[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 39 (Thursday, March 5, 2009)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2823-S2824]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                COLOMBIA

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the abuses perpetrated against civilians by 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, popularly known as the 
FARC, are too numerous to list. From kidnappings to bombings, torture 
and summary executions, the FARC have lost whatever credibility and 
popular support they may once have had. They are a criminal enterprise, 
despised by the vast majority of Colombians, funded with proceeds from 
the production and sale of cocaine, who show no respect for the laws of 
armed conflict.
  The FARC have kidnapped hundreds of people, many of whom remain in 
their custody, their health and welfare unknown. From what we have 
learned from the few who have escaped or been released, they suffer 
severe hardship and deprivation.
  The FARC have also targeted Colombia's vulnerable indigenous people, 
whose traditional lands are often located in conflict zones. They have 
also been victimized by other armed groups, including the Colombian 
army.
  Two recent incidents illustrate the dangers these people face. 
According to the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia, on 
February 11, 2009, the FARC killed 10 members of the Awa tribe in 
Narino department. This followed the killing of 17 Awa on February 4, 
also in Narino, and also reportedly carried out by the FARC. There are 
reports that an unknown number of Awa have been abducted.
  The killing of defenseless indigenous civilians can best be described 
as a crime against humanity. It is utterly without justification, and 
those who engage in such atrocities should pay for their crimes.
  For years I have worked to help improve respect for human rights in 
Colombia and to strengthen Colombia's judicial system. I have also 
supported efforts to protect the rights of Colombia's indigenous 
people. When we get reports of the FARC attacking and summarily 
executing members of the Awa, including women and children, we are 
reminded how much remains to be done to protect these vulnerable groups 
and before real justice and peace can come to Colombia.
  In recent years there have been notable improvements in security in 
some parts of Colombia, particularly Bogota, Medellin, and other 
cities. There has also been progress in expanding the presence of the 
state into areas which previously had been ungoverned. We are seeing 
some promising results from projects that provide coca farmers with 
titles to land, technical assistance to grow licit crops like coffee 
and cacao, and access to markets, in return for voluntarily stopping 
growing coca. These projects deserve our continued support.
  But many rural areas remain conflicted or controlled by the FARC or 
other armed groups, some of whose members are demobilized 
paramilitaries. After more than $7 billion in U.S. aid and 8 years 
since the beginning of Plan Colombia, the amount of coca under 
cultivation is close to what it was before. It is now grown in smaller, 
more isolated plots, in many more parts of the country. More than 
200,000 rural Colombians were displaced from their homes as a result of 
drug-related violence last year alone.
  Another issue that requires the attention of the Colombian Government 
is reparations for victims of the conflict. There are tens of thousands 
of people who had members of their families killed or injured by 
paramilitaries, the FARC, or the army. Many had land or other property 
stolen by paramilitaries who often had the active or tacit support of 
the army. The Colombian Government established mechanisms for returning 
stolen assets, but for the most part it has not yet happened. Very 
little of the land has been returned to its previous occupants. This 
process needs to be urgently invigorated if reconciliation is to 
succeed in Colombia.
  Whether a family member was killed or their property stolen by the 
FARC, paramilitaries, or members of the army, the loss is the same. The 
judicial process in Colombia is wholly incapable of adjudicating the 
large number of cases or claims. It is critical that, as was finally 
done in the United States when Congress appropriated funds to 
compensate victims of the Japanese internment camps during World War 
II, the Colombian Government take the necessary steps to provide 
reparations for the victims so they can rebuild their lives.
  The issue of extra judicial killings, or ``false positives'' as they 
have been called, is another major concern.

[[Page S2824]]

Human rights groups warned repeatedly that Colombian soldiers were 
luring poor young men with the promise of jobs, summarily executing 
them, and then dressing the bodies to appear as FARC combatants in 
order to obtain higher pay, time off, promotions, or other benefits. I 
also expressed concern about this. Instead of investigating, top 
Colombian officials, including the President, responded by accusing the 
human rights groups of being FARC sympathizers. After the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed these crimes and it was 
revealed that they were the result of official army policy, the 
government acknowledged the problem, but the verbal attacks against 
human rights defenders and journalists who wrote articles about the 
issue have continued.
  To his credit, the Minister of Defense has taken some steps to 
address it, including issuing decrees disavowing the policy of 
rewarding body counts and dismissing army officers who were implicated 
in some cases. But few if any have been prosecuted and punished, and 
there are reportedly hundreds of these cases.
  Throughout this period, despite report after report that these 
atrocities were occurring, former Secretary of State Rice continued to 
certify that the Colombian army was meeting the human rights conditions 
in U.S. law. That was as shameful as the Colombian Government blaming 
human rights defenders. The Congress had no responsible alternative to 
withholding a portion of the military aid for Colombia. Whether or when 
those funds are released will depend, in part, on how thoroughly the 
government addresses the problem of false positives, whether the 
officers involved are held accountable, and whether those who had the 
courage to report these crimes continue to be the target of government 
attacks.
  I also want to mention the recently appointed Army Chief of Staff, 
GEN Gonzalez Pena, who replaced General Montoya. General Montoya 
resigned under pressure due to the false positives scandal and was 
``punished,'' as too often occurs in Colombia, by being appointed an 
ambassador. Not long ago, General Gonzalez Pena commanded the 4th 
Brigade in Antioquia which has one of the worst rates of reported extra 
judicial killings. It is difficult to believe that he was unaware of 
what his troops were reportedly doing, and it raises a concern about 
his qualifications for such an important position.
  This year, the Appropriations Committee will again review our aid 
programs in Colombia. We want to continue helping Colombia because we 
share many interests--in addition to stopping the traffic in illegal 
drugs to the United States which has not succeeded to the extent some 
had predicted. We need to determine what has worked and deserves 
continued U.S. support, whether the Colombian Government is meeting the 
conditions in U.S. law and what costs should be shifted to the 
Colombian Government as U.S. aid is ratcheted down in the coming years.

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