[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 159 (Wednesday, October 1, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10199-S10208]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION 
                       ENHANCEMENT ACT--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, first, let me thank Senator Dorgan for 
his leadership on this issue and for his heartfelt and very well-
articulated statement about the reasons why we need to amend this 
agreement before we proceed any further. I strongly agree with him, and 
I am honored to join with him in proposing an amendment that will 
improve the agreement that is coming to the Senate floor tonight for 
consideration.
  The bill we are dealing with tonight seeks to obtain expedited 
approval of

[[Page S10200]]

the United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement 
was the result of a bill we passed into law 2 years ago--nearly 2 years 
ago--that exempted India from the very export controls that were placed 
into the Atomic Energy Act as a result of India's decision to detonate 
a nuclear weapon in 1974--with United States-supplied technology, I 
would point out.
  Let me be clear: I do believe it is time that we as a nation did more 
to reach out to India in areas such as energy and high technology. The 
President deserves credit for recognizing that the India of the 1960s 
and 1970s is not the India of today. India is a great leader in 
technology and needs to be an ally of our country on a great many 
issues, but I cannot support the proposed agreement before us today in 
the form we are being presented.
  By modifying our nonproliferation laws for India, and just for India, 
and in a circumstance where India has not signed the nonproliferation 
treaty, not only are we sending the wrong signal to Iran, which is a 
signatory and desires to have its own nuclear program, but we are also 
sending the wrong signal to North Korea, to Pakistan, and to Israel. 
Those three countries are not signatories to the nonproliferation 
treaty, and they have detonated nuclear weapons. So approval of the 
agreement as it is now presented makes it difficult for us to justify 
our nonproliferation policies to the world at large, and in particular 
it makes it very difficult for us to justify them to other 
nonproliferation treaty signatories, such as South Africa, Brazil, and 
Taiwan, which have foresworn their nuclear weapons program as part of 
signing up for the nonproliferation treaty.
  The net result of approving the agreement as proposed today is that 
we are making India a de facto weapon state without them having to sign 
the nonproliferation treaty. India gets to have their cake and to eat 
it too. They obtain nuclear weapon state status but, by not signing the 
NPT, they do not have to adhere to its fundamental article VI 
requirement that nuclear weapon states shall ``pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race.''
  The amendment Senator Dorgan and I are offering seeks to make several 
improvements to the underlying bill that relate to the question of what 
happens if India again decides to detonate a nuclear weapon. The first 
section, developed by Senator Dorgan, states simply that the United 
States will not conduct trade in nuclear technology with India if they 
detonate a nuclear weapon. That is sensible policy. It is consistent 
with the Atomic Energy Act, which cuts off trade in nuclear technology 
if states such as India detonate a nuclear device.
  The second part of the amendment, which I have added to the combined 
amendment, requires the President to certify to Congress that the 
United States-supplied technology is not what has enabled India to go 
forward with detonation of a nuclear weapon.
  Let me explain why this is important. India detonated five nuclear 
weapons in 1998 without the aid of advanced technology supplied by 
other nations. The reason is because the 45-nation group that is called 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG, developed a consensus that they 
would not ship to India sensitive nuclear technology. As a result of 
the bill we passed 2 years ago, this Nuclear Suppliers Group has now 
approved the export of sensitive nuclear technology to India. It is 
entirely conceivable that India may want to improve their nuclear 
weapons now that they have access to advanced technology from this 
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  The certification we provide for in this amendment would force the 
President to ensure ahead of time that appropriate export controls are 
in place to begin with. It is one of the strictest conditions Congress 
can place on a President, but it can be met. We routinely require end-
use monitoring of sensitive technologies that we export to other 
countries. Embassy personnel inspect their purported destination to 
make sure they are not used for illicit purposes. Certification, as we 
provide for in this amendment, also places pressure on the President to 
work with the IAEA to ensure that the safeguards applied to Indian 
facilities are effective so the exported technology does not make its 
way into their weapons program. It seems to me that the President 
should place this level of scrutiny on our nuclear exports to India.
  Let me put up a chart to make the point I am trying to make with this 
part of the amendment. This chart tries to make the distinction 
between--that is reflected in the underlying agreement we are going to 
be voting on--between the parts of India's nuclear program that are 
safeguarded--and that is, to be specific, 14 nuclear reactors and 1 
fuel reprocessing plant--and then the parts of India's nuclear program 
that are not subject to any safeguards--and that is substantially more. 
That is eight power reactors, a fast breeder program, and its entire 
military program, which consists of two plutonium reprocessing plants, 
two uranium enrichment plants, and two heavy water plutonium production 
reactors.
  The underlying agreement we are voting on contemplates that all the 
nonsafeguarded parts of the nuclear weapons program in India will be 
supplied only with domestically produced fuel. The safeguarded parts 
are the parts that can be supplied with imported uranium fuel. So the 
theory is we can take great consolation in knowing that nothing we are 
sending to India is, in fact, affecting the nonsafeguarded part of 
their nuclear program.
  Now, around here, I don't know if you would call this a Chinese 
firewall or what you would call it--this yellow line that separates the 
safeguarded from the nonsafeguarded parts of the nuclear weapons 
program--but the truth is, under this agreement and the way it now 
stands, it is virtually impossible for us to be assured, in any 
credible way, that what is being provided in the way of technologies or 
fuel to India for its nuclear program is, in fact, being kept just for 
the safeguarded part.
  Obviously, the other point is, as to the fuel, it is all fungible. 
If, in fact, we are providing imported uranium fuel that can be used 
for safeguarded reactors, there is no reason why the domestically 
produced fuel can't be used for the nonsafeguarded reactors.
  It is, in my view, vitally important that we try to make some 
amendment to ensure that there is some degree of scrutiny over what is, 
in fact, occurring there, and that is the second part of the amendment 
I referred to--the net result of improving this. By modifying our 
nonproliferation laws for India, which has not signed the 
nonproliferation treaty, it is clear we are making an exception that 
will cause great difficulty in our ability to encourage other countries 
to comply with the nonproliferation treaty.
  The third part of the amendment we are offering requires that if 
India tests a nuclear weapon, we will not enable other countries to 
further India's nuclear program. This is called the third-party 
problem; whereby, we enable other countries to help India's nuclear 
program. If India detonates a nuclear weapon, the President, under our 
amendment, would have to recommend to Congress what export control 
authorities can be used so our exports to other nuclear suppliers do 
not end up helping India's program. The President, of course, would 
have a wide array of such authorities to apply--from end-use monitoring 
of the technologies that were supplied to outright prohibition on 
providing any of these technologies.
  The United States and India, obviously, have deep and important ties. 
Many of our leading citizens have ancestry in India. Many of our 
leading citizens in our high-tech community were originally born in 
India. They have greatly contributed to the strength of our Nation. We 
owe them a great debt of gratitude, and we honor them as we raise 
questions about this agreement.
  We need to draw a line in the sand in certain areas. The area of 
nonproliferation, and the nonproliferation treaty in particular, is one 
such area where we do need to maintain black and white distinctions, 
given the terrible consequence we face if a nuclear detonation were to 
occur, either on our soil or on the soil of any other nation.
  The amendment Senator Dorgan and I are offering that will be voted on 
this evening places clear and unambiguous requirements on the 
President, should India detonate another nuclear weapon. I think that 
is the least we should

[[Page S10201]]

do in our consideration of this very important agreement. I urge my 
colleagues to support the amendment.
  I yield the remainder of the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator wish to call up his 
amendment?


                           Amendment No. 5683

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I do call up amendment No. 5683.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], for himself and 
     Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Feingold, and Mrs. 
     Boxer, proposes an amendment numbered 5683.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To prohibit nuclear trade with India in the event that India 
    detonates a nuclear weapon and to impose certain certification, 
                  reporting, and control requirements)

       At the end of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 106. PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR TRADE IN EVENT OF NUCLEAR 
                   WEAPON DETONATION BY INDIA.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United 
     States may not export, transfer, or retransfer any nuclear 
     technology, material, equipment, or facility under the 
     Agreement if the Government of India detonates a nuclear 
     explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 107. CERTIFICATION, REPORTING, AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 
                   IN EVENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DETONATION BY INDIA.

       In the event the Government of India detonates a nuclear 
     weapon after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall--
       (1) certify to Congress that no United States technology, 
     material, equipment, or facility supplied to India under the 
     Agreement assisted with such detonation;
       (2) not later than 60 days after such detonation, submit to 
     Congress a report describing United States nuclear related 
     export controls that could be utilized with respect to 
     countries that continue nuclear trade with India to minimize 
     any potential contribution by United States exports to the 
     nuclear weapons program of the Government of India; and
       (3) fully utilize such export controls unless, not later 
     than 120 days after such detonation, Congress adopts, and 
     there is enacted, a joint resolution disapproving of the full 
     utilization of such export controls.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. First, let me thank my two colleagues from North Dakota and 
New Mexico for combining their amendments in a way that I think makes 
sense. My colleague can correct me if I am wrong, the House was similar 
to both. There were somewhat different approaches, but I think they 
offer some clarity as to their concerns which, let me say at the 
outset, these are concerns I believe all of us share. There is not a 
single one of us, that I am aware of, in this body who doesn't have the 
same worries and concerns that my colleague from North Dakota 
expressed, as well as my friend and colleague from New Mexico. I will 
not debate the number, whether it was 25,000 or 30,000 or 20,000--
clearly, the problem with having a proliferation of nuclear devices 
around is a concern to all of us. Obviously, each and every one of us 
bears a responsibility to do everything we can to minimize the threat 
such weapons pose.
  I don't know anyone more vigilant in that effort than my colleague 
from Indiana, along with my former colleague, Senator Nunn. The Nunn-
Lugar proposals, which regrettably were not pursued as aggressively as 
I think they should have been by the Bush administration, were to 
convince the former Soviet Union and other nations to dismantle weapons 
of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in particular. That exists, and 
there are those of us who would like to see it pursued more 
aggressively. There are countless examples over the years of Members 
who have sought various means by which we could reduce the threat. I 
would argue, and I will, that this bill is very much in that tradition. 
This is not a deviation from that effort. It is very much in that same 
tradition others have pursued, to create and formulate the means by 
which we can reduce those threats.
  This bill is comprehensive in many ways. It is certainly not perfect 
by anyone's stretch of imagination. Contrary to the suggestion that 
there has been one hearing on this, as if somehow this has been thrown 
together in the last couple weeks, there have been five major hearings 
with multiple panels conducted by Senators Biden and Lugar. The other 
body has conducted at least that many hearings. It all began about 4 
years ago, this process, not something just a week or two ago that has 
led to this.
  You heard Senator Lugar say that he alone submitted 174 questions to 
the State Department and other agencies, demanding their responses to 
those questions and publicized them on his Web site. So the very 
questions many of us have, have been addressed, maybe not to the 
satisfaction of everyone but certainly pursuing the very issues.
  The reason I mentioned that is if, in fact, this amendment were 
adopted, of course, there would be no means by which you could resolve 
these matters with the other body. They have already adopted a bill 
without this language in it. Therefore, this would presumably pass 
without consideration. The fact is, that come next year the 
administration--because the time runs out on this--would be submitting 
the agreement without any of the agreements we have included in this 
bill, many of which do exactly what my colleagues from New Mexico and 
North Dakota are seeking to achieve. So the irony of ironies would be 
that while I respect immensely their intent, what they seek, in fact, 
it would be counterproductive of the very goal they are trying to 
achieve and that is to strip away everything we have achieved under the 
leadership of Senators Lugar and Biden, along with Howard Berman's 
leadership in the other body, to include the kind of understandings and 
requirements this bill mandated.
  Is this a perfect bill? Absolutely not. But if we allow the perfect 
to become the enemy of the good, we are going to find ourselves, I 
think, in a far more serious situation than the one Senator Dorgan and 
Senator Bingaman has described to you.
  I would never make the argument to my colleagues that if you adopt 
this amendment--I don't say hate; my wife advises that I don't use the 
word ``hate'' in front of the children--I deplore arguments that 
suggest that if you adopt this, it is a killer amendment, and we would 
have to go back and do further work. I think that is an insulting 
argument. In fact, if an amendment is a good amendment and ought to be 
adopted, we ought not to shy away from our responsibility. As a matter 
of fact, I will argue, the amendment is unnecessary; existing law does 
exactly what my colleagues are asking us to do today. But if we adopt 
them, we run the risk of something coming back a lot worse than what 
Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, the Foreign Relations Committee, over 
extensive hearings, along with the work of the other body, have 
accomplished and achieved. As my colleagues listen to this debate, I 
hope they will take that under consideration.
  I point out, the United States-India agreement will be resubmitted in 
January if it is not approved now. The next President would not have to 
seek any special law, which is what we have, to speed up the process. 
Rather, he could wait us out until the Atomic Energy Act forces us to 
take a vote on a clean resolution of approval of the agreement, without 
any of the amendments we have adopted and worked on over the years.
  Let me mention an argument Senator Lugar raised; I didn't. I regret 
not having mentioned it because I think it is a compelling argument as 
well. One of the arguments people need to understand is India does not 
have an unlimited supply of materials by which to create nuclear 
weapons. They will be faced, without outside sources of supply, to make 
a choice between nuclear weapons or the commercial powerplants.
  I do not intend to speak as a great expert on Indian politics or the 
public mood in India, but nations, particularly ones that live in the 
neighborhood--I don't have the map up here any longer--where India 
resides, what choice would they make if they could only make one? Is it 
going to be energy or security? That is a difficult choice. While all 
of us want to see the energy choices made, a nation surrounded by 
nations that have nuclear capabilities, not exactly close to the 
democracy India is, by the way, may very well decide to have different 
alternatives. If

[[Page S10202]]

you are sitting in India's Parliament, you are a member of their 
Congress and you have one choice to make, security or energy, security 
or energy--how would we vote? How would we vote confronted by that 
choice?
  That is a choice with which India may well be confronted without 
additional sources of energy here or supplies that would allow them to 
promote the more commercial use of this power.
  I don't necessarily want to put India in that position to make that 
choice because I think I know what choice they would make. I suspect it 
is the same choice we would make. We bear an obligation to the people 
of this country to keep them secure. I suspect the Indian 
parliamentarians feel likewise. When confronted by that choice, my view 
is they would choose to make security the choice, the very thing my 
colleagues argued against would, in fact, be driving them to that 
conclusion.
  Obviously, the energy debate is a critical one. Again, no one has 
been more of an advocate of green technologies than our colleague from 
New Mexico, one of the stalwarts in this debate for many years--not 
just recently, where it has become popular to argue for alternative 
energy resources. But if we take away this alternative, India is 
growing--1.3 billion people. It has 300 million people living at 
middle-class or upper middle-class standards. They have a billion 
people living in abject poverty in India. They are seeking ways, of 
course, to bring many of those people out of poverty and improve the 
quality of their lives.
  India understands that coal-fired electrical power plants are a 
liability, but India cannot afford to slow the growth of energy 
production at the same time its population is growing and trying to 
deal with the economic circumstances of its people.

  India says we would like to build more commercial powerplants. It 
seems to me, for those of us who want to reduce the carbon footprint, 
the carbon emitters with India being a major supplier of carbon 
emissions it is in our interests to encourage them to move in a 
different direction. If we do not have some sort of arrangement or 
understanding on how to achieve that while simultaneously moving them 
away from that choice I mentioned a moment ago, we end up potentially 
where they have more weapons, doing little or nothing about energy 
production. It is a lose-lose proposition. We end up with India with 
nuclear weapons, and we end up with a nation that continues to use 
coal-fired plants, of course, endangering us further when it comes to 
the issue of global warming and the like. That is a further reason, I 
would argue, we ought seriously to understand the import of these 
amendments and appreciate the alternative presented by the bill before 
us.
  I mentioned earlier, in fact, the very concerns raised by my two 
colleagues are covered by existing law. It is not as if there is some 
vacuum that exists, that there would be no repercussions should India 
decide to pursue and test nuclear weapons. Let me share with my 
colleagues. Again, I invite Members or their staffs to come over and be 
briefed by staff who spent literally their adult lives, their 
professional careers working on these bills. The suggestion that this 
was thrown together somehow in a quick hearing before the Foreign 
Relations Committee in a sense fails to understand the work done by our 
collective staffs on these matters going back years. In fact, previous 
Members of this body--no one cared more about this issue than John 
Glenn of Ohio. He was an advocate on this issue long before many were. 
I am going to share in a minute some of the law that bears his name and 
is still the law of the land when it comes to these issues, the Glenn 
amendment, and how we deal with the issue of countries that would, in a 
sense, go into the use of nuclear weapons.
  This amendment would bar any and all nuclear exports for all time, 
without any exception or waiver, if India detonates a nuclear device.
  Section 106 sets a different standard for India than we have for any 
other nonnuclear weapons state, which is what it is under the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. law. There is no need, I think. I 
think it would be very harmful to single India out in such a manner. 
There are other nations in a similar situation. I don't hear amendments 
being offered to suggest they all ought to be treated the same way. I 
suspect you would run into a buzzsaw if you did so. We are picking out 
the one great democracy in south Asia, with whom we have had a very 
testy relationship for 35 years, which is critical for dealing with the 
fragile issues that section of the world poses, and we are going to 
say: They and no one else gets that kind of treatment.
  You can imagine the reaction we might get from a nation that is now 
reaching out to us for the first time in approaching half a century to 
get us back on a far different track than the one we are on.
  India would clearly see this provision as an effort to put in place 
special penalties against that nation, if it were ever to respond.
  Frankly, the proposed new section, as I said earlier, is a section I 
think poses some serious issues. I have commented before, I have put 
the language in of the administration. I think everyone mentioned 
earlier, and I will quote from the Secretary of State, she said:

  We have been very clear with the Indians. Should India test, as it 
has agreed not to do so, or should India in any way violate the IAEA 
safeguards agreements to which it would be adhering, the deal from our 
point of view would be at that point off.

  Under Secretary of State Bill Burns, before our committee, repeated 
that quote to us.
  What is more, as I said, the amendment is unnecessary. Several 
provisions of existing law already apply to India.
  The Glenn amendment sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act cut 
off a wide array of foreign aid, defense exports, bank credits and 
dual-use items.
  There is no waiver. No waiver under the Glenn amendment. That was 
modified some years later, but there would be no waiver. The Glenn 
amendment is tougher in many ways than what we talking about here, we 
can argue, in that it doesn't provide any kind of relief. Congress 
enacted a waiver in 1999, somewhat of a waiver, after India and 
Pakistan tested in the 1990s, but that waiver authority terminates for 
either country that tests again. So under the modified Glenn amendment, 
there is no waiver authority. Under Glenn, the role of the United 
States and our relationship with India is clear.
  Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act already prohibits exports to a 
nonnuclear weapon State if it detonates a nuclear device. That one is 
subject to waiver by the President. India is still a nonnuclear weapon 
state by definition, and therefore would be included under this. That 
law is on the books, very similar to what is being advocated in the 
amendment posed by our two colleagues. The President could only use the 
waiver under section 129, I would add, if he finds that ceasing exports 
would be ``seriously prejudicial'' to the achievement of the U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives or would otherwise ``jeopardize the common 
defense and security of the country.'' That is a high standard, I might 
add, for the waiver authority.
  Even if the President makes that determination, cooperation cannot 
proceed until 60 days of continuous session has passed after that 
determination has been submitted to Congress, further making that 
provision almost impossible to apply that waiver standard.

  So there are two sections, one under the Atomic Energy Act, one under 
the Glenn amendment, that virtually do what our two colleagues talk 
about with their amendment. The bill before us would amend the Atomic 
Energy Act to ensure, by the way, that the Senate can take advantage of 
expedited procedures--limits on debate and amendment--to pass a joint 
resolution to overturn such a Presidential waiver.
  Even if you got to that point, we have now put a further safeguard in 
against it, making it virtually impossible to waive the authority under 
section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act.
  So the bill already improves the law relating to what could happen 
with a so-called nonnuclear weapons state. We are using the language 
here, but this applies to states that we all, to be honest, know have 
nuclear weapons. There are several nations we all know about in that 
category, but they are called nonnuclear weapons states. And yet, here 
the language is very strong.
  Again, I think these sections are important to note. The combination 
of

[[Page S10203]]

the two amendments does cover the ground on all of this. I point out 
that Senator Bingaman's part of this amendment, this new section 107, 
is not necessary either.
  U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty already 
compel the United States to assure that its nuclear exports do not help 
nonnuclear weapons states to produce weapons. That obligation bars 
helping not only India but any nonnuclear weapons state. The Atomic 
Energy Act and the Hyde Act already provide tools to address the 
concern Senator Bingaman has raised.
  Let's look at the specific provision, if you will, under the proposed 
section 107. It would require a certification in the event of a nuclear 
detonation by India that no United States material, equipment, or 
technology contributed to the detonation.
  And what happens if the President makes that certification? The 
amendment does not say what happens. What happens if the President does 
not make the certification, or says it does not know whether any U.S. 
material, equipment, or technology was involved? This is a 
certification that may well be impossible to make under the law as 
drafted in this amendment.
  So even with the intent to do something about it, how can you make 
it? How are you going to determine whether, in fact, materials have 
been used, or is it just the assumption that if one occurred, it would 
be, which may be an entirely false assumption when it comes to that 
country? How will we ever know for sure that no U.S. technology was 
diverted?
  In any case, it is the certification that carries no consequences. 
The certification is not needed. Again section 104 of the Hyde act 
already requires the President to keep Congress fully and currently 
informed of any violation by India of its nonproliferation commitments 
and of this agreement.
  Any contributions by U.S. exports to an India weapons program under 
the United States-India agreement would certainly be a violation of 
India's commitments and of the agreement, and so would need to be 
reported to us, and would very likely be reported to us long before any 
detonation, I might add.
  Section 2 of the proposed act requires a report from the President 
after an Indian test describing those United States export controls 
that could be used to minimize any potential contribution that United 
States nuclear exports to third countries might make to an Indian 
nuclear weapons program.
  The Hyde act and the Atomic Energy Act already address this issue. 
And let me quote to my colleagues again. I apologize for citing in 
detail these things, but you need to know this, because statements 
being made here on the floor about this, I say respectfully, are not 
accurate, about what existing laws require and mandate and demand in 
these areas.
  Section 104(d)(5) of the Hyde act requires the President of the 
United States:

     shall ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to 
     maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, 
     equipment and technology . . . reexported to India so as to 
     ensure . . . United States' compliance with [obligations 
     under] article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

  Section 104(g)(2) of the Hyde Act explicitly requires detailed 
reporting on any United States authorizations for the reexport to India 
of nuclear materials and equipment.
  The Atomic Energy Act further requires that the United States not 
engage in civil nuclear cooperation with any country without an 
agreement for nuclear cooperation and that every such agreement must 
contain a guarantee by the other country that it will not transfer any 
nuclear material or facility to a third country without the prior 
approval of the United States.
  Section 127 of that act makes it explicit that for any U.S. export of 
source or special nuclear material, nuclear facilities, or sensitive 
nuclear technology, that material, facility, or technology may not be 
retransferred to a third party without the United States's prior 
consent. The transfer cannot go forward unless the third party agrees 
to abide by all of the agreements of section 127.
  That section also requires that the source and special nuclear 
material, nuclear facilities, and sensitive nuclear technology being 
exported must be under IAEA safeguards, and may not be used in or for 
research and development on a nuclear explosive device.
  This assures us that any such report does not contribute to India's 
weapons program. The truth is that if India were to conduct another 
nuclear test or reexport by third countries, United States-origin 
nuclear material, equipment, or technology would be the least likely 
way for India to evade a cut-off of cooperation.
  If any third country were to provide United States-origin nuclear 
material, or equipment, or material device from the United States-
origin material or equipment for India without the United States's 
consent, the United States would have the right to cease nuclear 
cooperation with that country and to demand the return of material and/
or equipment that has been provided under that country's nuclear 
cooperation agreement with the United States.
  So third countries are highly unlikely, given the implications under 
the existing law, to reexport without our permission, or run the risk, 
obviously, of facing all of the admonitions that the previously 
existing law requires. A much more serious concern would be the risk 
that other countries would export their own nuclear material or 
equipment, not our material but their own nuclear equipment and 
material technology, to India after we had cut off exports. That 
concern is not addressed at all by the Dorgan and Bingaman amendment. 
But the bill before us does address that concern. Their amendment 
leaves that out entirely, which is actually a far more dangerous way 
that this may happen.
  So under the bill before us, by reiterating a provision under the 
Hyde Act that if India should test again:

       It is the policy of the United States to seek to prevent a 
     transfer to India of nuclear equipment, of materials or 
     technology from other participating governments in the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group or from any other source.

  This bill already lays down a marker regarding the real concern if 
India were to test. Again, whether it is reexport or direct shipments, 
we are in a position, I think, to respond aggressively. I point out, 
you defeat this bill, we are back to the agreement and a lot of this, 
other than what I have mentioned in existing law, does not apply.
  So, again, I say to my friends and colleagues who offered the 
amendment, this is not a debate about whether some people care about 
nuclear weapons and others do not. The question is, are we being smart 
and intelligent about moving a major democracy that lives in a 
dangerous part of the world into a direction that will make it far more 
cooperative with us in doing exactly what the underlying amendment 
seeks to do, that is, to move away from weapons to commercial use, to 
dealing with the carbon emissions that are occurring here, to provide 
that kind of new relationship with India that I think is absolutely 
critical for our safety and security in the 21st century.
  Walk away from this, drive a wedge between India and the United 
States in that part of the world, then I think you are going to have 
exactly the kind of problem our two colleagues have suggested. It gets 
closer to what they fear most. I believe what we have offered our 
colleagues today drives us further away from that outcome, which is 
what all of us ought to be trying to achieve. That is the reason I 
reject these amendments, and urge my colleagues to do so when they 
occur on a vote later today. I yield the floor.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I join my distinguished colleague Senator 
Dodd in rising in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senators 
from North Dakota and New Mexico.
  I believe the bill before us today and the Hyde act passed by 
Congress in 2006 addressed the possibility of a future Indian nuclear 
test in a very clear and definitive way. I am confident the Congress 
has provided the necessary assurances and authorities to protect United 
States interests and promote strong nonproliferation policies in the 
event of an Indian nuclear detonation.
  The amendment seeks to address a concern that the Foreign Relations 
Committee addressed in 2006, and last month when we voted 19 to 2 to 
report the legislation pending before the Senate. Both bills ensure 
that there is no

[[Page S10204]]

ambiguity about the United States's legal and policy responses to a 
future Indian nuclear test.
  If India tests a nuclear weapon, the 123 Agreement is over. This 
means the President could terminate all United States nuclear 
cooperation with India and fully and immediately use the United 
States's rights to demand the return of all items previously exported 
to India. This would include any special nuclear material produced by 
India, through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or 
sensitive nuclear technology exported or reexported to India by the 
United States. These steps can occur as a response to any nuclear test, 
including instances in which India describes its actions as being ``for 
peaceful purposes.''
  In addition, the United States could suspend and revoke any current 
or pending licenses. One of the primary purposes of this agreement is 
to deter India from testing nuclear weapons. New Delhi has more to gain 
from peaceful nuclear cooperation through this agreement than in 
testing.
  The Hyde act and the bill before us were crafted to ensure that this 
is the case. Indian leaders argue that they retain the right to test. 
This is true. They are a sovereign nation. However, India has been 
warned repeatedly that consequences of another nuclear test would be 
dire.
  In 2006, Secretary Rice stated in testimony that:

       We have been very clear with the Indians. Should India 
     test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way 
     violate the IAEA safeguards agreements to which it would be 
     adhering, the deal from our point of view would at that point 
     be off.

  In a question for the record, I asked Secretary Rice at that time 
what the consequences of an Indian test would be. And she noted that 
under existing law:

       No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear 
     technologies shall be exported to any nonnuclear weapons 
     state that is found by the President to have detonated a 
     nuclear explosive device.

  Now, under United States law, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, India is a nonnuclear weapons state. In 2006 the Hyde act 
waived the application of the sanctions in the Atomic Energy Act to 
events that occurred before July 2005 when President Bush and Prime 
Minster Singh signed the joint statement. This waiver was intended to 
capture India's nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, and permit U.S.-Indian 
cooperation in spite of those actions.
  This does not apply to future Indian actions. So if India were to 
test tomorrow, the waiver provided by Congress in 2006 would not apply, 
and nuclear cooperation could be terminated. Let me repeat that. Under 
a law passed 2 years ago setting the parameters for congressional 
consideration of this agreement, if India were to test a nuclear 
weapon, terminate, or abrogate IAEA safeguards, materially violate IAEA 
safeguards, violate an agreement for cooperation with the United 
States, encourage another nonnuclear weapons state to engage in 
proliferation activities, or engage in unauthorized proliferation of 
sensitive nuclear technology, the agreement and United States 
cooperation could be terminated.
  If that is not enough to satisfy the Senators' concerns, I would 
direct them to article 14 of the agreement:

       Should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the 
     United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation 
     with India immediately, including the supply of fuel as well 
     as the request for the return of any items transferred from 
     the United States, including fresh nuclear fuel.

  Under Secretary Rood stated in testimony before the Foreign Relations 
Committee on September 18, 2008 that:

       Just as India has maintained its sovereign right to conduct 
     a test, so too have we maintained our right to take action in 
     response.

  Under article 14, the United States can also demand the return of any 
nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement 
for cooperation as well as any special nuclear material produced in 
India, if it detonates a nuclear explosive device. This was confirmed 
in response to a question posed by the House of Representatives. The 
administration answered that even ``the fuel supply assurances 
[contained in the 123 agreement] are not . . . meant to insulate India 
against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of 
nonproliferation commitments.
  The United States would be able to exercise its right under article 
14 of the agreement to require the return of materials and equipment 
subject to the agreement after, one, giving written notice to India 
that the agreement is terminated and, two, ceasing all cooperation 
based on a determination that a mutually acceptable resolution of 
outstanding issues has been impossible or cannot be achieved through 
consultation.
  Both of these actions are within the discretion of the U.S. 
Government and do not require Indian agreement, and both can be taken 
at once.
  In sum, the United States-India peaceful nuclear cooperation 
agreement ceases if India tests. This conclusion is consistent with any 
reasonable interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act, the Hyde Act, and 
article 14 of this agreement. As a result, this amendment is 
unnecessary. The issues it seeks to address have been remedied. I urge 
colleagues to vote against the amendment. The real effect of adoption 
of this amendment would be to, once again, delay consideration and 
approval of this important agreement. It is time to move forward and to 
vote on this legislation and start peaceful nuclear cooperation between 
the world's two largest democracies.
  The second portion of the amendment we are considering now requires a 
certification and a report that are at best duplicative of provisions 
already in law. This amendment would simply delay implementation of the 
U.S.-India 123 agreement in order to effect requirements that have 
already been enacted. First, the amendment requires the President to 
certify to Congress that no technology, material, or equipment, nor any 
facility supplied by the United States to India under the 123 agreement 
assisted with a nuclear detonation, if one occurs in India. In my 
opinion, this provision is duplicative of section 104(g) of the Hyde 
Act passed by Congress in 2006. Under that existing law, the President 
is already required to report annually on whether U.S. civil nuclear 
cooperation with India is in any way assisting India's nuclear weapons 
program. This report is to include information on whether any U.S. 
technology has been used by India for any activity related to the 
research, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. It is 
unclear what additional information is required by the Senator's 
amendment than is available each year now to Congress under the Hyde 
Act.
  Second, the amendment requires a report on any export controls that 
could be used by the United States if India detonated a nuclear 
explosive. The purpose of the export controls would be to ensure that 
no U.S. materials, equipment, or technology that may be in countries 
other than India could be reexported by those nations to India so as to 
minimize all trade with India and ensure that no U.S. technology or 
exports contributed to their nuclear weapons program.
  Again, this provision is repetitive. In 2006, Congress endorsed 
section 105 of the Hyde Act that created a Nuclear Export 
Accountability Program for all U.S. exports to India. The purpose of 
section 105 was to ensure that our country was taking all appropriate 
measures to maintain accountability of all nuclear materials, 
equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to 
India to ensure full implementation of the IAEA safeguards in India and 
U.S. compliance with article I of the NPT. The program created by the 
Hyde Act is a highly detailed accounting system focused on ensuring 
that India is complying with the relevant requirements, terms, and 
conditions of any licenses issued by the United States regarding 
exports to India. This program represents the most comprehensive and 
detailed system of accounting ever imposed. I believe it provides 
substantially the same information that is required in the Senator's 
amendment, without the need for a new law.
  The Hyde Act also addressed the concern that other nations might 
continue to supply India with any technology or fuel in the event of a 
cutoff by the United States. Section 103 of the Hyde Act makes it the 
policy of the United States to strengthen the guidelines and decisions 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to move other nations toward 
``instituting the practice of a timely

[[Page S10205]]

and coordinated response by [Nuclear Suppliers Group] members to all 
such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an 
involved recipient'' and discourage ``individual NSG members from 
continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a 
consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.''
  The conference report on the Hyde Act clearly states the definitive 
interpretation of that provision. It reads:

       The conferees intend that the United States seek agreement 
     among [Nuclear Suppliers Group] members that violations by 
     one country of an agreement with any NSG member should result 
     in joint action by all members, including, as appropriate, 
     the termination of nuclear exports. In addition, the 
     conferees intend that the Administration work with individual 
     states to encourage them to refrain from sensitive exports.

  Section 103 of the Hyde Act also made it U.S. policy to seek to 
prevent the transfers of nuclear equipment, material, or technology 
from NSG participating governments to those countries with whom nuclear 
commerce has been suspended or terminated pursuant to the Hyde Act, the 
Atomic Energy Act, or any other U.S. law.
  In other words, if U.S. exports to a country were to be suspended or 
terminated pursuant to U.S. law, it would be U.S. policy to seek to 
prevent the transfer of nuclear equipment, material, or technology from 
other sources, including from other countries with which the United 
States has substantial nuclear trade.
  In sum, the amendment is duplicative. The issues raised here have 
been thoroughly dealt with under the Hyde Act of 2006, and the 
legislation currently before us. As a result, the impact of this 
amendment would simply be to delay congressional approval of this 
important agreement by sending it back to the House of Representatives. 
I do not believe such a course serves the U.S. security interests, and 
I urge defeat of the amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.


                            Financial Rescue

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I am in strong agreement with the bipartisan 
leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee. I will address those 
issues shortly. But, first, since we have a rather full legislative 
calendar this evening, I will touch briefly on the financial system 
rescue, a rescue of a locked-up credit system which is having its 
impact on Main Street, where I live in the hearthand, and in every 
community in the Nation where credit is locked up.
  Today I was advised that the State of Missouri cannot issue bonds to 
build highways. The State of Maine is also having trouble. Local 
governments can't get loans. There is no money available in the credit 
markets for municipal bonds at reasonable rates. There is a threat that 
workers will not get their paychecks if businesses or payroll companies 
cannot get the loans they need. Families will not be able to get loans 
for college education, to buy a car, to buy a home. Farmers will not be 
able to get operating loans they must have in Missouri to begin their 
normal agricultural operations.
  When I came to the floor a week ago yesterday, I said we must pass 
something. At that time I said the Treasury's proposal lacks 
accountability, taxpayer protection, and transparency. Thanks to the 
good work of our negotiators--and I commend the Senator from 
Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, Senator Gregg from our side, and the House 
negotiators for putting in those elements, as they are critical--the 
taxpayers have a triple level of protection against losses. The CBO has 
come out with a score saying it will be far less than the $700 billion. 
There are some who think we might recoup all of it, but it is far 
cheaper than continuing the process we have right now where Federal tax 
dollars are being used to come to the rescue of failing savings and 
loans, investment banks, and we don't get any equity from those 
efforts. We don't have a means of recouping it. What is even more 
important, it does nothing to unlock the credit gridlock that threatens 
to bring this economy to a halt, with workers losing their jobs, small 
businesses unable to operate.

  Yesterday, I strongly urged that we raise the Federal deposit 
insurance limit from $100,000 so small businesses that have more than 
$100,000 don't have to continue taking their money out of the banks, 
leaving the banks less capital available to make loans, in order to get 
protection of U.S. Treasury deposits. I heard the stories, and I talked 
with a broker in Missouri yesterday who said: Small business clients 
are trying to move all their money out of banks above $100,000 and put 
it into Treasuries. Again, I am delighted that the leaders, our 
negotiators, and the bipartisan leadership in both Houses agreed to 
extend the FDIC limit to $250,000. We will be looking at all of those 
things, as well as general regulation of the financial markets when we 
return. I have lots of ideas. If anybody cares, I will be sharing them 
at the appropriate time.
  I am also delighted that we are going to include the tax extenders, 
tax extenders that businesses need to continue to operate; tax 
extenders that, unfortunately, would only extend on a year-to-year 
basis but are necessary for profitable operation so businesses can 
continue to hire and build the economy. Probably the greatest part of 
that is delaying the burdensome and punitive alternative minimum tax 
that is now threatening to hit many middle-income working Americans, 
unless we pass this bill. Another element, on which my colleague from 
Iowa, Senator Harkin, has been a leader, is getting disaster relief. 
Residents in Missouri need it. Iowa needs it. Our neighbors in Illinois 
need it. Many other places in the Nation need disaster relief. That is 
another must-pass piece of legislation.
  To return to the subject that the Senators from Connecticut and 
Indiana are addressing, we currently have before us a number of 
legislative opportunities that, if we act and act properly, would send 
a reinforcing signal to our allies and friends in the world that the 
United States values and appreciates their support and cooperation. We 
all know that anti-Americanism is growing throughout the world. It is 
most evident in the socialist vitriol being spewed by Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, and the widespread suspicion 
throughout the Muslim world about America's intentions. In places such 
as Southeast Asia and south Asia, where we are competing for influence 
with an emerging China, we must increase our engagement and strengthen 
our economic and strategic links with countries such as India, which I 
will speak to in a minute.
  Let's face it, we have a lot of work to do in rebuilding America's 
image abroad and increasing security and stability throughout the 
world. But we have a number of opportunities before us, opportunities 
we must act upon. The way in which we get there is by engaging and 
deploying our Nation's smart power. This consists of, but is not 
limited to, public diplomacy efforts, educational exchanges, deployment 
of more Peace Corps volunteers and USAID foreign service officers, and 
supporting free-trade agreements and increased economic engagement.
  The first target of opportunity where America must act is Colombia. 
Congress must act on the Colombia FTA and renew the Andean Trade 
Preferences. Doing so would solidify our image as a nation committed to 
helping a strategic ally in Latin America that is, in fact, standing 
shoulder to shoulder with us.
  Colombia is a remarkable success in the fight against terrorism and 
narcotrafficking that needs to be told. It is a country where its pro-
American leader, President Alvaro Uribe, has led a surge against 
narcoterrorists militarily while simultaneously improving the overall 
security, economy, and safety of the civilian population. They have 
done so while ensuring that protection of human rights and adherence to 
international humanitarian law are fully integrated into their security 
forces.

  In my visit there just over a month ago, I was greatly encouraged by 
the tangible evidence I saw of a country in complete transformation. 
Just 6 years ago, in 2002, as much as 40 percent of Colombia was 
controlled by terrorist groups and ruthless narcotics-trafficking 
cartels. Many of my colleagues visited Colombia at that time and 
brought back grim reports of a country slipping into a failed state.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is an agreement to recess at 12:30.

[[Page S10206]]

  Mr. BOND. Well, Mr. President, might I ask consent to conclude my 
remarks.
  Mr. DODD. I say to the Senator, he can do that. I will propound a 
consent request, Mr. President, that the Senator be allowed to conclude 
in 5 minutes. Is that appropriate?
  Mr. BOND. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. Five minutes; and my colleague would like 15 minutes. So I 
ask, Mr. President, unanimous consent that the Senator from Missouri be 
allowed to proceed for 5 minutes and the Senator from Iowa for an 
additional 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and thank my colleagues.
  Since 1998, the United States has been supporting the 
counternarcotics effort President Clinton initiated known as Plan 
Colombia, and today our mutual objectives have evolved from a strict 
counternarcotics focus to encompass counterterrorism activities as 
well. Our investment has paid off.
  With U.S. aid to Colombian security forces and assistance and trade 
preferences under the Andean trade preferences agreement, the Colombian 
people have been positively transforming their nation. Others, however, 
under the Andean trade preference agreement in Bolivia and Ecuador have 
produced less encouraging results, even taking sides with aggressively 
hostile Hugo Chavez.
  I believe we ought to have a debate about extending them the full 
benefits of the Andean trade agreement. If I had the opportunity to 
offer an amendment, I would have limited the questionable Governments 
of Ecuador and Bolivia to 1 year while giving much longer protection to 
Colombia.
  The message is simple: reward our friends and allies in the world, 
not those who wish us ill or support our enemies.
  Colombia has been our friend and ally in an increasingly left-
leaning, anti-American Latin America. We must take the opportunity to 
reward and thank them by passing the Colombia FTA.
  This agreement also benefits America's economy by increasing exports 
and generating jobs. Upon entry into force of the agreement, over 80 
percent of U.S. exports of agricultural, consumer, and industrial goods 
to Colombia would enter duty-free immediately.
  The Colombian free-trade agreement will benefit America.
  Another strategically important part of the world where the United 
States has an opportunity to increase cooperation and deploy its smart 
power is in India.
  India is a friendly democracy strategically sitting between the two 
places American strategists worry most about: China and the Middle 
East.
  We are natural allies as two of the world's largest democracies and 
we should be much closer. And the feeling, by and large, is mutual 
among the people of India.
  India has more Muslims--150 million or so--than any other country in 
the world except Indonesia, which I have spoken extensively on this 
floor about engaging more proactively. Positive engagement of American 
smart power and increased economic opportunities will help prevent the 
likelihood of al-Qaida or radicalization of this large Muslim 
population.
  During my trip to India in March of 2006, the major item of interest 
to all of the Government and private-sector officials I met, from Prime 
Minster Singh to businessmen in New Dehli, was the support for the 
civilian nuclear technology agreement which was signed as I was in the 
air. I was asked about it when I landed and could not answer. But I 
spent a day being fully briefed by our Embassy and intelligence 
officials.
  After extensive discussions with Indian and American officials, as 
well as intelligence briefings, I reached the conclusion that this 
agreement is a very positive step for the United States and India.
  It would aid in cementing a good working relationship with the 
world's largest democracy in a strategic part of the world. I support 
this agreement and agree with our bipartisan leadership that we must 
defeat the amendments which would merely delay and possibly sidetrack 
approval.
  India has three paramount challenges ahead that it must address: 
First, it must improve its infrastructure and roads. Second, it must 
deal with the extreme poverty of its huge rural population. Thirty 
percent of its population live below the official poverty line. Third, 
India, just like the United States, must be able to meet the demand for 
increases in energy.
  A strong relationship between India and the U.S. is vital to ensuring 
peaceful development and continued prosperity in South and Southeast 
Asia.
  Regional rivalries, particularly with China will continue to heat up 
in a race for energy to fuel both India's and China's rapidly expanding 
economies and societies. An increase in nuclear power production in 
India through the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement would help to cool 
these rivalries in their race for energy resources.
  In a land where air quality is a major problem, despite recent 
improvements, this agreement would allow India to meet its surging 
energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner.
  Further, increasing the supply of energy in India, make no mistake 
about it, also indirectly helps consumers at the pump here at home as 
well.
  In addition to nuclear power, during my visit I also encouraged the 
development of clean coal technology. With the fourth largest coal 
reserves in the world, India and the U.S. should work together to 
develop that source of energy as well.
  Developing energy solutions together with India will increase our 
engagement and lead to other economic opportunities for Americans.
  I hope my colleagues will support this agreement between the United 
States and India without amendment.
  It will safeguard Indian nuclear facilities and help meet the surging 
demand for global energy supplies in this critical Nation.
  And most importantly, it will solidify our relationship with a 
strategically important country that for too long suffered under the 
burden of a Soviet-style economy. Now it is opening its market, shares 
our democratic values, and is on its way to becoming one of the world's 
three largest economies.
  I urge my colleagues to act on solidifying our partnership with two 
critically important countries, Colombia and India.


                           Tribute To Senator

                             Pete Domenici

  Mr. President, I want to say that the passing of the mental health 
parity bill will be a great tribute to a wonderful friend, Pete 
Domenici, a true icon. He has been a longtime champion of this issue, 
and this will be a great testament to his leadership.
  I worked with Pete on the Budget Committee. I say thanks, Pete, for 
making me take all the tough votes. It was ugly but necessary, just 
like the financial rescue package.
  He is most recognized for his work on energy. I am very proud to have 
supported him in his efforts over many years to develop an abundant 
energy resource, long before $4 gasoline brought the issue home to 
every American.
  Just as important to me, I will miss the great friendship of a 
wonderful man, Pete Domenici, and his magnificent wife Nancy.
  Pete is known for his devotion to his friends and family--to his wife 
Nancy of 50 years and their 8 children.
  Pete is also known for his devotion and dedication to New Mexico.
  Born and raised in New Mexico, Pete has served his State in the U.S. 
Senate now for 36 years--making him the most senior Senator New Mexico 
has ever had.
  Pete has also earned the title as the only Republican to ever be 
elected by New Mexico for a 6-year Senate term--in a State not known to 
lean Republican.
  Pete's contributions to his State are well known to his constituents 
in New Mexico--whether it is fighting for solutions to the State's 
water crisis, supporting New Mexico schools, or ensuring New Mexico 
gets their fair share of tax dollars.
  Pete's contributions to our Nation are also well known. He 
understands the importance of keeping America as a leader in science 
and technology and has worked for improvements to the math and science 
education our school children need to succeed.
  Pete has also fought passionately for fiscal responsibility to ensure 
tax

[[Page S10207]]

payer dollars are spent wisely and curbing nuclear proliferation to 
keep our communities safe.
  In recent years, Pete has used his role as chairman or ranking member 
of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee to fight for our Nation's 
energy security.
  Pete worked across the aisle to pass the first comprehensive energy 
legislation since 1992. Because of Pete and the bill he got through 
Congress, our Nation began investing in our own energy sources.This 
bill provided incentives to expand the production of energy from wind, 
solar, geothermal and biomass sources to promote cleaner alternative 
sources of energy.
  Pete also ensured that this bill promoted research and development of 
hydrogen and fuel-cell technology.
  Pete didn't end the fight for our Nation's energy independence in 
2005 though.Since that time, he has been a leader in the Senate calling 
for more action.
  Before the gas price crisis that is now affecting families across the 
country, Pete sounded the alarm.He has called for bringing relief to 
families struggling with pain at the pump by tapping our own domestic 
supplies of gas and oil.
  Pete has proposed the commonsense proposal--the Gas Price Reduction 
Act--to end our Nation's energy crisis.
  It is this foresight, this leadership, and this passion to making our 
Nation a better place and for making our communities better for our 
families that will make Pete Domenici missed by all--Republicans and 
Democrats alike.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rockefeller). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand there is an order that the 
distinguished Senator from Iowa will be recognized next. But I asked 
him graciously, would he give me a minute to speak in support of the 
United States-India nuclear cooperation agreement. I strongly endorse 
this agreement because as one of those who advocate greater nuclear 
power in our Nation, the industrial base of India will work with our 
industrial base at this time when we need to increase the number of 
plants we have in our Nation.
  The United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act will provide congressional approval of 
the agreement reached between the United States and India that will 
pave the way for bilateral cooperation in civilian nuclear energy. This 
agreement resulted from years of diplomatic negotiations. I note that 
my dear friend, Ambassador Nick Burns, helped lay the foundation for 
this agreement during his tenure as Under Secretary of State for 
Policy.
  As I publicly stated when this agreement was first announced in March 
2006, it is important that as we move to implement this historic 
arrangement with India, we preserve two equally important objectives: a 
strengthened strategic partnership with India that includes mutually 
beneficial cooperation in civilian nuclear energy; and preservation of 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime to prevent the further spread of 
nuclear weapons and related technologies. I believe the bill ably 
crafted by Senators Biden and Lugar seeks to advance both of those 
objectives.
  As part of this agreement, India has agreed to separate its civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle from its military program, and to place the civilian 
program under full safeguards to be monitored by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. This arrangement is intended to ensure that 
cooperation in civil nuclear energy will not assist India's nuclear 
weapons program in any way. India has also agreed to maintain its 
moratorium on nuclear testing, work toward a Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty, and strengthen its domestic nuclear export control laws. The 
bill providing congressional approval for the agreement makes clear 
that in the event India were to test a nuclear weapon in the future, 
cooperation under this agreement would be terminated.
  Facilitating India's development of civilian nuclear energy will make 
an important contribution to a cause I value highly: reducing the 
emission of greenhouse gasses into the environment. As nations such as 
India grow and have increasing requirements for energy, it is 
imperative for the health of our global environment that they turn 
increasingly to clean sources of energy such as nuclear power.
  I am also hopeful that this agreement will open the door to United 
States-India trade and investment in nuclear energy, and lead to new 
business opportunities for American firms with expertise in civilian 
nuclear power. Today, the United States is looking to expand its 
production of civilian nuclear power; to do so with the participation 
of the industrial base of India should help to expand the safe and 
economical production of civilian nuclear energy in both countries.
  Mr. President, I support Senate approval of the United States-India 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement because I believe it will advance the 
United States-India strategic partnership, promote a clean energy 
source to meet India's growing demand for energy, open the door to new 
business opportunities for the U.S. nuclear energy sector, and still 
promote and preserve important nonproliferation practices and 
principles which remain in the interest of the United States and indeed 
the international community.
  I thank the Presiding Officer and my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I come to the floor to express my 
opposition to this deeply unwise United States-India Nuclear 
Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. In truth, 
this is not a nonproliferation enhancement act; it is a 
nonproliferation degradation and weakening act. If we pass this 
legislation, we will reward India for flouting the most important arms 
control agreement in history, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
we will gravely undermine our case against hostile nations that seek to 
do the same.
  At a time when one of our primary national security objectives is to 
mobilize the global community to prevent Iran from producing nuclear 
weapons, the legislation before us would severely undermine our 
credibility and consistency.
  India has refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--
one of only four nations, by the way--and, three decades ago, produced 
its first nuclear weapon. It was precisely for this reason that 
following India's first nuclear test in 1974, the United States felt 
compelled to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  Since the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the United States has prohibited--
has prohibited--the sale of any nuclear technology, peaceful or not, to 
any nation, such as India, that does not have full nuclear safeguards--
full nuclear safeguards. As was pointed out earlier by my colleague 
from North Dakota, Senator Dorgan, right now India has 22 nuclear 
reactors. Under this agreement, only 14 will come under IAEA, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, safeguards--14. What about the 
other eight? What is going to happen to them? They are not under any 
safeguards at all. So, again, we are undermining and we are overturning 
what the United States has been doing for over 50 years.
  The legislation we now have before us permits the United States to 
unilaterally break that ban. It will open the floodgates for other 
nations, such as France and Russia, that already have agreements to 
sell to India pending--pending--the approval of this deal.
  Listen to the views of LTG Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for 
Arms Control and Proliferation. I quote his words:

       The greatest threat to the security of the United States is 
     the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This deal [with India] 
     significantly weakens U.S. and international security by 
     granting an exception to the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group and American laws, thereby undermining the entire non-
     proliferation regime and inviting violations by other 
     nations.

  I would add there is nothing in this agreement to prevent India from 
continuing on a parallel path its robust nuclear weapons program. India 
is allowed to continue producing--to continue producing--bomb-making 
material, and it is free to expand its arsenal of nuclear weapons. Even 
worse, there is nothing in this legislation to prevent India from 
resuming nuclear weapons testing.
  So I ask, why, in the twilight of the Bush Presidency--and we know 
what

[[Page S10208]]

his ratings are and how the people feel about this Presidency--why are 
we rushing to pass this gravely flawed agreement? It was hustled 
through the other body without any hearings and without a vote in the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee. Here in the Senate, the Foreign 
Relations Committee held just one hearing with just one witness who 
spoke in support of the agreement. Until Senators objected, an attempt 
was made to pass the bill on the floor without any debate whatsoever. 
Given the monumental national security implications of this 
legislation--casting aside core principles of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--this lack of debate and due diligence is simply 
extraordinary.
  Leading arms control experts have condemned this agreement. Leonor 
Tomero, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms 
Control and Nonproliferation, rendered this verdict:

       The Bush administration ignored congressional conditions 
     and gave away the store in its negotiations with India, with 
     nothing to show for the deal now except having helped foreign 
     companies, enabled the increase of nuclear weapons and 
     nuclear-weapons materials in India, and seriously eroded a 
     thirty-year norm of preventing nuclear proliferation.

  India is a peaceful nation, a strong democracy, and a friend of the 
United States. I have tremendous respect for India. But there are facts 
that must be acknowledged: India is one of only four states that have 
refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; India continues 
to produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal; India does 
not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all elements 
of its civilian nuclear program; and India has failed to file a list of 
facilities that will be subject to the IAEA safeguards. According to 
the U.S. Department of State, in the past, Indian entities have sold 
sensitive missile technologies to Iran--to Iran--in violation of U.S. 
export control laws.
  I might just add one other thing. It has been said time and time 
again that India is a great friend of the United States. I suggest that 
one go back and look at the votes in the United Nations General 
Assembly and see how many times India votes with the United States and 
has since the establishment of the United Nations. It is dismal. I was 
trying to get that before the debate today, going all the way back. I 
had that at one time. But I can tell you, last year, in 2007, in the 
General Assembly, India voted with the United States 14 percent of the 
time--one of the lowest in the world. This great friend of the United 
States supported us in the United Nations 14 percent of the time. Is 
that a real friend?
  As I said, one more item: India, 22 reactors; only 14 are going to 
come under IAEA safeguards, the other 8 used for military weapons 
programs. Yet, despite this record, the legislation before us would 
give India the rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that 
heretofore have been restricted to members in good standing of the 
nonproliferation treaty.
  As others have pointed out, this would create a dangerous precedent. 
It would create a distinction between kind of ``good'' proliferators 
and ``bad'' proliferators. It would send mixed, misleading signals to 
the international community with regard to what is and is not permitted 
under the nonproliferation treaty. Under this legislation, the United 
States would be saying, in effect, that India is a ``good'' 
proliferator and it should get special favorable treatment. What if, in 
the months ahead, China or Russia decides to recognize Iran as a 
``good'' proliferator? On what grounds would we object, having 
rewritten the rules to suit our own interests and certain special 
interests with regard to India?
  I oppose this legislation. But there is one element of this 
prospective agreement with India that I believe is particularly 
dangerous and needs to be changed. It was talked about earlier. Under 
the 2006 Henry J. Hyde Act, the United States must--must--ban the 
transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to India and it 
must cut off--must cut off--nuclear trade with India if that nation 
resumes nuclear testing. The administration has successfully pressured 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group to approve an India-specific waiver that 
does not incorporate these consequences if India resumes nuclear 
testing. This is virtually an invitation to India to resume nuclear 
testing, secure in the knowledge that a resumption of testing would not 
nullify this new nuclear trade agreement.

  I believe this to be a grave mistake. That is why I am joining with 
Senator Dorgan and Senator Bingaman and others to offer a commonsense 
amendment to this legislation in order to send an unambiguous warning 
to India with regard to resumption of nuclear testing. Our amendment 
states:

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United 
     States may not export, transfer, or retransfer any nuclear 
     technology, material, equipment, or facility under the 
     Agreement if the Government of India detonates a nuclear 
     device after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  It is very simple, very straightforward.
  In order to protect the integrity of the world's nonproliferation 
regime, I urge my colleagues to vote against the United States-India 
nuclear energy cooperation agreement. It will set a dangerous 
precedent, and it will weaken our efforts to deny Iran a nuclear 
weapon. But if nothing else, at least we can adopt the amendment being 
offered by Senator Dorgan and Senator Bingaman and others to say that 
if, in fact, they do detonate a nuclear device, the United States will 
stop any export, transfer, or retransfer of any nuclear technology, 
material, or equipment to India. So, again, I am a realist. I recognize 
that this seems to be on a fast track. It will likely go to passage. So 
to minimize the damage, I urge Senators to support the Dorgan-Bingaman 
amendment which will give India strong incentives not to resume nuclear 
testing.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

                          ____________________