial that Pakistan will 
     participate fully in the fight against Al Qaeda and the 
     Taliban if the U.S. is to finance it.
       Before the U.S. sends billions more in aid--both civil and 
     military--to Pakistan, what assurances do we have that it 
     will go to the intended recipients? Dr. Anthony Cordesman, of 
     the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote on 
     April 10, 2009:
       ``Far too much of the military portion of the . . . past 
     U.S. aid to Pakistan never was used to help fight the Taliban 
     and al Qaeda or can't be accounted for. Future aid should be 
     clearly tied to clearly defined goals for Pakistani action 
     and full accounting for the money.''
       Is it possible to get Pakistan to focus on the threat posed 
     by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in its tribal regions when 
     Islamabad perceives an existential threat to lie next door in 
     India? Or, will Pakistan continue to divert U.S. aid to 
     bolster defenses along its Indian border, as alleged in an 
     August 30, 2009 New York Times article, which said:
       ``The United States has accused Pakistan of illegally 
     modifying American-made missiles to expand its capability to 
     strike land targets, a potential threat to India . . .''
       I think we need to understand that any reorientation of 
     Islamabad's strategic calculus--specifically a change of 
     perception that the existential threat lies to its west in 
     the form of Al Qaeda and the Taliban rather than to the east 
     in India--will have to emerge internally. No amount of money 
     we give Islamabad is going to convince it otherwise. The 
     current proposal by Senators Kerry and Lugar to spend $7.5 
     billion over five years to strengthen Pakistan's civilian 
     institutions is worth considering, but this alone would not 
     guarantee Pakistan's cooperation in committing fully to the 
     fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. More important than 
     giving money, I believe, is the U.S. undertaking to broker a 
     lasting peace between India and Pakistan.


                    Towards an India-Pakistan Peace

       In August 1995, Senator Hank Brown and I were told by Prime 
     Minister Rao in a visit to New Delhi that India was 
     interested in negotiating with Pakistan to make their 
     subcontinent free of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Rao 
     asked Senator Brown and me to raise this issue with 
     Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto which we did. I then 
     wrote to President Clinton urging him to broker such 
     negotiations. Those discussions are summarized in a letter 
     which I sent to President Clinton:

                                                  August 28, 1995.
       Dear Mr. President: I think it important to call to your 
     personal attention the substance of meetings which Senator 
     Hank Brown and I have had in the last two days with Indian 
     Prime Minister Rao and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir 
     Bhutto.
       Prime Minister Rao stated that he would be very interested 
     in negotiations which would lead to the elimination of any 
     nuclear weapons on his subcontinent within ten or fifteen 
     years including renouncing first use of such weapons. His 
     interest in such negotiations with Pakistan would cover 
     bilateral talks or a regional conference which would include 
     the United States, China and Russia in addition to India and 
     Pakistan.
       When we asked Prime Minister Bhutto when she had last 
     talked to Prime Minister Rao, she said that she had no 
     conversations with him during her tenure as Prime Minister. 
     Prime Minister Bhutto did say that she had initiated a 
     contact through an intermediary but that was terminated when 
     a new controversy arose between Pakistan and India.
       From our conversations with Prime Minister Rao and Prime 
     Minister Bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very 
     receptive to discussions initiated and brokered by the United 
     States as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile 
     systems.
       I am dictating this letter to you by telephone from 
     Damascus so that you will have it at the earliest moment. I 
     am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to Secretary of 
     State Warren Christopher.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Arlen Specter.

       After returning to the United States, I discussed such a 
     presidential initiative with President Clinton, but my 
     suggestion was not pursued.
       If the current tensions and hostilities between India and 
     Pakistan could be eliminated or reduced, Pakistan might be 
     persuaded to increase its military forces to aid us in the 
     fight against the Taliban. On September 9, 2009, I wrote to 
     Secretary Clinton to urge her to work to mediate dialogue 
     between India and Pakistan in the hope of easing bilateral 
     tensions to enable Pakistan to focus more intently on the 
     problem posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban along its western 
     border.


                               Conclusion

       Congress will be called upon to make important decision on 
     the war in Afghanistan that will have consequences for years 
     to come both in Southwestern Asia and here at home. As I said 
     on the Senate floor on October 7, 2002, the authorization of 
     the use of military force is a core duty of Congress which 
     this institution must not delegate to the Executive Branch:
       ``. . . the doctrine of separation of powers precludes the 
     Congress from delegating its core constitutional authority to 
     the executive branch. . . . Congress may not delegate the 
     authority to engage in war. If we authorize the President to 
     use whatever force is necessary, that contemplates further 
     action. While no one is going to go to court to challenge the 
     President's authority, that is of some concern, at least to 
     this Senator.''
       Congress must ask the tough questions about what an 
     expansion of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan would 
     accomplish. On October 7, 2002, in the lead up to the 
     authorization of the use of force in Iraq, I raised similar 
     questions on the Senate floor:
       ``What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over 
     weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of 
     casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the 
     consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was 
     toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the 
     Arab world, and the impact on Israel?''
       In retrospect, Congress should have been more diligent and 
     insistent on getting candid, accurate answers to such 
     questions. It would have been a help to President George W. 
     Bush to have had answers to these questions candidly and 
     correctly in determining his policy. It would now be a help 
     to President Obama to have congressional input on

[[Page S9495]]

     posing relevant, tough questions and getting candid, correct 
     answers. While the Constitution gives the President paramount 
     authority as Commander-in-Chief, the Constitution gives the 
     Congress the sole authority to declare war. That 
     congressional authority and responsibility have not been 
     appropriately exercised considering what has happened in 
     Korea and Vietnam and in the resolutions authorizing the use 
     of force in Iraq in 1991 and 2002, none of which constituted 
     congressional declarations of war.
       On the ultimate issue of increased U.S. forces: Congress 
     should not, and this member will not, support a policy of 
     increasing U.S. forces in Afghanistan until such policy is 
     warranted by candid and correct factual information and 
     preferable alternatives cannot achieve the desired 
     objectives.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma is 
recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, could I inquire as to the regular order?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The minority has 30 minutes 
remaining in morning business.
  Mr. INHOFE. I ask when the majority would then be recognized?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority has 12 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, if the Senator controlling the remainder 
of the majority time would like to reserve his time, I will go ahead 
and start.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________