[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 57 (Monday, April 20, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4430-S4434]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER R. HILL TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the next nomination.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Nomination of Christopher R. Hill, of Rhode Island, a 
     Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Career 
     Minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
     of the United States of America to the Republic of Iraq.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is now 20 
minutes equally divided for debate on the motion to invoke cloture on 
the nomination of Christopher Hill.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. KERRY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Indiana, the 
distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I rise in support of the nomination of 
Christopher Hill to be Ambassador to Iraq. During his 32-year career, 
he has led three embassies and served as Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. In that position, he was the Bush 
administration's point man at the six party talks on North Korea. As 
Assistant Secretary, Chris Hill demonstrated outstanding diplomatic and 
managerial skills in dealing with one of our most difficult foreign 
policy challenges. His innovative approach contributed to successes, 
including the ongoing disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 
the presence of American monitors, the re-entry into North Korea of 
IAEA officials, and the potential transition of the six party process 
into a forum for broader multilateral engagement in Northeast Asia.
  North Korea remains an inscrutable regime with unpredictable 
motivations. Any suggestion that the North Korea nuclear issue lends 
itself to obvious solutions or the application of a

[[Page S4431]]

standard diplomatic playbook is off the mark. Ambassador Hill had to 
apply both imagination and persistence in moving this complex process 
forward in five foreign capitals.
  Now President Obama has tapped him to address another of the most 
important foreign policy challenges confronting the United States. In 
my judgment, it would take extraordinary circumstances for the Senate 
to deny the President his choice of an Ambassador to carry out his 
directives in Iraq, especially given that the President will be judged 
meticulously on what happens there.
  Ambassador Hill has unique experience in managing the type of 
regional diplomatic effort that is likely to be required at this stage 
of Iraq's development. Iraq's success will increasingly depend on 
regional factors involving the activities of both friends and 
adversaries. We must seek to reassure allies and send adversaries the 
clear message that the United States remains committed to regional 
stability and has no intention of leaving a vacuum in Iraq that could 
be exploited.
  Prime Minister Maliki's outreach to Sunnis has already reduced 
tensions among Iraq's Sunni neighbors. Leaders from Turkey, Jordan, 
Syria, and virtually all of the Gulf States, including Kuwait, have 
paid high-level visits and appointed ambassadors, indicating acceptance 
of the Shia-run government.

  Across the region, and internationally, the incentive structure for 
involvement in Iraq is fundamentally different than it was 2 years ago. 
Coupled with the drawdown, the time is right to expand our engagements, 
solidify regional security gains, and cultivate more robust regional 
and international cooperation in Iraq. Ideally, this cooperation would 
include regular and wide-ranging talks with neighboring states on 
broader issues of regional security. One of the purposes of these talks 
must be to avoid surprise and miscalculation in the region that could 
ignite further conflict.
  Through the confluence of many factors, Iraq is showing positive 
trend lines. American casualties are at their lowest mark since the 
conflict began 6 years ago. The Iraqi government held successful 
elections last month, and those provincial councils are convening, 
electing chairmen, and beginning to set their agendas.
  But progress in Iraq remains vulnerable to political rivalry, outside 
interference, and the slow pace of economic reconstruction. Government 
institutions at all levels remain underdeveloped, inefficient, and 
subject to corruption. The economy, which grew at a rate of 3.5 percent 
in the first two quarters of 2008, has slipped as oil prices have 
dropped. Oil production rates are flat, and reduced revenues may slow 
the efforts of Iraq's government to make necessary infrastructure 
investments. Unemployment and underemployment remain high. Because of 
these and other conditions, Ambassador Crocker and General Odierno have 
described Iraq's progress as fragile and reversible. It is important to 
get our next Ambassador in place as quickly as possible.
  I have appreciated Ambassador Hill's accessibility to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. In addition to nine appearances before the 
committee in the last 5 years, he has always been willing to meet with 
us privately about developments on the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere in 
East Asia.
  I also appreciate his willingness to accept this difficult post, 
especially after several years of an unrelenting diplomatic activity. I 
am hopeful that the Senate will move forward on his nomination. I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I yield myself 8 minutes.
  Colleagues, tomorrow is a terrible day. It is Holocaust Remembrance 
Day. I want to put up a picture of something that is all too familiar 
to the world. It is Auschwitz, the main camp. You can see the different 
buildings that were there. What took place there was a horrible thing 
that happened. The world will remember that.
  There was a new movie out on it last night that was put forward by a 
group of students from Kansas. They found a lady who had moved through 
the Polish concentration camp, actually the internment that they did in 
the city, the slum. She saved a bunch of orphans. It was a beautiful 
story about a terrible situation.
  Tomorrow, Holocaust Remembrance Day, we remember this type of a 
picture. Let me show you a modern picture that looks eerily similar. It 
is not the same situation but just look at the barracks. Look at the 
design. Just look at the setting. This is North Korea. It is a gulag. 
We have tens of thousands who have been killed. We have 10 percent of 
the population that have died over the last decade and a half in North 
Korea.
  You want to see an eerie resemblance to something that we always say 
never again, never again, and yet in our time we see this. Here is the 
most infamous of the camps. Here is Camp 22. You can get this on Google 
Earth if you do not trust my images. We did not have that of Auschwitz 
at the time. We have it now. We know what is going on at Camp 22 from 
people who have been in North Korea who have made it out. Here is a 
list of the places where the gulags are throughout the country. We know 
where these are. We did not know at the time what was taking place in 
Auschwitz, what was taking place there. We had thoughts about it. We 
thought it might be taking place. We were not exactly sure. In some 
cases I am afraid we acted like we didn't want to know.
  I am afraid that is what we are acting like on this issue; we do not 
want to know this is taking place. Yet it is. We have witnesses and we 
have Google Earth. You can show pictures of it. Tomorrow we have 
Holocaust Remembrance Day. Today we consider what is taking place here, 
and we are considering a nominee to be our most key ambassadorial 
post--this is in Iraq--who was the key strategist on North Korea 
strategy, on the six-party talks, who ignored this situation, who lied 
to me about it that he would involve our human rights ambassador to 
North Korea in the six-party talks.
  That never happened. I have a letter from Jay Lefkowitz, who stated 
this to me March 25, 2009:

       At no point during my tenure as special envoy for human 
     rights in North Korea, either before or after July 31, 2008, 
     did Chris Hill or anyone acting on his behalf invite me to 
     participate in any six-party talks.

  We know it is going on. We have the pictures. We do not even involve 
our guy to talk about it, and this is the person now we want to promote 
to the biggest diplomatic post that we have in the world, a diplomat 
who ignores the human rights abuses in North Korea. The Washington Post 
even said this about Chris Hill:

       . . . a stunning lack of urgency on human rights in North 
     Korea.

  That is my biggest beef, but let's also look at the diplomatic 
scorecard on what we have negotiated. Oh, OK, so we ignored human 
rights in North Korea. Chris Hill, he is the lead of our negotiators. 
He is also over that region. We are going to ignore human rights. But 
we must have gotten a great deal out of North Korea then because we are 
going to ignore this piece of it.
  Here is the diplomatic scorecard of what Kim Jung-Il got and what we 
got out of the six-party talks. I might remind you what happened during 
the break that we were on, 2 weeks since our adjournment: The North 
Korean regime launched a multistage ballistic missile over the mainland 
of Japan toward Western United States; kidnapped and imprisoned two of 
our citizens, American citizens; pulled out of the six-party talks; 
kicked out international nuclear inspectors and American monitors; 
restarted its nuclear facilities; and, according to at least one news 
source, is now under investigation for shipping enriched uranium to 
Iran.
  Now, that just happened in the last 2 weeks. That is a pretty good 2 
weeks for Kim Jung-Il, I guess. And the guy who negotiated this great 
deal, now we want to put him in charge of Iraq. Well, here is the 
scorecard: Kim Jung-Il gets delisted as a state sponsor of terrorism; 
he obtains key waivers of U.S. sanctions imposed after the regime's 
illegal nuclear detonation in 2006; he received tens of millions of 
dollars' worth of fuel oil assistance from us--that is, what the 
Soviets used to give him; now that we are sponsoring we are giving him 
this sort of stuff so

[[Page S4432]]

he can operate these gulags--allowed to continue totalitarian 
oppression and starvation of the North Korean people.
  We ignore human rights. He likes that. He is never required to 
release or account for all of the abductees or POWs or to acknowledge a 
clandestine uranium enrichment program and its role in the Syrian 
nuclear facility that the Israelis bombed. Remember that one. That was 
a North Korean facility. It was North Korean designed, able to test 
ballistic missile technology in violation of U.N. Security Council 
sanctions without any meaningful consequences.
  And what did we do? What did we do? Obtained incomplete declarations 
from North Korea. I might note to my colleagues, some of you may 
remember this, the actual papers we got, they radiated. They had 
radiation coming from the papers themselves. That was probably a gift 
from Kim Jung-Il.
  Implosion of the Yongbyon cooling tower, through the reversal they 
are already starting to produce plutonium or they are setting back up 
to produce plutonium at this plant after they blew up the tower. So 
they did probably the least safest thing, blowing up the tower, but 
they can still produce plutonium.
  That is what we got out of this deal, and now we are going to put 
Chris Hill in charge of Iraq, a situation and a case where we need the 
most diplomatic skill, the most accomplished diplomat, and somebody 
this body trusts because increasingly this moves from a military 
engagement to a diplomatic engagement. We have to trust the diplomat 
who is coming forward, who we are putting forward in this situation, 
and this is what he did on our last account for the United States of 
America. This is what he did the last time. The camps and human rights 
is what he ignored the last time around.
  Now, I think Chris Hill as an individual is a fine individual. I have 
met with him, as my colleague from Indiana has. I have great regard for 
my colleague from Indiana and the chairman from Massachusetts--
wonderful individuals. But I am saying, sort out and move away from 
Republican and Democrat. I opposed Chris Hill and what he was doing 
during the Bush administration. This is not me saying I am opposed to 
him because this is about President Obama. It is not. It is about 
ignoring human rights, it is about the terrible diplomatic scorecard. 
We are getting skunked. If this were baseball, they would call the game 
for the mercy rule. We are just getting skunked on this situation.
  Now we are going to put him in Iraq, and we are going to ask him to 
move this ball forward for us. I, for one, cannot seem to be able to 
support him to do that. That is why I want to have a fulsome debate 
about this. I want to have a debate about why we take these sanctions 
off on North Korea. We should put them back on.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used 8 minutes.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. I am going to speak to the issue raised by Senator 
Brownback in a moment. But let me say, Ambassador Christopher Hill has 
made a career, which is now entering his fourth decade, of taking on 
some of the toughest assignments in our Government.
  Today, the President, our country, and our troops, need him to take 
on this task in Iraq. I hope my colleagues will join the overwhelming 
majority of the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Lugar who has 
spoken on this in moving to this nomination which is long overdue. This 
should not be a controversial nomination. There are very few American 
diplomats with more experience than Chris Hill where it matters most: 
in negotiating complex, high-stakes, multilateral deals in conflict 
zones.
  In addition to serving as Ambassador to Macedonia, Poland, and South 
Korea, Chris Hill was one of the top negotiators at the 1995 Dayton 
Accords that ended the war in Bosnia.
  He served as Special Envoy to Kosovo during the 1999 NATO bombing 
campaign. As Ambassador to South Korea from 2004 to 2005, he managed 
the bilateral relationship that includes the presence of nearly 30,000 
American troops, and, of course, he was the point person in the talks 
Senator Brownback has referenced. Make no mistake, our troops are 
beginning to draw down in Iraq, and the entire resolution of Iraq as a 
success will revolve around the diplomacy we apply and our ability to 
seek political reconciliation which will be implemented by that 
diplomacy. We will have more time tomorrow to talk about this, I hope, 
if we can move to the nomination.
  Let me speak quickly to what Senator Brownback has said. Chris Hill 
was working under daily communications and instructions from the State 
Department, from Secretary of State Condi Rice, and from the President. 
What he did was in response to those instructions. He was never 
admonished publicly or otherwise for going outside those instructions. 
The argument is made about humanitarian and human rights issues. I ask 
unanimous consent that the portion of Ambassador Hill's Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee testimony be printed in the Record so Senators can 
judge for themselves.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Hill on the Allegation That He Reached an Agreement With the North 
             Koreans While They Were proliferating to Syria


 SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE NOMINATION HEARING, MARCH 25, 2009

       Senator Wicker: Okay. Let me ask you one other thing. 
     There's a letter by--signed by some five Senators--Ensign, 
     Inhofe, Bond, Kyle, Brownback--in which they are urging the 
     President not to choose to appoint you. And they say this, in 
     testimony before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Secretary 
     Hill said, ``Clearly we cannot be reaching a nuclear 
     agreement with North Korea if at the same time they're 
     proliferating, it is unacceptable,'' your quote. And yet they 
     say that--that at a time when Congress was trying to answer 
     key questions about Korea's proliferation to Syria, you were 
     involved in those negotiations, contrary to what they believe 
     was your clear statement to the subcommittee.
       Mr. Hill: That we cannot reach an agreement if they're 
     proliferating, yes.
       Senator Wicker: Yes, well do you see a contradiction there? 
     Congress was still wrestling with the fact that--that North 
     Korea was proliferating to Syria. And yet you went ahead. I'd 
     just ask you to respond to that.
       Mr. Hill: Well, yeah. To the best of our estimate--that is 
     other agencies in the U.S. Government, to the best of their 
     estimate--the North Koreans ceased proliferating after this 
     facility was destroyed.
       Now, the--it is very clear, at least it's very clear to me 
     and I think very clear to most people--that unbeknownst to 
     us, the North Koreans had carried on a program to assist 
     Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor. We are not 
     aware, to this day, of any transfer of actual nuclear 
     material. But we are aware, of course, of the transfer of 
     nuclear technology, or we became aware of this. The North 
     Koreans subsequently stated, and it's part of our agreement, 
     that they have no--no ongoing proliferation activity. We 
     wanted that statement to be expanded to acknowledge the fact 
     that they were proliferating. And so, what they did was they 
     acknowledged our concerns about it, they did not acknowledge 
     their past activities.
       Do I think that is an honest reaction from the North 
     Koreans, is that in the spirit of what we're trying to do? 
     No, it isn't. The North Koreans are--are a people who try to 
     play by their own set of rules and it is difficult to get 
     things done with them. We felt it was--given that we had 
     assurances that they had stopped, but more importantly we had 
     indications that it stopped.
       Because frankly, getting assurances or getting any 
     statements from the North Koreans are not what we're after, 
     we're after facts not statements.
       But when we saw that the activities had stopped, we felt it 
     was worthwhile to continue the effort to disable their 
     nuclear facilities in Yongbyon because at the end of the day, 
     if we can prevent the North Korean nuclear problem from 
     becoming a bigger problem than it is--right now it is a 30 
     kilo problem. Had we not succeeded in shutting down their 
     facilities and in disabling their facilities, that 30 kilo 
     problem could have been a 60 kilo problem, a 100 kilo 
     problem. But I--I am the first to say, Senator, that the job 
     is not done. They have some 30 kilos and we can not rest 
     until we get the 30 kilos from them.
       The issue that I've had to deal with as an implementer of a 
     policy, and I want to stress there was a chain of command 
     here and I was not off on my own. I was receiving 
     instructions pretty much on a daily basis, and during the 
     actual negotiations I received instructions even from 
     Secretary Rice--that our effort was to try to shut down and 
     disable the production of nuclear materials and then to--to 
     continue and get them to put on the table the nuclear 
     materials they had already produced, that is the 30 kilos.
       And it was at that phase, which did not come, but that was 
     the phase where we anticipated--and where I explained to 
     Senator Brownback--that is that next phase that we would be 
     prepared, and in return for that nuclear material on the 
     table, we would be prepared to launch a normalization effort 
     with the North Koreans.
       Senator Brownback, quite rightly, and I fully respect this 
     position, said, ``We can't be

[[Page S4433]]

     normalizing with a country with one of the world's worst 
     human rights records.'' And so, I quite--by the way, I really 
     respect that position as someone who's dealt with human 
     rights in my 30-some, 32-year career, I know about that, I 
     know very well about that--so I agreed to recommend, and 
     Secretary Rice completely agreed with this, to create a human 
     rights track. So as we're going forward in normalization--
     this was not just going to be a normalization, you give up 
     the nukes and we treat you like you're some ally--this is a 
     normalization that would include dealing with some of the 
     issues that, serious issues that stand between us.
       And so, that is what I--what I supported doing and I regret 
     that we were not able to get the verification agreement that 
     would have allowed us to get onto this next phase.
       Senator Wicker: Thank you.
       Senator Wicker: [Quoting an article by Stephen Hayes in the 
     Weekly Standard] ``Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had 
     given Hill permission to meet face to face with the North 
     Koreans, but only on the condition that diplomats from China 
     were also in the room. Although the Chinese participated in 
     the early moments of the discussions, they soon left, Hill 
     did not leave them.
       Now, the article goes on to say that Secretary Rice was 
     angry with you, and that CNN reporter Mike Chenoi wrote, 
     ``Although Rice remained supportive of reviving the 
     diplomatic process, Hill had held the bilateral discussion 
     with North Korean negotiator Kim Chyguan in defiance of her 
     instructions.'' And the author, Hayes, of this article 
     concludes that the Secretary of State expressly forbade you 
     from participating in the bilateral talks, but that you 
     thought otherwise. So, this is an opportunity for you to give 
     us your version of that.
       Mr. Hill: Well, thank you, thank you very much. Actually, 
     what this was--was the start of the--this was in the summer 
     of 2005, and this was an effort to get the Six Party process 
     going, because the North Koreans had boycotted.
       And so, what Secretary Rice agreed to--to do, was to have 
     bilateral talk--a bilateral meeting--with the understanding 
     that the North Koreans would then announce, at the end of the 
     bilateral meeting, their participation in the Six Party 
     process, but she wanted the Chinese to be there.
       The Chinese came, but the North Koreans were not willing to 
     carry on the meeting with the Chinese, so I was there in the 
     meeting room, the North Koreans were arriving, and the 
     Chinese were disappearing.
       So, the question I had--and Secretary Rice was in the air 
     between Anchorage, where she had a refueling stop--and coming 
     into Beijing. So, the audible I had to call at that point 
     was, do I continue the meeting or do I walk out? And I made a 
     judgment to continue the meeting.
       We had the meeting, and at the end of the meeting, the 
     North Koreans announced that they were returning to the Six 
     Party process. Secretary Rice arrived that night in Beijing 
     and in the morning--and I remember this very clearly--she 
     was--she was quite angry, but quite angry with the Chinese 
     for not having remained through the process. And she 
     expressed that directly to the Chinese Foreign Minister in a 
     meeting that I--that I attended, that is the next morning.
       So that was the incident, with respect to the--to the 
     meeting with the North Koreans.
       I know there's some journalists who've tried to make this a 
     rather dramatic moment, quite frankly, it was a little less 
     dramatic than some of the journalistic retellings of it.
       Senator Wicker. Was she angry with you?
       Mr. Hill. Not to my knowledge. She was angry with the 
     Chinese for not persevering.
       Senator Wicker. You and she did not have a verbal 
     confrontation about your audible that you called?
       Mr. Hill. Never.
       Senator Lugar. . . . Now, let me just say, Ambassador Hill, 
     you have tried in your opening responses to the chairman's 
     questions to talk about the experience with regard to 
     diplomacy and Iraq, and I have attempted in my opening 
     comments to indicate what I saw to be regional implications, 
     not only the shoring up and strengthening of the Iraqi 
     government.
       But for this record, would you respond to Senator Brownback 
     and to others that I have cited personally and from this 
     quote who have raised serious questions about testimony about 
     the South Korean nominee before and the holdup in the Armed 
     Services Committee and other issues that need to be addressed 
     as a part of our moving this nomination forward?
       Ambassador Hill. Senator, I would be happy to do so.
       First of all, I want to make very clear that I very much 
     respect Senator Brownback's concern about human rights. These 
     are concerns that are deeply felt, and they are well placed. 
     I have said on a number of occasions--and I will say it again 
     here--that the North Korean human rights record is one of the 
     worst in the world. There is no question it is one of the 
     worst in the world, and I have had those conversations with 
     Senator Brownback.
       Now, with respect to the specific issues that he raised or 
     were raised in the Armed Services Committee, I would like to 
     make a couple of points.
       What I agreed to do was that as we were going through the 
     phase two of the disablement process and verification of the 
     North Korean nuclear declaration, we anticipated moving on to 
     phase three, or a next phase, if you look in the transcript. 
     And what I told Senator Brownback we would do in that next 
     phase was to--the next phase was to include bilateral 
     normalization talks with the North Koreans.
       Now, of course, we were not ever going to normalize with 
     North Korea until it had done away with all of its nuclear 
     materials and nuclear ambitions. But the plan was in phase 
     three to sit down with the North Koreans for talks aimed at 
     normalization.
       I told Senator Brownback that when we got to that stage, I 
     would be prepared to support--and I emphasized I would be 
     prepared to support because I did not make the decisions. The 
     decisions were made by Secretary Rice and an interagency 
     group, but I would be prepared to support the creation of a 
     human rights track within the normalization talks.
       And what did I have in mind for a human rights track? I 
     thought we could, in this track, acquaint the North Koreans 
     with the fact that if their aspiration is to join the 
     international community, which was the whole concept of the 
     Six Party Talks, they would have to do something about their 
     human rights record. Specifically, we would look at whether 
     we could, for example, give them lists of prisoners of 
     conscience, of whom there are many in North Korea. We would 
     also look to see whether we could stand up some activities, 
     for example, help them with their criminal procedures code or 
     things like that, work with other countries on this. So I 
     told Senator Brownback that we would create, in the context 
     of this bilateral normalization working group, a human rights 
     track.
       The second point concerned his concern that the human 
     rights envoy who was envoy from 2005 and 2009, and Senator 
     Brownback was concerned that this envoy should be made a part 
     of the six parties. I told Senator Brownback that I would 
     support--indeed, that I would invite the envoy to any 
     negotiations with the North Koreans that did not deal with 
     nuclear matters, that is, anything beyond nuclear, he would 
     be a participant in. In fact, this statement on my part is 
     addressed in a press release that Senator Brownback issued on 
     July 31st, 2008.
       The problem, Senator, was that we were not able to get 
     beyond phase two. We were not able to get beyond phase two 
     because, although the North Koreans did issue a nuclear 
     declaration, we did not get adequate verification measures to 
     verify the entire declaration. We got some verification 
     measures. We got their agreement to allow people to visit 
     sites. We got their agreement to allow people to visit sites 
     that are not already listed on their declaration. We got them 
     to agree to give us documentation on how the reactor 
     operated. That is, we got daily production records from them 
     from 1986 so that we could track the production of the 
     reactor, and that would help verify whether, indeed, they had 
     produced 30 kilos versus 35.
       So we got some verification, but what we were seeking was a 
     fuller international standard verification of the type that 
     one would have in the context of a country that has 
     completely denuclearized and a verification that would be 
     familiar to anyone who has dealt with the IAEA.
       So we were not able to get that, and therefore, we were not 
     able to complete phase two, and therefore, we never got on to 
     having these bilateral talks. And so that is why we were not 
     able to do that.
       Senator Lugar. Thank you.

  Mr. KERRY. Senator Lugar asked him about this. He said specifically 
that, yes, he would have been willing to have the additional 
participation of the human rights appointee at the talks, but that 
referred to the talks when they moved beyond the nuclear component. The 
fact is that he said to Senator Lugar in committee that they never got 
to that phase. I will quote him:

       We were not able to get beyond phase two because although 
     the North Koreans did issue a nuclear declaration, we did not 
     get adequate verification measures to verify the entire 
     declaration. We got some verification measures.

  Then he goes on about that. He says:

       But what we were seeking was a fuller international 
     standard verification, and we were not able to complete phase 
     two. Therefore, we never got on to having the bilateral 
     talks.

  They never got to the period where he would have been perfectly 
happy, as he always was, to deal with the human rights issues.
  The fact is, Ambassador Hill has explained this. I respect Senator 
Brownback's long track record of outspokenness on human rights. What he 
has shown there in those photographs is unacceptable. It is 
unacceptable to all of us. But the fact is, Chris Hill, following the 
President's instructions, kept his primary focus on the 
denuclearization, while also trying to address a host of other 
concerns, including human rights, missile proliferation, 
counterfeiting, drug smuggling, and other illicit activities. That 
focus was entirely appropriate given the direct threat to our security. 
Moreover, those who criticize him for not

[[Page S4434]]

accomplishing more in the area of human rights ought to appreciate that 
he was, in fact, implementing the specific daily instructions he was 
receiving. If they don't like that policy, then their real complaint is 
against President Bush and the Secretary of State.
  I will have more to say about this tomorrow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I appreciate my colleague from 
Massachusetts and his statement, as well as the ranking member.
  This was Chris Hill's strategy in North Korea. He was Assistant 
Secretary of East Asia and Pacific Affairs during the same period of 
time. It was a failed strategy. We should have him in the middle of 
designing our diplomatic strategy toward Iraq on such a failure, where 
he will be coming back before this body asking us for support?
  I will have more to say on this tomorrow.
  I will file a bill tonight for myself and several other cosponsors 
asking that we consider, at the same time as we consider the Chris Hill 
nomination, reimposing sanctions on North Korea that were lifted during 
the Bush negotiations. The North Koreans, over this recess, launched a 
missile and are being investigated for selling uranium to the Iranians. 
Clearly, we have it within our power to put U.S. sanctions back on 
North Korea, and that should take place. I hope that during the process 
of discussing Chris Hill's worthiness for the Iraqi post, which I do 
not support, we will also vote to put sanctions back on North Korea 
that were lifted. Clearly, that should take place. I will be filing 
this bill tonight and asking for its consideration tomorrow.
  I yield back my time and urge a ``no'' vote on cloture against 
Ambassador Hill.


                             Cloture Motion

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Merkley). Under the previous order, 
pursuant to rule XXII, the clerk will report the motion to invoke 
cloture.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     hereby move to bring to a close debate on the nomination of 
     Christopher R. Hill, of Rhode Island, to be Ambassador to the 
     Republic of Iraq.
         Harry Reid, John F. Kerry, Richard Durbin, Charles E. 
           Schumer, Jon Tester, Tom Udall, Dianne Feinstein, 
           Edward E. Kaufman, Mark Begich, Frank R. Lautenberg, 
           Bill Nelson, Sheldon Whitehouse, Jack Reed, Bernard 
           Sanders, Christopher J. Dodd, Patty Murray, Benjamin L. 
           Cardin.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the 
nomination of Christopher R. Hill, of Rhode Island, to be Ambassador to 
Iraq shall be brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Begich), the 
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), the Senator from Connecticut 
(Mr. Lieberman), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller), and 
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl), 
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. 
Roberts).
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 73, nays 17, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 158 Ex.]

                                YEAS--73

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Barrasso
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennet
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Burris
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Johnson
     Kaufman
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Thune
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                                NAYS--17

     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Coburn
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Grassley
     Inhofe
     McConnell
     Risch
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Vitter
     Wicker

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Begich
     Bennett
     Kennedy
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     McCain
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 73, the nays are 
17. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in 
the affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I 
move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  (At the request of Mr. Reid, the following statement was ordered to 
be printed in the Record.)
 Mr. BEGICH. Mr. President, I was not able to be present in the 
Senate at the time of the confirmation votes on the nominations of Tony 
West, Lanny Breuer, and Christine Varney, to be Assistant Attorneys 
General of the United States, and the cloture vote on the nomination of 
Christopher Hill, to be our Ambassador to Iraq.
  Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea'' on the confirmation of 
each of the Assistant Attorneys General nominees, as well as ``yea'' on 
the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Christopher Hill.
  I ask that the Record reflect how I would have voted had I been 
present at the time of the votes.

                          ____________________