[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 157 (Monday, September 29, 2008)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2156]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page E2156]]
 UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION 
                            ENHANCEMENT ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                          HON. ADAM B. SCHIFF

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 26, 2008

  Mr. SCHIFF.  Mr. Speaker, my friend and colleague from California, 
Chairman Berman, has work tirelessly over the last year to make this 
deal better. He has been a great champion of nonproliferation in this 
House, and he has led many efforts to prod and question the Bush 
administration on the negotiations with India--pressing for a deal that 
would enhance our relationship with the world's largest democracy while 
protecting the global nonproliferation regime and our interests around 
world. Unfortunately, the administration resisted many of his efforts, 
and those of others, and I am forced to oppose the final package.
  I believe that our relationship with India is one of our most 
important. Our interests are inextricably linked, and our economies 
draw ever closer. In the past, that relationship has been strained by 
the issue of nuclear proliferation--India never signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, and continues to build nuclear weapons. The 
agreement we vote on today began as a valiant attempt to bring India 
into the nuclear mainstream, while binding our business communities 
closer together. Unfortunately, it has ended with an agreement that 
falls short of either goal: the safeguards are not strong enough, the 
incentive for other nations to proliferate is too great, and while 
opening India's nuclear market to the world, it places American 
companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to French and Russian 
firms.
  Even worse, the ``deal'' is not really a deal at all. The Indian 
government and the Administration have been issuing contradictory 
statements about it for the past year. This is not a problem of each 
side interpreting the treaty differently--the two sides have apparently 
signed two different treaties. The next time India has a new 
government, which could be as early as this winter, it may withdraw 
from the agreement, and the net result of all of this negotiation will 
be to allow foreign companies to sell nuclear technology to India. No 
nonproliferation goals would be accomplished, no new business would be 
generated for American companies, and no new relationship with India 
would be achieved.
  So, I have a few questions for the administration, which have not 
been answered, and I think they're important questions to consider as 
we vote on this proposal.
  When the administration realized that the Indians would not accept a 
deal that punished them if they decided to test a nuclear weapon, a 
requirement of the Hyde Act, why did they continue to negotiate?
  When it became clear that the real winners in this deal were the 
Russians and other nuclear powers that indiscriminately and 
irresponsibly sell nuclear technology around the world, why didn't we 
pull out?
  When the administration realized that this deal might undermine the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that has succeeded in 
dramatically limiting the number of nuclear nations, why did they not 
take steps to strengthen other nonproliferation efforts?
  When it became clear that we couldn't get the assurances we needed to 
stem proliferation, why didn't we shift gears and produce a deal in 
renewable energy, information technology, or another area that would 
bring actual benefits to the American economy without harming our 
national security?
  Some proponents of the deal have said that it brings India into the 
nonproliferation mainstream. But in fact, India remains free to test 
nuclear weapons, has not agreed to abide by the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and will only 
allow international inspectors access to a few of their civilian power 
plants. That is not the mainstream.
  India has become a vital partner in a world that has grown dangerous 
and unpredictable. But tragically, an agreement in any other field 
would have brought us more, without seriously weakening our efforts to 
prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia.
  As a strong supporter of improving our relationship with India, but a 
firm advocate of nonproliferation, I cannot support this agreement, and 
I must urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.

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