[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 64 (Wednesday, April 29, 2009)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1017-E1018]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1913, LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE 
                     CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF 2009

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                        HON. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 29, 2009

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support 
of H. Res. __ the Rule on H.R. 1913, the Local Law Enforcement Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 2009. I urge my colleagues to support this 
rule.
  The rule will provide assistance to state and local law enforcement 
and amend federal law to streamline the investigation and prosecution 
of hate crimes. The key element of the rule is its expansion of federal 
jurisdiction to cover crimes motivated by bias against a victim's 
perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity or disability. 
This legislation would make tremendous strides in garnering the civil 
and human rights of all Americans. Its passage would secure the equal 
protection of all Americans under the law. It is a landmark and long 
overdue piece of legislation.
  This is an important legislation and I have introduced similar 
legislation in this and prior Congresses. While I support this 
legislation and urge my colleagues to support it, I am disappointed 
that the rule did not include my amendment which I offered last 
Congress.


                   MY AMENDMENT LANGUAGE IN H.R. 1592

  Last Congress, I offered an amendment to H.R. 1592, the legislation 
that was introduced last term. My amendment was accepted by unanimous 
consent by the members of the Judiciary Committee. Specifically, my 
amendment required ``the United States Sentencing Commission shall 
study the issue of adult recruitment of juveniles to commit hate crimes 
and shall report such findings back to the Congress within 180 days.'' 
If this language was included in the present bill, it would only

[[Page E1018]]

serve to strengthen it and make it better. The amendment language was 
intended to gather information on adults that solicit and use youth in 
the commission of hate crimes. This issue arises with respect to hate 
groups such as the Skinheads, Neo-Nazis, KKK, and other similar type 
groups.
  The Rule is aimed at combating hate crimes. Because the rule 
addresses hate crimes, it is necessary to define the criminal actions 
that constitute a hate crime in the first instance. The definition is 
straightforward. Hate crimes involve the purposeful selection of 
victims for violence and intimidation based upon their perceived 
attributes. Such targeting for violence removes these actions from the 
protected area of free expression of belief and speech as enshrined in 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The crimes are 
investigated and prosecuted at both the Federal and State and local 
level, depending upon the facts of the case and the needs of the 
investigation.
  Opponents will argue that this bill abrogates constitutional rights 
of Freedom of Speech or other First Amendment guarantees under the 
Constitution. These arguments have no merit.
  First, all speech is not protected speech. For example, one does not 
have the right to scream ``Fire!'' in a crowded movies theatre.
  Second, nothing in this bill prevents a person from exercising their 
fundamental rights or their First Amendment right to free speech. The 
actionable crime here is crimes that cause bodily injury.
  Third, the rule clarifies that neither this Act, nor the amendments 
made by it may be construed to prohibit any expressive conduct 
protected from legal prohibition, or any activities protected by the 
free speech or free exercise clauses of, the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The legislation does not punish, nor 
prohibit in any way, name-calling, verbal abuse, or even expressions of 
hatred toward any group, even if such statements amount to hate speech. 
Because it covers only violent actions that result in death or bodily 
injury nothing in this legislation prohibits lawful expression of 
deeply held religious beliefs. Thus, clergy and other religious persons 
are not prohibited from decrying any acts, lifestyles, or 
characteristics that they deem repugnant or contrary to their beliefs. 
This speech is not actionable under this bill and is in no way 
proscribed.
  The rule specifically provides at Section 8, in its Rule of 
Construction, that ``Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by 
this Act, shall be construed to prohibit any expressive conduct 
protected from legal prohibition by, or any activities protected by the 
Constitution.'' Thus, the plain language of the rule makes clear that 
clergy or others exercising their First Amendment right to speech or 
expression will not be penalized by this law. Words or conduct that 
does not result in bodily injury is not actionable under this bill.
  The Rule will address two serious deficiencies in the Federal civil 
rights crimes, in which a limited set of hate crimes committed on the 
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin are prohibited. The 
principal federal hate crimes statutes are 18 U.S.C. sec. 245 and 42 
U.S.C. sec. 3631, this bill expands the application of hate crimes 
legislation.

  In the last forty years, limitations in section 245 have become 
apparent and needed to be addressed. For example, the existing statute 
requires the government not only to prove that the defendant committed 
an offense because of the victim's race, color, religion, or national 
origin, but also because of the victim's participation in one of sex 
narrowly defined protected activities. These activities related to 
enrolling/attending schools, participating in or enjoying a service, 
program, facility, or activity administered or provided by a state or 
local government, applying for or enjoying employment, serving in a 
state court as a juror, travelling in or using a facility of interstate 
commerce, and enjoying the goods or services of certain places of 
public accommodation. This bill extends the application of hate crimes 
beyond these narrow and limited situations.
  The Rule extends hate crimes in another important manner. The 
existing statute provides no coverage for violent hate crimes committed 
because of the victim's perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender 
identity or disability. The Rule covers these statuses.
  When federal jurisdiction has existed in the limited hate crime 
contexts authorized under 18 U.S.C. sec. 245(b), the federal 
government's resources, forensic expertise, and experience in the 
identification and proof of hate-based motivations has provided an 
invaluable investigative complement to the familiarity of investigators 
with the local community, people and customs. The limitations of 
section 245 have limited the opportunity for such collaboration in many 
incidents of violence.
  As I mentioned out the outset, I understand the urgency and 
importance of passing this bill. I would however like to address two 
issues that I would like considered, and that I would like to work with 
leadership to ensure is included, in conference.
  First, the rule adds a certification requirement that is not 
currently found in section. Specifically, it requires a written 
certification from the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, 
the Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General that 
the person has reason to believe that a hate crime has occurred and the 
person has consulted with local and state law enforcement.
  This imposes yet another burden upon the Department of Justice and 
might infringe upon its right to bring and try hate crimes. I do not 
see any compelling reason for changing the existing law and adding this 
additional burden.
  Similarly, with respect to the Rule of Evidence in section 7(d) of 
this legislation, it provides the following:
  ``In a prosecution for an offense under this section, evidence of 
expression or associations of the defendant may not be introduced as 
substantive evidence at trial, unless the evidence specifically relates 
to that offense. However, nothing in this section affects the rules of 
evidence governing impeachment of a witness.''
  Thus, this new rule of evidence alters the relevance standard that 
already exists under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It would seem 
appropriate to use evidence, albeit circumstantial insofar as it is 
relevant. For example, consider the following hypothetical that a hate 
crime is perpetrated but under the current construction of section 
7(d), it would be inadmissible to proffer evidence that the defendant 
collected racist magazine or paraphernalia unless such paraphernalia 
was directly used in the crime or is entered for purposes of 
impeachment. It defies reason that the existence of such paraphernalia 
is relevant and should be admissible to prove that a crime was racially 
motivated. Therefore, I would excise the language in section 7(d).
  Hate crimes are real. The bodily injury, loss of life, and havoc that 
their perpetration wreaks on an individual, a family, community, and 
the country is wholly unacceptable. I urge my colleagues to support an 
end to such hate crimes and support this rule. Its passage would make 
America a fuller, freer and more equal society that ensures that all 
accorded equal protection under the laws of the United States.

                          ____________________