[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 159 (Wednesday, October 1, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10302-S10303]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                AFRICOM

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today marks the full operational launch 
of the U.S. Africa Command, known as AFRICOM. I have long supported the 
idea of a unified regional combatant command for Africa that recognizes 
the continent's growing strategic importance for U.S. security and that 
is coordinated with other U.S. agencies. As I have discussed many times 
on the Senate floor, we can not pretend that weak and failing states, 
protracted violent conflicts, maritime insecurity, narcotics and 
weapons trafficking, large-scale corruption, and the misappropriation 
and exploitation of natural resources are not relevant to our long-term 
interests. At the same time, there are exciting economic and social 
developments underway across Africa that provide openings for the 
United States to help save lives, strengthen governance institutions, 
and build long-term partnerships. It is not a question of whether the 
United States needs to work proactively and collaboratively with 
African nations in these areas but a question of how we should do so to 
maximize our efficacy while minimizing potential backlash.
  Toward that end, the standup of AFRICOM presents both opportunities 
and risks. Indisputably, our Nation's military strength is one of our 
greatest assets and may be necessary to deal with some of the emerging 
national and transnational threats, such as narcotics trafficking, 
piracy, and terrorism. Military training, equipping, and logistical 
support are essential to develop strong, disciplined national 
militaries and also strengthen regional peacekeeping, especially with 
African Union missions currently operating in Somalia and Sudan. 
Furthermore, in many postconflict societies, such as Liberia, our 
military expertise can assist in demobilization, disarmament, and 
reintegration while also helping to rebuild that country's army.
  However, while militaries make important contributions in these 
areas, they are insufficient to address the underlying causes of 
violence and instability in Africa. Lasting security requires 
reconciling political grievances, improving governance, strengthening 
the rule of law, and promoting economic development: tasks for which 
our military, or any military for that matter, cannot be the lead. To 
advance and support those tasks, the United States needs to continue to 
invest in our diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and development 
capacities on the continent. We need a unified interagency approach to 
these challenges in which AFRICOM is supporting, not eclipsing, the 
work of our diplomats, our aid workers, and other key partners.
  I am concerned that the opposite is happening. Despite initial 
ambitions to have 25 percent of AFRICOM's headquarters' positions 
filled by nonmilitary staff, that number has been severely reduced 
because of resource and staffing limitations in civilian agencies. 
Furthermore, a report by the Government Accountability Office published 
this July stated that concerns persist among civilian agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations that the military is becoming the lead 
for U.S. policy in Africa. Even as Pentagon officials claim this is not 
their intention, it is hard to argue with the numbers. While civilian 
agencies operating abroad continue to face resource constraints, more 
and more resources are being invested in military relationships and 
assistance in Africa.
  Given this context, it is not surprising that some are casting 
AFRICOM's emergence as a signal of further militarization of U.S. 
Africa policy. Such perceptions of militarization are dangerous and 
risk undermining our ability to engage local populations. As I have 
said many times, the military has a critical role to play in helping 
Africans address their security challenges, but we must be careful that 
it does not outweigh or overshadow other forms of engagement. This is 
especially true in cases where local security forces are engaging in 
repressive tactics or committing serious human rights abuses, such as 
in Chad or Ethiopia. In these cases, we run a very real risk that U.S. 
military engagement could be seen by local populations as complicit in 
those abuses and become a target of resulting grievances. Before we 
jump at short-term opportunities to exert military influence, we need 
to consider seriously the long-term risks to U.S. stature and 
interests.
  Mr. President, this is not to say that AFRICOM is not capable of such 
nuanced strategic planning and interagency coordination. I have met 
with

[[Page S10303]]

General Ward and know that he is aware of both the opportunities and 
risks as AFRICOM stands up. I still believe that a unified regional 
combatant command can contribute to broader U.S. Government efforts to 
confront the many security challenges in Africa and can provide 
additional tools to pursue coherent and strategic objectives across the 
continent. But to fulfill that potential, AFRICOM must demonstrate in 
its inaugural months and years that it recognizes the unique political 
realities throughout Africa, concentrates on its defined mandate, and 
takes its lead from our diplomats. Simultaneously, we in Congress must 
act to ensure that our diplomats have the resources they need to take 
that lead in formulating and implementing comprehensive U.S. strategies 
in Africa.

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