[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 160 (Thursday, October 2, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10460-S10461]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I want to convey some brief remarks 
regarding my views on the United States-India civil nuclear cooperation 
agreement. I cast a ``yes'' vote on this agreement, but not without 
some serious reservations regarding the likely damage this agreement 
will do to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
  I had the opportunity to visit India earlier this year, spending a 
day meeting senior government leaders in New Delhi and another day in 
Hyderabad, where I witnessed first hand the dynamic entrepreneurism 
that has recently transformed India into an economic powerhouse, albeit 
with still extreme poverty. Let me be clear: The United States and 
India, sharing a common commitment to democracy and personal freedoms, 
are natural allies. I congratulate President Bush for building upon the 
initial steps taken by his predecessor, President Clinton, in nurturing 
closer ties between our two great nations and laying the building 
blocks for an enduring strategic partnership.
  India's exclusion from global trade in civil nuclear energy, a direct 
consequence of its 1974 nuclear weapons test utilizing equipment and 
materials imported for a civilian energy program, represented a 
continuing thorn to an otherwise blossoming United States-Indian 
relationship. Right or wrong, it was always the United States that was 
viewed as the leading advocate of the firewall between India and global 
nuclear trade--even though India never signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, NPT. So I understand why a resolution to this 
issue was necessary if the United States and India were to achieve a 
genuine partnership that could endure in coming decades.
  My strongest criticism of the United States-India nuclear cooperation 
agreement is that, in exchange for a historic exception to the 
principle that those states that refuse to abide by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty cannot enjoy the fruits of global civilian nuclear 
trade, the United States did not ask enough in return from the Indian 
Government. We could have pressed New Delhi to sign the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and forswear all future nuclear weapons tests. But we 
did not. We could have urged New Delhi to agree to a national 
moratorium on production of nuclear fissile material, linking that 
moratorium to a similar pledge by Pakistan. But we did not.
  I worry over the message this agreement sends to states like North 
Korea and Iran. Are their leaders to believe that, with the passage of 
time, one day the international community will also accept their 
nuclear weapons programs as a de facto reality and move to accommodate 
such programs? How do we convince the international community to 
demonstrate solidarity against Iran's violations of the NPT while 
giving a pass to India's refusal to abide by this very same treaty? Of 
course I am not equating the two states--India is a democratic regime, 
a friend of the United States, and a force for stability in the world. 
There is no comparison. But I am concerned when we begin to divide the 
world into ``good'' proliferators and ``bad'' proliferators--instead, 
we need to send the message that all nuclear proliferation harms our 
security and increases the odds that a nuclear weapon will one day be 
used and kill millions.
  Nevertheless, at every step of the process over the last 3 years, 
administration officials often appeared excessively sensitive to the 
need to smooth over domestic political concerns in India while 
downplaying concerns expressed by nonproliferation experts. So I 
congratulate Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Lugar for their 
persistence in ensuring this final agreement is a real improvement over 
initial administration proposals. The legislation before us clarifies 
some of the deliberate ambiguities contained within the Article 123 
United States-India agreement and the international exemption for India 
provided by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  The United States-India civil nuclear initiative is a flawed 
agreement. Nonetheless, I am casting a ``yes'' vote for this 
legislation for two primary reasons. First, in many respects, the 
damage to the global non-proliferation regime has already been done. 
The decision taken last month by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to provide 
a universal exemption to permit India to participate in civil nuclear 
trade means that, even if the United States Congress were to reject 
this agreement, other nations like Russia and France are free to 
initiate their own civilian agreements with India. The net result of a 
United States rejection would likely only ensure that United States 
companies--and United States workers--will be unable to participate in 
the fruits of civilian nuclear trade with India.
  Second, a ``no'' vote on this agreement will be unfairly construed as 
a rejection of a broader strategic alliance between the United States 
and India. Through his rhetoric and actions,

[[Page S10461]]

President Bush unwisely has transformed this nuclear cooperation 
agreement into the centerpiece of our bilateral relationship with New 
Delhi. In doing so, he has ignored the broad range of areas on which 
the United States and India can and should cooperate--ranging from 
science and technology to economic and business partnerships. In the 
security realm, our two nations should be doing more together on 
counterterrorism, especially in the wake of the devastating attacks in 
India over the past year.
  I strongly believe in the promise of the future partnership between 
our two great nations. I am voting in favor of this agreement, despite 
its serious nonproliferation flaws, because I do not want to jeopardize 
that emerging alliance that can bring so many benefits to both of our 
peoples.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I would like to take a few moments to 
discuss my vote against the India Nuclear Agreement.
  In 2006, I voted in favor of the Henry J. Hyde United States and 
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, primarily because of the 
safeguards included in the act that would ensure that assistance to 
Indian's civilian nuclear program to meet its domestic energy needs, 
would not assist the Indian nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, I 
do not believe that the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation 
Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act that we voted on last 
night has the full scope of necessary protections.
  India is the largest democracy in the world. Its economy is growing 
by 8 percent annually. Their domestic energy needs are enormous and 
they simply do not have enough indigenous resources to meet them. India 
is an important ally and our nation has benefitted from a strong trade 
and defense relationship for decades. Furthermore, my State of Rhode 
Island has prospered because of a vibrant Indian community. I believe 
that the United States should do all that it can to assist India and 
further strengthen the partnership between the two countries.
  However, our country's relationship with India must be balanced with 
concerns about nuclear proliferation and the stability of the Middle 
East and Asia.
  I believe that proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons material 
and technology is the greatest threat facing our country today. The 
most effective method of controlling such proliferation is a 
multilateral regime where all countries are subject to the same 
standards.
  The agreement that was approved by the Senate last night establishes 
a separate and unique regime for India. This particular agreement would 
allow India to be treated like a nuclear weapons state but not impose 
upon India the responsibilities and commitments placed on other nuclear 
weapons states. As such I believe that this particular agreement is 
flawed. This agreement has the potential to actually weaken the 
carefully constructed, long-standing nuclear nonproliferation regime 
that the world depends on to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
  This agreement does provide some benefits. Under this agreement India 
will put 14 of its nuclear reactors under safeguards agreements with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. This will help to 
ensure that these reactors and the fuel supplied to them will be used 
only for the peaceful production of nuclear poser. In addition the IAEA 
will bring its expertise to help to improve the operational safety of 
the reactors.
  On the other hand the rest of India's nuclear reactors will not come 
under the IAEA and these reactors can be used as India wishes to 
produce power or to produce more material for nuclear weapons. But it 
is troublesome to me that India retains the right to deny IAEA access 
to some or all of the reactors that it has now agreed will come under 
IAEA agreements.
  While this agreement will help India with its energy needs, India is 
also now free to use its limited indigenous uranium for to support a 
build up of its nuclear weapons stockpile. India has specifically 
preserved its ability to increase the number of nuclear weapons in its 
arsenal, its ability to increase the amount of nuclear weapons 
materials that it produces and its right to conduct a test of a nuclear 
weapon.
  While India has a voluntary moratorium on testing, India still 
refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to support a 
fissile material cut-off treaty. Finally, I am greatly concerned about 
the effect this agreement will have on the region, particularly the 
reaction of Pakistan. Pakistan will undoubtedly seek a similar 
agreement if it perceives an increased threat from India. Pakistan may 
seek to partner with China--and the United States would have few 
grounds to protest. In such a case, Pakistan will have additional 
access to nuclear technology.
  While I believe that the United States should help India with its 
urgent energy needs, I believe we missed an opportunity to provide 
assistance with adequate and necessary safeguards in place. For these 
reasons, I reluctantly decided to vote against this agreement. It is my 
hope that the United States and India continue to work together to make 
the world safer from nuclear proliferation.

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