[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 47 (Wednesday, March 18, 2009)]
[House]
[Pages H3627-H3631]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   TARP AND THE AIG-WALL STREET AXIS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Schrader). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 6, 2009, the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman) 
is recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I will try not to consume the entire 60 
minutes, but I do have much to say about the progress of the so-called 
TARP, or bailout, program and the treatment of executives as well as 
general creditors and counter-parties under that bill.
  I think that the way this bill has been administered has been a 
travesty for quite some time, and it is perhaps peculiar that only this 
last outrage from AIG has generated the kind of public revulsion that 
is well justified by actions taken prior to the recent AIG giant bonus 
payments.
  But let us look in particular at AIG. They have healthy insurance 
companies, a healthy savings bank, all owned by a parent company. And 
that parent company decided to establish a Financial Products division, 
a casino, in which the rich and powerful from around the world could 
come to bet. In fact, that is what they did. And they bet that American 
mortgages would decline in value. These gamblers were right, but they 
were too smart by half because together, they broke the bank. And now 
they come to American taxpayers, and they say, ``You should make sure 
that we walk away from the table with our winnings intact.''
  Now, how does this compare to the way that capitalism is supposed to 
work? When an insolvent institution has general creditors and that 
insolvency requires governmental intervention, usually in the form of 
bankruptcy reorganization or receivership, not just the shareholders, 
not just the executives, but also the general creditors and the 
counter-parties take a substantial hit. This is what is, in effect, 
happening with General Motors today. Now, General Motors is not in a 
formal bankruptcy, but they are carrying on pre-bankruptcy or in-lieu-
of-bankruptcy negotiations. Their workers are seeing their contract 
changed and modified. The bondholders are seeing that they will get 
paid only one-third of what the bond contract says they are supposed to 
be paid in cash. So what kind of country is it when what was once our 
greatest industrial company, the investors and the bondholders of that 
company, the workers at that company are told that they have to take a 
substantial hit, but a giant casino, we are told, those who went and 
bet at that casino need to get every dollar their winnings entitle them 
to at the expense of the Federal Government and, oh, by the way, the 
croupier is supposed to get a $6 million bonus as well?
  The difference is that the AIG-Wall Street axis represents the most 
powerful in the world, and they are not going to sit idly by as people 
say that just because AIG is insolvent, they should take less than 
everything they want.
  What should have happened to AIG long ago is AIG should have gone 
into receivership. Now, this would have liberated their insurance 
subsidiaries and savings bank, which are healthy, to be spun off and to 
play the role that they need to play in our economy. Now, it is said 
that these subsidiaries would have been hurt, that the consumers of the 
insurance company would feel bad and reluctant and uneasy if AIG went 
into receivership because, after all, that would mean AIG would get a 
lot of bad press and some of that bad feeling might attach itself to 
these subsidiaries. Well, my God, is there anything that could have 
generated more bad press for AIG and every entity associated with it 
than the events of the last few days?
  Had AIG gone into receivership, it would have been a 1-day story. Oh, 
in the financial press they would have covered it for weeks, but it 
would have been a 1-day story on the front page of every newspaper in 
the country. Instead, those affiliated and associated with AIG are 
being associated with what has got to be referred to as the worst 
business press any company has received.
  The second thing that would have happened with receivership is that 
the general creditors, the counter-parties, the people who won by 
placing bets at the AIG casino would have to take less

[[Page H3628]]

than what the contract provides. This would have been a reasonable 
outcome because one of the bets you make when you go to the casino is 
whether the casino is going to be able to pay. And if the house can't 
afford to pay, the House of Representatives shouldn't be the ones 
called upon to do so.
  Finally, receivership would have voided or forced major modifications 
of all those bonus contracts that we are told are so sacrosanct that in 
a society with a rule of law we have got to pay the $6 million bonuses 
to the people who invented the AIG casino.
  Now, we are told, oh, my God, we need these talented people to stay 
at AIG. We had testimony from the regulators of AIG's healthy 
subsidiaries, and they indicated to us in committee today that they 
have on their staffs at salaries between $100,000 and $150,000 people 
with expertise, substantial, major expertise, in credit default swaps. 
So if you want somebody with the expertise to deal with the assets that 
AIG needs to unwind, you may need to pay a salary of $100,000 or 
$150,000. But if you need not just that expertise but somebody who has 
the experience of creating a casino that destroyed the AIG Company and 
has imperiled the economy of the world, if you want somebody with the 
talent for that level of destruction, then you need to provide them 
with multi-million dollar bonuses. Clearly, AIG in receivership could 
have staff being paid reasonable amounts with the expertise necessary 
to carry on the necessary transactions.
  Now, AIG is not the only one of these firms that should be in 
receivership because how can we make the major bank balance sheet 
healthy? What we're told is we have to remove the toxic assets. Well, 
I'm an old CPA. I know what a balance sheet looks like. And you never 
made a company any stronger by removing any kind of asset from its 
balance sheet. Now, if you cannot remove an asset from the balance 
sheet but, rather, trade a bad asset for a lot of taxpayer cash, that 
can, indeed, enrich the company, and that enrichment is reflected on 
the balance sheet.
  But the way to strengthen these financial institutions isn't by 
taking assets off their balance sheet; it's by taking liabilities off 
their balance sheet. And how do you do that? Well, when you have an 
insolvent financial institution, you go into receivership. The 
creditors who are uninsured, the big boys, have to take a cut in the 
amount that's owed to them. That reduces the liabilities on the balance 
sheet. It increases the amount of net capital on the balance sheet, and 
that institution is able to emerge healthy and ready to do business and 
play the role in the economy it should.

                              {time}  1930

  Instead, we are told, Treasury is looking to buy the ``toxic assets'' 
in a ``public-private partnership.'' When you hear that the Treasury is 
going to trade cash for trash, that they are going to give large 
amounts of money in return for the worst assets these banks have, then 
hold on to your wallets.
  But now we are told it will be a partnership between hedge funds and 
the Treasury, in which the Treasury will put up almost all of the money 
and the Treasury will take almost all of the risk and the private hedge 
funds will get almost all of the upside. This is, needless to say, 
something that's going to be hard to sell to a skeptical American 
public.
  We need to make sure that if there's any public-private partnership, 
that the terms on which the Treasury invests are identical to those 
terms of the private investors. They put a dollar on the table, we put 
a dollar on the table. They make a dime, we make a dime. We lose a 
dime, they lose a dime.
  Instead, what I fear will be created is a system in which we put $9 
on the table, they put $1. And if money is to be made, it goes chiefly 
to the folks that put in only $1 of capital. Beware of any system that 
is overly complex, because that is a system in which the taxpayers may 
get shortchanged.
  I think we speak from experience, because taxpayers have already 
invested in the preferred stock of all these big banks, and the 
official congressional oversight panel says we got shortchanged to the 
tune of roughly $78 billion, 31 percent of the amount we invested. It 
got a few headlines for a while, and people have forgotten.
  Now we're told that these same companies that shortchanged us, that 
took in $252 billion of our money but gave us securities worth $78 
billion less than the cash we gave them, that they are eligible for 
further bailouts, that we are ready to do business with them as if they 
have sinned not at all. We should establish a policy that we are not 
doing business with these banks that shortchanged us until they give us 
additional preferred stock to fully compensate for the cash that we 
have put into the institutions.
  I fear that this will not be the policy of the Treasury. We already 
know, because I asked them at the last hearing, that the major banks 
are unwilling, on their own, to issue additional preferred stock to the 
U.S. Treasury in order to make up for the fact that they have 
shortchanged us.
  So we need to compel those additional shares of preferred stock to be 
issued. We need to be wary of buying toxic assets. We need to be wary 
of buying any assets on terms under which we put up most of the money 
and take most of the risk and private interests get most of the upside.
  But let me return to the issues of executive compensation which are, 
after all, what has touched a nerve with the American people. Before I 
quite go to executive compensation, let's talk a little bit about why 
that nerve was hit and why the larger rip-offs of the taxpayer have 
generated less attention. The reason is simply that people understand 
what it is for somebody who screwed up a company and drove it into the 
ground and imperiled the American economy to get a $6 million bonus. 
They understand a $6 million bonus.
  In contrast, the fact that the counterparties and general creditors 
of insolvent institutions are being paid in full when they should take 
a substantial haircut, that is something outside the experience of the 
American people. So, recently, we put up $30 billion to AIG. 
Immediately $20 billion went to the richest and most powerful in the 
world.
  Over the last few months, tens of billions of dollars have gone to 
foreign banks, as if bailing out American banks wasn't taxing us 
sufficiently already, those are the multibillion, the $10 billion, the 
$100 billion transactions. They are complex, and Wall Street is able to 
use that complexity to say, ``Oh, American taxpayers, you just don't 
understand, but trust us, trust us. The whole world economy will 
implode if you don't make sure that the credit default swap 
counterparties are paid in full.''
  And since so few Americans have much experience with credit default 
swaps, they have been able to sell that, and that's the big swindle. 
The small swindle is the $6 million, the $3 million bonus, the $165 
million in total bonuses going to this unit of AIG at this time. That 
is something the American people understand.
  So what are we going to do about it? First of all, let's reflect. If 
AIG had gone into receivership even a few days ago, those bonuses would 
not have been disbursed and the contracts under which they had been 
paid would have been modified or discarded. We still need receivership 
for AIG, but receivership last week would have been better.
  But now we have an opportunity to use the Tax Code to make sure that 
those who receive excess compensation and who work for these big 
bailed-out banks have to give that money back, either to the employer, 
or have to give it back through the Tax Code to the American taxpayer.
  Now I think that tax bill may reach this floor tomorrow. Let us 
discuss what should be in it, and I am concerned that a few things that 
should be in it will not be in it. First, and I think that the bill 
will be good in this respect, it shouldn't just be an AIG bill. What 
about the giant bonuses at Merrill Lynch?
  What about all those who are getting multimillion-dollar bonuses and 
working at firms that are insolvent, firms that need to be propped up 
by this extraordinary and perverse departure from capitalism called the 
TARP program? We ought to treat all executives at the big bailed-out 
firms the same.
  Now I see a reason to draw a line with those bailed-out firms that 
received only a few billion dollars in TARP money. They might be viewed 
separately. But those who have received many billions of taxpayer

[[Page H3629]]

money, those companies, we ought to look to the executives and say we 
don't think you should be receiving more than a reasonable amount of 
compensation.
  Now President Obama has drawn that line at half a million dollars of 
compensation per year. Plus, in his program, and he has several 
programs, this is the program that's most severe, plus an unlimited 
amount of restricted stock. That would be a reasonable line. Other 
people might draw the line differently.
  But we need to apply it, not just to bonuses, but to other forms of 
compensation as well. We got all upset about bonuses, they started 
calling them retention payments. Now we are going to pass a tax law 
dealing with bonuses and retention payments.
  You know what they are going to do? They are going to increase the 
salaries from $1 million a month up to $2 million a month. So the first 
thing we need, in any tax law designed to tax away the ill-gotten 
excessive compensation of executives with bailed-out firms is we need 
to deal with all forms of compensation, not just bonuses.
  Otherwise we will go back to our constituents for the District Work 
Period and they will say, fine, Congressman, fine, Congresswoman, you 
dealt with the bonuses, what about the $1 million-a-month salaries? 
What about the fact that some of them went up to $2 million a month? 
Deal with the entire executive compensation. Deal with all of the major 
bailed-out firms.
  Next, it is important that any tax bill provide explicitly what 
happens if, as we hope, the executive decides to return to the company 
the excessive portion of the compensation they have received.
  So I look forward to working both on this floor and perhaps with a 
conference committee to have a bill that is comprehensive as to which 
companies it deals with, that is comprehensive in that it deals with 
all forms of compensation.
  I see we have been joined by the esteemed gentlelady from Texas, and 
at this point I shall yield to her for whatever comments she would like 
to make to the House.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
California, and I thank him for yielding. I have listened to the 
gentleman. We have participated in a number of caucuses where we have 
collectively expressed the importance of reinstituting regulation, but, 
more importantly, letting the people speak.
  Our challenges to the actions of AIG are not new. I am reminded of 
the works that were done in the last administration in 2008. There was 
a whole litany of prohibition and restrictions, particularly to 
regulate how that money would be given. No bonuses was one of those 
that was highlighted.
  In addition, to restrain the random use of money, reporting 
transparency, the idea of set-asides for those involved in mortgage 
foreclosures or modification, these are the issues we fought for. And 
in a lesson that has been bitter, we have seen AIG literally implode 
the, if you will, sympathy of the American taxpayer.
  I believe that the tax bill that's going to be on the floor tomorrow, 
I happen to support the efforts that are being made by the Judiciary 
Committee to provide for enforcement against those who would issue 
such, in essence, retention bonuses and to likewise require penalties 
and reimbursement.
  But let me just indicate why we need to be strong in our regulation 
on these issues. We take note of the fact that the CEO of AIG came just 
a few months ago. We thanked him for committing to serving after AIG 
had reached the brink of collapse.
  But I think the concern that I wish to speak to is the need for 
congressional oversight that was occurring in the Financial Services 
Committee today. It was occurring in the Judiciary Committee today. We 
should not be ashamed or shocked of holding the reins on entities that 
seem to be confused about the importance of congressional oversight.
  The points that were most provoking and striking to me today in the 
Financial Services Committee hearing are two: one, that these retention 
bonuses were issued on a Saturday night. Sounds to me like something of 
old, the Saturday Night Massacre. I frankly thought that much of our 
business is done from 9 to 5 from Monday to Friday, but that was not 
the case.
  But the other part of it that raised concern is the lack of 
transparency. Some government officials were made aware of this, in 
particular, the Federal Reserve. But committees that have oversight 
jurisdiction, either enforcement or regulation, just seem to be lost 
along the way.
  How many times do we have to repeat the fact that these Members do 
not represent themselves? This House, in fact, is the people's House. 
The upper body, of course, represents the combination of Congress.
  So I think it is important, as we look to the legislative focus, we 
also need to change minds and mindsets. But now that we are a major 
stakeholder, we do believe in capitalization, or capitalizing, 
restoring the markets, but we also think it is important that there be 
this link of understanding.
  My question would be, and I am wearing a lawyer's hat, that if there 
was a legal premise on which one thought they had to give these 
bonuses, frankly, I believe, our legal system is strong enough, and the 
financial system, to have indicated that we are not giving these 
bonuses at this time and to, in essence, say, let us take it to court. 
In that instance, we would have had an independent arbiter to address 
the question of whether these bonuses were, in fact, adequate.
  I look forward to the legislation making its way through this House 
dealing with taxation. I would hope that this would be recognized as 
not a punitive measure for people's hard work. Don't get the wrong 
idea. We understand hard work. We understand business hard work, small 
business hard work. We understand people who work in the financial 
markets, the hard work they do, the late hours. But we are partners 
now, and we have to do hard work on behalf of the American public.
  We have got to cherish their tax dollars as we look forward to reform 
the health care system, as we make the markets work again. We have got 
to restore their confidence, that people will believe it's okay to 
invest in these large entities to make the market work.

                              {time}  1945

  So I would simply ask my colleagues as we begin to debate this, let 
us not mischaracterize any of our work. We have been fighting against 
this kind of debacle, if you will. Members have been working on both 
sides of the aisle. But I think it's honest to say that all of this 
started way back in the last administration.
  The language of the TARP bill of that era, the $350 billion, was not 
with any restraint, and many of us argued against it, and there were 
arguments across party lines.
  So let us now take the pledge, if you will, take the leap, if you 
will, in the cold waters to be able to accept the responsibilities--as 
a Judiciary Committee member, myself on the aspect of enforcement, and 
certainly I think the regulatory aspect, Mr. Sherman, is one that we 
need to ramp up.
  I will simply close by saying we're here tonight--it's about quarter 
to eight eastern standard time, but it is after a full day of work. I 
just hope that we can find a better day than late Saturday night, early 
Sunday morning, or midnight Saturday night and Sunday morning, to make 
important decisions that are made by the private sector and give the 
opportunity to the American people to see transparency and let us fix 
these markets.
  I'm prepared to fight the battle so that taxpayers can have a 
restoration of their confidence in what we are doing here but, more 
importantly, in what America stands for, and that is equality and 
justice and opportunity and fairness for all.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding to me at this time, and I'd be 
happy to yield back
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentlelady from Texas. At this point I would 
want to resume my comments about the tax bill or the latest draft of it 
that I expect will come before this floor tomorrow.
  The bill is retroactive in the sense that it does affect the taxation 
of monies received in 2008. That is not the best way to pass tax law, 
but it is not uncommon to act right up until April 15, 2009 or, even 
later, to affect the tax law applicable to 2008 tax returns.

[[Page H3630]]

  There have been many occasions when this House has, after the end of 
a calendar year, modified the tax law for that year. Usually, that 
takes the form of a tax reduction. But it has sometimes taken the form 
of a tax increase.
  Second, I should point out that the draft that is in circulation now 
uses the term ``capital infusions'' so as to apply the bill to 
executives with companies that have received capital infusions of over 
$5 billion. The bill, however, does not define the term capital 
infusions and so it leaves open how it would apply in two different 
situations.
  In one situation, it clearly would apply, and that is if the Federal 
Government spends $5 billion or more to buy preferred stock from a 
company, we have made a capital infusion in that company of $5 billion 
or more.
  But it now appears that Treasury is going to buy toxic assets from 
companies. The authors of the tax legislation should indicate if 
somebody sells us a big package of bad mortgages for $5 billion or $10 
billion, is that company covered by this new tax law--or are the 
executives covered by this new tax law.
  Second, the draft that is coming before us--and this isn't really 
second, but this is last on my list, rather--deals, perhaps unfairly, 
with small bonuses.
  The draft, for example--say you have an individual, and I will make 
it simple by assuming this individual is filing a separate tax return, 
separate from his or her spouse. And say the individual makes $125,000 
a year salary and a $10,000 bonus. Under this draft, they face a 
penalty tax on the $10,000 bonus.
  Well, somebody earning $125,000 dollars isn't terribly rich 
certainly, by Wall Street standards, and a $10,000 dollar bonus may not 
be excessive.
  The bill's laser-like focus on bonuses could subject a $10,000 bonus 
to a $9,000 tax, notwithstanding the fact that if somebody is getting 
$1 million a month in salary, and no bonus--if you're getting $1 
million a month in salary, I'm not sure you need a bonus--that person 
will face no additional tax under this tax bill.
  So I would hope that the bill would be reconfigured to deal with the 
total compensation package, including salaries and, in any case, even 
if it's just going to be targeted at bonuses, should focus not on small 
bonuses received by people who are earning modest middle-class or even 
upper middle-class salaries.
  The next point I would like to make--I think it's kind of obvious 
from the tone I'm taking that I voted against the TARP bill on this 
floor, twice, and hope that we see very substantial changes in the way 
we are dealing with financial institutions before we are called upon to 
vote on any financial rescue bill in the future.
  One change we need to see, a change I think we can believe in, would 
be a change of personnel in Treasury as to the Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury responsible for the TARP program. I refer to it not by its 
technical name but the Assistant Secretary for Big Bank Bailouts.
  Neel Kashkari is a holdover from the last administration. He is, more 
than any other person, responsible for the fact that we got 
shortchanged to the tune of $78 billion worth of securities on our 
first $252 billion of security purchases. He is still there.
  If there's one thing this country wanted change and expected would be 
changed on January 20 of this year, it would be the person in charge of 
the TARP program. And I look forward to the day when we get a new 
assistant secretary into that position. Even a temporary acting 
assistant secretary drawn from the banks of the bureaucracy would be an 
improvement over someone who has managed to lose 31 percent, and more, 
of everything we have invested.
  Now I'd like to return to the process by which AIG revealed these 
bonuses. It is true that everyone paying attention is aware that AIG 
had a lot of excessively compensated individuals. In fact, when Neel 
Kashkari, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, came before our 
committee, I questioned him about what I knew were $3 million bonuses 
being paid to AIG executives. I was able to point out to him that the 
TARP statute mandated that the Secretary of the Treasury provide 
standards of appropriate executive compensation, and that only because 
Treasury had deliberately intentionally ignored that general mandate 
were the--at that point, I only knew of $3 million bonuses being paid 
at AIG--were they paid.
  Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Kashkari, then speaking for the 
old administration, but perhaps holding the same views under the new 
administration, would not opine on whether a $3 million AIG bonus was 
or was not appropriate executive compensation.
  The fact is, Treasury continues to have the power and the duty to 
issue regulations defining executive compensation--appropriate levels 
of executive compensation at bailed out firms. They should do that, and 
do it promptly.
  So, in any case, people were aware that there were executives at AIG 
getting enormous bonuses and huge salaries. But this last weekend, it 
was revealed to us some particularly painful details. First, that $165 
million was about to be disbursed. Second, that the chief beneficiaries 
were going to be the people that created the most malignant casino in 
the history of Wall Street, the AIG Financial Products Division.
  So all this money, or virtually all of it, was going to the people at 
the division that had destroyed the AIG company and much of Wall Street 
besides.
  Finally, we learned that some of those bonuses would be in excess of 
millions of dollars--in one case, over $6 million. Those particulars 
were revealed just hours before the checks were distributed. And the 
question is: Did the securities law of the United States require that 
AIG reveal that much, much earlier.
  If the securities laws are not that clear, they should be, because 
the theme of the securities laws are that a company must reveal on a 
timely basis material information to its shareholders. Material 
information is that which would influence the shareholders in a 
decision to invest.
  Well, the American taxpayer invested $30 billion additional into the 
AIG morass just 2 weeks ago. I submit we definitely would have been 
influenced by knowing that these particular bonuses were being paid to 
the executives of the Financial Products Division of AIG.
  But, instead, these bonuses were hidden from us. The particulars were 
hidden from us right up until hours before disbursement. Well, why was 
that done? Because we could have, as a country, put AIG into 
receivership before they got the last $30 billion. We could have saved 
ourselves $30 billion and, in the process, we would also have 
invalidated or forced a judicial modification of all those obnoxious 
bonus contracts.
  But they didn't tell us about this. They didn't give us the 
particulars that are so important to the American taxpayer. They may 
have told one or two people over at the Federal Reserve Board, but 
securities law does not say that you reveal material facts to one or 
two people at the Federal Reserve Board. Securities law says material 
facts need to be revealed to shareholders promptly. And there is 
nothing that the 300 million shareholders of AIG--the American people--
find more significant to them than this obnoxious bonus program.
  I suggest that we were not told until the bonuses were distributed, 
not only to protect the bonuses, but to protect the concept that AIG's 
general creditors and counterparts should be paid in full with taxpayer 
dollars, as necessary.
  America would be a lot happier today. The subsidiaries of AIG, the 
insurance companies and the savings bank, would be much stronger today. 
The likelihood of the administration being able to get this Congress to 
pass additional legislation if it finds that necessary would be much 
higher today.
  If AIG had revealed these material facts in all of their very 
significant particulars months ago, or even weeks ago, but somebody at 
AIG decided not to tell us. Somebody at the Fed may have known these 
particulars and decided that the American people should not be trusted 
with such inflammatory information. And that is why we are where we are 
today.
  I look forward to strengthening America's insolvent financial 
institutions, not by putting in hundreds of billions of dollars more of 
taxpayer money, not by creating partnerships in which we put up 
hundreds of billions of dollars but, if there's any upside, it

[[Page H3631]]

goes to various hedge funds on Wall Street.
  I look forward to strengthening these institutions, not by removing 
assets, even assets that have declined in value, but assets 
nevertheless, from their balance sheet. I look forward to strengthening 
these institutions by going into receivership, removing liabilities 
from their balance sheet, thereby increasing their net worth, their 
capital, and returning them to the private sector as very, very well-
capitalized institutions.
  What is standing in our way is the fact that that reduction in 
liability is a reduction in the amount payable to the most powerful in 
the world--the largest financial institutions in the world.
  One final comment. I thank the House for indulging this lengthy 
speech. First we were told that AIG was too big to fail. Then the folks 
on Wall Street came up with a new story. They said AIG was too 
interconnected with other institutions to fail.
  Well, AIG is not too big to fail. It's not too interconnected to 
fail. It's too well-connected to fail. But receivership is not failure 
for AIG. Receivership is the road to success for AIG.

                              {time}  2000

  It simply will cost these very well-connected general creditors, the 
ones who went and bet at the AIG casino, the ones who broke the AIG 
casino bank. It will simply cost them money. And this Congress and this 
government should have the courage to do just that for the benefit of 
the American people.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________