[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 120 (Tuesday, August 4, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8780-S8783]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          SOTOMAYOR NOMINATION

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I want to discuss the nomination of 
Judge Sotomayor to be Associate Justice. I want to begin by saying that 
I have a lot of respect for her. I think she is an incredibly talented 
individual who has worked very hard and has had an extraordinary life 
story. I am impressed with the way Judge Sotomayor was able to beat the 
odds and reach new heights. Unfortunately, as I voted in committee, I 
vote on the floor. I cannot support her nomination because of my 
concerns with her judicial philosophy.
  There are a number of qualifications a Supreme Court nominee should 
have: a superior intellect, distinguished legal experience, integrity, 
proper judicial demeanor, and temperament. But the most important 
qualification of a Supreme Court nominee is truly understanding the 
proper role of a Justice as envisioned by our great Constitution. In 
other words, a Justice must have the capacity to faithfully interpret 
the law and Constitution without personal bias or prejudice.
  It is critical that judges have a healthy respect for the 
constitutional separation of power and the exercise of judicial 
restraint. Judges must be bound by the words of the Constitution and 
legal precedent. Because the Supreme Court has the last word as far as 
what the lower court says, Justices are not constrained like judges in 
the district and appellate courts. In other words, the Supreme Court 
and its Justices have the ability to make precedent. Because there is 
no backstop to the Supreme Court, Justices are accountable to no one. 
That is why we must be certain these nominees will have the self-
restraint to resist interpreting the Constitution to satisfy their 
personal beliefs and preferences. A nominee to the Supreme Court must 
persuade us that he or she is able to set aside personal feelings so he 
or she can blindly and dispassionately administer equal justice for 
all.
  That is what I was looking for when I reviewed Judge Sotomayor's 
record. That is what I was looking for when I asked Judge Sotomayor 
questions both at the hearing and in writing. Unfortunately, I now have 
more questions than answers about Judge Sotomayor's judicial 
philosophy. I am not convinced that the judge will be able to resist 
having her personal biases and preferences dictate her judicial methods 
when she gets to the Supreme Court.
  I find it very troubling that President Obama is changing the 
standard by which our country's Federal judges are selected. Instead of 
searching for qualified jurists who can be trusted to put aside their 
personal feelings in order to arrive at a result required by the law, 
President Obama has said he is looking for a judge who has ``empathy,'' 
someone who will embrace his or her personal biases instead of 
rejecting them.
  This concept represents a very radical departure from the normal 
criteria for selecting Federal judges and Supreme Court Justices. In 
his statement opposing the confirmation of Chief Justice John Roberts, 
then-Senator Obama compared the process of deciding tough cases in the 
Supreme Court--can you believe it--comparing it to a marathon. He said:

       That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one's 
     deepest values, one's core concerns, one's broader 
     perspective on how the world works and the depth and breadth 
     of one's empathy. . . . Legal process alone will not lead to 
     you a rule of decision. . . . [i]n those difficult cases the 
     critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge's 
     heart.

  That is the end of the quote from then-Senator Obama.
  Until now, judges have always been expected to apply law evenhandedly 
and to reach the result that the law requires. When speaking about the 
law, lawyers and judges often talk about what the law is or what the 
law requires, instead of what the law should be. We expect judges not 
to confuse the two. We expect judges not to bend the law in order to 
reach a result that they would want personally instead of what the law 
requires. We expect judges not to decide cases in favor of a particular 
litigant because he or she may be more worthy of compassion. We don't 
ask what the judge's heart says about a particular case of a legal 
issue. We ask what the law says.
  A mandate of judicial empathy turns that traditional legal concept on 
its head in favor of a lawless standard. If empathy for a litigant's 
situation becomes a standard for deciding cases, then there is no limit 
to the effect on American jurisprudence. If a judge's decision in the 
hard cases is supplied by the content of his or her heart, then that 
decision cannot be grounded upon objective legal principles. If the 
last mile that then-Senator Obama referred to is determined by a 
judge's deepest feelings instead of legal precedent, then the outcome 
will differ based on which judge hears the case. Predictably and 
consistently, hallmarks of the American legal system will be sacrificed 
on the altar of judicial persuasion and compassion.
  When a judge improperly relies on his or her personal feelings 
instead of relying solely on the law, it leads to creation of bad 
precedent. If a judge's decision is affected by his or her empathy or 
sympathy--whatever you want to say--for an affected party or group, 
then the law of unintended consequences dictates that others will be 
affected in the future, beyond the present case, and they will be 
judged by a standard that should not be applied to them because of what 
a previous judge did about personal sympathy instead of what the law 
says.
  Justice is blind. Empathy is not. Empathetic judges take off the 
blindfolds and look at the party instead of merely weighing the 
evidence in light of what the law is. Empathetic judges put their 
thumbs on the scales of justice, altering the balance that is 
delicately crafted by the law. Empathetic judges exceed their role as 
part of the judicial branch and improperly take extraneous, nonlegal 
factors into consideration. That is why President Obama's judicial 
standard of empathy is problematic, and why we should be cautious in 
deferring to his choices for the judicial branch.
  Judge Sotomayor's speeches and writings reveal a judicial philosophy 
that bestows a pivotal role to personal preferences and beliefs in her 
judicial method--although Judge Sotomayor attempted to spin away her 
statements. At her confirmation hearing I had difficulty reconciling 
what she said at the hearing with statements she has repeated so often 
throughout the years. That is because the statements made at the 
hearing and those speeches and law review articles outside the hearing 
cannot be reconciled.
  Since 1994, the judge has given a number of speeches where she 
responded to a remark by Justice O'Connor that a judge's gender should 
be irrelevant to judicial decisionmaking process. Judge Sotomayor said 
that she ``hope[d] that a wise Latina woman . . . would more often than 
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that 
life.''
  This statement suggests, very contrary to the Constitution, that race 
and gender influence judicial decisions and that some judges can reach 
a ``better conclusion'' solely on the basis of belonging to a 
particular demographic.
  When questioned about this issue, Judge Sotomayor initially stood by 
her words, saying that they were purposefully chosen to ``inspire the 
students to believe that their life experience would enrich the legal 
system,'' and that it was merely their context that ``ha[d] created a 
misunderstanding.''
  Even if that were the case, repeatedly misrepresenting to her 
audience one of the most fundamental principles of our judicial system 
demonstrates inappropriate and irresponsible behavior for a judge. 
However, Judge Sotomayor proceeded to contradict those very words by 
saying that she ``does not believe that any ethnic, racial, or gender 
group has an advantage in sound judging,'' and claimed that her 
criticism was actually agreeing with Justice

[[Page S8781]]

O'Connor's argument, saying the words she used ``agree[d] with the 
sentiment that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was attempting to convey.'' 
I fail to see how Judge Sotomayor can reconcile her views with those of 
Justice O'Connor because it is clear that they stand in direct 
contradiction to each other.
  The judge continued to confuse us, claiming that hers and Justice 
O'Connor's words ``literally made no sense in the context of what 
judges do.'' Assuming that Judge Sotomayor truly does agree with 
Justice O'Connor, then I find it troubling that she doesn't recognize 
that it is important for judges to understand their gender and 
ethnicity should have no bearing on their judicial decisions.
  Moreover, the judge contradicted herself again when she later 
attempted to brush aside these remarks, claiming that they were a 
``rhetorical flourish'' and ``can't be read literally.'' However, if 
she truly believed that these words ``fell flat,'' why would she 
continue to use the same words on at least four more separate 
occasions?
  Some of my colleagues claim that the significance of Judge 
Sotomayor's ``wise Latina'' statement has been exaggerated. 
Unfortunately, we are not concerned with just one statement. The judge 
has a record of freely articulating a judicial philosophy at odds with 
the fundamental principles of our legal system.
  Justice Story once said that, without justice being impartially 
administered:

       Neither our persons nor our rights nor our properties can 
     be protected.

  That is the end of Justice Story's quote.
  In her opening testimony Judge Sotomayor appeared to agree with 
Justice Story, saying she seeks to strengthen ``faith in the 
impartiality of our justice system.'' However, that statement is 
contradicted by her long history of expressing skepticism toward 
judicial neutrality and impartiality. In at least four separate 
speeches Judge Sotomayor said that ``the aspiration to impartiality is 
just that--it's an aspiration.''
  It is easy for a nonlawyer like me to become very cynical when I hear 
that. But when questioned about that statement, Judge Sotomayor argued 
that she ``wasn't talking about impartiality [being] impossible'' and 
tried to reconcile her views as ``talking about academic question.''
  In other speeches, the judge also expressed skepticism with Judge 
Cedarbaum's belief that judges must transcend their personal sympathies 
and prejudices, saying that she ``wonder[ed] whether achieving that 
goal is possible in all, or even most cases.''
  That is enhancing my cynicism.
  At the hearing, Judge Sotomayor failed to sufficiently explain those 
troubling remarks. Instead, she departed from the clear meaning of her 
words, arguing that they were actually intended ``to make sure that one 
understood that a judge always has to guard against those things 
affecting the outcome of a case.''
  Once again, her contradictory interpretation of her own words makes 
me question her sincerity and candor with our committee.
  In another speech in a law journal article, Judge Sotomayor declared 
that she ``willingly accept[s] '' that judges ``must not deny the 
differences resulting from experiences and heritage, but attempt, as 
the Supreme Court suggests, continuously to judge when those opinions, 
sympathies and prejudices are appropriate.''
  So I am concerned that these words radically depart from the bedrock 
principle of judicial impartiality that judges swear to uphold when 
they take their oath of office.
  When questioned about these words, Judge Sotomayor made the far-
fetched claim that her words were actually ``talking about the very 
important goal of the justice system to ensure that personal biases and 
prejudices of a judge do not influence the outcome of the case.'' Once 
again, I fail to see how Judge Sotomayor can reconcile both of those 
statements.
  Furthermore, her statement is especially concerning within the 
context of other ideas she expressed in the same ``Raising the Bar'' 
speech. That is her title of her speech, ``Raising the Bar.''
  For example, Judge Sotomayor openly questioned whether ``ignoring our 
differences as women, men or even people of color, will do a disservice 
both to the law and to society.'' Reason to be cynical, once again. 
This is yet another example of an out-of-the-mainstream judicial 
philosophy. The majority of Americans understand that allowing 
physiological differences to influence judging is a disservice to the 
law and demonstrates a blatant lack of regard for the principle of 
blind justice.
  At the hearing, the judge attempted to justify her words as simply 
part of an ``academic discussion.'' Contrary to the plain meaning of 
her words, she claimed that she was not encouraging or attempting to 
encourage the belief that ``personal characteristics'' and 
``experiences'' should drive the result.
  These excuses ring hollow and contradict other parts of the same 
speech where she declared, ``I accept there will be some differences in 
my judging based on my gender and my Latina heritage.''
  Similarly and even more concerning, she expressed in that speech on 
at least five other occasions that ``I accept the proposition that a 
difference there will be by the presence of men and women, people of 
color on the bench, and that my experiences affect the facts I choose 
to see as a judge.''
  When explaining those remarks at the hearing, the judge continued to 
display troublesome evasiveness, claiming that she ``did not intend to 
suggest that it is a question of choosing to see some facts or 
another.''
  Taken together, I remain unconvinced that Judge Sotomayor's history 
of freely delivered speeches demonstrates an appropriate understanding 
of the importance of approaching the law neutrally and upholding 
judicial impartiality. I am also concerned that over the past 13 years 
the judge has articulated that judges play a role as a policymaker.
  At a Duke University panel discussion she claimed that, ``The court 
of appeals is where policy is made.''
  Likewise in her Suffolk University law review article, the judge 
embraced the notion that judges should encroach on the constitutional 
power of legislatures by changing the law to adapt to social needs. She 
lamented that ``our society would be straitjacketed were not the 
courts, with the able assistance of the lawyers, constantly overhauling 
the law and adapting to the realities of ever-changing social, 
industrial and political conditions.''
  And in the same article, the judge noted that ``a given judge or 
judges may develop a novel approach to a specific set of facts or legal 
framework that push the law in a new direction.''
  I thought that was part of our checks and balances system of 
government. That is why we had a separate legislature, to make policy. 
Because if a Supreme Court Justice makes policy, they have got a 
lifetime position. You cannot vote them out of office, whereas if we 
make wrong policy, our constituents have an opportunity at every 
election to put us out on the street.
  So not understanding the proper role of a Justice is a problem for 
me. Even more alarming is that the judge has, on multiple occasions, 
expressed her own personal role in shaping policy in the bench. When 
describing the role of judges in a November 2000 speech before the 
Litigators Club, the judge stated, ``Our decisions affect not only the 
individual cases before us, but the course of litigation and the 
outcomes of many similar cases pending. This fact has made me much more 
aware of the policy impact of the decisions I have drafted or worked 
on.''
  In at least two other speeches, the judge told her audience, ``I wake 
up each morning excited about the prospects of engaging in the work 
that fulfills me and gives me the chance to have a voice in the 
development of the law.''
  These statements demonstrate either a lack of understanding or a 
blatant disregard for the proper constitutional role of judges. Rather 
than seriously addressing this aspect of her judicial philosophy at her 
confirmation hearing, the judge capriciously changed her views. She 
appeared to retract all of her previous statements by telling Senator 
Coburn that ``judges do not make law,'' and in responding to my 
questions about vacuums in the law by saying that judges are ``not 
creating law.''
  I find these statements disingenuous because in her posthearing 
written responses, the judge endorsed her previous views by justifying 
judges who

[[Page S8782]]

``apply broadly written statues by filling in gaps in the laws 
according to their personal common sense.''
  This is troubling because judges who fail to uphold their 
constitutional role and impose their own policy preferences undermine 
democracy and undermine our checks and balances system of government.
  Also, I was disturbed by Judge Sotomayor's general lack of candor at 
the hearing. Throughout her testimony, she repeatedly contradicted 
statements she had openly and unequivocally expressed on numerous 
occasions from her own bench. Even the Washington Post characterized 
Judge Sotomayor's hearing testimony as ``less than candid,'' and 
``uncomfortably close to disingenuous.''
  That is not a Republican Senator making the statement, that is the 
Washington Post, one of the guardians of democracy, as the first 
amendment allows newspapers to be.
  For example, despite her 7-year history of telling at least six 
different audiences that ``my experiences affect the facts I choose to 
see as a judge,'' and, `` I accept there will be some differences in 
judging based on my gender and my Latina heritage,'' she also told us, 
``I do not permit my sympathies, personal views, or prejudices to 
influence the outcome of my cases.''
  Likewise, when I questioned her about whether it was ever appropriate 
for judges to allow their own identity politics to influence their 
judgment, the judge answered ``absolutely not.''
  While I agree with her answer, it is still troubling and significant 
that it completely contradicts her previously expressed views. I find 
it interesting that she appears to have had a sudden confirmation 
conversion.
  I am also concerned about Judge Sotomayor's involvement with the 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund and her denials that she 
did not work on matters in a substantive or policy role relative to 
controversial issues during her tenure at that organization.
  During her supervision of this Defense and Education Fund, the 
organization took a number of radical positions on abortion, including 
the view that abortions on demand could not be restricted for any 
reason; that taxpayers should be required to pay for abortions; and 
that parents did not have the right to even be notified if their minor 
daughter was going to get an abortion.
  I find it hard to believe that the chair of the litigation committee 
of the organization had no substantive or policy involvement in the 
formulation of these legal briefs.
  Even when asked whether these positions were extreme and allowed an 
opportunity to disavow them, Judge Sotomayor refused to do that.
  I also was dismayed that the judge was not straightforward about her 
philosophy toward the use of foreign law. In a recent speech before the 
ACLU of Puerto Rico, the judge advocated and justified American judges 
using such foreign law. She told her audience that, ``International law 
and foreign law will be very important in the discussion of how to 
think about the unsettled issues in our own legal system.''
  She went on to say, ``To suggest to anyone that you can outlaw the 
use of foreign or international law is a sentiment that's based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding . . . nothing in the American legal system 
stops us from considering those ideas.''
  As examples of using foreign law to strike down American statutes, 
she favorably cited Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v. Texas, saying the 
courts were using foreign law to ``help us understand whether our 
understanding of our own constitutional rights fell into the mainstream 
of human thinking.''
  However, at the hearing, Judge Sotomayor contradicted herself saying, 
``Foreign law cannot be used . . . to influence the outcome of a legal 
decision interpreting the Constitution or American law.''
  Which Sotomayor, comparing those two quotes, is going to judge from 
the bench of the Supreme Court? In that same speech, Judge Sotomayor 
also openly disapproved criticisms by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas 
on the use of foreign law saying she shared the ideas of Justice 
Ginsburg that, ``Unless American courts are more open to discussing the 
ideas raised by foreign cases, and by international cases, then we are 
going to lose influence in the world,'' and, ``foreign opinions . . . 
can add to the story of knowledge relevant to the solution of a 
question.''

  However, at the hearing, Judge Sotomayor reversed herself, claiming 
that she ``actually agreed with Justice Scalia and Thomas on the point 
that one has to be very cautious even in using foreign law with respect 
to things American law permits you to.''
  So, once again, comparing those two statements, which Sotomayor view 
is going to be used on the bench of the Supreme Court? Once again, 
either Judge Sotomayor's beliefs were extremely short lived, or she 
failed to openly present her true opinions during her hearings.
  A few days after testifying that, ``Foreign law could not be used to 
interpret the Constitution and the statutes,'' Judge Sotomayor 
advocated her previous beliefs that, ``Decisions of foreign courts can 
be a source of ideas in forming our understanding of our own 
constitutional rights'' and ``to the extent that the decisions of 
foreign courts contain ideas that are helpful to that task, American 
courts may wish to consider those ideas.''
  Supporters of Judge Sotomayor discount her controversial statements 
and writings made over the years as a sitting judge and urge us to look 
at her judicial record. So I have had the opportunity to do that, and 
am still not convinced. I participated in the confirmation hearing and 
listened to her discuss her cases. For the most part, Judge Sotomayor 
refused to give a clear answer to our questions and in the end left us 
with more questions than we had before the hearing started.
  Most lawyers understand that hard cases say the most about a judge. 
And as we all know, the Supreme Court only takes hard cases. Yet those 
are the kinds of cases that raise the most concerns about the judge and 
what she will do if she is confirmed to the highest Court.
  Statements she made at the hearing raise concerns that she will 
inappropriately create or expand rights under the Constitution. 
Further, some of her cases raise questions about whether she will 
impose her personal policy decisions instead of those of the 
legislative or executive branch.
  Moreover, Judge Sotomayor's record with the Supreme Court is 
unimpressive. When the Supreme Court reviewed her work, it rejected her 
outcome 8 out of 10 times and disagreed with her analysis on another 
one of those cases. I am not sure a 1 in 10 record warrants elevation 
to the Nation's highest Court.
  What is troubling to me is how Judge Sotomayor has handled cases of 
first impression or important constitutional issues that have appeared 
before her on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. I am concerned that 
she dismisses cases with cursory analysis in order to obtain a 
politically desired result.
  The firefighters case Ricci v. City of New Haven is a case that 
should not be overlooked in an examination of Judge Sotomayor's 
judicial philosophy. Judge Sotomayor admittedly is opposed to and has 
litigated against standardized tests because she believes they are 
racially biased. This is the background she brought to the Ricci case, 
which she dismissed without writing an opinion. But the fortunes of the 
firefighters changed when Judge Cabrenas discovered the case by reading 
the local newspaper. Judge Cabrenas recognized that a detailed analysis 
of this case would serve a jurisprudential purpose and wanted the 
Second Circuit to reconsider it. The Second Circuit voted 7-6 not to 
reconsider this important case, with Judge Sotomayor casting the 
deciding vote. One has to question whether Judge Sotomayor allowed her 
personal biases against standardized test to seep into her 
decisionmaking process. Although Judge Sotomayor continued her efforts 
to sweep this case under the rug, the firefighters, because Judge 
Cabrenas highlighted the importance of the case in a dissenting 
opinion, were able to justify appealing to the Supreme Court.
  The Supreme Court issued an opinion which held that there was no 
``strong basis in evidence'' to support the ruling made by Judge 
Sotomayor. All nine Justices rejected the legal reasoning applied by 
Judge Sotomayor's three judge panel. Justice Alito summarized the case 
best in his concurring opinion,

[[Page S8783]]

where he stated ``a reasonable jury could easily find that the City's 
real reason for scrapping the test results was not a concern about 
violating the disparate impact provision of Title VII, but a simple 
desire to please a politically important racial constituency.'' As 
such, ``Petitioners were denied promotions for which they qualified 
because of the race and ethnicity of the firefighters who achieved the 
highest scores on the City's exam.'' As to Judge Sotomayor's expressed 
empathy for ruling against the firefighters, Justice Alito wrote:

       the dissent grants that petitioners' situation is 
     ``unfortunate'' and that they ``understandably attract this 
     Court's sympathy.'' But ``sympathy'' is not what petitioners 
     have a right to demand. What they have a right to demand is 
     evenhanded enforcement of the law--of Title VII's prohibition 
     against discrimination based on race. And that is what, until 
     today's decision, has been denied them.

  At the hearing, I wasn't persuaded by Judge Sotomayor's claims that 
she followed precedent in reaching her decision. I also was not 
convinced with Judge Sotomayor's explanation about why she dismissed 
this case with no legal analysis. I was left with the impression that 
Judge Sotomayor either she didn't understand the importance of the 
claims before her, or she issued a ruling based on her own personal 
biases.
  Some colleagues argue that her critics can only point to one 
controversial case over a 17-year career on the Federal bench. That is 
not quite accurate, because there are several of her decisions that 
raise concerns.
  For example, Judge Sotomayor issued another troubling decision in 
Didden v. Village of Port Chester, where Mr. Didden presented evidence 
that local government officials attempted to extort him in exchange for 
not seizing his property. When Mr. Didden refused to be extorted, the 
Village took his property and gave it to another private developer. 
This case was on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. 
City of New London, which held that the government is not ``allowed to 
take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its 
actual purpose is to bestow a private benefit.'' Yet Judge Sotomayor 
dismissed Mr. Didden's claim with a one paragraph opinion.
  I asked Judge Sotomayor about the Didden case, but wasn't satisfied 
with her answers. First, she inaccurately characterized the Supreme 
Court's holding in Kelo. I was also troubled with her failure to 
understand that her decision expanded the ability of State, local, and 
Federal governments to seize private property under the Constitution. 
Further, she told me that she had to rule against Mr. Didden because he 
was late in filing his claim. Mr. Didden had 3 years to file his claim. 
He filed it January 2004, 2 months after he was approached with what he 
classified as an extortion offer. Judge Sotomayor told us that Mr. 
Didden should have filed his claim in July 2002, before he was extorted 
and before he knew the city was going to take his property in November 
2003. This is simply not a believable outcome, especially in a one 
paragraph opinion, where it was never explained to Mr. Didden why the 
government could take his property. I specifically asked her how Mr. 
Didden could have filed his claim before he knew he had a claim. Judge 
Sotomayor did not answer this question directly, but the net result is, 
as Professor Somin stated, property owners in this situation will never 
be able to have their day in court:

       the panel's ruling that [the plaintiffs] were required to 
     file their claims before their property was actually 
     condemned creates a cruel Catch-22 dilemma . . . If [the 
     plaintiffs] had filed a Takings Clause claim before their 
     property was condemned, it would have been dismissed because 
     it was not yet ``ripe''). . . It is surely both perverse and 
     a violation of elementary principles of due process to rule 
     that the government can immunize unconstitutional 
     condemnations from legal challenge simply by crafty timing.

  There might not be a decision more disturbing than Judge Sotomayor's 
summary dismissal in Maloney v. Cuomo. If this summary dismissal is 
allowed to stand, the right to bear arms as provided for in the second 
amendment will be eviscerated. Instead of carefully considering whether 
the District of Columbia v. Heller case properly left open the question 
of whether owning a gun is a fundamental right, Judge Sotomayor in one 
paragraph held that it is settled law that owning a firearm is not a 
fundamental right. The Supreme Court noted in Heller that it declined 
to address the issue of whether owning a firearm was a fundamental 
right. At the hearing, I was concerned with Judge Sotomayor's 
explanation of her holding that the second amendment is not 
``fundamental'' and her refusal to affirm that Americans have a right 
of self-defense. In my mind, and I think anyone who reads the second 
amendment, when the Supreme Court does consider this issue, we will 
find that Judge Sotomayor was once again on the wrong side of an 
opinion.
  So based on her answers at the hearing and her decisions, writings 
and speeches, I am not convinced that Judge Sotomayor has the right 
judicial philosophy for the Supreme Court. I am not convinced that she 
will be able to set aside her personal biases and prejudices and decide 
cases in an impartial manner based upon the Constitution. I am 
concerned about Judge Sotomayor's dismissive handling of claims raising 
fundamental constitutional rights--I am not convinced that she will 
protect those rights, nor am I convinced that she will refrain from 
creating new rights. For these reasons, I must vote against her 
nomination.

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