[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 77 (Tuesday, May 19, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5616-S5617]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Brownback):
  S. 1067. A bill to support stabilization and lasting peace in 
northern Uganda and areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army 
through development of a regional strategy to support multilateral 
efforts to successfully protect civilians and eliminate the threat 
posed by the Lord's Resistance Army and to authorize funds for 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation, and 
transitional justice, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce the 
Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 
2009, and I am pleased to do so with a great champion on this issue: 
Senator Sam Brownback. For many years, we have both sought to bring 
attention to the terror orchestrated by the Lord's Resistance Army, the 
LRA, and the suffering of the people of northern Uganda. We have come a 
long way in just a few years, thanks especially to young Americans who 
have become increasingly aware of and outspoken about this horrific 
situation. As a result, the U.S. has made increased efforts to help end 
this horror. Those efforts have yielded some success, but if we are now 
to finally see this conflict to its end, we need to commit to a 
proactive strategy to help end the threat posed by the LRA and support 
reconstruction, justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda. This 
bill seeks to do just that.
  For over two decades, northern Uganda was caught in a war between the 
Ugandan military and rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army, leading at 
its height to the displacement of 1.8 million people, nearly 90 percent 
of the region's population. Just a few years ago, northern Uganda was 
called the world's worst neglected humanitarian crisis. In 2007, I 
visited displacement camps in northern Uganda and saw firsthand the 
terrible conditions and the desperation of people forced to endure such 
conditions year after year. Meanwhile, the LRA survived throughout this 
conflict by kidnapping an estimated 66,000 children, indoctrinating 
them, and forcing them to become child soldiers.
  In recent years, the LRA have come under increasing pressure. In 2005 
and 2006, they largely withdrew from northern Uganda and moved into the 
border region between northeastern Congo, southern Sudan and even the 
Central African Republic. Then for almost two years, there was a lull 
in the violence as representatives from the Ugandan government and LRA 
engaged in sporadic peace negotiations in southern Sudan. The parties 
brokered a comprehensive agreement, but then hopes were dashed as the 
LRA's megalomaniac leader Joseph Kony refused to sign the agreement and 
reports surfaced that the LRA had been conducting new abductions to 
replenish his rebel group.
  In December 2008, the Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudanese 
militaries launched a joint offensive against the LRA's primary bases 
in northeastern Congo. The operation failed to apprehend Kony and over 
the following two months, his forces retaliated against civilians in 
the region, leaving over 900 people dead. It's tragically clear that 
insufficient attention and resources were devoted to ensuring the 
protection of civilians during the operation. Before launching any 
operation against the rebels, the regional militaries should have 
ensured that their plan had a high probability of success, anticipated 
contingencies, and made precautions to minimize dangers to civilians. 
It is widely known that when facing military offensive in the past, the 
LRA have quickly dispersed and committed retaliatory attacks against 
civilians.
  However, this botched operation does not mean that we should just 
give up on the goal of ending the massacres and the threat to regional 
stability posed by this small rebel group. Moreover, given that the 
U.S. provided assistance and support for this operation at the request 
of the regional governments, we have a responsibility to help see this 
rebel war to its end. In order to do that, I strongly believe we need a 
regional strategy to guide U.S. support--which includes political 
economic, intelligence and military support--for a multilateral effort 
to protect civilians and permanently end the threat posed by the LRA. 
The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 
of 2009 requires of the administration to develop such a strategy. It 
leaves it up to the discretion of the administration to determine the 
most effective way forward, but it ensures this issue will not get put 
on the back burner and that we will not continue to rely on a piecemeal 
approach.

[[Page S5617]]

  In addition to removing the threat posed by the LRA, we cannot lose 
sight of the importance that the Ugandan government address the 
conditions out of which the LRA emerged and which could give rise to 
future conflict if unchanged. Rebuilding northern Uganda's institutions 
and addressing political and economic grievances is the surest 
safeguard against future violence and instability. The government of 
Uganda committed last year to move forward with that reconstruction and 
reconciliation process under the framework of its Peace, Recovery and 
Development, the PRDP plan. International donors, including the United 
States, have already put forth substantial funds for that process. 
However, thus far it has been hampered by a lack of strategic 
coordination, weak leadership and the government's limited capacity. In 
particular, there has been very little progress toward establishing the 
mechanisms envisaged by the peace agreement to address the original 
causes of the war and promote reconciliation and justice.
  Our legislation recognizes the importance of helping the Ugandan 
government to reinvigorate the PRDP process. The second part of the 
Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 
2009 encourages the U.S. to increase assistance in the upcoming fiscal 
years for recovery with the condition that the Ugandan government 
demonstrates a commitment to genuine, transparent and accountable 
reconstruction. We should better leverage our contributions to ensure 
that U.S. taxpayer dollars are used wisely. Finally, this legislation 
authorizes a small amount of additional assistance to see that 
mechanisms are finally established to promote accountability and 
reconciliation in Uganda on both local and national levels. A failure 
to address the underlying political grievances in northern Uganda could 
lead to new conflicts in the future.
  As my colleagues know, I make it a practice to pay for all bills that 
I introduce, and the authorization in this bill is offset by reducing 
funds appropriated for excess secondary inventory for the Department of 
the Air Force. A report by the Government Accountability Office in 2007 
found that more than half of the Air Force's secondary inventory or 
spare parts, worth roughly $31.4 billion, were not needed to support 
required on-hand and on-order inventory levels for fiscal years 2002 
through 2005. The GAO report concluded that this is not only wasteful, 
but could also negatively impact readiness. The Air Force has 
acknowledged that it currently has over $100 million of spare parts on 
order for which it has no need.
  Some may disagree with me on the need for an offset, but last year's 
Office of Management and Budget's projections confirm that we have the 
biggest budget deficit in the history of our country. We cannot afford 
to be fiscally irresponsible so we must make choices to ensure that our 
children and grandchildren do not bear the burden of our reckless 
spending. I believe reducing the excess secondary inventory for the 
Department of the Air Force by $40 million, a small amount, to pay for 
this bill is a responsible move that we can all support.
  Americans from all states and all walks of life have been touched by 
the stories of children from northern Uganda abducted and forced to 
commit unspeakable acts. Congress, too, has a long history of being 
involved with efforts to help end this rebel war, dating back to the 
Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act that we passed in 2004, which 
committed the United States to work vigorously for a lasting resolution 
to the conflict. The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern 
Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 reaffirms and refocuses that commitment to 
help see this--one of Africa's longest running and most gruesome rebel 
wars--to its finish. I believe that, with the necessary leadership and 
strategic vision envisioned by this legislation, we can contribute to 
that end. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
                                 ______