[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 44 (Thursday, March 12, 2009)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E658-E659]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ON H.R. 1463

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. JANE HARMAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 12, 2009

  Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, one of the most important challenges 
confronting the intelligence community is learning the nature of and 
damage done by the worldwide network in nuclear centrifuge technology, 
bomb components and training run for almost two decades by A. Q. Khan--
the revered ``father'' of his country's nuclear program. Considered a 
pariah abroad but a hero at home, that task got a lot tougher when 
Pakistan's High Court ordered Khan released from house arrest last 
month.
  At the recent Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich, Pakistani 
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi astonished delegates, telling us 
that his government had not decided whether to challenge the court 
decision but that Pakistan would continue to monitor Khan.
  For those who stay awake at night worrying about Iran's increasing 
mastery of centrifuge technology and the ability of terror groups to 
access nuclear components, Pakistan's action is distressing.
  When Khan ``confessed'' in 2004 to his illegal nuclear dealings, he 
was promptly placed under ``house arrest'' and pardoned by then 
President Pervez Musharraf. The U.S. government was denied access to 
him, and was never able to question him about what he did and what else 
he knew.
  Today, we introduce legislation to condition future military aid to 
Pakistan on two things: that the Pakistani Government make A.Q. Khan 
available for questioning and that it monitor Khan's activities.
  This much we do know. As a university student in Europe in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, Khan earned degrees in metallurgical engineering 
from institutions in Holland and Belgium. In 1972, he began working for 
the Dutch partner of a uranium enrichment consortium and almost 
immediately raised eyebrows for repeated visits to a facility he was 
not cleared to see and for inquiries made about technical data 
unrelated to his own assignments.
  Dutch intelligence quietly began to monitor him. In 1974, following 
India's first nuclear test, Khan offered his expertise to Pakistani 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Later that year, Khan's company 
assigned him to work on Dutch translations of advanced, German-designed 
centrifuges--data to which he had unsupervised access for 16 days.
  By 1975, the damage appears to have been done. Pakistan began to 
purchase components for its domestic uranium enrichment program from 
European suppliers, and Khan was transferred away from enrichment work 
due to concern about his activities.
  In December, he abruptly returned to Pakistan with blueprints for 
centrifuges and other components and detailed lists of suppliers.
  Convicted in absentia by the Dutch government for nuclear espionage, 
beginning in the mid-1980s, Khan is widely believed to have provided 
nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya and possibly 
Syria and Iraq. His network involved front companies

[[Page E659]]

and operatives in Dubai, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, South 
Korea, Switzerland and Turkey. Though much of the network was taken 
down following his confession, there is no conclusive evidence that it 
was destroyed.
  Khan is again a loose nuke scientist with proven ability to sell the 
worst weapons to the worst people. Hopefully, appropriate Pakistani 
officials worry as we do that their civilians could become nuclear 
targets--as could NATO soldiers in neighboring Afghanistan or civilians 
in any number of Western countries.
  Our bill provides a path for the Zardari government to do the right 
thing--to allow the U.S. to evaluate the full extent of A. Q. Khan's 
proliferation activities in order to halt any ongoing or future harm.

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