[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 128 (Friday, September 11, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9284-S9286]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         SURGE THE AFGHAN ARMY

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today we mark a solemn anniversary. Eight 
years ago this morning, our Nation was attacked by terrorist extremists 
motivated by hatred and bent on destruction. It is always appropriate 
to reflect on the shock of that day, the innocent lives lost, and the 
efforts our Nation has made since that day to ensure that Afghanistan, 
the nation that hosted those terrorists, cannot again become a safe 
haven for terrorists seeking to attack us. But today is an especially 
appropriate occasion to take stock of those efforts and consider how 
best to continue them.

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  I recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan where I was joined by 
my colleagues, Senators Jack Reed and Ted Kaufman. The situation in 
Afghanistan is serious. Security has deteriorated. But if we take the 
right steps, we can ensure Afghanistan does not revert to a Taliban-
friendly government that can once again provide a safe haven for al-
Qaida to terrorize us and the world.
  The Obama administration's new strategy focusing on securing the 
Afghan population's safety and partnering with the Afghan security 
forces in that effort is an important start in reversing the situation 
in Afghanistan. The change in strategy has led our forces, in the words 
of General McChrystal's Counterinsurgency Guidance, to:

       . . . live, eat and train together [with the Afghan 
     security forces], plan and operate together, depend on one 
     another, and hold each other accountable . . . and treat them 
     as equal partners in success.

  The general's guidance goes on to say that the success of the Afghan 
security forces ``is our goal.''
  To achieve that goal, we should increase and accelerate our efforts 
to support the Afghan security forces in their efforts to become self-
sufficient in delivering security to their nation before we consider 
whether to increase U.S. combat forces above the levels already planned 
for the next few months. These steps include increasing the size of the 
Afghan Army and police much faster than presently planned; providing 
more trainers for the Afghan Army and police than presently planned; 
providing them with more equipment than presently planned; and working 
to separate local Taliban fighters from their leaders and attract them 
to the side of the government, as we did in Iraq.
  While the security situation in Afghanistan has worsened, we still 
have important advantages there. The Afghan people hate the Taliban. 
Public opinion polls there show support for the Taliban at about 5 
percent. In addition, the Afghan Army is highly motivated and its 
troops are proven fighters.
  Despite those advantages, we face significant challenges. General 
McChrystal believes--and I agree--that we need to regain the initiative 
and create a momentum toward success. General McChrystal worries, and 
rightly so, about the perception that we have lost that initiative and 
the impact of that perception on the Afghan people, their government, 
al-Qaida, and the Taliban. By contrast, if we can dispel that 
perception, we have a chance to convince local and lower level Taliban 
fighters to lay down their arms and rejoin Afghan society.
  I believe the most effective way to retake the initiative in 
Afghanistan is with a series of steps to ensure that the Afghan Army 
and police have the manpower, equipment, and support to secure their 
own nation.
  First, we should increase troop levels for the Afghan Army and police 
faster than currently planned. There are approximately 90,000 troops in 
the Afghan Army now, and that number is scheduled to go up to 134,000 
by October of 2010. The Afghan police are scheduled to reach a level of 
82,000 by the same time. For a long time, many of us have urged the 
establishment of a goal of 240,000 Afghan troops and 160,000 Afghan 
police by 2013. The Afghan Minister of Defense has strongly supported 
those numbers. It now appears that our government and the Afghan 
Government are prepared to accept those goals. But the need for 
additional Afghan forces is more urgent. I believe it both possible and 
essential to advance those goals by a year, to 2012.
  Our own military in Afghanistan has repeatedly pointed to a need for 
more Afghan forces. In one sector of Helmand Province we visited last 
week, our marines outnumbered Afghan soldiers by five to one. A marine 
company commander in Helmand Province told the New York Times in July 
that a lack of Afghan troops ``is absolutely our Achilles' heel.''
  What do we need to do to increase the size of the Afghan Army and 
police? According to Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, there is no lack 
of Afghan manpower. We have been assured it is available. But we will 
need significantly more trainers. We asked General Formica, who is in 
charge of the American effort to train Afghan security forces, whether 
such an increase is possible. He indicated he would make an assessment 
of what would be necessary in order to meet the earlier timetable. In 
the meantime, we should press our NATO allies with much greater 
forcefulness to provide more trainers. If our NATO allies are not going 
to come through with the combat forces they pledged, at least they 
could provide additional trainers.
  Larger Afghan security forces will also require more mid-level Afghan 
officers. In addition to supporting efforts to graduate more Afghan 
officers from army academies, we should consider the recommendation of 
Defense Minister Wardak that previous midlevel officers who fought the 
war against the Soviets return to service on an interim basis. Minister 
Wardak emphasized that those men are well qualified and well motivated. 
And while they may not be trained in the most current tactics, they 
nonetheless could temporarily meet the need of the enlarged army while 
the new group of officers is trained.
  A larger Afghan force will need supporting infrastructure, such as 
barracks. While the available infrastructure may not be the most 
modern, it is adequate and exists in sufficient amounts.
  Larger Afghan security forces will require additional equipment. 
There must be a major effort to transfer a significant amount of the 
equipment that is coming out of Iraq to the Afghan Army and police. 
Such a significant commitment to equip the Afghan security forces would 
also help demonstrate U.S. determination to take the initiative and 
create momentum in the right direction. There is an enormous amount of 
equipment coming out of Iraq. Our military is calling it one of the 
greatest transfers of military goods in world history. A significant 
part of it could be transferred to the Afghan forces, increasing their 
capability without weakening our own readiness. Yet there does not seem 
to be that kind of a crash effort in place to do just that. We need to 
obtain, on an urgent basis, a list of the basic equipment needs of the 
Afghan forces and a list of how those needs could be met in a major 
program to transfer equipment leaving Iraq.

  Rapidly expanding Afghan's military and police forces would address 
one of the major problems and risks we now face. General McChrystal 
told us he worries that waiting until 2013 for a larger Afghan force 
creates a gap in capabilities that brings significant risk of failure. 
But if we accelerate the training and equipment of Afghan forces by a 
year, we address his concern. Depending on additional capability from 
Afghanistan, rather than U.S. forces, also addresses a major problem of 
public perception in Afghanistan. The larger our own military footprint 
there, the more our enemies can seek to drive a wedge between us and 
the Afghan population, spreading the falsehood that we seek to dominate 
a Muslim nation.
  Finally, we should make a concerted effort to separate the local 
Taliban from their leaders. In Iraq, large numbers of young Iraqis who 
had been attacking us switched over to our side and became the Sons of 
Iraq. They were drawn in part by the promise of jobs and amnesty for 
past attacks and in part by the recognition that the status quo was 
creating horrific violence in their own communities. In their own 
interests and the interests of their nation, they switched sides and 
became a positive force.
  That same prospect exists in Afghanistan. Afghan leaders and our own 
military leaders say that local Taliban forces are motivated largely by 
the need for a job, loyalty to the local leader who pays them, and not 
by ideology or religious zeal. They believe an effort to attract these 
fighters to the government side could succeed if they are offered 
security for themselves and their families and if there is no penalty 
for previous activity against us.
  General McChrystal himself has emphasized the potential for such 
reintegration to accomplish the same result as was achieved in Iraq. 
Here is what General McChrystal said on July 28:

       Most of the fight materials we see in Afghanistan are 
     Afghans, some with foreign cadre with them. But most we don't 
     see are deeply ideological or even politically motivated; 
     most are operating for pay; some are

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     under a commander's charismatic leadership; some are 
     frustrated with local leaders. So I believe there is 
     significant potential to go after what I would call mid- and 
     low-level Taliban fighters and leaders and offer them 
     reintegration into Afghanistan under the constitution.

  But this game-changing possibility was apparently not factored into 
General McChrystal's assessment. There is no plan yet to put in place a 
Sons of Iraq approach in Afghanistan. It is urgent that we lay out the 
steps that need to be taken to involve local and national Afghan 
leaders in that effort. They alone can accomplish this crucial job, but 
first we and our Afghan allies must draft such a plan on an urgent 
basis, and the potential positive impact of such a plan should be taken 
into account as we consider the need for any additional U.S. military 
resources.
  Afghanistan's people are grateful for our aid but also eager to 
assume responsibility for their own future. In a tiny village in 
Helmand Province, we were invited to meet with the village elders at 
their council meeting--called a shura. A group of 100 or so men sat on 
the floor and chatted with us about their future and their country's 
future. When asked how long the United States should stay, one elder 
said: ``Until the moment that you make our security forces self-
sufficient. Then you will be welcome to visit us not as soldiers but as 
guests.''
  Helping Afghanistan achieve self-sufficiency and their own security 
is everybody's goal. On that, there is little difference of opinion in 
Afghan's village councils or in the corridors of this Capitol. Can we 
help Afghanistan reach self-sufficiency in security fast enough? Can we 
get there in a way that regains the initiative and creates the momentum 
we need? Can we encourage those lower level Taliban to abandon an 
insurgency headed by terrorists whose fanaticism they do not share? I 
believe we can, by supporting a far more rapid growth in the Afghan 
Army and police, by providing more trainers more quickly, by a rapid 
infusion of two Afghan units of equipment no longer needed in Iraq, and 
by rapidly adopting a plan for the reintegration of lower level Taliban 
fighters into Afghan society. In other words, we need a surge of Afghan 
security forces. Our support of their surge will show our commitment to 
the success of a mission that is clearly in our national security 
interest, without creating a bigger U.S. military footprint that 
provides propaganda fodder for the Taliban.
  I believe taking those steps on an urgent basis, while completing the 
previously planned and announced increase in U.S. combat forces, 
provides the best chance of success for our mission--preventing 
Afghanistan from again being run by a Taliban government which harbors 
and supports al-Qaida, whose goal is to inflict additional catastrophic 
attacks on the United States and the world. I believe we should 
implement those steps before considering an increase in U.S. ground 
combat forces beyond what is already planned by the end of the year.
  I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Ohio as well.

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