[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 68 (Tuesday, May 5, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5132-S5133]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. GRASSLEY:
  S. 976. A bill to provide that certain provisions of subchapter I of 
chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, relating to Federal 
information policy shall not apply to the collection of information 
during any investigation, audit, inspection, evaluation, or other 
review conducted by any Federal office of Inspector General, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, the Federal Inspectors General are the 
frontline of protection for taxpayer dollars, ensuring that Federal 
agencies spend taxpayer dollars in an effective, efficient, economical 
manner that is in accordance with all applicable law. The Inspectors 
General root out fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs by 
auditing, evaluating, and investigating how Federal agencies spend 
taxpayer dollars and how Government programs utilize funds. The 
Inspectors General occupy a unique position within our government. 
Created by the Inspector General Act of 1978 and by various subsequent 
statutes, the Inspectors General at Executive Branch agencies also 
report directly to the Legislative Branch. They were created to keep 
tabs on the government bureaucracy to make sure that agencies follow 
the spirit and intent of the laws while protecting taxpayer dollars.
  I have been an outspoken advocate for Inspectors General during my 
time in the Senate and I was proud to be a cosponsor of the Inspector 
General Reform Act of 2008, which was signed into law by President Bush 
last year. That legislation ensures that Inspectors General are truly 
independent of the Federal agencies they oversee. The independence of 
Inspectors General is a critical requirement to their ability to get 
the job done. If Inspectors General lack independence from the agency 
they oversee, the quality of their work is impacted negatively and 
their reputation as independent watchdogs is tarnished.
  Over the years, I have seen a number of Inspectors General come and 
go. It is a tough job to be an Inspector General. You can not go along 
to get along. You must buck the system, dig deep into the books of the 
agency, find where the secrets are hidden, and then report the truth to 
Congress, the President, and the American people. Unfortunately, 
Inspectors General must do all this with the agencies that often fight 
their every move. These entrenched bureaucracies have an interest in 
not seeing Inspectors General succeed--they do not want egg on their 
face. That is why we in Congress must make sure they have all the tools 
they need to get the job done and ensure that there is accountability 
for the billions in taxpayer dollars that are spent annually on the 
operation of the Executive Branch.
  One growing area of concern I have seen over the years is procedural 
roadblocks being placed before Inspectors General to limit or prohibit 
their ability to do their job of protecting taxpayer dollars. One 
recent example relates to the Special Inspector General for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program SIGTARP, Neil Barofsky. Inspector General 
Barofsky notified me on January 22, 2009, that he intended to begin an 
oversight initiative that would have improved the transparency of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP. Inspector General Barofsky's plan 
was to collect data from TARP recipients asking them for a response 
outlining the use of TARP funds, copies of support documents, a 
description of plans to comply with executive compensation 
restrictions, and certification by a senior executive officer of the 
accuracy of the statements they make. This sounded like a legitimate 
plan from the Inspector General tasked by Congress with ensuring that 
the $700 billion handed out by the TARP program wasn't lost to fraud or 
abuse. However, it was shortly after this letter that Mr. Barofsky ran 
into procedural hurdles erected by the Office of Management and Budget, 
OMB.
  On January 30, 2009, I asked the Inspector General for an update on 
his initiative when he informed me that OMB had advised the SIGTARP 
that he could not initiate his effort due to the restrictions in the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PRA. As a result, SIGTARP requested 
``emergency processing'' by OMB to consider the impact of its letter to 
TARP recipients. It is my understanding that OMB initially responded 
favorably finding that SIGTARP would not be limited by the PRA. 
However, OMB reversed course and withdrew the emergency approval right 
after it was granted.
  OMB then informed SIGTARP that the PRA required he post his proposed 
letter online for TARP recipients to review for 15 days, wait for 
comments from the recipients, and then require that the SIGTARP justify 
to OMB that it has taken into account all the public comments. This was 
a significant, unnecessary roadblock that was erected at a time when 
American Taxpayers were asking everyone ``where did the money go.'' 
This type of procedural hurdle to an audit and investigation by the 
SIGTARP is unacceptable. Can you imagine what the very corporations 
that took taxpayer money would write during the comment period? It is 
my view that corporations that took Government money should be 
subjected to oversight by Inspectors General and they should not have a 
say in drafting or amending a letter from the Inspector General that 
they must respond to. This is exactly what OMB was asking of the 
SIGTARP.
  I am glad to report that later that same week SIGTARP Barofsky was 
given approval from OMB to send the letter requests to the TARP 
recipients without delay. However, around the same time that the 
letters were approved and sent, the Department of Treasury posted a 
comment request in the Federal Register about the SIGTARP request. 
Those responses were due to Treasury by April 13, 2009. While SIGTARP 
Barofsky was ultimately able to send his request, this uncertainty 
about the application of the PRA to audits, evaluations, inspections, 
or investigations by Inspectors General remains a significant question. 
This whole saga was a wakeup call for many Inspectors General. As a 
result, many Inspectors General have reached out to my office about 
this issue and the dangers the PRA could pose to their audits and 
investigations.
  That is why I am here today to introduce legislation that will 
clarify the impact the PRA has on official audits, evaluations, 
inspections, and investigations conducted by Inspectors General. This 
legislation is narrowly tailored to ensure that Inspectors General are 
not subject to bureaucratic hurdles erected by OMB, which could be used 
to limit the independence and authority of Inspectors General, and most 
importantly information that we can garner through their work.
  Specifically, the PRA currently states that agencies must receive 
approval for each collection request before it is implemented. Failure 
to get this approval provides the recipient of the request the 
protection to not comply with the request without penalty. The current 
PRA does not apply to criminal investigations, administrative actions, 
or investigations involving an agency against a specific individual or 
entities. However, it does apply to ``general'' investigations. The PRA 
is also silent as to whether it was intended to apply to Inspectors 
General and defines agency as any ``executive department, military 
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, 
or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government 
including the Executive Office of the President, or any independent 
regulatory agency. The PRA does expressly exclude the Government 
Accountability Office and the Federal

[[Page S5133]]

Election Commission, but not the Inspectors General.

  The PRA was passed with the noble goal of reducing the impact Federal 
Government regulatory agencies have on small businesses and other 
private individuals. However, over the years the investigative and 
audit roles of the Inspectors General have expanded to ensure that 
taxpayer dollars are not lost to fraud, waste, or abuse. As a result, 
the important work of the Inspectors General may run directly into the 
PRA resulting in a slower process for audits, evaluations, and 
investigations, as well as potentially tipping off those being 
investigated by the Inspectors General and providing them time to, for 
example cover-up potential wrong doing.
  The legislation I'm introducing today is designed to protect the PRA 
as well as the Inspectors General by trying to head off a potential 
conflict among the two statutes before it has to be decided by the 
courts. It simply states that the PRA shall not apply to the collection 
of information ``during the conduct of any investigation, audit, 
inspection, evaluation, or other review conducted by'' any Federal 
office of Inspector General. It further defines the definition of 
Inspector General to include: statutory Inspectors General, Federal 
entity Inspectors General, and any Special Inspector General. This 
definition also includes the Council of the Inspectors General on 
Integrity and Efficiency, CIGIE, created by the Inspector General 
Reform Act, and the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency Board 
created by the stimulus bill signed into law earlier this year. These 
two entities have some audit and evaluation roles provided to them and 
should also not face procedural hurdles under the PRA when they are 
overseeing the various Inspectors General or Recovery programs.
  All in all, this is a simple piece of legislation that I encourage 
all my colleagues to support. It picks up on the great work of the 
Inspector General Reform Act to ensure that Inspectors General are 
independent and free from any undue influence--procedural or 
substantive--when conducting audits, evaluations, inspections, or 
audits on behalf of the American people. I hope this legislation will 
receive expedited consideration and swift passage.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 976

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. INVESTIGATIONS, AUDITS, INSPECTIONS, EVALUATIONS, 
                   AND REVIEWS CONDUCTED BY INSPECTORS GENERAL.

       Section 3518(c) of title 44, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph (3)'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
       ``(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), this subchapter shall 
     not apply to the collection of information during the conduct 
     of any investigation, audit, inspection, evaluation, or other 
     review conducted by--
       ``(A) any Federal office of Inspector General, including--
       ``(i) any office of Inspector General of any establishment, 
     Federal entity, or designated Federal entity as those terms 
     are defined under sections 12(2), 8G(a)(1), and 8G(a)(2) of 
     the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), 
     respectively; or
       ``(ii) any office of Special Inspector General established 
     by statute;
       ``(B) the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
     and Efficiency established under section 11 of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); or
       ``(C) the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board 
     established under section 1521 of division A of the American 
     Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5; 123 
     Stat. 289).''.
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