[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 159 (Wednesday, October 1, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10191-S10198]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION 
                            ENHANCEMENT ACT

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now proceed to the consideration of H.R. 7081, which the 
clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 7081) to approve the United States-India 
     Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 
     and for other purposes.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut is 
recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am standing in today, my colleagues should 
be aware, for Senator Biden, who is the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee. As most of the world is aware, he is otherwise 
occupied.
  As the ranking Democrat next to him, I have been asked to assume the 
responsibility of bringing this matter before the Senate. Senator Biden 
has spent a great deal of time on this issue, along with his friend and 
colleague, the former chairman, Senator Lugar, as have other Members as 
well.
  Today we will talk about this issue, the importance of it, the action 
taken by the House of Representatives under the leadership of Howard 
Berman, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of that body.
  I have a letter from the Secretary of State, as well as other 
supporting information, that leads us to the conclusion that this bill 
ought to be passed, and passed, I hope, overwhelmingly by this body 
because of the message it would send not only to the people and the 
Government of India but others as well about the direction we intend to 
take in the 21st century about this matter.
  I will share some opening comments, and I will turn to my colleague, 
Senator Lugar, for any comments he has, and then Senator Dorgan and 
Senator Bingaman--at least two people I know who have amendments they 
wish to have offered. I know they have comments and thoughts they have 
to share on this subject matter as well.
  In addition to Senator Lugar and Senator Biden on the committee, 
there are other Members as well who expressed a strong interest in the 
subject matter--not necessarily an agreement with this proposal but 
nonetheless should be recognized for their diligence in paying 
attention to the issue. Senator Feingold of Wisconsin and Senator 
Barbara Boxer of California have demonstrated a real interest and 
concern about this issue.
  I want to speak for a few minutes about Representative Henry Hyde. I 
was elected with him in 1974 to the House of Representatives. He is no 
longer with us, but nonetheless he made a remarkable contribution as a 
Republican Member of the House of Representatives, not the least of 
which was this one, on the Hyde amendment, which will be discussed, I 
presume, at some length today as we talk about this bill, H.R. 7081, 
the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
Nonproliferation Enhancement Agreement.
  I rise to urge passage of this bill, approving the United States-
India peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. On this past Saturday, 
the House of Representatives passed this bill by a margin of 298 to 
116, a resounding vote in support for this agreement.
  This agreement with India is as important as it is historic. This 
bill enables the United States and India to chart a new course in 
relations between our two great democracies.
  There are compelling geopolitical reasons to move forward with this 
relationship. India has become a major actor in the world.
  Why don't we put up this map. One of the things I thought I would do 
is put up a map. I know everyone knows exactly where these countries 
are located, but I think sometimes it can be helpful to remind people 
of the tremendous importance of India's location in Asia, sharing 
borders with many countries--certainly China and Pakistan and in close 
proximity with Afghanistan, a very fragile part of the world.
  If you look at this map--I will leave it up for a good part of the 
day--you will appreciate, aside from the agreement itself, the 
strategic importance of this relation for the United States.
  India has become a major actor in the world, and it increasingly sees 
itself in concert with other global powers, rather than in opposition 
to them.
  Indian Prime Minister Singh, who visited Washington just last week, 
has devoted energy and political courage in forging this agreement, and 
in seeking approval for it in India. Put simply, he has placed himself 
and his political party on the line.
  In India, the political symbolism of the agreement is extremely 
important. It addresses the most divisive and long-standing issue 
between our two countries dating back to 1974. Most important, the 
agreement addresses India as an equal--a point that looms large in 
India, where there are strong memories of a colonial past and of 
tensions with the United States during the Cold War.
  Some of the debate in India focused on whether the agreement with the 
United States would hamper India's nuclear weapons program. But much of 
the give-and-take was really about a more basic question--whether it 
was really time for India to work cooperatively with Western countries. 
Reaching an accord on nuclear status has been wrenching for India, 
despite the favorable terms that some say India obtained.
  This agreement is indicative of a new era in Indian foreign policy--
an era in which India will see all the world's powers as potential 
partners in efforts to address its own needs and the needs of others. I 
believe that this new era will bring increased stability and progress 
to South Asia. I see the bill before us as approving far more than just 
a nuclear agreement. Among other things, it will set the stage for a 
stronger U.S.-India relationship, which will be of critical importance 
to our country in the 21st century.
  The Committee on Foreign Relations held an in-depth hearing on the 
U.S.-India agreement last month. The committee, along with the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, worked closely with the administration to 
address technical concerns expressed about the agreement. This 
extraordinary consultation resulted in a bill that will improve U.S. 
implementation of the accord and assure that nuclear non-proliferation 
remains at the core of U.S. foreign policy. Our committee approved a 
bill identical to the House-passed bill by a vote of 19-to-2. I commend 
chairman Howard Berman in the House and Senator Lugar for his 
leadership as well.
  This agreement is not a partisan issue. President Clinton launched 
the initiative, and President Bush pushed it to fruition. It had strong 
support on both sides of the aisle in 2006, when we voted on the Henry 
J. Hyde Act, establishing the underlying principles and requirements of 
this accord. Indeed, 85

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members of the Senate supported the Hyde Act, and only 12 voted against 
it. I believe the resulting agreement has strong support today.
  I mentioned Henry Hyde arrived in Congress in 1975, along with some 
74 of us elected in that fall of 1974. I had a wonderful relationship 
with Henry Hyde. We served together in the House and then during our 
respective tenure in that body, and then in this body. As I mentioned 
earlier, Henry Hyde was a remarkable Member of Congress and 
accomplished many things. He was controversial in some ways but a 
person of deep conviction, deep personal convictions, and he brought 
that conviction to everything he engaged in as a matter of public 
policy.
  We probably would not be in as strong a position today to talk about 
this agreement had it not been for the Hyde Act. So I would be remiss 
this morning in discussing this if we didn't pay tribute to Henry Hyde 
and his contribution to this very issue. I want the record to reflect 
my appreciation for the work this man did on behalf of all of us by 
drafting and supporting and insisting upon the adopting of the Hyde 
Act.
  Mr. President, throughout our work on this agreement we have sought 
to address concerns expressed in the United States as well as in India. 
Some nuclear nonproliferation experts have voiced a fear that it would 
lead India--and then India's neighbors--to increase the production of 
nuclear weapons. Some experts have warned that giving India the right 
of peaceful nuclear commerce, despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, could undermine the world's willingness to 
abide by that vital treaty and to enforce compliance with it. We have 
been consistently vigilant to such risks, and the Hyde Act and this 
bill give us the tools to remain so in the future.
  The process that led to the U.S.-India agreement was undertaken with 
an eye to achieving progress on nonproliferation issues. Pursuant to a 
declaration issued in July 2005 by President Bush and Prime Minister 
Singh, it is important to note the following:
  India has improved its export control law and regulations;
  India has moved to adhere to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime;
  India has affirmed that it will not transfer equipment or technology 
for uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing to any country that 
does not already have a full-scale, functioning capability;
  India has reaffirmed, both to the United States and to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
  India has initialed, and intends to sign, a safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA;
  India has begun to negotiate an Additional Protocol to that 
safeguards agreement; and
  India will bring under IAEA safeguards over a dozen existing or 
planned nuclear facilities that were not previously subject to 
safeguards.
  The bill before the Senate provides additional measures that guide 
the implementation of the agreement, and they are worthy of note.
  This agreement reaffirms that our approval of the agreement is based 
on U.S. interpretations of its terms. In other words, it reaffirms that 
President Bush's assurances about fuel supplies are a political 
commitment--and are not legally binding.
  It requires the President to certify that approving this agreement is 
consistent with our obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty not to assist or encourage India to produce nuclear weapons.
  Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue any licenses under 
this agreement, India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA must first 
enter into force. In addition, India must file a declaration of 
civilian nuclear facilities under the safeguards agreement that is not 
``materially inconsistent'' with the separation plan that India issued 
in 2006. We know that there will be some changes, because the 2006 plan 
envisioned safeguards beginning that year--rather than 2 years later. 
But this guards against a declaration that flatly contradicts India's 
promises.
  The bill also requires prompt notification of the Foreign Relations 
Committee if India should diverge from its separation plan in 
implementing its safeguards agreement.
  The bill establishes a procedure for congressional review--and 
possible rejection--of any ``subsequent arrangement'' under the 
agreement that would allow India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel that 
was derived from U.S.-supplied reactor fuel or produced with U.S.-
supplied equipment. Article 6 of the India agreement anticipates such a 
subsequent arrangement if India builds a new reprocessing facility 
dedicated to its civilian nuclear power sector. Congress should have a 
special role in this, because spent fuel reprocessing can produce 
weapons-grade plutonium. This is an improvement over current law, which 
allows such arrangements to take effect 15 days after public notice is 
given in the Federal Register.
  The bill requires the President to certify that it is U.S. policy to 
work in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to achieve further restrictions on 
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment or technology.
  The bill also directs the President to seek international agreement 
on procedures to guard against the diversion of heavy water from 
civilian to military programs. The India agreement has protections for 
heavy water that the United States may supply, or that is produced with 
U.S.-supplied equipment. We need to get supplier countries to adopt 
similar standards. This was the subject of some lengthy conversation at 
the committee hearing on this very matter, talking about the heavy 
water issue and what can be produced by that. I left the hearing 
confident that the administration intends to pursue these matters very 
aggressively.
  The bill requires regular reporting on the executive branch progress 
in its efforts on enrichment and reprocessing limits and protecting 
against heavy water diversion.
  That is a lot to consume. I will be happy to make this available to 
my colleagues to review--staff have worked on this very diligently over 
the last number of years--to respond to any Member or staff member 
about any of this. It is somewhat complicated when you get into the 
issue of heavy water and physics. Nonetheless, there are matters I want 
the Members to be confident about when they consider their vote on this 
very important bill.
  So, again, I wish to thank the administration, and I will ask 
unanimous consent, if I may--this is a letter which we received from 
the State Department, from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 
expressing the strong support of the administration for this agreement.
  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. DODD. As I mentioned earlier, of course, I'd like to express my 
gratitude to Senator Biden for his remarkable work on this effort, 
along with Senator Lugar. Obviously, this team who has worked so 
closely together on so many issues, but this one is of extreme 
importance. Again, I urge my colleagues to be supportive of it. We have 
a chance to get this done.
  There are those who will argue for delaying and waiting later, but I 
think the moment is here. Again, this is an important message to send. 
As I mentioned earlier, I am not sure my colleagues are aware of this, 
but Prime Minister Singh showed remarkable courage as the Prime 
Minister of that country in forging this agreement. I think our 
response to it is important--not that we ought to sign on to it for 
that reason--but it is important, how important this relationship is.
  Again, I draw the attention of my colleagues to this map behind me 
and the central role, geographically, this great and mature democracy 
holds in this part of the world, where in many cases there is something 
far less than a strong and mature democracy. To have a good, strong 
relationship with this great country in this century will be of 
critical importance, I believe, to our safety as a nation and the 
safety of mankind.
  So this agreement transcends a bilateral relationship. It goes far 
deeper than that, reaches far broader than the boundaries of two 
countries separated by the great distance but allows us, for

[[Page S10193]]

the first time in some 35 years, to once again grow closer together as 
two greet democracies.
  The tension between our countries has been there for these past 35 
years. Tonight we will have an opportunity to put that behind us and to 
build a new relationship.
  For that reason, this agreement also has great significance and 
import.

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                      Washington, October 1, 2008.
     Hon. Harry Reid,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Reid: I am writing to express support for the 
     ``United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 
     Nonproliferation Enhancement Act'' (H.R. 7081). I very much 
     appreciate your consideration of this important bill within 
     such an extraordinary timeframe. We would not be asking for 
     such exceptional action if we did not believe it was 
     necessary to complete an initiative on which both the 
     Administration and Congress have worked very hard, and on a 
     thoroughly bipartisan basis, since 2005.
       The U.S.-India nuclear agreement marks the culmination of a 
     decade-long process. Two successive Administrations have 
     sought to improve U.S.-India relations and adapt American 
     policy to India's emergence on the international stage. For 
     the United States, passage of this legislation will clear the 
     way to deepen our strategic relationship with India, open 
     significant opportunities for American firms, help meet 
     India's surging energy requirements in an environmentally 
     friendly manner, and bring India into the global nuclear 
     nonproliferation mainstream.
       I encourage you to pass H.R. 7081 without amendment. The 
     current bill advances the U.S.-India relationship while 
     enhancing nonproliferation efforts worldwide. Amendments 
     would unnecessarily jeopardize the careful progress we have 
     achieved with India at a time when I believe it is important 
     for us to seize the significant momentum we have created in 
     the U.S.-India relationship.
       I understand that some Senators have questions about the 
     impact of an India nuclear test on this initiative. We 
     believe the Indian government intends to uphold the 
     continuation of the nuclear testing moratorium it affirmed to 
     the United States in 2005 and reiterated to the broader 
     international community as recently as September 5, 2008. Let 
     me reassure you that an Indian test, as I have testified 
     publicly, would result in most serious consequences.
       Existing in U.S. law would require an automatic cut-off of 
     cooperation, as well as a number of other sanctions, if India 
     were to test. After 60 continuous session days, the President 
     could waive the termination of cooperation if he determined 
     that the cut-off would be ``seriously prejudicial'' to 
     nonproliferation objectives or ``otherwise jeopardize the 
     common defense and security.'' We believe existing law 
     strikes the proper balance in responding to a nuclear test, 
     and it is consistent with the approach adopted by the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group when it adopted the exception for India in 
     early September.
       Please allow me also to reiterate what I told Congress on 
     April 5, 2006, when this same question arose: ``We've been 
     very clear with the Indians . . . should India test, as it 
     has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate the 
     IAEA safeguard[s] agreements to which it would be adhering, 
     the deal, from our point of view, would at that point be 
     off.''
       Encouraging India's sustained commitment to its moratorium 
     on nuclear testing will be important to the strategic 
     partnership the United States now seeks to build with India. 
     Congress and the Administration have carefully addressed 
     testing concerns in the Hyde Act, the U.S.-India 123 
     Agreement, and the testimony of Administration officials.
       We have an unprecedented and historic opportunity before us 
     to help shape the 21st century for the better. With this 
     legislation in its current form, the Senate can help ensure 
     that the United States and India complete the journey we 
     began together three years ago. You can also help ensure that 
     U.S. industry--just like its international counterparts--is 
     able to engage with India in civil nuclear trade.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Condoleezza Rice.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate Senator Dodd for his 
leadership in the Foreign Relations Committee as we took up this 
historic agreement. He and I both congratulate Prime Minister Singh, 
our President, President Bush, and Secretary Rice for their advocacy.
  This is, indeed, a historic day and a historic moment in the 
relationship between the United States and India, a very important 
partnership for world peace.
  Today we consider the United States-India Peaceful Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement. This is one of the most important strategic 
diplomatic initiatives undertaken in the last decade. By concluding 
this pact, the United States has embraced a long-term outlook that will 
give us new diplomatic options and improved global stability.
  The legislation we are considering approves the 123 Agreement that 
will allow the United States to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation 
with India, while protecting U.S. national security and 
nonproliferation efforts, as well as congressional prerogatives.
  It is an opportunity to build a strategic partnership with a nation, 
India, that shares our democratic values and will exert increasing 
influence on the world stage.
  Last Saturday, September 27, the House of Representatives voted 297 
to 117 to approve this agreement. Senate approval would be the capstone 
to more than 3 years of efforts in the United States and India and 
around the world.
  By embracing this agreement, India's leaders are seeking to open a 
new chapter in the United States-India relations and reverse decades of 
fundamental disagreement over the nonproliferation regime. India has 
created a new national export control system; promised to maintain its 
unilateral nuclear testing moratorium; pledged to work with us to stop 
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies; proposed to 
separate its civilian and military facilities and committed to place 
its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.
  If approved, an agreement will allow India to receive nuclear fuel 
technology and reactors from the United States, benefits that were 
previously denied to India because of its status outside the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  The benefits of this pact are designed to be a lasting incentive for 
India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate 
closely with the United States in stopping proliferation.
  The 123 Agreement was submitted by President Bush on September 10, 
2008. Last week, the Foreign Relations Committee voted 19 to 2 to 
report this bill, approving the agreement to the full Senate. The bill 
the House voted on Saturday was almost identical to the bill approved 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  Now, 2 years ago, the Senate voted 85 to 12 to approve legislation 
that set the parameters for the 123 Agreement we are considering today. 
The House voted 359 to 68 to approve companion legislation. At the 
time, the Foreign Relations Committee undertook an extensive review of 
the agreement and its context. We held three public hearings with 
testimony from 17 witnesses, including our Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice.
  We received a classified briefing from Under Secretaries of State 
Nick Burns and Bob Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with 
experts from the Congressional Research Service, the State Department, 
the intelligence community, and the National Security Council.
  I submitted 174 written questions for the record to the Department of 
State on details of the agreement, and I posted those answers on my Web 
site. The 2006 legislation set the rules for today's consideration of 
the 123 Agreement between the United States and India.
  Unlike the administration's original proposal, the Hyde Act neither 
restricted nor predetermined congressional action on the 123 Agreement.
  We expect India to move quickly to negotiate a new safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA and then to seek consensus from the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group in accordance with the Hyde Act. Unfortunately, 
domestic political divisions in India led to a delay of almost 2 years.
  Final action on these two tasks was not completed until earlier this 
month. India engaged and obtained the approval of a new safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA on August 1. Nuclear Suppliers Group consensus 
was received on September 6. Since that time, the administration and 
both Houses of Congress have worked diligently to evaluate the 
agreements, answer questions from Members of Congress, and move the 
process forward.
  The Hyde Act required the President to report to Congress on whether 
India had met seven determinations which are as follows: India has 
provided the United States and the IAEA with a separation plan for its 
civilian and military facilities and filed a declaration regarding 
civilian facilities with the IAEA; India has concluded all legal steps 
prior to signature for its safeguards agreement in perpetuity with the 
IAEA; India and the IAEA are making substantial progress in completing

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an additional protocol; India is working actively with the United 
States to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty; India is working 
with and supporting the United States to prevent the spread of 
enrichment and reprocessing technology; and, India is taking the 
necessary steps to secure nuclear materials and technology; and, the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
India of nuclear items under an exception to their guidelines.
  Now, 2 weeks ago at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns, Acting Under 
Secretary Joan Rood, and the lead U.S. Negotiator, Richard Stratford, 
provided detailed analysis of the agreement. Members were able to 
examine the documents accompanying the 123 Agreement and ask questions 
of witnesses about the Hyde Act, the 123 Agreement's text, the new 
safeguards agreement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group decision.
  I am convinced the President has met all the required determinations 
under the Hyde Act. However, the congressional review of the agreement 
demonstrated that two issues required provisions in the legislation 
before us.
  First, India has not identified in the text of its IAEA safeguards 
agreement those facilities it will place under safeguards. India has 
provided a plan for the separation of facilities from its nuclear 
weapons program to the IAEA, but the plan is nonbinding and appears 
outdated.
  This is not what Congress understood would happen when we approved 
the Hyde Act. Indeed, in 2006, the administration requested bill 
language calling on India to file ``a declaration regarding its civil 
facilities with the IAEA.''
  The safeguards agreement containing that declaration was to enter 
into force before submission of the 123 Agreement to Congress.
  Under the Hyde Act, India and the IAEA must conclude:

       All legal steps required prior to signature by the parties 
     of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards 
     in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, 
     and practices . . . to India's civil nuclear facilities, 
     materials, and programs. . . . including materials used in or 
     produced through the use of India's civil nuclear facilities.

  The purpose of this complex provision was to secure the most complete 
version possible of the safeguards agreement for congressional review. 
We intended that it be submitted as part of the Presidential 
determination and waiver report required by the Hyde Act. 
Unfortunately, by not naming the facilities in the safeguards 
agreement, there is an open question as to when India will act. This 
has legal implications because the United States is prohibited by law 
and our NPT obligations from having nuclear trade with any facility not 
named in India's safeguards agreement.
  In response to this issue, Section 104 of the bill before us requires 
that licenses may not be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
for transfer of nuclear fuel, equipment and technology until after the 
President determines and certifies to Congress that, one, the 
safeguards agreement approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on August 
1, 2008, has entered into force; and, two, India has filed a 
declaration of facilities that is not materially inconsistent with the 
facilities and schedules described in its separation plan.
  The second issue that required a new provision in this legislation is 
India's desire to reprocess spent nuclear fuel burned in its reactors, 
including fuel from the United States. Reprocessing can result in the 
separation of plutonium, which can be used in a nuclear weapon.
  The United States permits some NPT members with long histories of 
strong compliance with the IAEA agreement to reprocess U.S.-origin 
spent nuclear fuel through a process called programmatic consent.
  During negotiations on the 123 Agreement, India requested 
programmatic consent and the United States agreed. However, the United 
States made programmatic consent contingent on India establishing a 
dedicated facility to carry out the reprocessing and an agreement on 
reprocessing procedures in this new facility.
  During the formulations hearings, I asked Acting Under Secretary John 
Rood if the arrangement that would be negotiated with India to permit 
reprocessing would be submitted to Congress for review.
  Mr. Rood stated: `` . . . yes, that's required under the Atomic 
Energy Act.''
  Permitting spent nuclear fuel from the United States to be 
reprocessed in India is a complex matter that requires careful 
implementation. The bill before us today does not block negotiations on 
such arrangements with India. However, the bill does require a future 
administration to submit such a ``subsequent arrangement'' to Congress 
which would have the power to pass a resolution of disapproval.
  By addressing these two important matters, I believe this legislation 
improves congressional oversight for future nuclear cooperation with 
India and corrects a problem related to the new safeguards agreement 
India has with the IAEA.
  In conclusion, I strongly urge my colleagues to approve the United 
States-India agreement. The national security and economic future of 
the United States will be enhanced by a strong and enduring bipartisan 
with India.
  With a well-educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S. 
population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and an engine 
of global economic growth.
  Moreover, the United States has a strong interest in expanding energy 
cooperation with India to develop new technologies, cut greenhouse gas 
emissions, and prepare for declining global fossil fuel reserves.
  The United States' own energy problems will be exacerbated if we do 
not forge energy partnerships with India, China, and other nations 
experiencing rapid economic growth. This legislation will promote much 
closer United States-Indian relations while preserving the priority of 
our nonproliferation efforts. We should surely move forward now.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska). The Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield time to the Senator from North 
Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the tragedy of 9/11 is indelibly imprinted 
on the minds of all of us. What is not so well understood or remembered 
was that one month later, October 2001, something else happened. Graham 
Allison, someone who has worked on nonproliferation in the Clinton 
administration, has written a book about it. Time magazine wrote about 
it in March of 2002.
  Here is what they said: A month after 9/11, for a few harrowing 
weeks, a group of U.S. officials believed the worst nightmare of their 
lives--something even more horrific than 9/11--was about to come true. 
In October of 2001, an intelligence report went out to a small number 
of government agencies, including the Energy Department's top secret 
nuclear emergency search team based in Nevada.
  This is a Time report, but I have it also in a book written by Graham 
Allison.
  The report said that terrorists were thought to have obtained a 10-
kiloton nuclear weapon from the Russian arsenal and that they planned 
to smuggle it into New York City. The source of the report was a CIA 
agent named Dragonfire. Dragonfire's report actually was something that 
was claimed to be undetermined in terms of reliability. But it was 
something the CIA agent named Dragonfire had picked up. Dragonfire's 
claim tracked with a report from a Russian general who believed his 
forces were missing a 10-kiloton device. Since the mid-1990s, 
proliferation experts have wondered whether several portable nuclear 
devices might be missing from the Russian stockpile. That made the 
Dragonfire report all that more alarming. Detonation of a 10-kiloton 
nuclear weapon in downtown New York would kill about 100,000 civilians, 
irradiate 700,000 more, and flatten everything for a half a mile.
  So the counterterrorist investigators went on the highest alert, we 
are told. The search team went to New York City. It was kept secret so 
as not to panic the people of New York. Mayor Giuliani was not 
informed. If terrorists had managed to smuggle a nuclear weapon into 
New York City, the question was, could they detonate it. About

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a month later, after this report from a CIA agent named Dragonfire of a 
nuclear weapon having been stolen by terrorists, smuggled into New York 
City, about to be detonated, about to kill massive numbers of people, 
it was determined that perhaps this was not a credible intelligence 
report. But in the postmortem evaluation, they determined it is 
plausible to have believed a Russian nuclear weapon could have been 
stolen. It is plausible to believe, having stolen it, terrorists could 
have smuggled it into New York City, and plausible to believe they 
could have detonated it; one low-yield nuclear weapon. There are 25,000 
of them on this planet. Think of the apoplectic seizure that occurred 
in October of 2001 over a report by a CIA agent that he picked up some 
information about one low-yield nuclear weapon being smuggled into New 
York City. There are 25,000 nuclear weapons on this Earth.
  Our job is to provide the leadership to begin to reduce the number of 
nuclear weapons. The bill before us will almost certainly expand the 
production of nuclear weapons by India.
  Here is what it says to India: Even as we take apart the basic 
architecture of nonproliferation efforts, the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty, which India is one of three countries that has never signed, 
even as we take that nonproliferation architecture apart with this 
bill, we have said to India, with this agreement, you can misuse 
American nuclear technology and secretly develop nuclear weapons. That 
is what they did. You can test those weapons. That is what they did. 
You can build a nuclear arsenal in defiance of United Nations 
resolutions and international sanctions. After testing, 10 years later, 
all will be forgiven, and you will be welcome into the club of nuclear 
powers without ever having signed the nonproliferation treaty.
  Let's understand what this does. First, let me say that never has 
something of such moment and such significance and so much importance 
been debated in such a short period and given such short shrift: one 
very brief committee hearing in the Senate and a total of a couple of 
hours here on the Senate floor today; pretty disappointing.
  What this agreement says is, India needs various kinds of equipment 
and technology to produce and build nuclear powerplants. They need more 
power, and they want to get it from nuclear powerplants. They have been 
prevented from accessing the kind of material and equipment to produce 
those plants because they have not signed the nonproliferation treaty, 
and they developed nuclear weapons outside of the purview of all of us, 
misusing American nuclear technology to secretly develop these weapons. 
Now we have said in an agreement with them, yes, we will allow big 
companies now to sell you this technology--this is all about big 
companies being able to access a new marketplace for technology, to 
sell the technology and the capability to develop nuclear powerplants--
we will allow you to do that, and we will have the opportunity in this 
agreement for you to put eight of your plants behind a curtain that 
will have no international inspections, which is a green light to say, 
you may produce additional nuclear weapons.
  That is not just a supposition. Almost everybody understands that is 
going to happen. This agreement does not prohibit them from nuclear 
tests in a way that would nullify the agreement, if they do test. The 
Administration's interpretation of this agreement is very ambiguous 
about that.
  I want to go through a couple of points. India would have unlimited 
ability to import fuel for 14 civilian powerplants under this 
agreement. That is what they want. They want to produce additional 
power with nuclear plants. Then it says India could have eight other 
power reactors behind a curtain that we will not be able to inspect. 
India can then divert its entire domestic fuel supply to eight military 
reactors to produce additional nuclear weapons.
  What does that mean? It is our agreeing that India, that has never 
signed the nonproliferation treaty and has tested nuclear weapons and 
developed nuclear weapons in secret using our technology, is now given 
an agreement that allows them to build more nuclear weapons. Their 
neighbor is Pakistan, also possessing nuclear weapons. Pakistan warned 
the international community yesterday that a deal allowing India to 
import United States atomic fuel and technology could accelerate the 
nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have 
fought three wars since independence from Britain in 1947 and, through 
a peace process, have stabilized relations since 2004, but they remain 
deeply distrustful of each other. We have now reached an agreement that 
says one of them may begin to produce additional nuclear weapons.
  UPI--Islamabad, Pakistan: Without naming sources, the Press Trust 
reported Wednesday that the Pakistani Prime Minister has reported 
construction of two nuclear powerplants with Chinese assistance. The 
move appears aimed at counterbalancing a nuclear fuel deal negotiated 
with India. The decision was made on September 19 in Islamabad. The 
point is, we will allow you to put eight reactors behind a curtain. We 
will allow you to produce additional nuclear weapons that we won't know 
about. Is there a reaction to that? Pakistan has a reaction, to engage 
with the Chinese.
  The United States had agreed that the purpose of the agreement was 
not to contain India's strategic program but to enable resumption of 
full civil nuclear energy cooperation. So that is the India separation 
plan. That is what they say. They say the United States and India 
agreed the purpose of the agreement is not to constrain India's 
strategic program. That means they say the agreement is to not 
constrain India's ability to produce nuclear weapons. That is what that 
means.

  I am going to offer an amendment today that the managers will oppose. 
The conferees believe there should be no ambiguity regarding the legal 
and policy consequences of any future Indian test of a nuclear 
explosive device. That is from a joint statement of the conference of 
the Hyde Act which passed the Congress. There should be no ambiguity. 
Here is what the Administration says it thinks the agreement provides: 
Should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the United States has 
the right to cease all nuclear cooperation. Well, we know we have the 
right. Are we going to do it? No. That is deliberate ambiguity to say 
if India were to test a nuclear weapon, there is nothing that will 
require us to decide to nullify this agreement.
  Let me say again, the India Prime Minister says the agreement does 
not in any way affect India's right to undertake future nuclear tests, 
if necessary.
  This is a planet with 25,000 nuclear weapons, tactical and strategic. 
The suspected loss or stealing of one caused an apoplectic seizure in 
October of 2001. We have 25,000 of them. Our job as an international 
leader, a world leader, our job is to begin marching back from the 
abyss; that is, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Instead we are 
taking apart the basic architecture of nuclear nonproliferation that 
has served us for many decades. We are saying to India, who has never 
signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, it is OK if you produce 
additional nuclear weapons we can't see and we don't know about. We are 
going to sign an agreement that allows you to do that. That is almost 
unbelievable.
  India is a very important trading partner. India is a very important 
ally for our country. I believe that. I accept that. But this 
administration and those in the Congress who have agreed to the measure 
before us today are making a grievous mistake. We will not have second 
chances with respect to this issue of nuclear weapons. If we don't 
provide the world leadership to begin marching back from the prospect 
of terrorists using nuclear weapons, the prospect of nuclear weapons 
being stolen and developed by terrorist organizations, we will one day 
wake up and tragically read that a nuclear weapon was exploded in a 
major city on this planet. This agreement marches in exactly the wrong 
direction. Do you think this agreement allowing India to produce 
additional nuclear weapons has no impact on Pakistan, has no impact on 
China, has no message to the rest of the world? The message is: You can 
misuse American nuclear technology and secretly develop nuclear 
weapons. You can test those weapons. You can build a nuclear arsenal in 
defiance of United Nations resolutions, and

[[Page S10196]]

you will be welcomed as someone exhibiting good behavior with an 
agreement with the United States. What kind of message is that? What 
message does that send to others who want to join the nuclear club who 
say: You have nuclear weapons, we want some.
  If we don't find a way to begin systematically reducing the number of 
nuclear weapons and stop the spread of nuclear weapons and try to find 
every way to prevent a nuclear weapon from ever again being exploded in 
anger on this planet, one day we will ruefully regret what we have done 
here.
  Again, let me close by saying that never in my life has such a large 
issue been given such short shrift. This issue has great consequences 
for this country, the world, and their respective futures for that 
matter, and this administration is, in my judgment, making a very 
serious mistake.
  Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I inquire of my colleague from North Dakota, 
is it the intent of the Senator to offer an amendment at this time or 
is it later this morning, or what is my colleague and friend's plan?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Connecticut, I 
am waiting for the Senator from New Mexico to come to the floor. What 
we are going to do is we are going to combine our two amendments.
  Mr. DODD. OK.
  Mr. DORGAN. We will still wish to take the 30 minutes each, but we 
will combine the two amendments and have a vote on one amendment, 
provided, of course, that meets unanimous consent. But I will, in a few 
moments, be ready to consume my half hour on this subject if that is 
your desire. I want to wait for Senator Bingaman to come in order to 
consult. He should be here momentarily.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in his absence, why don't we wait. My plan 
would be to have you do that and make your statements, and I will 
respond to them at the appropriate time.
  So I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, Senator Bingaman and I will be combining 
our amendments into a Dorgan-Bingaman amendment, with other cosponsors, 
and that is now being put together by legislative counsel. So we will 
have that here briefly. But why don't I proceed with my 30 minutes. I 
think Senator Bingaman will have 30 minutes. Then apparently there is 
going to be a response following that, and we will conclude a portion 
of this debate.
  So, Mr. President, on the 30 minutes I now have available, let me 
read to my colleagues something written by Graham Allison. Graham 
Allison is someone who has been involved in nuclear nonproliferation 
with the Clinton administration. He wrote this in a book, and this, by 
the way, is published in an article. I want to read it. I will quote 
it:

       One month after the terrorist assault on the World Trade 
     Center and the Pentagon, on October 11, 2001, President 
     George W. Bush faced a more terrifying prospect. At that 
     morning's presidential daily intelligence briefing, George 
     Tenet, the director of central intelligence, informed the 
     president that a CIA agent codenamed ``Dragonfire'' had 
     reported that Al Qaeda terrorists possessed a 10-kiloton 
     nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the Russian arsenal. 
     According to Dragonfire, this nuclear weapon was in New York 
     City.

  Continuing to quote:

       The government dispatched a top-secret nuclear emergency 
     support team to the city. Under a cloak of secrecy that 
     excluded even Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, these nuclear ninjas 
     searched for the bomb. On a normal workday, half a million 
     people crowd the area within a half-mile radius of Times 
     Square. A noon detonation in Midtown Manhattan would kill 
     them all instantly. Hundreds of thousands of others would die 
     from collapsing buildings, fire and fallout in the hours 
     thereafter.

  Continuing to quote:

       In the hours that followed, Condoleezza Rice, then national 
     security adviser, analyzed what strategists call the 
     ``problem from hell.'' Unlike the Cold War, when the US and 
     the Soviet Union knew that an attack against the other would 
     elicit a retaliatory strike of greater measure, Al Qaeda--
     with no return address--had no such fear of reprisal. Even if 
     the president were prepared to negotiate, Al Qaeda has no 
     phone number to call.

  Again, continuing to quote:

       Concerned that Al Qaeda could have smuggled a nuclear 
     weapon into Washington as well, the president ordered Vice 
     President Dick Cheney to leave the capital for an 
     ``undisclosed location,'' where he would remain for weeks to 
     follow--standard procedure to ensure ``continuity of 
     government''. . . .
       Six months earlier the CIA's Counterterrorism Center had 
     picked up chatter in Al Qaeda channels about an ``American 
     Hiroshima.'' The CIA knew that Osama bin Laden's fascination 
     with nuclear weapons went back at least to 1992, when he 
     attempted to buy highly enriched uranium from South Africa. . 
     . .
       As CIA analysts examined Dragonfire's report and compared 
     it with other bits of information, they noted that the 
     September attack on the World Trade Center had set the bar 
     higher for future terrorist attacks. . . .
       As it turned out, Dragonfire's report proved to be a false 
     alarm. But the central takeaway from the case is this: The US 
     government had no grounds in science or logic to dismiss this 
     possibility, nor could it do so today.

  Now, think of that. That is a discussion about one low-yield 10 
kiloton nuclear weapon allegedly stolen from the Russian stockpile, 
smuggled into New York to be detonated by terrorists--one nuclear 
weapon. There are 25,000 on this Earth. One small weapon caused an 
apoplectic seizure about the prospect of hundreds of thousands of 
people being killed.
  What does that have to do with this? Well, what it has to do with 
this is we have struggled since the end of the Second World War to try 
to put a cap on the bottle here and make sure a nuclear weapon is never 
again exploded in anger--not by a military power, not by a terrorist 
group. We have tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We have 
tried to see if we could find a way to reduce the number of nuclear 
weapons. We have created something called the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the NPT. We have created something called the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, which I regret to say our country has not ratified. But we have 
tried to find ways to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, stop the 
building of additional nuclear weapons.
  One of three countries that did not sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
was India. They refused to sign it. In these intervening years, what we 
have discovered about India--a respected ally of ours, a trading 
partner of ours, a country we hold in high esteem--we have discovered 
that they misused American nuclear technology to secretly develop their 
own nuclear weapons. We have discovered that they tested those nuclear 
weapons. They have defied the United Nations resolutions and 
international sanctions.
  Now we have discovered that an agreement has been reached with the 
Government of India that all will be forgiven. We will sign a new 
agreement with you--that I believe unwinds and undoes the entire 
architecture of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. All will be 
forgiven. In fact, what we will do is we will say to you that you can 
create nuclear powerplants because you need nuclear power, and our 
corporations and international corporations can sell--this is about 
business, a lot of business--can sell to you the technology and the 
construction materials to produce nuclear powerplants. And, oh, by the 
way, the agreement also says you can have eight nuclear powerplants 
that are behind a curtain that will never be inspected by international 
inspectors. That is where you can produce additional nuclear weapons, 
which the Indian Government wishes to do.

  This agreement is an unbelievable mistake. At exactly the moment when 
this country should exhibit its leadership, its world leadership that 
is required of this country to not only stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons but to begin marching back to reduce the number of nuclear 
weapons, at this exact time, this Government, this administration and 
this Congress, is saying to an ally: We will give you the green light 
to produce more nuclear weapons even though you have never signed the 
nonproliferation treaty. That is almost unbelievable to me.

[[Page S10197]]

  The nonproliferation treaty prohibits peaceful nuclear assistance to 
so-called nonnuclear states unless they agree to put all their 
facilities under international safeguards and give up the option of 
producing nuclear weapons. With this agreement, we say that does not 
matter anymore. It does not matter. You do not have to subject these 
eight plants to international safeguards. You do not have to give up 
the option of producing nuclear weapons.
  The five traditional nuclear powers in the post-Second World War 
period--Russia, the United States, Britain, France, and China--all have 
signed the nonproliferation treaty. All other countries are considered 
to be nonnuclear states according to the nonproliferation treaty.
  Article I of the NPT obligates the recognized nuclear weapon states, 
including the United States, ``not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any non-nuclear weapons State to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons. . . .'' With this agreement, we have decided 
that does not matter. We have no intention to pay attention to Article 
I any longer.
  Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act requires all states other than 
the five I mentioned to have full-scope safeguards as a prerequisite 
for receiving U.S. civil nuclear exports. That does not matter anymore.
  Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act requires the termination of 
nuclear exports if a nonnuclear weapon state has, among other things, 
tested nuclear weapons after 1978. We have said that does not matter 
anymore.
  Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act requires sanctions on any 
nonnuclear weapon state that has detonated a nuclear device. That 
doesn't matter anymore. The United Nations Security Council resolution 
1172 condemned India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests. The United 
States-India agreement says that none of these provisions will be 
applicable to India anymore, even though it secretly used our 
technology to develop nuclear weapons and then tested them.

  Now, a working nuclear bomb can be produced with as little as 35 
pounds of uranium 235 or 9 pounds of plutonium 239. I think nuclear 
terrorism and the threat of nuclear terrorists gaining access to 
nuclear weapons represent the gravest security threats to our Nation, 
bar none.
  Retired GEN Gene Habiger, who commanded America's nuclear forces, has 
said that nuclear terrorism ``is not a matter of if; it is a matter of 
when.''
  In 2006, Henry Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post:

       The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that 
     nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national 
     armament and wind up in terrorist hands.

  It will become a standard part of armament for countries, because 
they want to possess it, and it will inevitably end up in terrorist 
hands.
  Former Senator Sam Nunn wrote in the Wall Street Journal:

       We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear materials--
     enriched uranium or plutonium--to build a nuclear weapon. We 
     know that if they get that material they can build a nuclear 
     weapon. We believe that if they build such a weapon, they 
     will use it. We know terrorists are not likely to be 
     deterred, and that the more this nuclear material is 
     available, the higher the risks.

  We know Osama bin Laden has been seeking the opportunity and the 
materials to build nuclear weapons since the early 1990s. In 1998, 
Osama bin Laden issued a statement titled ``The Nuclear Bomb of 
Islam,'' declaring:

       It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as 
     possible to terrorize the enemies of God.

  I described the book entitled ``Nuclear Terrorism'' written by Graham 
Allison, an official in the Clinton administration who worked on these 
issues: The potential stealing of one low-yield weapon terrorizing the 
country and a city.
  Nowhere is the threat of nuclear terrorism more imminent than in 
South Asia. It is home to al-Qaida, which is seeking nuclear weapons. 
It is an area where Pakistan and China and India have always had tense 
relations. All three possess nuclear weapons. India and China fought a 
border war in 1962. India and Pakistan have fought three major wars and 
had two smaller scale contests. Both detonated nuclear explosions in 
1998 and declared themselves a nuclear power. After that, the world 
held its breath while India and Pakistan fought a limited war in 
Kashmir. India is thought to have a modest cache of nuclear weapons at 
this point. You can go to the journals and get estimates of 25 to 50 or 
60 nuclear weapons, but India wants more.
  It seems to me that to do this in the absence of an understanding of 
what it means in the region, and in the absence of what it means to 
unravel the regime by which we have tried to move toward 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is a dangerous step.
  I wish to describe something The New York Times wrote yesterday, and 
I fully agree: President Bush and his aides were so eager for a foreign 
policy success they didn't even try to get India to limit its weapons 
program in the future. They got no promise from India to stop producing 
bomb-making material, no promise not to expand its arsenal, and no 
promise not to resume nuclear testing. The Senate should postpone 
action until the next Congress can figure out how to limit the damage 
from this deal.
  I fully agree with that. I don't have any understanding why we are 
rushing--with one short hearing before one committee in this Congress--
to a short, truncated version on the floor of the Senate, and then 
agreement.
  Here is the agreement: India would have unlimited ability to import 
fuel for 14 civilian nuclear powerplants, and it could then divert all 
of its current domestic fuel supply to 8 military reactors which are 
used for nuclear weapons production, with no international inspection 
at all.
  If anyone thinks this makes sense for our country, I think there is 
something wrong with that thinking.
  Will it have a consequence with respect to Pakistan? I expect so. 
Pakistan warned the international community in July that a deal 
allowing India to import United States atomic fuel and technology could 
accelerate a nuclear arms race between Delhi and Islamabad. They have 
fought substantial wars before, as I said.
  So what does Pakistan do? They go off and they will seek nuclear fuel 
assistance from China to build 10 nuclear powerplants. Will they be 
inspected? The move appears aimed at counterbalancing a nuclear fuel 
deal negotiated this year between India and Western suppliers.
  Paragraph 5 of the India separation plan says: The United States and 
India--this is India's portion of the agreement--had agreed that the 
purpose of the agreement was not to constrain India's strategic 
program.
  That is a fancy way of saying their understanding is we are not 
constraining their ability to produce additional nuclear weapons.
  Now, the Hyde Act passed the Congress and allowed this negotiation to 
take place. I didn't vote for it. I was one of a minority who didn't 
vote for it because it had some huge holes in it, but here is what the 
conferees said:

       The conferees believe there should be no ambiguity 
     regarding the legal and policy consequences of any future 
     testing of a nuclear explosive device by India.

  That is what they said. Here is how the Administration interprets the 
agreement that is on the floor of the Senate:

       Should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the 
     United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation 
     with India.

  We already have that right. But is that ambiguous? It surely is. The 
Administration doesn't say we are going to shut down or nullify this 
agreement; it says we have the right to.
  The proposition of the Hyde amendment that passed the Congress said 
it should be unambiguous. No ambiguity. Yet the Administration is 
deliberately being ambiguous so that if India tests a nuclear weapon, 
that country may still not be subject to sanctions.
  The BJP, which may be India's next ruling party, says:

       The BJP would like to clearly reiterate that any compromise 
     on India's right to nuclear test is wholly unacceptable. 
     Finally, the agreement does not in any way affect India's 
     right to undertake future nuclear tests, if necessary.

  This last statement was from the Prime Minister of India. Do we need 
to say more about what might or might not be here?
  Senator Bingaman and I are offering an amendment, the Dorgan-Bingaman 
amendment, with a good number of cosponsors, that makes clear two 
things. No. 1: If India would test, it would nullify this agreement 
with respect to United States cooperation. No. 2: Senator Bingaman has 
added--and we are

[[Page S10198]]

putting them together--if India were to test a nuclear weapon, the 
export controls we can enact to deal with other suppliers around the 
world and their dealings with India should be fully utilized.
  Let me go back to where I started for a bit. Probably all of my 
colleagues have been in the same discussions. I hear people say nuclear 
weapons are like any other weapon. I hear people say nuclear weapons 
are usable. I hear people say we need to build new nuclear weapons here 
in our country. We need to build bunker-buster weapons, nuclear weapons 
that can go under and bust some caves; Earth-penetrating bunker-buster 
weapons. Designer nuclear weapons. We have all heard it. This 
administration has wanted to build new designer nuclear weapons.

  Some believe a nuclear weapon is like any other weapon. It is not. It 
can never be used. To the extent and when it is used, if it is used by 
a terrorist group or country, nothing on this Earth will be the same.
  It was different in the 1940s. The last time a nuclear weapon was 
used in anger, outside of tests, was to end the Second World War. Then 
virtually no one else had nuclear weapons. Now we have nuclear weapons 
spread around this globe. This country has assumed the responsibility 
for many years--the mental responsibility to try to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons. It is a desperate attempt to say: You know what. The 
only way this planet is going to continue is if we stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons. Does anybody think if people start lobbing nuclear 
weapons back and forth, killing millions of people, that this planet 
survives? I don't. We have 25,000 of them on this planet, and we are 
going to sign up to an agreement today that says let's produce more? 
Not us, although we have people here who want to produce more in this 
country. This says let India produce more in secret. What does that 
mean to Pakistan? What does that mean to China? What does that mean to 
that South Asian region? What does it mean to the world?
  This is such a truncated debate and such a shame. There are a lot of 
very interesting, qualified, serious people who ought to be weighing in 
on this to describe what we are doing here today in terms of the 
consequences to this planet. What are the consequences to the regime 
that has existed for many years--five or six decades now--to try to 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons?
  I had a hearing one day in my appropriations subcommittee, because we 
fund the nuclear weapons portion of the appropriations process in the 
Department of Energy. In that hearing, someone described the fact that 
the last time a nuclear weapon was used in a conflict was in 1945, and 
it has been all of these decades--all of these decades--that we have 
constrained the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviets and the U.S. built 
massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons under a doctrine called Mutually 
Assured Destruction, believing that if either attacked the other, the 
retaliation would essentially destroy both. The original attack would 
inflict massive damage on the country that was attacked, but the 
country that was attacked would also retaliate in a manner that 
virtually obliterated the attacking country. So that mutually assured 
destruction represented a standoff during the Cold War with the Soviet 
Union.
  In the meantime, other countries aspired to become nuclear weapons 
powers, to obtain nuclear weapons, and to this day not only do many 
countries still desire these things, but now terrorists do as well. So 
the question is, Who is going to step us back from this cliff? We have 
a former Secretary of Defense who believes there is about a 50-percent 
chance that a nuclear weapon--I believe he said a 50-percent chance--
will be exploded in a major city within 10 years. I don't doubt that 
could be the prospect if we don't use all of our energy and all of our 
leadership capability as a leading nuclear power in this world--a 
nuclear weapons power in this world--to try to march back from 25,000 
nuclear weapons to far fewer nuclear weapons; to try to put up walls by 
which we will not allow people or countries to proliferate nuclear 
weapons.
  We have a man in Pakistan who is under house arrest, and has been for 
a long while, Mr. A. Q. Khan, who apparently is a national hero of 
sorts in Pakistan. He spread nuclear secrets all around the world for 
money. Our country has never even been able to interview him, to talk 
to him, to understand where these secrets went. As I said, he is not in 
prison, he is under house arrest. He is still considered a hero by 
some.
  We have to get serious about this issue of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. We are not getting serious about an issue such as this 
by dismantling the very structure that has helped us now for some 60 
years to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or at least prevent the 
use of nuclear weapons.
  In the Appropriations Committee hearing I described earlier, I said: 
We have been lucky, and someone said: Well, it is much more than luck. 
I said: I agree it is more than luck. It is a regime, it is a structure 
of nonproliferation that we have worked on. Many administrations worked 
seriously in this area.
  This administration, regrettably, appointed people to positions of 
authority on nuclear nonproliferation who didn't believe in the 
mission. They didn't even believe in the mission. The question for us 
now is: Is this the way forward, to take apart the structure?
  When I said we have been lucky, what I meant was that the structure 
has certainly helped, but we are going to need more than that. We are 
going to need some good fortune. If we think we can live on a planet 
with 25,000 nuclear weapons, that somehow, some way, some day, somebody 
is not going to steal one and detonate it in a major city--we have to 
be serious about this.
  India is a wonderful country. India is an ally of ours. It is an ally 
of the United States. But that should not justify our deciding to give 
a green light to India--a country which has never signed the 
nonproliferation treaty--give the green light to produce more nuclear 
weapons. That is exactly what this agreement does. No one can stand up 
in this discussion and say: This agreement doesn't allow a country that 
has refused to sign the nonproliferation treaty, this agreement does 
not allow them to produce more nuclear weapons. It does on its face, 
and everybody knows it. Everybody wants to pretend as though it doesn't 
exist.
  This is a horrible mistake. I am enormously surprised, after so many 
decades of people talking and thinking seriously about nuclear 
nonproliferation, that we reward those countries that misuse nuclear 
technology in order to secretly produce nuclear weapons and secretly 
test nuclear weapons. We now say to them: By the way, here is your 
reward, an agreement by which you can continue to do it; an agreement 
which is written in a way that says we will allow you to produce more 
nuclear weapons and, oh, by the way, if you test, we won't even put in 
the agreement that we will nullify it. An agreement we might nullify. 
We ought to put in the agreement, ``We will,'' which was promised in 
the conference report.

  So maybe I am not capable of understanding the world view of some 
that allowing an ally of the United States, that has not signed the 
nonproliferation treaty, to produce additional nuclear weapons is 
somehow strengthening our country or the world or is good for us. Maybe 
I missed something, but I don't think so. I think what is missing is 
the logic and the commitment to nonproliferation of those who 
negotiated this. What is missing is the determination and the 
relentless effort by this country to lead in the direction of reducing 
the number of nuclear weapons and not allowing the production of more.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time. How much time do I 
have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Casey). Five minutes.
  Mr. DORGAN. I reserve the remaining 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I have a consent agreement that would 
combine the two amendments. I ask unanimous consent that the order with 
respect to H.R. 7081 be modified to provide that the Dorgan and 
Bingaman amendments be combined into one amendment; that all debate 
time specified previously remain available and the amendment be subject 
to the 60-vote threshold, as provided under the previous agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.




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