[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 16 (Tuesday, January 27, 2009)]
[House]
[Pages H546-H556]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009

  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to H. Res. 87, 
I call up the Senate bill (S. 181) to amend title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, and to modify the operation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to clarify that a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful 
under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
  The text of the Senate bill is as follows:

                                 S. 181

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
     of 2009''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
     Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly impairs 
     statutory protections against discrimination in compensation 
     that Congress established and that have been bedrock 
     principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter 
     decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly 
     restricting the time period in which victims of 
     discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory 
     compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the 
     intent of Congress.
       (2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of 
     discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of 
     wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust 
     application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
       (3) With regard to any charge of discrimination under any 
     law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or limit an 
     aggrieved person's right to introduce evidence of an unlawful 
     employment practice that has occurred outside the time for 
     filing a charge of discrimination.
       (4) Nothing in this Act is intended to change current law 
     treatment of when pension distributions are considered paid.

     SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF RACE, 
                   COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

       Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful 
     employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in 
     compensation in violation of this title, when a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is 
     adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or 
     when an individual is affected by application of a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, 
     including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
     paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or 
     other practice.
       ``(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977A 
     of the Revised Statutes (42

[[Page H547]]

     U.S.C. 1981a), liability may accrue and an aggrieved person 
     may obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1), including 
     recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing 
     of the charge, where the unlawful employment practices that 
     have occurred during the charge filing period are similar or 
     related to unlawful employment practices with regard to 
     discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time 
     for filing a charge.''.

     SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF AGE.

       Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
     1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(d)) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and
       (B) by striking ``(d)'' and inserting ``(d)(1)'';
       (2) in the third sentence, by striking ``Upon'' and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(2) Upon''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice 
     occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in 
     violation of this Act, when a discriminatory compensation 
     decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes 
     subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
     practice, or when a person is affected by application of a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, 
     including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
     paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or 
     other practice.''.

     SEC. 5. APPLICATION TO OTHER LAWS.

       (a) Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.--The 
     amendments made by section 3 shall apply to claims of 
     discrimination in compensation brought under title I and 
     section 503 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
     (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq., 12203), pursuant to section 107(a) 
     of such Act (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), which adopts the powers, 
     remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 of the 
     Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5).
       (b) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--The amendments made by 
     section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in 
     compensation brought under sections 501 and 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791, 794), pursuant 
     to--
       (1) sections 501(g) and 504(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 
     791(g), 794(d)), respectively, which adopt the standards 
     applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
     of 1990 for determining whether a violation has occurred in a 
     complaint alleging employment discrimination; and
       (2) paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 505(a) of such Act 
     (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) (as amended by subsection (c)).
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Rehabilitation act of 1973.--Section 505(a) of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``(42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5 (f) through (k))'' the following: ``(and the 
     application of section 706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)) to 
     claims of discrimination in compensation)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``1964'' the 
     following: ``(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsection 
     (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5), 
     applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)''.
       (2) Civil rights act of 1964.--Section 717 of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following:
       ``(f) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to complaints of 
     discrimination in compensation under this section.''.
       (3) Age discrimination in employment act of 1967.--Section 
     15(f) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 
     U.S.C. 633a(f)) is amended by striking ``of section'' and 
     inserting ``of sections 7(d)(3) and''.

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect 
     as if enacted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of 
     discrimination in compensation under title VII of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), the Age 
     Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et 
     seq.), title I and section 503 of the Americans with 
     Disabilities Act of 1990, and sections 501 and 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that are pending on or after that 
     date.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Holden). Pursuant to House Resolution 
87, the gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller) and the gentleman 
from California (Mr. McKeon) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. George 
Miller).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and 
extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on S. 181.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 
minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, today the House of Representatives meets to give final 
approval to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and send it to President 
Obama for his signature. What a difference a new Congress and a 
President make.
  Nondiscrimination in the workplace must be a sacred American 
principle. Workers should be paid based upon their merits, not an 
employer's prejudices. Yet, more than 40 years after the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court dramatically turned back 
the clock on this bedrock principle. Instead of abiding by decades of 
long-standing law, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court decided to 
commit legal jujitsu to satisfy a narrow ideological agenda. The 
Supreme Court simply told bad employers that to escape responsibility 
for pay discrimination all they need to do is keep it hidden for the 
first 180 days.
  The Ledbetter ruling has already dramatically impacted how Americans 
can remedy discrimination. It has been cited in hundreds of cases over 
the past 19 months since the ruling. Not only have pay discrimination 
cases been adversely impacted, but even fair housing protections and 
title IX complaints. The Supreme Court sent these lower courts 
backwards down the wrong path, and today the Congress will correct that 
course by passing this bill.
  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would simply reset the law as 
businesses, most courts, employers and employees and the EEOC had 
understood it before the Court's 2007 ruling. Under S. 181, every 
paycheck or other compensation resulting, in whole or part, from an 
earlier discriminatory pay decision or other practice would constitute 
a violation of title VII. In other words, if an employer keeps issuing 
discriminatory paychecks, that employer will keep restarting the clock 
for filing charges. That's only fair. As long as workers file their 
charges, as Lilly Ledbetter herself did, within 180 days of a 
discriminatory paycheck, the charges will be considered timely. The 
legislation also clarifies that an employee is entitled to up to 2 
years backpay as provided in title VII already.
  Finally, S. 181 ensures that these simple reforms extend to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
and the Rehabilitation Act to provide these same protections for 
victims of age and disability discrimination.
  Correcting pay discrimination poses significant challenges to 
workers, made all the harder with the Supreme Court's Ledbetter 
decision. This is best illustrated by Lilly Ledbetter's own words from 
an Education and Labor Committee hearing in 2007: ``What happened to me 
is not only an insult to my dignity, but it had real consequences for 
my ability to care for my family. Every paycheck I received, I got less 
than what I was entitled to under the law.
  ``The Supreme Court said that this didn't count as illegal 
discrimination, but it sure feels like discrimination when you are on 
the receiving end of that smaller paycheck and trying to support your 
family with less money than the men are getting for doing the same job. 
And according to the Court, if you don't figure things out right away, 
the company can treat you like a second-class citizen for the rest of 
your career. This isn't right.''
  I agree with Lilly Ledbetter: what happened to her wasn't right.
  Unfortunately, it's too late for Lilly Ledbetter to receive justice. 
But today, thanks to Lilly's incredible courage and perseverance, and 
thanks to millions of Americans making their voices heard, Congress 
will reject this ruling for the millions of Americans suddenly now 
subject to legal discrimination.
  The Ledbetter v. Goodyear Supreme Court ruling was a painful step 
backwards for civil rights in this country. Today, the House will 
correct this injustice and send President Obama his first bill to sign 
into law. All victims of discrimination are entitled to justice, and I 
urge my colleagues to support the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill before us was the first substantive piece of 
legislation considered by the 111th Congress. In a matter of days, it 
could be one of the first substantive measures signed into law by the 
44th President of the United States. And despite all the promises of 
openness and bipartisanship, at the end of the day it will have been 
considered not once, not twice,

[[Page H548]]

but three separate times in the House without the opportunity to debate 
a single Republican amendment. It didn't have to be this way.
  This legislation is supposed to be about protecting workers--and 
especially women--from discrimination in the workplace. Like my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I am strongly opposed to 
discrimination of any type, be it gender discrimination, racial 
discrimination, or any other type of discrimination inside or outside 
the workplace. Rooting out such discrimination is a bipartisan goal, 
and I cannot think of a single reason why it is not being given a 
bipartisan debate.
  The arguments on both sides of this bill are clear, and they have 
been debated on this floor before. For my part, I believe that 
enriching trial lawyers is simply the wrong way to ensure a fairer, 
more just workplace; and clearly that's what this bill will do. By 
eliminating the statute of limitations, the bill invites more and 
costlier lawsuits. We're talking about economic stimulus this week, so 
it's only fitting that we begin with an economic stimulus package for 
trial lawyers.
  But for me, Mr. Speaker, the controversy we face today is not just 
the underlying legislation, although it certainly is controversial. No, 
the controversy today is the stunning lack of openness being shown by a 
majority that seems intent on wielding the heavy hand of power.
  Less than 24 hours ago, the Rules Committee held an emergency meeting 
in order to bring this bill to the floor today. As I understand it, the 
job of the Rules Committee is to consider potential amendments and 
decide which of those will receive a vote by the full House. After 2 
years of watching Republican amendments routinely discarded without a 
vote, I wasn't surprised that the majority brought this bill to the 
floor under a closed rule. What surprised me was that they didn't even 
bother to keep up the illusion that they might make one of our 
proposals in order. In fact, the Rules Committee did not even set a 
deadline for amendments on this bill, so certain were they that not a 
single proposal would be worthy of consideration.
  For the record, I offered two amendments that were refused by the 
majority, two amendments that I believe were consistent with the 
majority's stated goals of preventing wage discrimination and 
overturning the Ledbetter decision. At the same time, I believe those 
amendments would have helped to avert at least some of the unintended 
consequences this legislation is sure to spawn. I did not ask the 
majority to guarantee that my amendments would pass; I simply asked for 
a debate among the Members of good will who can argue the merits and 
vote as they see fit. I was denied.
  Mr. Speaker, workplace discrimination is a serious issue and it 
deserves a serious debate. What a disappointment this is.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my friend for 
yielding.
  Lilly Ledbetter went to work in a factory in Alabama. She was one of 
the best at her job as a supervisor. She routinely won awards for being 
best at what she did. Late in her career, when she retired, she found 
out that she was systemically paid about 30 percent less than the men 
next to whom she worked. She filed suit in Federal court. The company 
said she wasn't underpaid because she was a woman, she was underpaid 
for other reasons. A jury of her peers heard her case and the 
employer's case, and she won unanimously.
  The case went up through the United States Supreme Court. The United 
States Supreme Court, in the case that now bears her name, 
unfortunately, said that because she didn't file suit when she didn't 
know that she had been discriminated against, she couldn't recover. So 
because the employer was successful at hiding the discrimination for a 
period of time, she couldn't recover.
  Lilly Ledbetter could be any one of our mothers, daughters, sisters, 
wives, or neighbors. What was done to her is an affront not only to 
her, but to the law. Women should not confront this law as a trap to 
deny them their rights. The law should not be a vessel of injustice. 
And we should not wait to pass this bill, put it on President Obama's 
desk, and make it the law of the land today.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I'm happy to yield at this time to the 
gentleman from Minnesota, the ranking member of the subcommittee that 
has jurisdiction, such time as he may consume, Mr. Kline.
  Mr. KLINE of Minnesota. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose, yet again, seriously flawed 
legislation. As you know, we passed this bill just 2 weeks ago, and it 
is before us once again.
  Unfortunately, the flaws and the potential damage to our civil rights 
and our economy remain. The enthusiastic supporters of the Ledbetter 
Act continue to beat the drum, claiming we are simply voting on a 
straightforward bill to reverse a Supreme Court decision involving 
discrimination in the workplace. Despite the passage of time and 
continued requests by my colleagues and I in the minority party, 
however, they are no closer to telling the whole story.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill before us would reverse a court decision for 
the benefit of Lilly Ledbetter, but perhaps more significantly, it 
would dismantle the long-standing statute of limitations established by 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. And this is the reason that the Supreme 
Court ruled the way they did. They held that the statute of limitations 
is an important part of our society, of our government, of our way of 
doing business in this country, and we need to preserve that statute of 
limitations.
  While I can understand the pain that Ms. Ledbetter felt, can you 
imagine as an employer trying to keep track of decisions going back 20 
years and more and trying to defend those in a court? It is not 
practical, it's not fair.
  This bill would set into motion unintended consequences that its 
supporters simply are not willing to acknowledge, including radically 
increasing the opportunity for frivolous and abusive litigation. This 
is, indeed, another boon for trial lawyers.
  Further, this bill would also permit individuals to seek damages 
against employers for whom they never worked by allowing family members 
and others who were never directly subjected to discrimination to 
become plaintiffs even after the worker in question is deceased.
  Just this weekend our new President said our economic troubles are 
worsening. We should heed his caution and recognize that in such a 
climate we cannot afford to enable endless litigation and potentially 
staggering recordkeeping requirements on employers. We are trying to 
get employers to create more jobs to hire more people.
  We must also be wary of the devastating effect this bill could have 
on pensions by exposing employers to decades-old discrimination claims 
that they have little--or I would argue no--ability to defend. This 
legislation could risk the retirement security of many hardworking 
Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, it's very clear that this legislation amounts to a 
significant change in our civil rights laws. And despite a delay, we 
have had no more debate or deliberation, leaving unanswered many 
relevant questions that deserve to be addressed through the normal 
legislative process.
  My concerns and unanswered questions can only lead me to say that the 
Ledbetter bill makes for bad policy created through a poor legislative 
process.
  I urge my colleagues again to vote ``no.''
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. I yield myself 15 seconds just to 
say, according to the analysis done by the Congressional Budget Office, 
there is no new cost associated with this legislation because it 
creates no new cause of action, and no anticipated increase in 
litigation in spite of the remarks of the gentleman from the other side 
of the aisle. And that's what the independent analysis shows of this 
legislation.
  I would like now to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Woolsey), the subcommittee Chair of the committee of 
jurisdiction.

[[Page H549]]

                              {time}  1515

  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I don't know about the rest of you, but 
I've come to think of Lilly Ledbetter as my girlfriend. I mean she has 
been so important to all of us and to women and to the issue on this 
landmark day that we have today for women and American workers and 
their families because this bill does tell the whole story. And at the 
end of this debate, we will be one step closer to overturning an unjust 
Supreme Court decision, a decision that offered a restricted and 
decidedly unrealistic reading of when a discriminatory action regarding 
compensation actually occurs.
  Good for the Senate for joining us in passing the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act and with an overwhelming bipartisan vote at that, giving 
us the go-ahead to do exactly the right thing.
  Sadly, Lilly Ledbetter will not be affected by our actions, but we 
know that she has paved the way for others who will benefit from her 
bravery and will have recourse when they are paid less than their male 
counterparts.
  The President understands that equality and fairness are crucial in a 
free society. He understands that more than 40 years after the passage 
of the Equal Pay Act, women are still paid an average of just 78 cents 
for every dollar a man earns.
  I urge my colleagues to pass this bill, and I look forward to 
President Obama's signing it into action, into law, the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield at this time to the 
gentleman from California, a new member of the committee, Mr. 
McClintock, such time as he may consume.
  Mr. McCLINTOCK. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, much has been said about the chilling effect this 
legislation will have on our economy because of the endless lawsuits it 
makes possible, including for grievances that may stretch back 30 years 
or more, and I certainly share those concerns.
  But I want to express a deeper concern with this legislation. I 
believe it hurts the cause of equality and opportunity in the workplace 
by making it more difficult for the people who need jobs and who most 
want those jobs to actually get them.
  Any person's labor is worth exactly what that person's willing to 
receive and what another is willing to pay. The decisions that are made 
by both the employee and the employer are unique to those people and to 
those circumstances. Someone passionately wanting to break into a 
field, for example, or to stay in a region or to shorten a commute or 
an infinite variety of other considerations may be willing to accept 
less in order to gain those noneconomic advantages than someone who is 
equally qualified but indifferent to those advantages. Imposing rigid 
one-size-fits-all requirements into the relationship between an 
employee and an employer reduces the employee's freedom to negotiate 
for the best set of overall conditions for his or her own unique 
circumstances. And lest we forget, when all else fails, there is a 
fail-safe and absolute protection: It's the word ``no.'' No, the pay is 
not acceptable; no, the conditions are not satisfactory; no, I can get 
a better job elsewhere.
  Mr. Speaker, freedom works, and it's time that we put it back to 
work.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hare), a member of the committee.
  Mr. HARE. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to rise once again in strong 
support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and I commend the Senate 
for passing the legislation so quickly and commend the leadership of 
this House, Chairman Miller, for bringing it to the floor for its final 
vote.
  It's remarkable that the potential first piece of legislation signed 
into law by President Obama this year is one that will help victims of 
pay discrimination.
  Last year I had the privilege of hearing Mrs. Ledbetter testify 
before the Education and Labor Committee. After 19 years, 19 years as a 
Goodyear employee, Mrs. Ledbetter discovered she was paid significantly 
less than every single one of her male counterparts. She took her case 
all the way to the Supreme Court where it was thrown out on a 
technicality. She filed her paperwork too late. Unfortunately, Mrs. 
Ledbetter had no idea this was even happening to her. I suppose the 
Supreme Court decided that Mrs. Ledbetter was a mind reader.
  This Fair Pay Act would correct this wrong by clarifying that every 
paycheck resulting from a discriminatory pay decision constitutes a 
violation of the Civil Rights Act and employees have 180 days after 
each discriminatory paycheck to file a suit.
  Again, I am pleased Congress is acting swiftly to correct a 
disastrous Supreme Court ruling that allows bad employers to 
discriminate against their employees as long as they hide it for 180 
days. I urge all of my colleagues to vote for S. 181 so we can promptly 
send it to the President's desk.
  Thank you, Lilly Ledbetter.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro), a champion of fair pay 
and equal pay for women.
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act. I congratulate Chairman Miller, the driving force behind 
this effort, who, with great tenacity and great leadership, has given 
this issue the priority that it deserves.
  Together, with his colleagues on the Education and Labor Committee 
and our dedicated partners in the Senate, Chairman Miller has brought 
gender-based pay discrimination front and center in this Congress, and 
as a result, we finally have the opportunity to send powerful 
legislation to the President's desk today.
  We are here because Lilly Ledbetter got shortchanged, shortchanged by 
her employer, the perpetrator of consistent pay discrimination lasting 
years; and shortchanged again by the Supreme Court.
  A jury found that, yes, Lilly Ledbetter had been discriminated 
against by her employer. They awarded her $3.8 million in back pay and 
damages. But then under Title VII, this award was reduced to $360,000, 
and ultimately zero when the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 against her in 
2007, drastically limiting women's access to seek justice for pay 
discrimination based on gender, requiring workers to file a pay 
discrimination claim within a 6-month period only, regardless of how 
long the pay inequity goes on. When women still earn only about 78 
percent of what men earn, this ruling has essentially rolled back 
efforts to ensure equal pay and left women with little remedy.
  As Justice Ginsburg suggested in her dissent, Congress has an 
obligation to correct the court's decision. That is why we must pass 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, clearly stating that Title VII 
statute of limitations runs from the date a discriminatory wage is 
actually paid, not simply some earliest possible date which has come 
and gone long ago. Instead, you would be able to challenge 
discriminatory paychecks as long as you continue to receive them.
  But we cannot stop there. I strongly urge the Senate to build on this 
vital foundation. Take up the Paycheck Fairness Act, which this House 
passed in tandem with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, to face gender 
discrimination head on and eliminate the systemic discrimination faced 
by women.
  Mr. Speaker, that process starts in earnest. With the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act, we can begin to ensure pay equity. We can help families 
gain the resources they need to give their children a better future, 
the great promise of our American Dream. Let us make good on that 
promise, pass this bill. Let us make sure that women who face the 
discrimination that Lilly Ledbetter faced have the right and the tools 
to fight against it.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I congratulate the 
Democratic leadership on moving this bill forward, George, Rosa, Lynn, 
so many who worked so hard on it.
  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act stands for equal pay for equal work. 
This bill overrules the outrageous Supreme Court decision which 
rejected Ms. Ledbetter's pay discrimination

[[Page H550]]

case because she had not sued quickly enough to end an injustice. An 
injustice is an injustice, and it should not have a time limit on 
correcting it.
  Forty years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act and title VI, 
statistics show that women continue to be paid less than their male 
colleagues. When I entered the workforce, women were paid 59 cents to 
every dollar a man earned. Today it's up to 78 cents. A disparity which 
costs women anywhere from $400,000 to $2 million in lost wages over a 
lifetime. This is terribly unfair.
  In the midst of the dire economic reports of these last weeks and 
months, today this Congress can take a step towards helping women and 
families who are struggling by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act. There are too many Lilly Ledbetters in our country, and when you 
discriminate against a woman, you discriminate against her family, her 
husband, her children. Passing the Fair Pay Act sends a strong message 
of fairness and equity to women and families everywhere.
  This may be the first bill that gets to President Obama's desk. It 
shows a change and a shift of priorities between a Democratic Congress 
and the one we replaced. I congratulate all my colleagues and the 
Democratic leadership for moving it forward.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Congresswoman Eleanor 
Holmes Norton.
  Ms. NORTON. Kudos to Mr. Miller, who would not give up on this bill, 
for his early hearings and this early consideration now, and to the 
Speaker and to our leadership for this early floor time just when women 
need us most when the economy is indeed punishing them enough.
  I hold here a settlement agreement that is perhaps the best evidence 
of why we need this bill. The first case brought under the so-called 
Congressional Accountability Act, that was the act of about 10 or 15 
years ago that said that the Congress had to abide by the same rules 
and rights as workers have in the private sector. This suit was brought 
by 300 current and former female custodians. All of them were African 
American women. They accused the House of Representatives and the 
Senate of paying them $1 less than men who had comparable jobs. After a 
long period of depositions and discovery, where a class was approved, 
the Congress paid $2.5 million to these women.
  Like Lilly Ledbetter, most of them had worked for many years as 
female custodians in the House and the Senate. Like Lilly Ledbetter, 
they had no idea they were being paid less than the men who did the 
same jobs, collecting our trash, if you will, in our offices. The way 
they found out and the only way they found out is that they were 
represented by a great union, the American Federation of Government 
Employees, who represented them in court and got the settlement. I 
remember going over to the Ford building and helping to hand out the 
checks. Many of the women, like Lilly Ledbetter, were near retirement. 
And this settlement agreement shows that those women, unlike Lilly 
Ledbetter, indeed received funds from the United States Congress under 
the Equal Pay Act. That is how the act was enforced when I chaired the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. That is how it was enforced 
before I chaired the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. And that 
is how we return it today.
  I would like to include this settlement agreement in the Record.

       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

       PATRICIA HARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. OFFICE OF THE 
     ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, Defendant.
       C.A. No. 97-1658 (EGS), Filed July 25, 2001, Nancy Mayer 
     Whittington, Clerk, U.S. District Court.

                          Settlement Agreement

       This Settlement Agreement is entered into this 20th day of 
     July 2001, between plaintiffs Patricia Harris, et al. as 
     class representatives, (hereinafter collectively referred to 
     as ``plaintiffs''), on the one hand, and defendant the Office 
     of the Architect of the Capitol (hereinafter referred to as 
     the ``Architect''), on the other hand, for the purpose of 
     finally resolving all aspects of this class action. In the 
     interest of avoiding the expense, delay, and inconvenience of 
     further litigation of the issues raised in this action, and 
     in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants, and 
     obligations in this Agreement, and for good and valuable 
     consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are 
     acknowledged, plaintiffs and defendant, through their 
     undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as follows, 
     subject to the approval of the Court.


                 I. DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

       A. ``Agreement'' and ``Settlement Agreement''--These terms 
     refer to this Settlement Agreement and all attachments 
     thereto.
       B. ``Effective date of this Agreement''--This term refers 
     to the date of Final Court Approval of this Agreement.
       C. ``Final Court Approval''--This term refers to the latest 
     of the following dates, after the conduct of a Fairness 
     Hearing and approval of this Agreement by the Court: the date 
     on which any and all appeals from any objections to the 
     Agreement have been dismissed, a final appellate decision 
     upholding approval has been rendered, or the time for taking 
     an appeal has expired without an appeal having been taken. If 
     there are no objections to the Agreement, this term refers to 
     that date, following the conduct of the Fairness Hearing, on 
     which the Court grants final approval of the Agreement.
       D. ``Preliminary Court approval''--This term refers to that 
     date, following submission of this Agreement to the Court by 
     the parties but prior to the conduct of a Fairness Hearing, 
     on which the Court grants initial approval of the Agreement.
       E. The ``parties' execution of this Settlement 
     Agreement''--This term refers to the date on which all 
     parties have signed the Agreement.
       F. ``Plaintiffs'', ``plaintiff class'' or ``class 
     members''--These terms refer to the class of plaintiffs 
     certified by the District Court on February 29, 2000:
       ``All women custodial workers employed by the Architect of 
     the Capitol on or after January 23, 1996, the effective date 
     of the Congressional Accountability Act, including those who 
     terminated their employment or retired after that date and 
     who were hired after that date, with respect to the causes of 
     action alleged herein as violative of Section 201(a) and (b) 
     of the Congressional Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 1311(a) & (b), which incorporate the rights and remedies 
     of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 2000e-2 and other sections cited therein, and make them 
     applicable to the defendant and the legislative branch 
     generally.''
       G. ``Plaintiffs' counsel'' and ``counsel for plaintiffs''--
     These terms refer to plaintiffs' class counsel, Beins, 
     Axelrod & Kraft, P.C. ``Counsel for the parties'' refers to 
     counsel for the plaintiff class and counsel for the 
     defendant.
       H. ``Active Class Members'' are the class members who are 
     currently employed with the Architect as of the date of the 
     parties' execution of this Settlement Agreement who elect not 
     to retire.
       I. ``Inactive Class Members'' are those class members who, 
     as of the date of the parties' execution of this Agreement, 
     have been terminated or retired, died, resigned or been 
     promoted out of the class. The retired class members who are 
     part of the Inactive Class Members are those class members 
     who retired before April 9, 2001.
       J. ``Retirement Eligible Class Members'' are those class 
     members who had not retired as of April 9, 2001, but who 1) 
     are retirement eligible (by qualifying age and years of 
     service), and 2) elect to retire pursuant to the terms of 
     Section II (B) of this Agreement.
       K. The term ``night custodial workers'' refers to female 
     employees who work during the night shift.
       L. The term ``day custodial workers'' refers to female 
     employees who work during the day shift.
       M. The Office of Personnel Management will be hereinafter 
     referred to as ``OPM.''
       N. The Congressional Accountability Act will be hereinafter 
     referred to as the ``CAA.''


                          II. MONETARY RELIEF

     A. Active Class Members and Inactive Class Members
       1. Pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, a lump sum payment 
     from the Department of Treasury will be made to plaintiffs' 
     counsel (to be calculated as set forth in paragraph two 
     below) to distribute to the Active Class Members and the 
     Inactive Class Members at plaintiffs' counsel's discretion, 
     except that those Inactive Class members who were terminated 
     for cause will not receive a payment for any time period 
     beyond the date they were terminated.
       2. The lump sum payment for distribution by plaintiffs' 
     counsel to the Active Class Members and Inactive Class 
     Members will be based on the sum of two calculations: 1) the 
     number of Active Class Members multiplied by $7,000 and 2) 
     the number of Inactive Class Members multiplied by $4,000. 
     The lump sum payment for distribution to the Active Class 
     Members will be reduced by $7,000 for each Active Class 
     Member who is retirement eligible and elects to retire. Any 
     money paid under this subparagraph that has not been 
     distributed to class members two years after Final Court 
     Approval of the settlement will be remitted back to the 
     Office of Compliance to be returned to the Department of 
     Treasury.
     B. Retirement Eligible Class Members
       1. Pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, an individual lump 
     payment from the Department of Treasury will be made in the 
     amount of $20,000 to each of the Retirement Eligible Class 
     Members.
       2. Only those class members who: a) are eligible to retire 
     as of April 9, 2001 or become eligible to retire during the 
     period of April 9, 2001 through September 30, 2001, and b) 
     who

[[Page H551]]

     actually retire during the period of April 9, 2001, through 
     September 30, 2001, may retire during this period and receive 
     the individual lump sum payment described in paragraph B.1 
     above. All class members who are eligible to retire during 
     this period will have 60 days after receiving the class 
     notice (as described more fully below) to designate whether 
     they will retire. A class member's decision under this 
     paragraph is irrevocable unless the Court disapproves this 
     Agreement.
       3. In order to be eligible for the individual lump sum 
     payment described in paragraph B.1 above, each class member 
     who chooses to retire before Final Court Approval of the 
     Settlement and actually begins her retirement before Final 
     Court Approval must agree in writing, and will acknowledge in 
     writing, as follows:
       ``If the Court does not finally approve the Settlement 
     Agreement, I will not receive the $20,000 individual lump sum 
     payment or have any further recourse against the Architect, 
     except to continue as a plaintiff in Harris v. Office of the 
     Architect of the Capitol, Civil Action No. 97-16587
     C. Payment Terms
       1. Pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, payments under 
     Sections II and III of this Settlement Agreement shall be 
     made from the Department of Treasury. Payments shall be made 
     to class members whom the parties have identified and who 
     have exhausted the counseling and mediation procedures of the 
     CAA. Class members identified after the execution of this 
     Agreement will be required to exhaust the counseling and 
     mediation procedures of the CAA in order to be eligible for 
     the relief described in Sections II and III of this 
     Settlement Agreement.
       2. Plaintiffs' counsel and the Retirement Eligible Class 
     Members shall receive the payments as set forth in sections A 
     and B above within sixty (60) days after Final Court Approval 
     of the Settlement.
       3. Nothing in this Agreement shall increase or decrease the 
     amount oftaxes owed by the plaintiffs under the tax code and 
     other applicable provisions of law.
     D. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
       1. Pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, a payment of 
     $290,000 from the Department of Treasury shall be made to 
     plaintiffs' counsel, which represent plaintiffs' counsels' 
     costs and fees at the applicable Laffey rates as of August 
     31, 2000. This payment will be made within a reasonable time 
     period. Defendant agrees to assist in expediting this payment 
     by taking whatever steps are reasonably possible in 
     accordance with established procedures of the United States 
     Attorney's Office. In addition, pursuant to Section 415 of 
     the CAA a one-time lump sum payment from the Department of 
     Treasury shall be made to plaintiffs' counsel for reasonable 
     fees and costs after August 31, 2000 at the applicable Laffey 
     rates, based on monthly invoices to be submitted to and 
     approved by Defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel will 
     submit an invoice for each month in which services are 
     performed after August 31, 2000 following the parties' 
     execution of this Agreement
       2. Pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, a payment from the 
     Department of Treasury in the amount of $5,235.00 to 
     plaintiffs' counsel for plaintiffs' expert fees.
       3. Defendant shall pay the mediator in this matter, Linda 
     Singer, the sum of $9,484.22, which is the amount owed for 
     her services as of November 15, 2000. Defendant agrees to pay 
     Ms. Singer's additional fees if the parties require her 
     services after November 15, 2000, not to exceed $16,000. To 
     the extent plaintiffs have paid any mediation fees to Ms. 
     Singer, defendant will reimburse plaintiffs for those fees in 
     lieu of Ms. Singer.


                        iii. NON-MONETARY RELIEF

     A. Prospectve Promotions With Pay for Active Class Members
       Within sixty days after Final Court Approval of this 
     Agreement, all Active Class Members will receive a promotion. 
     The promotion will be retroactive to the date of Final Court 
     Approval ofthe Settlement. All Active Class Members who are 
     night custodial workers will be upgraded from a WG-2 to a WG-
     3 and will be paid at the WG-3 level at their current step. 
     All Active Class Members who are day custodial workers will 
     be upgraded from a WG-2 or WG-3 to a WG-4 and will be paid 
     at the WG-4 level at their current step. No Retirement 
     Eligible Class Member will receive the promotion referred 
     to in this paragraph A. All Active Class Members who are 
     night custodial workers will retain their night 
     differential.
     B. Retroactive Promotions
       Within six months of the date of Final Court Approval, the 
     Architect will retroactively promote all class members as of 
     January 23, 1996, the effective date of the CAA. All night 
     custodial workers will be retroactively promoted to a WG-3 at 
     the step they would have held if they had been a WG-3 on 
     January 23, 1996. All day custodial workers will be 
     retroactively promoted to a WG-4 at the step they would have 
     held if they had been a WG-4 on January 23, 1996. No class 
     member will receive back pay as a result of this retroactive 
     promotion. To effectuate this provision of the Agreement, 
     pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, a payment from the 
     Department of Treasury shall be made in an amount sufficient 
     to make all appropriate payments to the Office of Personnel 
     Management for the retirement fund under Chapter 83 or 84 of 
     Title 5 U.S. Code, which includes payments for each class 
     member and the AOC and appropriate deductions for any 
     additional coverage for the Federal Employee Group Life 
     Insurance Program (``FEGLI'').
       The National Finance Center (``NFC'') will calculate the 
     additional amount of employee retirement withholding and 
     employer contribution due for each pay period of the 
     retroactive promotion for each class member. This additional 
     amount will be based on the difference in the base pay of the 
     class members' old and new grade levels, multiplied by the 
     applicable statutory percentages for the employee deduction 
     and the agency contribution to the retirement fund. The NFC 
     will also calculate for each class member, if applicable, the 
     amount of any additional deductions for the MU. Additionally, 
     pursuant to Section 415 of the CAA, a payment shall be made 
     from the Department of Treasury in an amount sufficient to 
     pay an invoice submitted to the AOC by the NFC for the cost 
     of performing the referenced calculations under this section, 
     including overtime charges and indirect costs.
     C. Notice of Vacant Positions
       Beginning sixty days after Final Court Approval of this 
     Agreement, the Architect will send all vacancy announcements 
     for Wage Grade and GS positions for which plaintiffs may be 
     eligible (including but not limited to Wage Grade and GS 3, 
     4, 5 and 6 positions) to the plaintiffs' counsel on a monthly 
     basis for one year.


                    IV. PROCEDURES FoR CLASS NOTICE

     A. Notice to Potential class Members
       Within 60 days after Preliminary Court Approval of this 
     Agreement, the Architect shall send a Notice to potential 
     class members at their last known address. Attachment A 
     hereto is a proposed ``Notice of Proposed Settlement and of 
     Hearing on Proposed Settlement'' (``Fairness Notice''), which 
     the parties hereby request that the Court approve in 
     connection with scheduling the Fairness Hearing, as set forth 
     in paragraph VI below. This notice to class members shall 
     also include this Agreement. The Architect shall pay for the 
     cost of this mailing.
     B. Published Notice
       In order to advise all potential class members of their 
     rights under this Agreement, including class members who have 
     retired, who have relocated, or whose current location is 
     unknown, the Architect shall arrange for the publication, at 
     the Architect's expense, of a one-time Notice in the general 
     news sections of the District of Columbia Metro and Prince 
     George's County editions of The Washington Post, and in 
     Roll Call. The text of the published notice will be 
     submitted to plaintiffs' counsel for their review and 
     approval in advance of publications.


                   V. PROCEDURES FOR FAIRNESS HEARING

     A. Hearing No Later Than 60 Days After Preliminary Approval
       The parties request that the Court schedule a Fairness 
     Hearing to be held no later than 60 days after the Court 
     preliminarily approves the settlement.
     B. Objections to Settlement Agreement
       Any person who wishes to object to the terms of this 
     Agreement, must submit, not less than 15 days prior to the 
     Fairness Hearing, a written statement to the Court, with 
     copies to counsel for the parties. The statement shall 
     contain the individual's name, address and telephone number, 
     along with a statement of her objection(s) to the Agreement 
     and the reason(s) for the objection(s).
     C. Parties to Use Best Efforts to Obtain Prompt Judicial 
         Approval
       The parties and their counsel shall jointly use their best 
     efforts to obtain prompt judicial approval of this Agreement. 
     The parties have bargained in good faith for the terms of 
     this Agreement. No section or subsection of this Settlement 
     may be modified or stricken without consent of the parties, 
     and in no event after Final Court Approval. If the Court does 
     not approve of this Settlement as written, the Agreement 
     shall be voidable in its entirety at the option of either 
     party.


                           VI. OTHER MATTERS

       A. The plaintiffs relinquish all rights to reopen this 
     action or to seek further or relief than is provided in this 
     Agreement.
       B. The parties to this action have entered into this 
     Agreement to resolve all issues in controversy in this 
     action. In recognition of this fact, neither the terms of 
     this Agreement nor their substance may be offered, taken, 
     construed, or introduced as evidence of liability or as an 
     admission or statement of wrongdoing by the defendant, or 
     used for any other reason either in this action or in any 
     subsequent proceeding of any nature.
       C. This Agreement shall not constitute an admission of 
     liability or fault on the part of the Office of the 
     Architect, its agents, servants, or employees, and is entered 
     into by all parties for the sole purpose of compromising 
     disputed claims and avoiding the expenses and risks of 
     further litigation.
       D. This Agreement comprises the full and exclusive 
     agreement of the parties with respect to the matters 
     discussed herein. No representations or inducements to 
     compromise this action or the administrative proceedings that 
     gave rise to it have been made, other than those recited in 
     this Agreement. No statements other than those recited in 
     this Agreement are binding upon the parties with respect to 
     the disposition of this action or the administrative 
     proceedings that gave rise to it.
       E. The terms of this Agreement shall constitute full and 
     complete satisfaction of all

[[Page H552]]

     claims of class members against the defendant that arise out 
     of events occurring up to Final Court Approval of this 
     Agreement which fall within the scope of the allegations in 
     the fourth amended complaint in this action, and of all 
     rights of the class members to relief within the scope of 
     this action. Upon Final Court Approval of this Agreement, the 
     class as a whole and each class member individually shall 
     be bound by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
     estoppel with respect to all such claims.
       F. This Agreement shall be enforceable in the U.S. District 
     Court for the District of Columbia.
       G. This action will be dismissed with prejudice upon Final 
     Court Approval.
       Counsel for Plaintiffs: Barbara Kraft and Sarah J. 
     Starrett.
       Counsel for Defendant: Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney; 
     Mark E. Nagle, Assistant U.S. Attorney; Stacy M. Ludwig, 
     Assistant U.S. Attorney.
       This Agreement has been approved by the Office of 
     Compliance pursuant to 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1414.
                                          William W. Thompson, II,
                         Executive Director, Office of Compliance.
       Approved and So Ordered on this 20th day of July, 2001,
                                      Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan,
                                     United States District Judge.
       IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT A FAIRNESS HEARING IS SCHEDULED 
     FOR September 28, 2001, at 11 a.m. in Courtroom #1.

  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fattah).
  Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this act. I join with 
so many of my colleagues who find it extraordinarily important that we 
right the wrong of the Supreme Court decision and allow access to the 
courts for those who have been discriminated against in terms of pay 
equity.
  And Lilly Ledbetter and the act that is before us today, I want to 
thank Chairman George Miller for his leadership and his hard work on 
this and his committee for their relentless pursuit of correcting this. 
It's one of the very first acts of this new Congress, and I just want 
to rise in support of it and hope that it gains an extraordinary vote 
in the House today because it will send a message to not only my 
mother, my wife, my daughters, but to women throughout our country and 
to others that the United States Congress stands squarely on the right 
side of history on this critically important question.
  Mr. McKEON. I continue to reserve my time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Maryland, the majority leader.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. HOYER. I thank the chairman, I thank the ranking member, I thank 
the United States Senate for passing this bill.
  I am proud that this is the very first bill that we passed in this 
House in the 111th Congress. Lilly Ledbetter is a woman of courage, 
leadership, and my daughters owe her a debt of gratitude.
  In passing that bill, we recognized that sexism and discrimination 
can still cheat women out of equal pay and equal worth, a theft of 
livelihood and dignity that is especially damaging as families across 
our country struggle to pay their bills, as if somehow a single mom 
raising children could do it more cheaply than a single dad raising 
those same children.
  That didn't make any sense then or now. Within my lifetime, sexism in 
the workplace could be blatant and unashamed, but today it does some of 
its worst work in secret.
  We can take a stand against it by voting for final passage today. It 
was secret sexism that cheated Lilly Ledbetter out of the thousands of 
dollars for years. And we repeat her story, not because it is unique 
and shocking, but because it's typical, typical of the experience of so 
many American women, indeed, women all over the world.
  Ms. Ledbetter was a supervisor at a tire plant. For years she was 
paid less than her male coworkers, but she was paid a differential in 
secret. Her employer didn't tell her I am going to pay you less than I 
pay your male counterparts who do exactly the same work. For years, she 
was left in the dark, and by the time she finally saw the proof, the 
Supreme Court said it was too late. Ironic.
  I will tell you on assault there may be in some States no statute of 
limitations and others there may be a statute of limitations. 
Essentially, what happens here, if they keep hitting you, and they keep 
hitting you month after month after month, it's not the last hit that 
counted, it's the first hit that counted. And you couldn't sue for 
that, what we would call, we lawyers, tortious conduct, others would 
call criminal conduct.
  But there was no responsibility that Lilly Ledbetter could get from 
the employer for wrongdoing, for breaking the law. There was no dispute 
that the law was broken. It was simply that it was broken in secret. 
And so Lilly Ledbetter had to suffer in public.
  The Supreme Court ruled that even though Ms. Ledbetter had suffered 
clear discrimination, the law had been broken. She had missed the time 
in which to raise the issue. How perverse, in a nation of laws, of 
justice, of equity, that we would say they broke the law in secret, and 
you didn't know it, and you couldn't find it out and, therefore, we 
will not redress your recognized grievance.
  Ladies and gentlemen of the House, this is the right thing to do. 
It's the right thing to do, not just for Lilly Ledbetter, not just for 
women, it's the right thing to do because our country believes in 
fairness, in equity, that we are a nation of laws and treat people 
equally under those laws. That is why it's so appropriate for us to 
pass this bill today and send it to the President, who will sign it 
proudly. All of us who vote for it and see its enactment will be proud 
as well.
  I thank the gentleman for his leadership.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Our Nation is facing serious challenges. The economic picture remains 
bleak, with seemingly more jobs lost every day. American families are 
struggling to pay bills and send their families to college. I don't 
object to the fact that we are considering this bill again, despite 
widespread concern about its consequences. What bothers me about it is 
that we are not truly debating it. Had this bill truly been ``a narrow 
fix,'' as the supporters would have the American people believe, this 
rush to approval may not have been such a problem.
  However, this is a major, fundamental change to civil rights law 
affecting no less than four separate statutes. The last change to civil 
rights law of this magnitude, the 1991 civil rights law, took 2 years 
of negotiation, debate and partisan accord to accomplish.
  Instead, what we have before us is a partisan product that is 
fundamentally flawed. It guts the statute of limitations contained in 
current law and, in doing so, would allow an employee to bring a claim 
against an employer decades after the alleged initial act of 
discrimination occurred. Trial lawyers, you can be sure, are salivating 
at this very prospect.
  You know, I think about a person that maybe did one of these acts 30 
years ago, has since sold the company, the company has since sold 
again, the original employer that made the discrimination case in the 
first place has since passed away and now a trial lawyer can bring all 
of these people to court. The person who passed away maybe would still 
have that liability. It boggles my mind to think of the unintended 
consequences that will come from this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a bad bill, and it's the result of an equally 
bad process. It breaks the vows of bipartisanship that the majority has 
made time and time again. In the last election and in the previous 
election they talked about bipartisanship. They talked about regular 
order, they talked about transparency, about working together. You 
know, we could work out our honest differences but do it in the light 
of the day before the American people and, once again, we are denied 
that opportunity. I think the American people deserve better.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this bill, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
goes to basic and fundamental American values, both in our daily lives 
and in our workplace, and that is that people ought to be rewarded with 
equal pay for equal work. It's fundamental, it's

[[Page H553]]

basic to our economy, it's basic to our society. It's basic to our 
sense of fairness, to our sense of justice, and to our sense of 
equality.
  But in far too many workplaces that's not what is done. Women, in 
many instances, time and time again, for doing the same job that men 
are doing in the same manner that men are doing it, are paid less, not 
because they are not doing the job equally as well as the men, but 
because somebody decided that they were going to pay them less simply 
because they were women.
  That runs counter to the values of this Nation. It runs counter to 
the values of our society. It runs counter to the best interests of 
women. It's rather fascinating that they are suggesting that because of 
tough economic times some businesses may only be able to survive if 
they can engage in discrimination. If they can carry out a business 
plan based upon discrimination, they may be able to survive, so women 
should underwrite that discriminatory policy and accept less.
  Well, let me tell you what it's like when you are trying to support a 
family, either as a dual wage earner or by yourself, and you are 
accepting less every week, every day, every hour for the work that you 
are doing the same as the people alongside of you, but you are getting 
less because you are a woman. Try that in these tough economic times. 
Try running your household in these tough economic times where the 
Republicans would have you believe we should enforce the policy of 
discrimination, that somehow women should underwrite these difficult 
times by accepting, being a victim of discrimination.
  I don't think so. I don't think the people in this Congress believe 
that. I don't believe the people in this country believe that, and 
that's why we're going to pass this legislation.
  It's fundamental to the values of this country. Now, they are trying 
to run up the scare tactics that this gets rid of the statute of 
limitation, same statute of limitations, 180 days, that somehow if you 
had waited a long time you would collect more recovery than otherwise. 
No, you get 2 years of backpay, that's the maximum, and that's it. But 
they want to suggest otherwise, no, that's what the law says.
  And because of that, because we reset the law to what it was, as it 
was interpreted by courts all over this country and by employers and 
employees, the CBO in its independent analysis said this does not 
increase costs because it does not create a new cause of action and 
they don't expect a lot of litigation as a result of this because we go 
back to the law as it was.
  So let's move along here and get rid of this outrageous 
discriminatory practice that was sanctified by the Supreme Court in 
some kind of ideological rampage against women and the treatment and 
the fairness of them in the workplace.
  We have an opportunity to do that now. We will pass this bill today, 
we will send it to the White House where our new President, Barack 
Obama, has said he will sign this legislation. And with that signature 
on this bill, we can change the law in this country to once again make 
sure that women are provided equal pay for equal work that they do in 
the American workplace, and I urge my colleagues to support this 
legislation.
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong 
support for this very important bill. I thank Speaker Pelosi for 
championing this effort to improve the lives of American women and 
their families.
  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is a bill of enormous importance for 
women's rights and civil rights in general. For decades, companies big 
and small have paid women less for the same work as their male 
counterparts. Today, we correct a major fault in both law and market, 
and we move toward true equality for all men and women in America.
  This bill is important in so many ways. Perhaps most obviously, the 
bill confirms America's commitment to women's rights. Kofi Annan, the 
former Secretary-General of the United Nations, was right on the mark 
when he said, ``when women thrive, all of society benefits, and 
succeeding generations are given a better start in life.'' Today we 
help underpaid women thrive, we help restore a sense of dignity and 
pride, we help women--mothers and mentors, daughters and sisters--
improve the lives of others as we lawfully improve theirs.
  With the passage of this bill, we tell working American women that 
their work is valued, that it is just as good as a man's, and that they 
deserve fair and equal pay. The extra 20 or 30 cents per dollar that so 
many women do not receive means less food on the table or less money to 
save for her family's future. Over a lifetime, unequal pay cheats 
dedicated, hard working women of $400,000 to $2 million. Imagine what 
these women could have done with this money. And to reflect back on the 
words of Mr. Annan, passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law 
will benefit both current and future generations.
  This bill is valuable not only because of its significant place in 
the women's rights movement, but also because it demonstrates the 
Congress' and President Obama's commitment to positive change, change 
that betters the lives of all Americans regardless of gender or race. 
Our passage of this bill confirms that equality is a priority for this 
new Congress. The first bill signed into law during the 111th Congress 
will be the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, ensuring all Americans that--
even in these difficult times--their Government is committed to the 
ultimate American promise of equality for all.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I would also like to thank 
Congressman George Miller for his leadership in bringing this 
legislation forth and for working together to see that gender equity is 
not just something we talk about, but something that is achieved.
  Sadly, women in the United States still earn only 78 cents on the 
dollar compared to men more than 45 years after the passage of the 
Equal Pay Act in 1963.
  Lilly Ledbetter helped shine new light on this issue when the Supreme 
Court denied her the $223,776 in additional wages she would have earned 
had she been a man in its 2007 decision, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. The Supreme Court was restricted by laws that saw women as 
less than equal. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would correct this 
decision and ensure that future victims of pay discrimination can bring 
a lawsuit after any act of discriminatory pay.
  Women have made enormous advances toward economic equality, but gaps 
in income between men and women persist and only multiply over time, as 
the following numbers from Jessica Arons' Center for American Progress 
Action Fund report, ``Lifetime Losses: The Career Wage Gap'' show. 
Passing this bill along with H.R. 12, the Paycheck Fairness Act, would 
be an important first step in addressing this problem.
  Although we encourage our daughters to stay in school and obtain 
their degrees, women with higher education are losing more income due 
to the career wage gap. In fact, $434,000 is the median amount that a 
full-time female worker loses in wages over a 40-year period as a 
direct result of the gender pay gap, also known as the ``career wage 
gap.''
  The wage gap widens as women get older and carries into retirement 
because women workers earn less than men at every stage of life, and 
this continues into retirement. Just some of the statistics that 
demonstrate that inequity exists are:
  78 cents: The amount that the average, full-time working woman makes 
for every $1 a man makes over a year.
  $713,000: The career wage gap for women with a bachelor's degree or 
higher.
  $452,000: The career wage gap for women with some college education.
  $392,000: The career wage gap for women with a high school education.
  $270,000: The career wage gap for women with less than a high school 
education.
  17 percent: The additional amount that single mothers would take home 
in income if they were paid fairly. This would lead to a 50 percent 
reduction in poverty for these women, from 25.3 percent to 12.6 
percent.
  13.4 percent: The additional amount that single women would receive 
in income if they were paid fairly. This would lead to an 84 percent 
reduction in poverty for these women, from 6.3 percent to 1 percent.
  6 percent: The additional amount that married women would earn if 
they were paid fairly. This would lead to a 62 percent reduction in 
poverty for these women, from 2.1 percent to 0.8 percent.
  $8,000: The gap between the average retirement income that men and 
women receive annually. Two-thirds of this disparity can be attributed 
to the pay gap and occupational segregation.
  Higher wages for women would bring greater prosperity to families. A 
report from the AFL-CIO and the Institute for Women's Policy Research 
found that if women were paid fairly, family incomes would rise and 
poverty levels would fall.
  This legislation is intended to combat the wage gap that still exists 
today between men and women in the workplace. It is an important step 
in addressing the persistent wage gap between women and men.
  Early last year the House passed H.R. 2831, legislation reversing 
last year's Supreme Court decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber Co., in which the court ruled, 5-4, that workers filing suit for 
pay discrimination

[[Page H554]]

must do so within 180 days of the actual decision to discriminate 
against them.
  Which is why we need to pass not only the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act but the Paycheck Protection Act as well to stop discriminatory pay 
practices by employers against our mothers, wives, daughters, and 
granddaughters that do the same job as their male counterparts.
  As a Member of the Women's Caucus I have been fighting to close the 
wage gap for American women since before I arrived here as a 
Representative in 1995, and I believe that equal pay for equal work is 
a simple matter of justice. Wage disparities are not simply a result of 
women's education levels or life choices.
  In fact, the pay gap between college educated men and women appears 
the first job after college--even when women are working full-time in 
the same fields with the same major as men--and continues to widen 
during the first 10 years in the workforce. Further, this persistent 
wage gap not only impacts the economic security of women and their 
families today, it also directly affects women's retirement security 
tomorrow.
  I urge my colleagues, both men and women to support equality in 
rights and pay for all Americans by supporting H.R. 181, The Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
  Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as an original 
cosponsor of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, to express my strong support 
for the bill. I am pleased we are taking up this bill as passed by the 
senate so we can finally send it to the President's desk after 
previously passing it twice in this chamber.
  The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act corrects and clarifies a serious 
misinterpretation by the Supreme Court in its 2007 ruling in the case 
of Ledbetter v. Goodyear. In that 5-4 decision, the majority ruled that 
Lilly Ledbetter, the lone female supervisor at a tire plant in Gadsden, 
AL, did not file her lawsuit against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. in 
the timely manner specified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.
  The court determined a victim of pay discrimination must file a 
charge within 180 days of the employer's decision to pay someone less 
for an unlawfully discriminatory reason such as race, age, sex, or 
religion.
  The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act clarifies that each paycheck resulting 
from a discriminatory pay decision constitutes a new violation of the 
employment nondiscrimination law, as long as the charge is filed within 
180 days of the employee receiving the paycheck.
  The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act restores workers' ability to pursue claims 
of pay discrimination on not only sex, but race, religion, age, or for 
any other reason. Congress must pass this legislation to help ensure 
all workers are treated fairly in the workplace and the standard of 
equal pay for equal work is upheld. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting this bill to end pay discrimination.
  Mr. NADLER of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.
  The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is necessary to overturn the 
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. In that 
decision, this Supreme Court once again went out of its way to read our 
anti-discrimination laws as narrowly as possible, and refused to 
interpret the law as intended by Congress. In doing so, the Court said 
something astonishing: the only discriminatory act was the initial 
decision to pay Lilly Ledbetter less than her male coworkers. Once the 
employer had successfully concealed that fact from her for 180 days, 
she was out of luck, and Goodyear could go on paying her less--just 
because she is a woman--forever. The 180-day deadline to sue had 
passed. The decision to discriminate was illegal, but paying her less 
than her male colleagues from that moment forward was not.
  This is astonishing because it rewards employers who successfully 
conceal pay discrimination and makes it virtually impossible for 
employees to challenge such discrimination. It is also astonishing 
because--17 years ago when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991--
Congress rejected the reasoning that the Supreme Court relied upon in 
its Ledbetter decision. Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress 
rejected the Supreme Court's conclusion that a statute of limitations 
begins to run when an employer adopts a discriminatory seniority system 
and does not restart when the discriminatory effects of that system are 
felt. Congress made clear that it was rejecting this reasoning in the 
context of discriminatory seniority systems, which was the question 
presented by the Lorance case, and in all other contexts as well.
  Until its Ledbetter decision, the Supreme Court seemed to have gotten 
Congress's message. In Ledbetter, however, the Supreme Court relied 
upon the faulty reasoning in Lorance and ruled, once again, that a 
statute of limitations runs only from the time that a discriminatory 
decision is made. Now we're called upon to do it over again. Hopefully, 
the Supreme Court will hear us once and for all and interpret statute 
of limitation periods as we intend. Thus, while Ledbetter addresses 
discrimination in employment, our passage of this bill expresses broad 
disapproval of the Court's reasoning in any context where it might be 
applied. Within the specific context of pay discrimination, our use of 
the phrase ``discriminatory compensation decision or other practice'' 
should be read broadly, and to include any practice--including, for 
example, seniority or pension practices--that impact overall 
compensation.
  I urge adoption of The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support 
of S. 181, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. As an original 
cosponsor of H.R. 11, the House passed version of this bill, I would 
like to express my appreciation for the efforts of Chairman George 
Miller for his instrumental efforts in ensuring passage of this vital 
legislation. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act will strengthen 
protections against discrimination and safeguard the civil liberties of 
our Nation's employees.
  Through the passage of this legislation, we correct the injustice 
that occurred following the unlawful discrimination against Ms. Lilly 
Ledbetter. After nearly 2 decades of service to the Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber facility in Alabama, Ms. Ledbetter discovered that she was the 
lowest-paid supervisor at the plant, despite having more experience 
than several of her male colleagues.
  When Ms. Ledbetter sued her employer, a jury found that she had been 
the victim of unlawful discrimination. The Supreme Court agreed, but 
nonetheless upheld Goodyear's appeal on the ground that Ms. Ledbetter 
was barred from challenging the discriminatory payments. The Supreme 
Court's reason was that the time limit for bringing her claim had 
passed as the initial discriminatory decision had occurred 20 years 
earlier. In dismissing Ms. Ledbetter's claim, the Supreme Court 
overruled a previous law under which every discriminatory paycheck was 
a new violation that restarted the clock for filing a claim.
  The Supreme Court's decision put workers who were subject to 
discrimination at an extreme disadvantage. As Ms. Ledbetter's case 
shows, it is very difficult for employees to discover pay 
discrimination, and workers may not discover pay discrimination for 
many years after they are discriminated against. Under the Supreme 
Court's decision, many victims of this deplorable practice would be 
left without recourse.
  Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision encourages employers to 
keep a discriminatory pay decision secret for 180 days, allowing them 
to pay the discriminatory the rest of a worker's career.
  Mr. Speaker, for all of these reasons the Supreme Court's decision 
rendered much of our civil rights law virtually unenforceable. This was 
a decision that affected not only gender discrimination, but also 
discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity and sexuality. I am 
therefore proud to support this legislation and encourage my colleagues 
to do so as well.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 87, the Senate bill is considered read 
and the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the third reading of the Senate bill.
  The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the 
third time.


                            Motion to Commit

  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to commit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. McKEON. I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to commit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. McKeon moves to commit the bill S. 181, Lilly Ledbetter 
     Fair Pay Act, to the Committee on Education and Labor.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I move to commit this bill to the committee 
so that this bill, which is so sweeping in its scope, be given an 
opportunity to be debated in a comprehensive fashion. To this day, this 
committee has never had a hearing on this bill.
  There has not been a full and fair debate, regular order has not been 
followed, and it needs to be. As I noted in my remarks, we have not 
entertained, in the three times that this bill has been brought to the 
floor, a single Republican amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page H555]]

  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. I rise to speak against the motion 
to commit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, 
this motion to commit is clearly an effort to not only send this bill 
back to committee, but to kill this legislation. My colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle recognize the situation that we find ourselves 
in. The House has passed this legislation earlier, in this session, and 
the Senate has passed similar legislation which we are now taking up. 
And when we vote in a little while, this afternoon, we will pass this 
legislation, and it will go to the President of the United States.
  So this is a desperate attempt to somehow keep that from happening. 
And what we will be sweeping is we will be sweeping away a policy of 
discrimination in the workplace against women who are paid less than 
their male counterparts for the same work.
  The fact of the matter is that there were hearings held both in the 
Judiciary Committee, in the last session of Congress, and in the 
Education and Labor Committee, and all sides were allowed to present 
their views in those hearings.

                              {time}  1545

  In the last Congress, it was subject to a full committee markup, 
which all Members could have offered as many amendments as they like. 
They offered two amendments. Those amendments were rejected. They could 
have offered more. They chose not to.
  The bill went to the House floor, debated, and was passed on a 
bipartisan vote of 225-199 in June of 2007. The minority had an 
opportunity to offer a motion to recommit. They chose not to. The bill 
went to the Senate, where it was filibustered. Filibustered. And then 
the bill was reintroduced identical to what the House had already 
passed earlier this month.
  On January 9 of this year, we passed the bill on the House floor 
again, 247-171, on another bipartisan vote. The minority had another 
opportunity to offer a motion to recommit. They chose not to.
  The bill went to the Senate, where it was subjected to amendment 
after amendment. The bill was passed on a bipartisan vote of 61-36. And 
now we are on the cusp of sending this bill to President Obama for his 
signature. That is what we should do.
  We should reject this motion to commit, an attempt to kill this 
legislation, and make sure that this bill goes to the President's desk 
and ends this discriminatory policy against women in the workplace. I 
urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the motion to commit and vote 
``aye'' on the passage of the legislation.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to commit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to commit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair will reduce to 5 minutes 
the minimum time for any electronic vote on the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 176, 
nays 250, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 36]

                               YEAS--176

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Austria
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Cao
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chaffetz
     Childers
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cole
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Fallin
     Flake
     Fleming
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Griffith
     Guthrie
     Hall (TX)
     Harper
     Hastings (WA)
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hoekstra
     Hunter
     Inglis
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan (OH)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (NY)
     Lewis (CA)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCotter
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Olson
     Paul
     Paulsen
     Pence
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Scalise
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Turner
     Upton
     Walden
     Wamp
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--250

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Adler (NJ)
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boccieri
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Bright
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Dahlkemper
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Driehaus
     Edwards (MD)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foster
     Frank (MA)
     Fudge
     Giffords
     Gonzalez
     Gordon (TN)
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Halvorson
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Heinrich
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kilroy
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick (AZ)
     Kissell
     Klein (FL)
     Kosmas
     Kratovil
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lujan
     Maffei
     Maloney
     Markey (CO)
     Markey (MA)
     Marshall
     Massa
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McMahon
     McNerney
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Minnick
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler (NY)
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nye
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Perriello
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Polis (CO)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schauer
     Schiff
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis (CA)
     Space
     Speier
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Teague
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Titus
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Etheridge
     Lynch
     Rush
     Tiberi
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1615

  Messrs. CONNOLLY of Virginia, ADLER of New Jersey, LUJAN, JACKSON of 
Illinois, HOYER, BOREN, KLEIN of Florida, GUTIERREZ, Ms. KOSMAS, Ms. 
BEAN, Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin, Messrs. HILL, TANNER, GORDON of 
Tennessee, Ms. McCOLLUM, Messrs. CARNEY, SESTAK, MINNICK, BERMAN, 
CARDOZA, CUELLAR, OLVER, Mrs. MALONEY

[[Page H556]]

and Mr. SPRATT changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mrs. LUMMIS and Messrs. BILBRAY, COLE, LATHAM and HERGER changed 
their vote from ``nay'' to yea.''
  So the motion to commit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall vote 36, I inadvertently voted 
``nay.'' I meant to vote ``yea.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the Senate 
bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the 
yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 250, 
nays 177, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 37]

                               YEAS--250

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Adler (NJ)
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boccieri
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Castor (FL)
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Dahlkemper
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Driehaus
     Edwards (MD)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foster
     Frank (MA)
     Fudge
     Giffords
     Gonzalez
     Gordon (TN)
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Halvorson
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Heinrich
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kilroy
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick (AZ)
     Kissell
     Klein (FL)
     Kosmas
     Kratovil
     Kucinich
     Lance
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lujan
     Maffei
     Maloney
     Markey (CO)
     Markey (MA)
     Marshall
     Massa
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McMahon
     McNerney
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Minnick
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler (NY)
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nye
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Perriello
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Polis (CO)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schauer
     Schiff
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis (CA)
     Space
     Speier
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Teague
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Titus
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--177

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Austria
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boustany
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bright
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Cao
     Capito
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castle
     Chaffetz
     Childers
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cole
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Fallin
     Flake
     Fleming
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Griffith
     Guthrie
     Hall (TX)
     Harper
     Hastings (WA)
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hoekstra
     Hunter
     Inglis
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan (OH)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (NY)
     Lewis (CA)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCotter
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Olson
     Paul
     Paulsen
     Pence
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Scalise
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Turner
     Upton
     Walden
     Wamp
     Westmoreland
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Etheridge
     Lynch
     Pallone
     Tiberi
     Young (AK)


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. DeLauro) (during the vote). There is 1 
minute remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1625

  So the Senate bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________