[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 118 (Friday, July 31, 2009)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2120-E2121]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            SUDAN: U.S. POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CPA

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. FRANK R. WOLF

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 30, 2009

  Mr. WOLF. Madam Speaker, I would like to share with our colleagues 
testimony that John Prendergast, co-founder of the Enough Project, gave 
yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and 
Global Health on the critical issue of U.S.-Sudan policy, specifically 
as it relates to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA). During the Clinton administration John was director of African 
Affairs at the National Security Council and special advisor at the 
Department of State. I respect his views given his long-time 
involvement in Africa and Sudan.

            Sudan U.S. Policy and Implementation of the CPA

       Thank you Congressman Payne and members of this 
     subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on a topic that 
     will help determine the future of millions of people from 
     Sudan and the surrounding region.
       At this subcommittee hearing, members will hear a very 
     different message than that which will be communicated at 
     tomorrow's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Today, 
     this subcommittee's members will hear a bipartisan critique 
     of the current direction of U.S. policy towards Sudan. Rich 
     Williamson, Roger Winter and I all have negotiated 
     extensively with the regime in Sudan, have roughly a combined 
     six decades in working on or in Sudan, and have a very clear 
     idea of what is required for lasting peace to have a chance 
     in that embattled country.
       This hearing comes at a moment in Sudan's history fraught 
     with danger and potential. There is no effective peace 
     process for Darfur, but one could be built with U.S. 
     leadership. The CPA is on the brink, but could be salvaged if 
     U.S. engagement deepens. Next year's elections are at risk, 
     but could become an important opportunity to strengthen 
     opposition parties and democratic structures crucial for the 
     referendum and for Sudan's political future. The referendum 
     itself is doubtful, but its prospects could be enhanced with 
     a credible international roadmap.
       The major unknown variable that will help determine whether 
     the dangers or the opportunities get maximized is the 
     unresolved internal debate over the direction of U.S. policy 
     towards Sudan. In the absence of any agreement on the policy, 
     U.S. diplomatic engagement has been energetic, for which 
     Special Envoy Gration should be credited. But the substance 
     of this robust engagement has been fraught with missteps, 
     lack of internal coordination, and an overall aversion to 
     pressuring the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). 
     Sustained pressure leveraged by meaningful and focused sticks 
     is the principal tool that has moved the NCP to change its 
     behavior during the 20 years of its authoritarian rule. This 
     substantial track record of empirical evidence of the value 
     of pressure makes the direction of U.S. diplomacy all the 
     more questionable.
       There is also a broader inconsistency in U.S. foreign 
     policy when it comes to Sudan. The Obama administration has 
     resolutely worked to craft more formidable international 
     coalitions to isolate North Korea and Iran for important U.S. 
     policy objectives. However, the U.S. is not doing the same 
     for Sudan, despite the existence of a regime there that is 
     responsible directly or indirectly for the loss of two and a 
     half million lives in the South and Darfur.


              U.S. Goals in Sudan and How to Achieve Them

       In the context of its policy review, the U.S. should spell 
     out clear goals:
       (1) U.S. leadership in constructing a more effective Darfur 
     peace process, using as a model the process that led to the 
     CPA involving a lead role for the U.S. and a multilateral 
     support structure that provided international leverage, 
     expertise, and support;
       (2) U.S. leadership in supporting the implementation of the 
     CPA, continuing the trend of deeper engagement over the last 
     few months but structuring clear penalties for non-
     implementation of any of the key provisions;
       (3) U.S. leadership in supporting the democratic 
     transformation of Sudan by supporting the electoral process, 
     providing institutional support to opposition parties and 
     civil society organizations, and building the capacity of the 
     Government of Southern Sudan;
       (4) U.S. leadership in preparations for the South's 
     referendum in 2011, which will be a make-or-break process for 
     the future of both North and South.
       The essential word that repeats throughout all these goals 
     is ``leadership.'' U.S. leadership--multilaterally and when 
     necessary unilaterally--will be an enormously influential 
     ingredient in a successful transition to peace and democracy 
     in Sudan.
       But success will require greater leverage than that which 
     presently exists. The debate internally within the U.S. 
     Government in part rests on the degree to which incentives or 
     pressures ought to be favored instruments for changing the 
     behavior of the Sudanese regime, the Darfur rebels, and the 
     GOSS. It is the view of this panel and the activist 
     organizations that comprise the Darfur movement that the way 
     forward should involve deeper diplomatic engagement that is 
     rooted in multilateral pressures and the credible threat of 
     significant consequences for policies or actions by Sudanese 
     parties that undermine peace efforts and lead to worsening 
     humanitarian conditions. In the absence of these pressures, 
     and if incentives are all that are put forward, then failure 
     is guaranteed.
       Success will also require the construction of credible and 
     effective processes that allow for the achievement of U.S. 
     policy goals. First and foremost, the glaring lack of an 
     effective peace process for Darfur calls out for greater U.S. 
     leadership in constructing from the existing elements a 
     revitalized process that has the chance of ending Darfur's 
     war. Secondly, the U.S. should intensify its early efforts to 
     revive the CPA and back these efforts with the construction 
     of clear multilateral consequences for violations or non-
     implementation of key elements of the deal.
       U.S. policy must be shaped by the fact that these complex 
     conflicts have a common core: Flawed governance by a center 
     that exploits and marginalizes an underdeveloped periphery. 
     Not only does the CPA provide a roadmap for resolving the 
     longest and bloodiest of these conflicts, but it also offers 
     a framework for the kind of democratic, structural 
     transformation necessary to alter the root cause of Sudan's 
     many recurring conflicts. The successful model of the CPA 
     could and should be replicated in a revitalized Darfur peace 
     process. The U.S. cannot afford to allow the CPA to fail, nor 
     can it allow the continuation of an ineffective Darfur 
     process that obstructs any real possibility of peace.


                   Priorities for CPA Implementation

       The troubling reality is that Sudan's North-South peace 
     remains precarious at best. Given the mounting tensions 
     between the North and South and the spate of violence in the 
     South in recent months, deeper international engagement is 
     required. Renewed Sudanese civil war could bring wholesale 
     violence on a terrible scale while further destabilizing the 
     entire region. I will focus the remainder of my testimony on 
     the key priorities for the U.S. Government in CPA 
     implementation.
       I am encouraged by recent positive steps by the Obama 
     administration to prioritize CPA implementation and to 
     revitalize international efforts to urge the Sudanese parties 
     to work on an array of outstanding provisions in the 
     agreement in the remaining year and a half. These new 
     efforts should be followed up with an approach that 
     penalizes failure of one of both of the Sudanese parties 
     to implement key provisions of the agreement. The hard 
     work begins now. It is time

[[Page E2121]]

     for the administration to pursue specific priorities in 
     order to meet the key benchmarks in the crucial final 
     stages of CPA implementation.
       The U.S. must direct renewed energy and commitment toward 
     the following strategic priorities:
       1. Protect the People: Due to a worrisome upsurge in 
     intercommunal violence, the death toll in the South this year 
     now exceeds the number of violent deaths in Darfur in the 
     same period, and as elections draw closer, instability may 
     well increase. Tribal clashes are occurring among a heavily 
     armed civilian population that the poorly disciplined 
     southern army has proved incapable of securing. Some of the 
     latest clashes highlight the flaws and dangers of the so-
     called the Joint Integrated Units, or JIUs, whose presence 
     has often led greater violence, instability, and civilian 
     casualties. The U.S. should take two specific measures to 
     help improve security and decrease the risk of further 
     violence in communities throughout the South:
       Work with the U.N. Security Council to ensure that the 
     United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has the necessary 
     capacity to fulfill its mandate and protect civilians. The 
     United States should lead efforts within the U.N. Security 
     Council to strengthen UNMIS' ability to support the CPA, but 
     this support must be matched with clearer strategic vision by 
     UNMIS on how it can best allocate its resources to 
     operationalize its mandate amidst ongoing security threats 
     throughout the South. Other guarantors of the CPA can support 
     UNMIS' efforts by contributing to coordinated programs such 
     as security sector reform within the SPLA.
       Encourage the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to take 
     leadership in promoting local peace-building initiatives to 
     defuse tensions between communities that have taken up arms 
     against each other.
       2. Build the ``peace dividend'': Since the signing of the 
     CPA, progress has been slow in providing basic infrastructure 
     and services to the peripheral areas of Sudan. Insecurity and 
     underdevelopment remain a fact of life for most Sudanese. As 
     long as that is the case, the southern government will have 
     difficulty consolidating the peace and holding together an 
     ethnically divided South with competing political visions. 
     The GoSS has also been hit hard by the financial crisis, and 
     is in need of significant economic support, but this support 
     should be aimed specifically at capacity building efforts 
     that can strengthen the fledgling government. Additional 
     investments in agriculture and microcredit would make a 
     difference on the ground for the people of southern Sudan, 
     more than two million of whom have returned home to very 
     little after decades of war.
       3. Defuse North-South tensions: A number of contentious 
     issues between the North and South must be resolved in next 
     year and a half, all of which necessitate robust support from 
     the international community in order to keep the negotiations 
     and processes on track. The U.S. should direct renewed energy 
     and commitment toward the following strategic priorities:
       Urge meaningful reforms from the Sudanese parties before 
     the 2010 elections. The United States and other key actors, 
     operating on a tight timeline, need to lower their 
     expectations for the election and develop a multilateral 
     strategy to press the Government of National Unity--the 
     ruling National Congress Party in particular--to enact 
     meaningful reforms regardless of who wins in 2010, revitalize 
     CPA implementation, and establish a framework for talks in 
     Darfur that are consistent with the power-sharing provisions 
     of the CPA. There also has to be a clear and unified 
     international posture with regard to addressing the issue of 
     Darfur, given the near-impossibility of holding a free and 
     fair ballot there.
       Keep the parties on track in the dual processes of 
     implementing the legal ruling on the boundaries of the Abyei 
     region and demarcating the North-South border. Two crucial 
     issues regarding contested borders between Sudan's North and 
     South need sustained attention from the international 
     community. The failure to establish clear international 
     penalties for a failure to implement these key CPA provisions 
     such as the demarcation of the disputed North-South border 
     has been a clear drag on the CPA. However, last week's legal 
     decision on the boundaries of Abyei--an oil-rich, contested 
     region along the disputed North-South border within Sudan--is 
     a crucial litmus test of the parties' will to implement the 
     CPA moving forward. Now that the ruling on Abyei has been 
     accepted by both parties, the U.S., the U.N., and the rest of 
     international community must follow through on its 
     commitments to help implement the ruling and monitor the 
     status of the demarcation of the Abyei boundaries.
       Encourage negotiations between the NCP and SPLM on long-
     term wealth-sharing arrangements before the 2011 referendum. 
     Track-two diplomatic efforts can get both parties to consider 
     various scenarios for wealth sharing after the referendum and 
     mitigate the likelihood that these discussions will short 
     circuit into a zero-sum game leading directly to conflict 
     after the referendum. Discussions of access to land for 
     populations with diverse needs and livelihoods and planning 
     for mutually beneficial development of oilfields in the 
     contested border region could ease current tensions over 
     border demarcation and generate momentum for further 
     cooperation.
       Urge passage of the referendum law before the elections. 
     Applying pressure on Sudan's Government of National Unity to 
     urge the National Assembly to review and pass the law on the 
     southern referendum before the elections could reduce 
     tensions between the parties after the elections and enable 
     preparations for the referendum to begin now. Once the law is 
     passed and the Referendum Commission is created, potential 
     disputes, such as questions over whether or not certain 
     populations--such as southerners in Khartoum--are eligible to 
     vote, can be addressed before tensions escalate in the 
     immediate run-up to the referendum.
       4. Prevent a return to war: The likelihood of a return to 
     war between the North and South, or of conflict breaking out 
     within the South, is real. An arms race between the Northern 
     and Southern government is just one warning sign of a tenuous 
     situation that could explode into outright conflict. Several 
     preventive measures can mitigate the risks of violence in the 
     run-up to the 2010 general elections and the 2011 referendum:
       Enhance efforts to professionalize and modernize the SPLA. 
     The SPLA has struggled to transition from a guerilla movement 
     to a formal army, a process complicated by attempts to 
     integrate southern militias that opposed the SPLA during the 
     war. To ensure that the south is stabile and the GoSS can 
     deliver a peace dividend, the SPLA must continue to modernize 
     through a well-supported process of security sector 
     transformation that improves discipline, command and control, 
     capacity, and competency. Toward this end, the Obama 
     administration should explore the sale of an air defense 
     system to the GoSS. Although introducing new weapons systems 
     into a volatile military environment could be interpreted as 
     contrary to donors' responsibility to make unity attractive, 
     it is in the interests of lasting stability that the GoSS 
     spend money on defense wisely. Unlike the aforementioned 
     refurbished tanks, an air defense is non-offensive and helps 
     level the playing field by neutralizing the north's major 
     tactical advantage in the event of renewed hostilities.


             Comprehensive Peace: the Only Option in Sudan

       Ending genocide in Darfur and fulfilling the promise of the 
     Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires a comprehensive 
     approach to Sudan rather than reactive crisis management. The 
     U.S. must lead the international community in working now to 
     ensure that the CPA does not collapse and spark a devastating 
     new round of conflict in Sudan. With a significant diplomatic 
     reinvestment in the CPA that prioritizes protecting 
     civilians, building peace in the South, and defusing tensions 
     between the North and South, the U.S. can help prevent the 
     catastrophic consequences of a potential collapse of the CPA.

                          ____________________